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Abstract 
This thesis examines Japan's response to contemporary maritime security issues that 
adversely affect Japanese national interests. The maritime threats studied in this thesis 
are posed by actors deemed to be on the periphery of, if not wholly outside, the 
interstate society as defined by the English School. Because the actions of these actors 
cannot be justified according to the laws and norms of the interstate society they are 
termed outlaws. In order to understand Japan's response to maritime security threats it 
is necessary to determine the motivations and characteristics of the outlaws under 
investigation. Those outlaws who are politically motivated, but can be bargained with, 
have been designated barbarians. Outlaws who are politically driven and seek the 
overthrow of the interstate society are deemed infidels. Finally, maritime outlaws who 
operate for economic gain are labelled pirates. 
This thesis is concerned with how the different outlaw types affect order in the interstate 
society and how Japan works to maintain order in the interstate society. This raises the 
question of whether order in the interstate society is to be upheld at the expense of 
justice and how the balance of order versus justice determines whether the interstate 
society is pluralist or solidarist. This thesis finds that Japan's response to contemporary 
maritime security threats has not balanced issues of order and justice in the interstate 
society. Only by responding to the maritime threats posed by barbarians, infidels and 
pirates from a perspective of justice that takes Human Security issues into account can 
order in the international society truly be sustained. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Contemporary Maritime Security Threats to Janan 
The Japanese government is alert to the risks presented by contemporary maritime 
security threats. As Japan is a major maritime power and an island nation, the Japanese 
economy (the world's second largest) and trade are reliant upon the safe passage of 
shipping through Southeast Asian waters, in particular 80 percent of Japan's oil 
resources transit the Malacca Straits (Yamada, 2003: 143-144). A blockage of the 
Malacca Straits caused by an intentional terrorist incident or an accident resulting from 
a piratical incident would significantly damage Japan's economic interests (Graham, 
2006: 1-7). 
The cost of deterring would-be pirates or terrorists alone is substantial for the Japanese 
shipping industry. For example, avoiding conflict zones, like Somalia, means extending 
the distance ships travel, which in turn costs freight companies more in terms of wages 
and fuel. ' Alternatively, the price of installing anti-piracy devices, such as ShipLoc2 (a 
location device) or Secure Ship3 (an electric fence that runs around the deck of a ship) 
must be borne by shipowners. These costs are ultimately passed down to the consumer. 
Furthermore, piracy and maritime terrorism puts the lives of Japanese seafarers at risk 
and, in the case of terrorism, potentially creates a threat to Japanese ports and harbours. 
Spy ships from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (hereafter North Korea) 
have posed another maritime security threat to Japan. These ships have engaged in 
clandestine activities around the Japanese coast, hijacking Japanese citizens, conducting 
an illegal narcotics trade and carrying out intelligence gathering operations. Such 
missions have augmented existing tensions between Japan and North Korea which 
1 For information on Somali piracy, see "Unprecedented increase in piracy attacks off Somalia" www. icc- 
ccs. org/main/news. php? newsid=57, London 20 October 2005, and "Piracy increasing on Somali Coast" 
www. icc-ccs. orc/main/news. php? newsid°53, London 15 August 2005. Accessed 28 October 2005. 
2 See website www. shiploc. com. 
3 See website www. secure-marine. com. 
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centre upon the development of North Korea's missile and Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) capabilities (Yamada, 2003: 25,31-36; Richardson, 2004: 102- 
107). 
Considering the substantial risk to Japanese shipping, as well as to Japan's national 
interests, particularly as regards energy and economic interests, the fact that Japan has 
responded to contemporary maritime security threats is of little surprise. This thesis will 
examine three maritime security threats to Japan. These threats are North Korean spy 
ship incursions into Japanese waters, pirates in Southeast Asia and terrorists worldwide. 
Investigating these three case studies enables us to conduct a comprehensive study of 
how Japan treats maritime security threats in its domestic waters, in the Southeast Asian 
region and across the globe. 
1.2 Hypothesis 
This thesis will test the following hypothesis: 
Japan's response to maritime security threats posed by barbarians, pirates and infidels, 
is conducted through the institutions of the interstate society. 
In order to test this hypothesis, seven questions will be answered in each of the case 
studies. These questions are: 
" What are Japan's goals? 
" How is Japan acting to achieve those goals? 
" Are Japan's actions based on coercion, calculation or belief? 
" How can the interstate society in which Japan is acting be defined? 
" What are the key interstate institutions affecting Japan's actions in each case? 
" What interhuman and transnational societal factors influence Japan's response? 
" How does Japan respond to these interhuman and transnational societal factors? 
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Answering these seven questions will reveal how the constraints and opportunities of 
the interstate, interhuman and transnational societies act upon Japan's response to 
contemporary maritime security threats. 
1.3 Contribution to literature 
Japan's maritime security is an understudied subject. There is nothing in English on 
Japan's response to North Korean spy ships or maritime terrorism and only one article 
on Japan's response to piracy. Addressing each of these issues will provide detailed and 
timely information on a significant subject in international affairs. Japan's response to 
maritime security threats enables an interpretation of Japan's changing stance towards 
security issues in global affairs since the end of the Cold War. 
This thesis will also contribute to the important work of drawing diverse International 
Relations Theories together by adopting the English School as its theoretical framework. 
In particular, this thesis will examine three different kinds of interstate society, those of 
North and Southeast Asia, as well as the global interstate society, in order to enrich the 
geographical scope of the English School. Furthermore, this work on Japan's response 
to contemporary maritime threats intends to deepen the English School's understanding 
of maritime affairs, as well as the links between interstate, interhuman and transnational 
societies through the adoption of the barbarian, infidel and pirate categories, as the 
definitions chapter will demonstrate. 
1.4 Chapter Outline 
Chapter 2- Theory 
International Relations theories offer a variety of standpoints from which Japan's 
response to maritime security issues can be viewed. The theory of realism notes the 
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importance of material concerns, national interests and the balance of power in 
Southeast Asia. It is in Japan's national interests to ensure the stable supply of energy 
resources and trade to and from Japan. Furthermore, building security links with 
Southeast Asian states to safeguard the oceans enables Japan to balance against the rise 
of a Chinese blue water navy (Zha, 2001: 33-51). Liberalism provides a conceptual lens 
that highlights the significance of multilateral cooperation, international institutions and 
international law. As Japan spearheaded the creation of a piracy reporting centre in 
Singapore on I1 November 2004, committed itself to upholding international law and 
collaborated multilaterally in the fight against maritime security threats, so Liberalism 
can be of significant value as a theoretical framework. Norms and values, as 
emphasized by Constructivist theory, also explain elements of Japan's approach to 
maritime security issues. Anti-militaristic norms limited Japan's response to incursions 
by North Korean spy ships into Japanese waters in March 1999, and respect for ASEAN 
norms of non-interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN states has also restricted the 
extent to which Japan has been able to intervene to prevent piracy and maritime 
terrorism in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the adoption of the Japan Coast Guard model in 
Malaysia and the Philippines has enabled the norms which infuse the Japan Coast Guard 
(JCG) to be exported to Southeast Asia. Overall, no single theory can adequately 
explain Japan's response to maritime security threats. Instead a conceptual lens, which 
bridges the differences between the principal International Relations theories, is needed 
(Katzenstein and Sil, 2004: 1-33). 
The English School provides such a theoretical framework, in that the School's holistic 
interpretation of international relations incorporates realist conceptions of an 
International System, Rationalist notions of an International Society and Revolutionist 
ideas about a World Society. Recent work by Barry Buzan of the London School of 
Economics has opened up new avenues for understanding the scope of the English 
School, by understanding international relations in terms of interactions between 
different types of interstate, transnational and interhuman societies. In Buzan's work, 
interactions between states are stressed and these interactions occur through the medium 
of the interstate institutions. Interactions between states are based on coercion, 
calculation or belief (Buzan, 2004a) and have the potential to alter the framework of the 
14 
international society. As Headley Bull, one of the founders of the English School, 
argued, the international society would have to adapt its rules in order to confront 
threats from non-state actors, he termed, barbarians, infidels and pirates (Bull, 2002: 
192-193,264-265). Finally, the English School emphasises dialogue between academics 
and practitioners of international relations indicating the desire of many English School 
theorists to influence policy directly. 
Chanter 3- Definitions 
The terms infidels, pirates and barbarians refer to Bull's interest in the international 
society and the groups that operated beyond the boundaries of the international society 
(Hurrell, 2002: x-xi). Whilst Bull, in his book The Anarchical Society, is primarily 
interested in establishing how order is maintained between states in the international 
society, he is also concerned with the challenge posed by state and non-state actors 
outside the international society. When these actors threaten the order of the 
international society by usurping the state's legitimate use of force, they are termed 
barbarians, infidels and pirates. 4 In responding to such threats, states in the international 
society are constrained by the dictates of the international society, while barbarians, 
infidels and pirates operate freely across the globe (Bull, 2002: 192-193,259,264-265). 
Bull compares relations between Greek city-states on the one hand with Persia and 
Carthage on the other to elucidate his use of the term barbarian. Whilst the Greek city- 
states always considered Persia and Carthage as either potential enemies or allies, they 
both lay outside the boundaries of the society of Greek city-states. This is because 
neither Persia nor Carthage held Greek values (including the Greek language, the pan- 
Hellenic games or the consultation of the Delphi oracle) in common, they were not 
constrained by rules regarding conflict amongst Greek city-states, and they did not 
benefit from either institutionalised cooperation (amphictyonae) or diplomatic 
institutions (proxenoi). Thus, from a Greek perspective, both Persia and Carthage were 
° Just war, according to Bull, is conducted by states in the international society in order to maintain the 
balance of power and enforce international law (Bull, 2002: 178-183). 
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barbarians (Bull, 2002: 14). As this example demonstrates, membership of the 
international society depends not only upon obeying the dictates of the society, but also 
being recognised as a member of the international society by existing members 
themselves. The responsibility for judging membership of the international society falls 
most keenly on the most powerful states in the international society, the Great Powers 
(Bull, 2002: 33). 5 
In fact, the existence of barbarians provides a rationale for the establishment of 
international societies. Bull postulates that powerful and independent states that share 
common values, institutions and languages, and that enjoy close economic and political 
relations, band together against barbarian threats (Bull, 2002: 161). 6 Nonetheless, the 
label barbarian does not preclude diplomatic relations of a kind. Indeed, deals could be 
struck between members and non-members of the international society, whether these 
non-members were state or non-state actors (Bull, 2002: 14-15,157). Moreover, 
illegitimate violence employed by secessionist groups, such as Gerakan Aceh Merdeka 
- Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which will 
be explored in Chapter 6, does not threaten the existence of the international society, but 
in fact upholds the principle of sovereign state actors in the international society, as 
secessionist groups aim to create separate states (Bull, 2002: 258,260). The possibility 
of diplomatic interaction coupled with the desire to create and be accepted as a 
legitimate state actor is what distinguishes barbarians from infidels in the international 
society. 
The term infidel is employed in this thesis to refer to actors in international relations 
whose conduct places them outside the bounds of international law and who are not 
recognized by the international society as legitimate actors. Furthermore, infidels attack 
states belonging to the international society for a political purpose; namely to disrupt or 
overturn the international society in a region of the world and to create new regional 
s Greece is regarded as a Great Power in the example given in the text. The terms Superpower, Great 
Power and Regional Power will be defined in more detail in the second chapter of this thesis. 
6 This point has been echoed by Buzan and Little who examined the development of international society 
from hunter-gather bands to the international society at the turn of the twenty-first century (Buzan and 
Little, 2000: 53,66,136,177,200,210). 
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societies based on their beliefs. Hence, infidels are synonymous with certain terrorist 
organizations, such as Al Qaeda or the Red Army Faction (RAF). 7 
This definition marks a break from Bull's understanding of infidels in the international 
society, which he believed were identical to barbarians (Bull, 2002: 42-43,67). This 
thesis contends that in the post-9/11 world, understanding maritime threats posed by 
state and non-state actors requires that a distinction be made between barbarians and 
infidels. This distinction may yield significant policy ramifications for states that 
attempt to tackle security threats posed by other states as well as non-state actors, as it 
becomes possible to conceptualise those groups that are prepared to bargain in order to 
join the international society from those who intend to destroy the international society. 
As Chapter 3 will demonstrate, however, some researchers have attempted to group 
more frequent pirate and maritime barbarian acts with more devastating infidel threats 
in order to dramatise a security issue (Luft and Korin, 2004). 
Piracy, the third and final category employed in this thesis, is defined in Article 101 of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). 8 According to 
Article 100 of UNCLOS, all states are required to respond to the threat of piracy. Hence, 
as Bull notes, pirates are deemed hostes humani generis (literally enemies of mankind)9 
by international law, one of the key institutions of the international society. Bull 
believes that Article 101 demonstrates the solidarity of the international society in 
Though the Red Army Faction will not be discussed further in this thesis, the RAF is mentioned to 
highlight the potential of the infidel label to understand revolutionary groups across time and space. For 
more on the RAF, see Hoffman, 1998: 80-84,157-184. It is possible for states, such as Nazi Germany, 
and even entire international societies to be infidels also. For example, because both the American and 
Soviet dominated international societies during the Cold War armed themselves to be able to destroy their 
opponent, so they perceived their opponent as an infidel international society. The existence of an infidel 
is always negative from the perspective of the international society at a particular point in history, even 
though with time the existence of an infidel may be seen to have brought certain benefits to later 
international societies. The French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802), for example, spread the ideals of 
liberty, fraternity and equality, though France could be understood to be an infidel state from the 
perspective of the international society at the time. 
See http: //www. un. org/Depts/los/convention agreements/texts/unclos/UNCLOS-TOC. htm, accessed 14 
March 2006. See also Appendix I for relevant piracy articles in UNCLOS. 
9 The term hostes human! generis is an ancient epithet, attributed to Cicero, a Roman philosopher 
(Herrmann, 2002: 444). See also Erik Barrios, "Casting a Wider Net: Addressing the Maritime Piracy 
Problem in Southeast Asia" http: //www. bc. edu/schools/law/lawreviews/meta- 
elements/ioumals/bciclr/28 1/03 FMS. htm, accessed on 24 October 2005. 
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combating economically motivated violence, but this article also points to the lack of 
international consensus to establish a single, unified international law tackling 
politically motivated violence perpetrated by barbarians and infidels. This, Bull 
maintains, is because states define the politically motivated behaviour of other actors 
according to their own interests and political objectives (Bull, 2002: 259,264). 10 Whilst 
this international consensus to create an anti-piracy law is significant, the reality of 
contemporary piratical violence is such that the definition offered in Article 101 is no 
longer sufficient to cover the majority of economically motivated violent acts at sea, 
which range from petty robbery through officially complicit acts to the murder of whole 
crews and the theft of an entire ship. Moreover, states in the international society, 
particularly those states where maritime violence and robbery are prevalent, disagree 
over the definition of piracy. The Definitions Chapter will address these issues in 
greater detail, however, in order to distinguish between pirates, barbarians and infidels 
from an international society perspective, pirates are those who undertake an act of 
violence or robbery at sea or in port for their own personal gain. 
Chapter 4- Barbarians: North Korean Spy Ships 
The term barbarian refers to an actor considered legitimate by the international 
community, even though the actor's behaviour does not always conform to standard 
international practices, such as transgressions of Japanese territory by North Korean spy 
ships. Though developments within the English School since Bull's Anarchical Society 
will entail a revision of this initial definition of barbarians in the Theoretical and 
Definitions Chapters, North Korea's status as a barbarian actor in the international 
society can now be ascertained. North Korean spy ships pose numerous threats to Japan, 
including the illegal importation of narcotics, the abduction of Japanese citizens, the 
insertion and extraction of spies, as well as covert missions to provide the North Korean 
military with intelligence against Japan and US forces based in Japan. These activities, 
10 This is a point that the barbarian and infidel definitions seek to overcome, as barbarians and infidels are 
objectively determined according to their actions vis-ä-vis the interstate society and not according to the 
interests and political objectives of individual states. 
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with the possible exception of intelligence gathering, are illegal according to 
international law and therefore are actions outside the boundaries of international 
society. 
Yet, whilst conducting illicit activities, North Korea is also engaged in a diplomatic 
process with five members of the international society, comprising China, Japan, South 
Korea, Russia and the United States, whereby Pyongyang is negotiating for aid and 
security guarantees in return for conceding the right to develop a WMD programme. 
Hence, North Korea is recognized as a sovereign state by the international society, even 
though the state does not observe many of the international society's rules and norms. 
Furthermore, North Korea promotes a juche, or self-reliance, ideology which 
underscores the desire of the ruling party leadership to remain isolated from the 
international society. " 
Incursions of North Korean spy ships have occurred both during and after the Cold War, 
but received little attention from the Japanese government until August 1999, when 
Maritime Self-Defence Force vessels chased two North Korean spy ships out of Japan's 
sovereign maritime territory. Explaining this event, as well as the sinking of a North 
Korean spy ship which JCG vessels had pursued into China's Exclusive Economic Zone 
(EEZ) in December 2001, will provide a unique insight into Japan's relationship with 
North Korea from a maritime perspective. The key questions that this thesis seeks to 
answer concerning North Korean spy ships are: why did Japan respond more 
aggressively towards North Korean spy ships in March 1999 and December 2001, and 
to what degree do the institutions of the international society provide a significant 
restraint on Japan's use of force against a barbarian power? By answering these two 
questions, Japan's response to maritime security threats in its own waters can be 
juxtaposed with threats outside its territorial waters, such as piracy and terrorism, in 
order to comprehend Japan's motivations vis-ä-vis tackling barbarians, infidels and 
" Indeed a further question in this thesis will be to ascertain not only Japan's reaction to maritime 
security threats posed by barbarians, pirates and infidels, as a member of the international society, but 
also to examine how actors defined as barbarians, pirates or infidels view Japan and the international 
society. For example, in the aftermath of the sinking of a North Korean spy ship in China's EEZ in 
December 2001, the North Korean leadership referred to the conduct of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) as 
"an act of modern-day terrorism" and "piracy" (Sekai Editorial Board, 2002: 280). 
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pirates at sea and to what extent the international society restricts Japan's actions 
outside it's domestic waters. 
Chanter 5- Pirates: Piracy in Southeast Asia 
Despite the formulation of domestic and international anti-piracy laws, such as Article 
101 of UNCLOS, a problem of perception persists in the sense that classical novels, as 
well as Hollywood and Disney movies about the Golden Age of Piracy (1692-1725), 
have romanticised the image of the pirate to the extent that piracy is thought of as 
analogous to early eighteenth century highway robbery. The result is ignorance of the 
fact that piracy exists in a contemporary and violent form. 
The case of the Hai Sin, a 17,000-ton cargo vessel, is indicative of both the reality of, as 
well as people's lack of knowledge, about contemporary piracy. In January, 1993, at a 
breaker's yard of the Guandong Shunde Shipwrecking Company in Southern China, ten 
badly decomposed, severely charred cadavers were discovered in the Hai Sin's walk-in 
refrigerators as the vessel was being inspected. No authority has yet investigated how 
ten dead bodies wound up in the vessel, though the incident did prompt Eric Ellen, 
founder of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), to suggest a correlation with the 
missing crew of the Nagasaki Spirit; a crude oil carrier that had collided with and sunk 
the 27,000 ton container vessel, the Ocean Blessing. 12 Officials did uncover that the Hai 
Sin's identity had been altered. Records proved that the Hai Sin was none other than the 
Erria Inge, an Australian vessel pirated a year earlier. 13 Ellen noted that the lack of 
investigative interest in the case of the Hai Sin was revealing: 
12 Investigators concluded that the collision between the Nagasaki Spirit and the Ocean Blessing could 
have been prevented had one or both ships not been pirated (Burnett, 2002: 136). An interview with 
Captain Potengal Mukundan, director of the International Maritime Bureau, revealed that this possibility 
had only been discussed, not officially confirmed (Mukundan interview, 22 April 2003). 
13 Changing a ship's identity (the name of the ship is repainted, as are significant features of the vessel, 
such as the funnel, and documents regarding ownership are forged) makes it appear as though a vessel has 
simply disappeared, albeit mysteriously; such a vessel is therefore referred to as a `phantom ship'. A case 
of a phantom ship usually indicates the involvement of transnational criminal groups. The true identity of 
a phantom ship is often ascertained by checking its engine number. Section 3.3b `Transnational Criminal 
Organizations' will examine the phantom ship phenomenon in more detail. 
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If ten rotting corpses were found in an apartment in New York or London, police inquiries 
would be relentless. If a crime is committed in international waters, then life is a cheap 
commodity... Nobody is interested in what happened to the crews - they are not even statistics 
(Ellen quoted by Burnett 2002: 141-142). 
Piracy has flourished in Southeast Asia since the end of the Cold War. 14 The conditions 
that have facilitated this increase in piratical incidents in Southeast Asian waters raise 
important questions about economic development, sovereignty issues, security, inter- 
state competition as well as cooperation in one of the world's most economically 
significant regions. Examining responses to contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia will 
provide a window through which to better comprehend how and to what extent states 
can collaborate to resolve common security problems. 
Japan has taken the leading role in tackling piracy in Southeast Asia, as Japanese ships 
have suffered on numerous occasions from acts of piracy in the Southeast Asian region. 
Major incidents against Japanese ships include the hijacking of the Tenyu in 1998 and 
the Alondra Rainbow in 1999, as well as the kidnapping of the Japanese Captain and 
Chief Engineer from the Idaten in March 2005. The Japanese government has 
responded to the threat of piracy by dispatching JCG vessels to Southeast Asia on anti- 
piracy exercises as well as hosting major anti-piracy conferences and the training of 
Southeast Asian authorities in anti-piracy measures at Japan's Coast Guard College in 
Hiroshima. 
Japan has responded to piracy in Southeast Asia in spite of a well-documented 
reluctance on the part of the Japanese government to confront security issues, beyond 
granting aid, owing both to Article 9 of the Japanese constitution that prohibits the 
dispatch of military forces abroad and a perceived anti-militarist norm prevalent 
amongst Japanese society and politicians (Hook et al., 2001: 65). Instead, since the end 
of the Cold War, calls to amend the constitution and contribute to international 
peacekeeping efforts have led to Japanese forces playing an ever-greater role in security 
issues outside Japan (Midford 2000). Prime Minister Koizumi's support for the US and 
14 Erik Barrios, "Casting a Wider Net: Addressing the Maritime Piracy Problem in Southeast Asia" 
http: //www. bc. edu/schools/law/lawreviews/ineta-eleinents/iournals/bciclr/28 1/03 FMS. htm, accessed 
on 24 October 2005. 
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the `war on terrorism' even enabled the dispatch of troops to Iraq, a de facto combat 
zone. It is therefore necessary to locate where Japan's response to maritime piracy lies 
vis-ä-vis Japan's developing role in tacking other international security issues. 
Chapter 6- infidels: Maritime Terrorism 
Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 11 September 
2001, governments and the shipping industry throughout the world view the possibility 
of maritime terrorism with growing concern, arguing that global terror networks might 
employ commercial vessels to inflict mass destruction and casualties. 15 Because these 
global terror organizations employ violent means in order to transform the interstate 
society, they are termed infidels in this thesis. The intentional targeting of vessels 
carrying explosive cargo, including oil and Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) tankers, or 
radioactive materials to strike a major port or close a congested international sea lane, 
such as the Malacca Straits, is perceived as increasingly likely amongst governments 
and analysts alike. Indeed, Al Qaeda attacks against the USS Cole, a US Aegis destroyer, 
in October 2000, and the French tanker, the Limburg, in October 2002 demonstrate the 
devastating consequences and threat of maritime terrorism (Richardson, 2004: vi, 18, 
41-48). 
Japan's response to maritime terrorism has focussed on the Southeast Asian region, 
primarily because of the importance of the Malacca Straits for Japan's economic and 
energy security, but also due to evidence that Jemaah Islamiya operatives were targeting 
the US navy in Singapore in December 2001 (Richardson, 2004: 23-24). Furthermore, 
the routing of Al Qaeda and the Taliban government from Afghanistan following 
intervention there by the US and its allies displaced large numbers of terrorists. Many of 
these terrorists relocated to Southeast Asian states where they blended with indigenous 
terrorist or separatist movements with whom they shared their experience and 
knowledge of waging political violence (Abuza, 2002: 427-465; Cruz De Castro, 2004: 
13 Of course, an accidental catastrophe involving a pirated tanker could equally cause substantial damage 
to a shipping lane or port, as the case of the Nagasaki Spirit and the Ocean Blessing made clear. 
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193-195). The Southeast Asian region has become potentially more dangerous since this 
influx of terrorists from Afghanistan and therefore is a new battleground in the `war 
against terrorism'. 
Nonetheless, this thesis argues that it is necessary to distinguish between maritime 
violence perpetrated by international terror organizations, such as Al Qaeda, and 
separatist groups. Political violence against shipping has existed in Southeast Asia since 
the lure of the spice trade drew the first European colonialists to the region. In the early 
sixteenth century, for example, local villages around the Malacca Straits would resist 
imperial powers by attacking their merchant ships (Yamada 2003: 162). The multi- 
ethnic status of many Southeast Asian states as well as the existence of competing 
religions and cultures has also prompted resistance movements to challenge central 
authorities through violent means, since the departure of the colonial powers in the 
years after the end of the Second World War. Separatist movements in Southeast Asia 
have pursued their cause both on land as well as at sea; targeting ships as a means of 
demonstrating their territorial claims or to garner additional funds for their political 
objectives. Though separatist groups engage in political violence at sea, their motives 
differ from global terror organizations, like Al Qaeda, in that separatist groups seek to 
gain control of a specific territory to which they can make some legitimate claim. 
Therefore, a separatist group will often aim to gain the support and recognition of the 
international society. It is more appropriate to classify separatists under the title 
barbarian rather than infidel, as discussed in the previous definitions section. 
Finally, whilst Japan has concentrated on maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia, it has 
also cooperated with states beyond the Southeast Asian region in the fight against 
terrorism. Maritime Self-Defence Force (MSDF) vessels have been dispatched to supply 
the US campaign in Afghanistan, and Japan is participating in the Proliferation Security 
Initiative (PSI) designed to limit the proliferation of WMD. Hence, examining Japan's 
response to maritime terrorism in the international society widens the focus of the thesis 
to the global level. 
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Chanter 7- Conclusion 
The conclusion to the thesis reveals that Japan has responded robustly to contemporary 
maritime threats posed by barbarians, infidels and pirates. With the exception of the 
December 2001 North Korean spy ship incident and possibly in its involvement in the 
PSI, Japan has acted in accordance with the dictates of the interstate society, thereby 
supporting the hypothesis of the thesis. Nevertheless, Japan has focused on the 
symptoms of maritime security threats posed by barbarians, infidels and pirates, in its 
response. As a result, the underlying causes of barbarian, infidel and pirate violence and 
crime remain untreated. The thesis argues that by examining contemporary maritime 
security threats from interhuman or transnational societal perspectives, explored in 
recent work by Buzan (2004a), reveals potential avenues for addressing the causes of 
outlaw maritime threats. However, such a bottom-up approach to resolving security 
issues in both regional and global interstate societies increases cooperative interstate 
interactions, encouraging the development of a more solidarist interstate society. The 
thesis now turns to the theoretical issues concerning contemporary maritime threats 
posed by outlaws. 
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2. Theoretical Framework 
This chapter will profile the three main theories of International Relations: 16 Realism, 
Liberalism and Constructivism. Each of these three theories will demonstrate alternative 
ways in which Japan's response to maritime outlaws can be interpreted. However, each 
theory can only explain one area of Japan's maritime foreign policy, as critiques of the 
three theories illustrate. As Buzan has stressed, "International Relations already knows 
how to tell Hobbesian, Kantian and Grotion stories. But as things stand, it prefers to tell 
these stories in opposition to each other. International Relations needs to shift 
perspective so that it sees these stories not as alternative, mutually exclusive, 
interpretations, but as a linked set, each illuminating a different facet of reality" (Buzan, 
2001: 480). This theoretical chapter will demonstrate how the English School provides 
an eclectic theoretical approach to understanding Japan's response to contemporary 
maritime security issues. '7 
Developments within the English School have enabled the construction of an analytical 
framework that can blend the three principal theories of International Relations. In 
particular, Buzan's separation of the interstate, transnational and interhuman societies, 
coupled with his notion of a pluralist-solidarist spectrum along which regional interstate 
societies are aligned allows for a deeper conceptualization of structural, actor-based, 
and normative approaches in International Relations. Furthermore, the English School's 
focus on sectoral differentiation allows for a more flexible approach to understanding 
the different capabilities of actors in the international society. Also, the evolution of 
interaction capacity enabling ever more complex processes within international societies 
over time and space points to the possibility of progress in international affairs. The 
matter of ever improving international societies hangs, however, on the issue of whether 
the purpose of the interstate society is to ensure order amongst its member states or 
16 The words International Relations will be capitalised when they concern the theories of International 
Relations or the field itself. The words international relations will remain in lower case when referring to 
relations between nations. 
17 Katzenstein and Sil have both argued in favour of analytical eclecticism to understand Asian security 
(Katzenstein and Sil in Suh, Katezenstein and Carlson (eds. ), 2004: 1-33). 
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justice for all peoples and transnational groups in the transnational and interhuman 
societies. 
In its examination of Japan's response to maritime security issues, this thesis shows that 
a state-centric approach concentrating on maintaining order, through maritime patrols 
for example, fails to treat the causes of maritime threats, such as piracy and terrorism, 
that lie in the transnational and interhuman quarters of Buzan's structural model (Buzan, 
2004a: 159). Indeed, a lack of justice in the transnational and interhuman societies is a 
cause of disorder in the interstate society. In other words, poverty, demographic stress, 
social problems, and environmental issues combine to encourage many types of 
maritime violence, as Chapter 3 will demonstrate. This disorder is manifest in the 
tensions that emerge between different international institutions, such that 
comprehensively tackling maritime security issues requires nothing less than a revision 
of the international institutions themselves. Hence, an English School approach, that 
remains state centric in spite of Buzan's inclusion of the transnational and interhuman 
domains in his theory, must be tempered with a contribution from a Human Security 
perspective that emphasises human equality and justice. '8 Cooperation amongst states 
on issues of both order and justice can overcome the tensions between international 
institutions, thereby generating more inclusive and progressive interstate societies. This 
chapter commences by exploring the need for a theoretical framework to guide the 
argument in this thesis. 
2.1 Why theorize? 
No matter what scholars research in the broad field of International Relations, they are 
bound to approach their topic from a particular mindset or theory. Such a theory of 
global affairs is essentially a series of reflections upon past and current world events and 
phenomenon that seeks to explain how these events and phenomenon are related and for 
18 Cronin and Ludes have stressed the need for a grand strategy that targets the causes as well as the 
symptoms of contemporary terrorism; noting the importance of foreign aid as much as law enforcement 
or military means in confronting terrorism (Cronin and Ludes (eds. ), 2004). 
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what purpose. By understanding the connections between events and phenomenon in 
world affairs, scholars can propose theories that indicate how a state will act or why a 
state acted in a particular way (Burchill, 1996: 8). Theories act as the lens or filter 
through which an analyst views the world or understands the workings of a single issue 
in the world (Snyder, 2004: 55). Without a theory to guide the scholar, a problem area 
becomes too complex in that all possible causes and consequences are intermixed and 
no apparent connections between these causes and consequences can be fathomed, 
making useful inferences sparse. Therefore, it is up to the scholar to select what he or 
she perceives to be the most appropriate theory to understand the issue being studied. 
An unfortunate drawback of tackling a problem through an individual theoretical lens is 
that it is biased. It is for academics to specify how the complex reality of global 
interactions should be simplified in order to be understood. The scholar's work is, 
therefore, a perception not of how the world actually is, but of how they would choose 
to imagine the world to be. As Cox suggested, "theory is always for somebody and for 
some purpose" (Cox, 1981: 128). 19 
The notion that academics promote their particular world-view would be of no purport 
were theories to exist in a vacuum. However, theories introduce people interested in 
international relations to particular ways of thinking about the world and therefore have 
the potential to shape how international relations proceed. Hence, theories are not 
simply reflections upon past and current world events, but also a means of influencing 
how international relations evolve. For example, world leaders who possess a mindset 
approximate to and coloured by realist theory will perceive their relations with other 
states as being primarily concerned with security issues and the relative power of each 
other's countries. By way of contrast, a head of state with a view of the world 
conditioned by liberalist theory will be more inclined to emphasise economic issues and 
the importance of transnational institutions than security matters. Hence theory can 
interfere with and potentially mould the very world it attempts to describe (Burchill, 
19 This criticism is primarily directed at explanatory theories, which test hypotheses, propose causal 
explanations, describe events and explain general trends and phenomena in order to construct a plausible 
image of the world, as opposed to constitutive theories that question the inherent biases in scholarly work 
and the ways in which academics approach their subject. 
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1996: 1-5). 20 The potential for international relations theory to influence the mindsets of 
political actors also highlights the significance of the competition that exists between 
theories of international relations. After all, theorists tend to extol the virtues of their 
theory over rival theories in the belief that it provides the best means of responding to as 
well as understanding an issue in the field of International Relations. 
The question then becomes which theory provides the best account of an issue. Kang 
proposes an answer to this question in the context of analyses of post-Cold War Asia, 
by saying that everyone has adopted the wrong theoretical frameworks. Kang argues 
that too much emphasis has been placed upon Western International Relations theories21 
and not enough stress has been put on comparative case studies that comprehend the 
unique features of individual countries in their regional context. This has been to the 
detriment of the International Relations' field as a whole. Too often facts are made to fit 
a specific theory rather than to illuminate significant anomalies that pose problems for 
individual theories. Investigating the sources of such anomalies is of far more interest 
and relevance to both International Relations academics and policy-makers in 
government alike (Kang, 2003: 63,82-85). 22 
This position has been echoed by Wallace who is in favour of more policy-relevant 
studies that move away from pure theory and `speak truth to power' by presenting 
decision makers in government with thorough analysis of contemporary issues (Wallace, 
1996). Considering the history of the International Relations discipline, which evolved 
in response to the carnage of World War One to provide governments with the means of 
avoiding inter-state conflicts (Buzan and Little, 2001: 24), Wallace's proposition 
deserves consideration as it questions the purpose of academic work directly. 
Nevertheless, as critics have noted, how can anyone be sure that they are speaking the 
20 Of course there are multiple factors which influence the ways in which world leaders perceive 
international relations with which they are involved on a day to day basis, including religion, media, 
culture, education and upbringing. Hence, the influence of scholarly work upon the execution of 
international relations should not be overemphasised. 
21 For a thorough account of how Western (in particular American) academia dominates the field of 
International Relations, see Waever, 1998. 
22 Katzenstein and Okawara have similarly argued for combining analytical frameworks when addressing 
international issues in Asia. See Katzenstein and Okawara, 2001-2002; and Suh, Katzenstein, and Carlson, 
(eds. ), 2004. 
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`truth' and will those in `power' actually listen (especially if the `truth' is against the 
self-interests of those in `power')? Is it the case that `power' is so diffuse in vast 
governments that no one has the `power' to do much about the `truth' even if they could 
hear it (Booth, 1997; Smith, 1997; Nicholson, 2000)? 
However, different theories do serve to group scholarly analysis into bodies of thought 
that can be compared and contrasted with the work of other academics. Whilst some 
analysis may be more thorough than others, determining whose work most accurately 
describes the current status of an issue in international relations is more subjective. 
Scholars therefore adopt a specific theoretical framework as the most appropriate 
vantage point to comprehend a particular issue based upon the evidence that they have 
collected. 
Yet, the academic approach to understanding contemporary issues remains a distortion 
of reality. State leaders do not deal with contemporary issues by selecting what they 
perceive to be the correct theory and acting accordingly. Instead, heads of state are 
closer in their thinking to Walt's conception of the `complete diplomat' who keeps the 
wisdom of several theoretical frameworks in mind when acting in global affairs (Walt, 
1998: 44). 23 Instead, combinations of theories that account for both continuity and 
change in world politics provide a more complete and holistic view of current issues. 
Buzan and Little note that the English School, also known as Rationalist Theory, by 
integrating different theoretical concepts within its framework, can be adapted to furnish 
richer and more thorough explanations of global affairs (Buzan and Little, 2001: 34- 
39)24 
This thesis takes Buzan and Little's criticisms of International Relations theory into 
account and thereby argues that the English School provides the best means of 
23 Nevertheless, two contending politicians may reference the same theories whilst articulating alternative 
policy options. In the 2004 US Presidential elections, for example, both the incumbent President, George 
Bush, and the Democratic candidate, Senator John Kerry, argued that their foreign policy visions 
combined both Liberalism and Realism (Snyder, 2004: 54). 
24 Whilst Steve Smith has described Rationalism as encompassing both Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism, 
but separate from Wendt's Theory of Social Constructivism (Smith in Baylis and Smith, 2001: 228), 
recent work by Buzan has sought to incorporate Constructivism into Rationalist Theory (Buzan, 2004a). 
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understanding Japan's response to contemporary maritime security issues. In particular, 
the adoption of an English School framework, with its focus on historical and cultural 
issues and perspectives, overcomes Kang's concerns pertaining to Western bias in 
International Relations Theory. The remainder of this chapter will examine why a 
rationalist position has been adopted as a theoretical lens to best comprehend Japan's 
response to North Korean spy ships, piracy and maritime terrorism. The cultural and 
historical specifics of the Southeast Asian region and Japan will be investigated in detail 
in subsequent chapters. 
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2.2 Conceptualising Japan's International Relations - Structure, 
agency and norms 
Japan's response to contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia can 
be understood by examining the effects of structure, agency and norms upon Japan's 
foreign relations. Structure, agency and norms comprise the three main elements 
emphasised in the four dominant theories of International Relations: realism, liberalism, 
constructivism, and domestic policy making approaches (Hook et al., 2001: 37-69). 
Structure comprises "the external environment in which a state and its people are 
enmeshed and interact. It consists of other states, global institutions, regional 
frameworks and organizations, TNCs, NGOs and other political actors", and acts to 
constrain as well as provide opportunities for agents (Hook et al., 2001: 39). Agency 
refers to the domestic policy-making groups and individuals (for example, political 
parties, bureaucracies, businesses and politicians) as well as a wider range of political 
actors (including the media and the public) that interact to produce Japan's foreign 
policy. These actors are said to "possess their own perceptions of individual and 
national interests which may both conform to and conflict with the pressures arising 
from the structure of the international system" (Hook et al., 2001: 40-41). Finally, 
norms "create new interests and categories for action, and order and govern the 
behaviour of actors" (Hook et al., 2001: 65) and are comprised of internationally 
embedded norms (bilateralism, asianism, trilateralism, and internationalism) and 
domestically embedded norms (anti-militarism, developmentalism, and economism) 
that are essential to understanding Japan's foreign policy. 
Analysts can employ the theoretical lenses of structure, agency and norms (either 
individually or in combination with one or both of the other lenses) to comprehend what 
Japan's foreign policy is concerning a specific issue, as well as how and why a certain 
foreign policy is pursued. Collectively these theoretical lenses provide an extensive 
means of interpreting Japan's foreign policy regarding contemporary maritime security 
issues. For example, Japan's response to maritime piracy in Southeast Asia can be 
understood through the lenses of structure, agency and norms. In terms of structure, the 
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withdrawal of US naval forces from Southeast Asia following the end of the Cold War 
in 1989, provided the opportunity for states to reassess the security dynamic of the 
region. This occasion enabled maritime cooperation to evolve amongst regional actors, 
including Japan, that encompassed specific matters, including piracy and maritime 
terrorism. The agencies involved in promoting and implementing Japan's response to 
piracy and maritime terrorism include bureaucracies (specifically the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT), the 
Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry (METI) and the Japan Defence Agency 
(JDA)), political parties (particularly the Liberal Democratic Party and, since 1993, its 
coalition partners), the Prime Minister's Office, as well as lobbyists and interest groups 
(such as the Japan Shipping Association (JSA)). International organizations, such as the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the International Maritime Bureau 
(IMB), and foreign governments, have also influenced Japan's stance vis-ä-vis piracy 
and maritime terrorism. 25 Finally, international and domestic norms have affected 
Japan's response to piracy and maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia. The internationally 
embedded norm of Asianism has facilitated cooperation between Asian states that have 
defined piracy as a common problem that they seek to resolve together. The domestic 
norm of economism, which stresses the expansion and protection of Japan's economic 
interests including maritime trade, has been off-set by the anti-militarist norm, which 
discourages the use of Japanese military forces abroad. Through a combination of these 
conceptual lenses, a clearer picture emerges as to what Japan's response to 
contemporary maritime piracy is, as well as how and why Japan has responded to this 
issue. 
However, two questions remain concerning which of these theoretical lenses best 
describes Japan's response to maritime security issues and how these theoretical lenses 
interact with one another. Should, for example, a structural approach to Japan's 
response to North Korean spy ships, piracy and maritime terrorism be favoured over an 
25 Although international organizations comprise part of the international structure (Hook et al., 2001: 39), 
international organizations should also be perceived as actors in and of themselves that interact with 
domestic agents (Krasner, 1995, Keohane, 1984). For example, the International Maritime Organization 
supervises the implementation of the Law of the Sea which establishes the structure for inter-state 
relations concerning maritime issues. However, the IMO is also involved in bargaining and mediating 
with domestic agents at conferences and meetings concerning piracy and maritime terrorism. 
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actor based method or normative explanation? Alternatively, if all three lenses are 
significant in comprehending Japan's treatment of maritime issues in Southeast Asia, 
then how does each theoretical aspect affect its partners? Answering these questions 
means delving into the theories upon which the frameworks of structure, agency and 
norms have been built. In doing so, the dialogue between different theoretical traditions 
will be briefly explored, before assessing in what ways the theoretical lenses of structure, 
agency and norms combine to explain Japan's response to piracy and maritime 
terrorism in Southeast Asia. 
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2.3 The Three Dominant International Relations Theories 
2.3a Realism and Neo-Realism 
Realism developed after the First World War, but draws on a rich theoretical tradition 
including Machiavelli's The Prince (1532) and Thucydides' account of the 
Peloponnesian War. The theory is rooted in the notion that states must take whatever 
action is necessary to sustain themselves against their rivals and that a blind faith in 
institutions and cooperation with potential rivals only endangers the security of the 
state. 26 Realist scholars seek to understand the continuities of international politics that 
have led to perpetual war between states. Carr, for example, emphasised that the pursuit 
of national power was the primary goal of any state and war is inevitable in an 
anarchical system with no overarching authority in international relations to govern the 
affairs of states. Morgenthau tied the continuities that led to war down to human nature 
and a natural human desire to pursue power. 7 Hence, all international politics can be 
reduced to the competing interests of states with different power capabilities. There is 
no room for ethics in international relations and all moral language employed by 
statesmen merely masks a hidden agenda to advance the interests of the state. 
Morgenthau postulated that to improve the world one must work with rather than 
against these forces. Although peace would never be permanent in an anarchical 
international system, states could mitigate the chances of conflict through an 
understanding of the basic laws of politics and by upholding the balance of power 
28 between the Great Powers (Burchill, 1996: 69-77). Because Morgenthau perceived 
Z6 Whilst realist arguments have traditionally attacked the idealism of scholars writing between the two 
World Wars, more recent scholarship has identified a great deal of common ground between the realist 
and liberalist theories. Significant `realist' conceptions, such as anarchy, sovereignty and the balance of 
power, are frequently referred to in earlier liberalist literature. Osiander argues that what truly 
differentiates liberalist and realist scholarship is liberalism's belief in "an inescapable, directional 
historical process" (Osiander, 1998: 409). Accordingly, liberalism is interested in understanding how 
current aspects of the international system will evolve over time, whilst stressing the difficulties inherent 
in an international system in which self-interested actors prevail (Schmidt, 1998: 443,449). 
27 Both Morgenthau and Carr were unclear as to what they meant by power. Morgenthau failed to 
distinguish between power as a resource (in terms of both tangible and intangible assets) and power as a 
means of influencing other's behaviour (Keohane, 1986: 11). 
28 Whilst realists may be pessimistic regarding the possibility of emancipation or global justice, many 
realists do suggest ways to ameliorate the conditions in which humans live within the confines set by the 
anarchical system of states (Desch, 2003: 415-426). Unfortunately, Desch's argument centres upon the 
primacy of order over justice, instead of examining the interplay of order and justice as adherents to the 
English School have done. In doing so, Desch fails to consider the ways in which a lack of justice can 
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states as rational actors, which order their foreign policy preferences and take action 
according to the option that will provide the best possible outcome, so states are able to 
maintain the balance of power effectively (Keohane, 1986: 11). 
Waltz sought to build on the writings of earlier realist thinkers, publishing his Theory of 
International Politics in 1979. Waltz felt that previous theories of realism had been 
`reductionist' in that they had failed to calculate the effects of the international system 
upon individual states. In seeking to understand how a state's foreign policies rarely 
matched the desired intentions of the decision makers who framed the policies, Waltz 
concluded that whilst the internal processes of a state had some significance in 
determining foreign policy, it is the presence of other states and interactions among 
them that shape foreign policy decisions (Waltz, 1986: 47-52; Hollis and Smith, 1990: 
105-106). The structure of the international system therefore acts as a constraining force 
upon states that makes the foreign policy outcomes of states similar as states compete 
amongst themselves and are socialised by the international structure to act alike 
(Linklater, 1995: 245; Burchill, 1996: 85; Brown, 2001: 43-48). 
Waltz described the structure of the international system as having three important 
characteristics: (i) the ordering principle of the system, (ii) the character of the units in 
the system, (iii) the distribution of capabilities in the system. The ordering principle of 
the system is anarchic as there is no overarching authority to preside over the actions of 
states. In an anarchical or a self-help system all states are concerned only with their own 
national interests and the most powerful states establish the conditions by which lesser 
states function. Whilst states may have other national interests, survival is a prerequisite 
to the pursuit of alternative goals and the accretion of military power is the key to 
ensuring a state survives. States that adhere to the accepted and successful practices 
determined by the international structure are more likely to prosper in that structure. 
undermine order. For example, Desch lambasts the claims of proponents of the Vietnam war, who argued 
that the Vietnam war was undertaken to spread democracy, ensure human rights and check unprovoked 
aggression (Desch, 2003: 424-425). However, he neither perceives rationale for the Vietnam war in realist 
terms, as a means of maintaining order in the international system, nor does he acknowledge that the way 
the Vietnam war was fought, including carpet bombing, the use of napalm and the Mai Lai massacre, 
undermined any legitimacy that the US intervention might have had. The way in which wars are fought 
matters as much as which wars states fight. 
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Those states that do prosper will also possess greater capabilities enabling them to have 
a more prominent role in international relations. The character of the units is identical or 
`functionally similar' as the constraints of the system work upon all states in a similar 
manner. States do, however, have different capabilities, in that states may be able to 
perform tasks or have the power to force other states to carry out tasks (Waltz, 1986: 
57-92; Hollis and Smith, 1990: 108-109; Burchill, 1996: 86-87). 
Neo-realists, led by Joseph Grieco, also stress, in direct opposition to neo-liberal theory, 
that states seek relative gains rather than absolute gains, as they are concerned with their 
position relative to other states. The effect of this pursuit of relative gains is that states 
do not work to improve the international system in which they exist lest a rival state 
take advantage of their actions (Gilpin, 1984: 289-291,303-304; Waltz, 1986: 98-106; 
Brown, 2001: 49-51). In this way the international system persists indefinitely 
(Linklater, 1995: 241). The importance of relative gains is echoed in the work of both 
offensive realists, who underline the importance of state power in relation to other states 
and regard war as inevitable within the international system, and defensive realists, who 
argue that whilst cooperation between friendly states is possible, states must always 
hedge against the prospect of a dominant power emerging in the international system 
(Lamy in Baylis and Smith, 2001: 183-188). 
A Realist Account of Japan's Response to Maritime Securi 
Broadly speaking, realist interpretations of Japan's response to maritime security issues 
highlight Japan's attempts to realize two key national interests, the protection of 
Japanese territory against foreign states and the enhancement of Japan's power. Hence, 
whilst Japan may aim to suppress piracy in Southeast Asia, Japan has broader objectives. 
These goals include the maintenance of a regional balance of power directed at 
stabilising growing Chinese economic and military strength, the protection of Sea Lines 
of Communication (SLOCs) through Southeast Asia on which Japan's trade and energy 
needs depend, and the development of Japanese naval capabilities to enhance Japanese 
military security. Bilateral anti-piracy exercises involving the JCG and the maritime 
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authorities in Southeast Asian states serves as a pretext to further security cooperation 
directed towards China, as well as protecting Japanese trade from pirate attacks. 
Furthermore, the US-led `war on terrorism' has provided a rationale for the MSDF to 
increase its operational scope and military hardware through new campaigns, such as 
Operation Arabian Rainbow, and commitments, like the PSI. Finally, realism can also 
explain Japan's response to a North Korean spy ship incursion in December 2001. In 
this instance, the North Korean spy ship was deemed a threat to Japanese security, so 
Japan Coast Guard vessels forcibly tried to board the spy ship. The action of the JCG 
resulted in a firefight that culminated in the North Koreans scuttling their ship. Neo- 
realism regards the actions of the JCG as justified in that Japan's national interests were 
being protected against a rival state in the East Asian region. 
Criticisms of Realism 
This account of Japan's response to piracy and maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia, 
whilst instructive, should be tempered by several criticisms. First, a realist interpretation 
fails to take domestic actors into account. 29 This thesis will show in Chapter 4 that 
failures of crisis management in the Prime Minister's Office were responsible in part for 
the sinking of the North Korean spy ship in December 2001, for example. 30 Second, 
though realism does admit certain aspects of international law, such as the inviolability 
of state sovereignty and upholds the principle of non-interference, international law as a 
whole is viewed sceptically as it may interfere with a state's pursuit of its national 
interest. Japan's strategy for tackling piracy, however, has always emphasised the 
centrality of international law. Third, realism is regarded as a theory which endorses the 
status quo in world politics in that it allows little or no possibility of change of the 
29 Rosenberg also comments that realists, such as Carr, sideline multinational firms and transnational 
monetary exchanges that act and occur independently of governments (Rosenberg, 1990: 287-288). 
Recent developments within the English School, however, would locate these economic activities and 
actors in the transnational society (Buzan, 2004a: 125-128). 
30 This criticism also highlights that Morgenthau's understanding of the state as a rational actor is 
contentious. Instead misperceptions, a lack of information, bargaining between policy-makers and 
irrationality frequently govern the making of foreign policy decisions. More often than not, foreign policy 
decision makers have to make do with a satisfactory outcome rather than an optimal one. 
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international system (Rosenberg, 1990: 291; Linklater, 1995: 256-257; Burchill, 1996: 
78-81). 31 Fourth, by placing the blame for international conflict upon human nature, 
more benign human qualities are overlooked, thereby undermining the importance of 
cooperation in international affairs (Keohane, 1986: 11). Based on these third and fourth 
criticisms a realist interpretation does not concede that enhanced cooperation between 
states can alter the security dynamic of the Southeast Asian region, despite the 
establishment of an Information Sharing Centre to combat piracy. 32 Fifth, Dunne and 
Schmidt identify that realism's definition of power fails to comprehend diplomatic 
influence, economic and ideological sources of power (Dunne and Schmidt in Baylis 
and Smith, 2001: 150-151). The US government mobilised substantial diplomatic, 
economic and ideological influence in founding the maritime anti-terror initiatives, such 
as the International Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS Code), PSI, Container Security 
Initiative (CSI) and Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT). Such 
discrepancies between realism and reality emphasise the utility of a neo-liberal position 
whereby mutually cooperative outcomes are possible and indeed likely between states 
in cases, such as Japan's response to maritime threats, where the states cannot realise 
their self-interests alone (Keohane, 1984; Powell, 1994: 327; Stein, 1995). 
2.3b Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism 
Liberalism can be divided into three camps: the liberal internationalists, the liberal 
idealists and the liberal institutionalists. Liberal internationalists are mainly interested in 
31 This criticism is perhaps slightly unfair. Both Morgenthau and Carr do allow for the possibility of other 
structures in the international system, though they maintain that only by working within the current 
confines of the international system can new structures emerge. Besides, the primary concern of realists is 
not to theorise change in the international system, but to instruct the policy-making community as to how 
best comprehend and manage threats to the security of their states in the present day (Keohane, 1986: 11). 
This sentiment is echoed in the writings of Machiavelli who noted, "it has appeared to me more fitting to 
go directly to the effectual truth of the thing than to the imagination of it. And many more have imagined 
republics and principalities that have never been seen or known to exist in truth; for it is so far from how 
one should live that he who lets go of what is done learns his ruin rather than his preservation... Hence it 
is necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able not to be good, and to use this 
and not use it according to necessity" (Machiavelli, Mansfield (trans. ), 1998: 61). Ruggie notes that the 
omission in neo-realist theory of an explanation of the effects of increasingly diverse, rapid and numerous 
transactions between states, or what Ruggie terms `dynamic density', accounts for the absence of factors 
explaining systemic change in Waltz's theory (Burchill, 1996: 88,90). 
32 This will be examined in section 5.3b `Coordination: the Information Sharing Centre'. 
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how the promotion of liberal-democracy and national self-determination may help 
generate a more peaceful world, as the citizens of constitutional governments do not 
want war and possess the rights to express this desire to their governments. Liberal 
idealism focuses on how international relations should be and is grounded in the belief 
that the carnage of the First World War should not be repeated. Finally, liberal 
institutionalists are primarily concerned with the international institutions that exist and 
what their roles and impacts are (Dunne in Baylis and Smith, 2001: 165-171). 
Liberalism, therefore, emphasises a conviction in the peaceful nature of constitutional 
government, the necessity to build international relations on legal foundations and that 
states have mutual interests to avoid war (Brown, 2001: 21-24). 
Liberals place faith in the power and spirit of commerce. They claim that free trade and 
comparative advantage enables economies to prosper, but also serves to forge stronger 
and more lasting relations between states thereby increasing understanding between 
peoples and dependence upon one another for trade, resulting in reduced chances of 
conflict among states. The interaction of states can also be self-sustaining as the more 
states cooperate, the greater the costs become of disengaging from processes which bind 
state policies to each other (Dunne in Baylis and Smith, 2001: 169). For liberals, the 
European Union represents the most advanced example of economic integration and 
political cooperation between states. Mitrany notes that the cooperation between EU 
members commenced with coordination in technical areas before `spilling over' into 
functional areas where it is to the benefit of the countries concerned (Burchill, 1996: 35- 
37). 
Neo-liberal internationalists, idealists and institutionalists echo the concerns of their 
forebears. For neo-liberal internationalist Francis Fukuyama, the end of the Cold War 
signalled the end of history, in that the democratic, liberal capitalist bloc, having 
triumphed over the centrally governed communist foe, represented an ideal form of state. 
The dominance of democracy and liberal capitalism signalled a new era in which global 
affairs would increasingly be managed through multilateral arrangements and 
international organizations. Fukuyama's conception of the post-Cold War era is firmly 
rooted in the liberal tradition, which perceives the history of mankind as progressive, 
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linear and directed towards the realisation of democratic, liberal capitalist countries 
worldwide (Fukuyama, 1993; Burchill, 1996: 28). 33 The cause for celebration at the end 
of the Cold War, for liberals such as Fukuyama, was the victory of a superior system of 
government; peace would now reign in international relations as it is widely held that 
democracies, which depend upon free trade, do not fight each other (Doyle, 1995: 100; 
Burchill, 1996: 29,31-33). This notion of progress in international affairs is mirrored in 
the work of neo-liberal idealists who propose means of advancing global peace. Richard 
Falk, for example, identifies human rights institutions and NGOs as the key to resolving 
tensions between the forces of globalisation and the global community. David Held, on 
the other hand, argues that such tensions can be treated through the establishment of a 
global democratic government as well as an International Court of Human Rights (Held, 
1995; Dunne in Baylis and Smith, 2001: 175). 
Neo-liberal institutionalism appears less optimistic than either of the two previous neo- 
liberal variants. Neo-liberal institutionalists doubt the extent to which states can provide 
both order and justice in the international system and criticise the neo-liberal 
internationalist position that cooperation is a given and that the growth of free trade 
promotes peace. While accepting the structural condition of anarchy and the state as the 
main actor in international relations, neo-liberal institutionalists do stress that 
cooperation in international relations is possible through international institutions and 
regimes. 34 Regimes and institutions are constructed so as to realise the interests of the 
actors that created them or of those who are members of them in conditions when these 
actors are not able to maximise their interests individually, or because collective 
interests and problems are better addressed in a collective forum. According to the neo- 
33 Fukuyama has therefore advocated the spread of liberal regimes through humanitarian intervention, in 
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia for example. Democracy can also be expanded through institutional 
leverage, whereby states adopt the political, economic and social institutions of the liberal West in return 
for the material benefits gleaned from wider access to markets, and conditionality, whereby incentives, 
such as loans and investment, are offered in return for compliance with economic or political programmes 
dictated by liberal Western states (Dunne in Baylis and Smith, 2001: 171-173). 
34 Krasner defines international regimes as "the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area of international relations", whereby norms 
are "the standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations", rules are "the specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action" and decision making procedures are "the prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice" (Krasner, 1995a: 1-2). Keohane defines institutions as 
"persistent and connected sets of rules that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations" (Keohane, 1995b: 290). 
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liberal institutionalist argument, states are interested in absolute rather than relative 
gains, meaning that states will cooperate even if they do not gain as much as their 
partners (Dunne in Baylis and Smith, 2001: 176-177). Moreover, by establishing a 
framework that orders inter-state relationships, regimes and institutions have the 
potential to influence how actors define and pursue their interests (Krasner, 1995a: 7- 
11; Keohane in Der Derian, 1995: 283). Since the end of the Second World War, there 
has been a growing emphasis on negotiated arrangements between states (Young in 
Krasner, 1995: 106), due both to the increasing interaction and interdependence 
amongst states, as well as the effectiveness of regimes and institutions in dealing with 
inter-state relationships and interests (Keohane in Krasner, 1995: 165-166). The neo- 
liberal institutionalist position notes that as the economic sphere of international 
relations has expanded through interaction and interdependence, and war has become a 
less acceptable form of pursuing state interests amongst liberal democracies, so the 
distinction between high and low politics has evaporated (Lamy in Baylis and Smith, 
2001: 188-191). Contrary to hegemonic stability theory, neo-liberal institutionalists 
maintain that regimes and institutions can be established even without hegemonic 
support (Keohane, 1984). 
A Liberal Account of Japan's Response to Maritime Securi 
Liberalism emphasizes both the importance of economic factors and the possibility of 
cooperation in Japan's response to maritime threats. Hence, Japan has sought to secure 
the SLOCs upon which Japan depends for its trade and energy imports. The neo-liberal 
institutionalist approach highlights Japanese efforts in the creation of the Information 
Sharing Centre in Singapore to manage the problem of piracy in Southeast Asia. 
Furthermore, agreements, such as the ISPS Code, PSI, CSI and C-TPAT, underline the 
necessity for international efforts to combat terrorism. Six-party talks, involving North 
and South Korea, the US, Russia, China and Japan, provide the cooperative framework 
in which North Korea's WMD programmes can be discussed. Finally, Indonesia and 
Malaysia's rejection of Admiral Fargo's suggestion that the US navy could assist in 
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patrolling the Malacca Straits indicates that only multilateral efforts can help to 
overcome maritime threats. 
Criticisms of Liberalism 
Of course there remain examples that run counter to this notion of international 
institutions preserving peace. The second Gulf War between an American-led alliance 
and Iraq, in which the dominant global power declared war on Iraq despite the fact that 
the UN did not legitimise the action, is indicative of the strength of the neo-realist rather 
than the neo-liberal argument. Neo-realist critiques of the neo-liberal viewpoint centre 
upon the extent to which states feel secure and free from military competition with one 
another as a precursor to international cooperation. Furthermore, it is argued that neo- 
liberalism is the embodiment of this international system dominated by Western states 
and is therefore a theory that imposes its Western values upon developing states for the 
benefit of the pre-eminent Western society, deepening the inequalities between the 
global North and the global South (Burchill, 1996: 38; Thomas, 2001: 159-175). This 
undercuts the neo-liberal internationalist position that the triumph of liberal democracy 
after the Cold War indicates progress in international affairs (Dunne in Baylis and 
Smith, 2001: 173). Moreover, constructivists argue that both neo-realism and neo- 
liberalism are status quo theories that do not explain the significance of sociological 
factors in world politics (Ashley, 1984: 256-257; Lebow, 1994: 249-277; Linklater, 
1995: 250-251; Dessler, 1999: 126). 35 
2.3c Constructivism 
The principal theme in constructivist literature is the human construction of the 
international system. This raises two important questions for international relations: 
35 Neo-realism and neo-liberalism are status quo theories in the sense that they take anarchy for granted. 
Linklater argues for the possibility of transformation of the system noting the ability of the industrialized 
core states to transcend the systemic limitations of anarchy (Linklater, 1995: 247-248,253). 
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how does what people believe affect what they do; and, if the current world system has 
been created by people, how can individuals and groups act to change the system 
(Vasquez, 1997: 667)? Constructivists argue that International Relations Theory has to 
develop an understanding of the social interaction between states in the international 
system. It is through this interaction that intersubjective meanings are created which in 
turn enables social practices between states to be fashioned. These social practices, or 
broadly speaking, international relations, help create actor identities as one state defines 
itself in terms of others in the international system. In accordance with its identity, a 
state formulates interests that it seeks to achieve through interaction with other states in 
the system (Wendt, 1995: 132-135; Hopf, 1998: 175). 36 Furthermore, interests and 
identity determine what policy instruments a state can use, or will tend to use, in dealing 
with another state (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 462-465). 37 
Over time and through continued interaction between states, social practices, or norms 
that define how actors relate to each other, and identities, which specify who an actor is 
and how actors are expected to behave, may be institutionalised (Wendt, 1995: 136; 
Kowert and Legro, 1996: 453). States create institutions or conventions that specify 
rules to better govern the affairs between states and these institutions in turn can 
generate new interests for states. For example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions are an 
expression of the values and behaviour that actors deem important in international 
affairs. The norms, rules and conventions that determine appropriate action between 
states are shared by all states belonging to the international system and explain why 
36 For example, the need for states to interact with each other has led to the establishment of 
intersubjective meanings regarding embassies, diplomats and diplomatic immunity. The creation of 
diplomatic posts, embassies to house them and rules, such as diplomatic immunity, enables the relations, 
or social practices, between states to be conducted smoothly. Governments receive information through 
their embassies that allows the government to determine the best course of action to take vis-ä-vis another 
state. Hence, specific government outcomes will reflect whether the identity and interests of a state they 
are dealing with is a belligerent, autocratic state or a liberal, democratic state, as well as the identity and 
interests of the government in question. 
37 In the case of evidence of torture at the Abu Ghraib prison by US troops on Iraqi prisoners following 
the second US-led war against Iraq, the state instrument of torture was deemed inappropriate in 
accordance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the UN Convention against Torture, which the US 
had signed, and the cases of torture were investigated. This indicates that even a state with the material 
power of the US must take into consideration the international rules and norms that help regulate 
international relations. By September 2005,230 US troops had been punished for offences against 
prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan (www. n)times. com/2005/09/24/polities/24abuse. htnil, accessed 25 
September 2005). 
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actors behave in similar ways. Failure to comply with the rules, norms and conventions 
of the international system amounts to a state being ostracised from the majority of 
states that comprise the system. 38 As a result, action may be taken against the rogue 
state in accordance with the rules, norms and conventions of the system. 39 Hence, by 
institutionalising norms, notions of cooperation, duty and obligation in international 
politics are elevated so that they are at least equivalent in value to concepts of self- 
interest and gain (Finnemore, 1996: 1-29,129; Katzenstein, 1996a: 2,25) and an 
international society is constructed that is more predictable and therefore more stable 
(Hopf, 1998: 175-178). 
A Constructivist Account of Japan's Response to Maritime Security 
Constructivism highlights Japan's reliance upon a multilateral approach and the 
dispatch of the JCG rather than the MSDF to Southeast Asia to combat maritime 
violence. The presence of Japan Coast Guard vessels as opposed to Maritime Self- 
Defence forces on anti-piracy patrols denotes a reluctance on the part of Southeast 
Asian states to accept Japanese naval vessels around their territorial seas. That Japan has 
acquiesced in the hesitancy of Southeast Asian states by only sending Coast Guard ships 
shows a sensitivity to regional concerns and denotes a level of bargaining between 
Japan and Southeast Asian states that neo-liberal and neo-realist theories overlook 40 By 
adopting a multilateral approach, Tokyo is able to assuage the fears of Southeast Asian 
38 Though it seems straightforward to label any state that disobeys the tenets of the international system as 
a `rogue state', the practice is more complicated. As the only Superpower in global affairs at the end of 
the Cold War, the US has mobilized its material and normative capabilities against the states it believes 
threaten the interstate society. The US has therefore delineated the states that flout international rules and 
destabilize global affairs (through WMD proliferation, for example) in regions deemed key to US national 
interests as rogues. As a result, charges of inconsistency and selectivity have been leveled against 
successive US governments for excluding states, like Syria, which defy international rules, from the list 
of rogues (Litwak, 2000: 1-8). The criteria for defining actors that disregard the rules of the interstate 
society will be addressed in the next chapter on definitions. 
39 It is notable that the actions of certain states are delineated as `rogue', such as Iranian and North 
Korean attempts to acquire a nuclear weapon, whereas other states' possession of weapons of mass 
destruction, such as the US, are deemed just. The key to understanding such divergence is in viewing the 
widespread US-led interstate society dominating both the world society, as well as those states that do not 
obey the tenets of the US hegemonic interstate society. 
ao This sensitivity has been classified as an anti-militarist norm that forms part of Japan's international 
identity and stems from Japan's defeat in World War Two (Berger, 1996). 
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states that Japan may be remilitarizing 41 Japan's reliance upon a multilateral approach 
to East and Southeast Asian regional security issues stems from the Nakayama proposal 
that recognised the need for Japan to play a greater role in international affairs following 
the first Gulf War, but also took account of the concerns of Asian states that the 
involvement of Japan's military in peacekeeping operations, policing actions and 
humanitarian efforts would not constitute a remilitarisation of Japan (Midford, 2000: 
388-390; Katzenstein and Okawara, 2004: 103-109). Japan's approach to maritime 
security issues in Southeast Asia demonstrates that Japanese policy makers care enough 
about how Japanese foreign policy is perceived for those perceptions to shape the 
making of Japan's foreign policy itself. This echoes Buzan's opinion that in a society of 
states, "sentience makes a difference, and that social systems cannot be understood in 
the same way as physical ones. When units are sentient, how they perceive each other is 
a major determinant of how they interact" (Buzan, 2001: 476) 42 
Nonetheless, constructivism also takes into account the potential for actor identities and 
relationships between actors to change. Constructivists note the interrelated nature of 
structure, identity, interests and policy, and stress that changes in one can occasion 
alterations of the others (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 52-65). Thus, a 
change in the structure of international relations, from a bipolar structure to a multipolar 
structure dominated by the US, particularly in technological and military fields, 
resulting from the conclusion of the Cold War enables identities and interests to be 
reassessed. In this new international structure, Japan has been encouraged to play a 
greater role in international affairs by committing its Self-Defence Force troops to 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, even dispatching ground forces to aid in the 
reconstruction of Iraq, since March 2004 (Marten Zisk, 2001; Singh, 2002a) 43 In the 
41 Japanese expansionism during the 1930s to the conclusion of the Second World War throughout 
Southeast Asia has left Southeast Asian states fearful of Japanese military power. This is in spite of the 
fact that in the aftermath of World War Two, Japan embraced democracy, signed a constitution with an 
anti-war clause (Article 9) and limited the growth of its armed forces. Since the end of the Cold War, 
Japan's increasing participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has caused some concern 
among Southeast Asian states that Japan sought a greater role for its military forces beyond the defence of 
Japanese shores (Hook et al., 2001: 14-15,156-157,208-209). See also, Singh, 2002. 
42 See also Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996: 33-37. 
a' For details on the dispatch of Japanese Self-Defence Forces to Iraq, see 
http: //www mofa go ip/whats/2004/index3. htnif (accessed 29 June 2004). 
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post-Cold War context, Japan's changing security role in world affairs has been largely 
accepted by Southeast Asian states, though not yet fully endorsed (Singh, 2002b). 
Japanese involvement in the fight against piracy and maritime terror in Southeast Asia 
may therefore be understood as one part of Japan's new strategy in global affairs 
(Graham, 2006: 201,225). 44 This new strategy may well transform the norm of anti- 
militarism which characterised Japan's involvement in international security operations 
during the Cold War. 
Criticisms of Constructivism 
It is unclear, however, as to where the identities, norms, practices and social structures 
that constructivism emphasises come from and how they are generated. Without a clear 
understanding of the way in which identities are created, constructivism is only able to 
make predictions in a given social context with the additional caveat that the social 
interactions between the actors they are examining are impermanent and liable to 
change at some point (Kowert and Legro, 1996: 469; Hopf, 1998: 196-198). Indeed, if 
norms can account for both continuity and change in the behaviour of actors in the 
international system, then the explanatory value of norms is suspect as norms can 
potentially be employed to explain whatever the analyst chooses (Legro and Kowert, 
1996: 482-497). Furthermore, it is uncertain how the manifold social structures 
examined by constructivists relate to each other. In fact, when social elements are 
investigated they tend to be limited to a single-issue area (Finnemore, 1996: 16). 
A potential pitfall in employing a constructivist theoretical framework to comprehend 
an issue is that in stressing the importance of social factors, constructivism creates a 
dichotomy between social and material explanations, encouraging researchers to 
perceive one set of forces as being more potent than the other (Dessler, 1999: 127). 
Finnemore, for example, gives prominence to international conventions that define the 
kind of world that people want to live in (Finnemore, 1996: 129), without recognising 
44 Graham's work echoes Michael Green's contention that Japanese security policy has shifted towards a 
more realist doctrine, which focuses on containing China and North Korea (Green, 2001). 
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that such conventions are frequently violated or ignored because of material factors 45 
Krasner accuses constructivists of having too much faith in norms, such as sovereignty, 
which are in fact more fragile than constructivists understand them to be when 
materially powerful states disregard the sovereignty of states to realise their own 
interests (Krasner, 2000: 132-134). Critics argue that it is necessary to ask how both 
material and social forces work in tandem to produce outcomes in international politics, 
rather than stressing one set of causal variables over another (Keohane, 2000: 126-130; 
Smith, 2000: 153-156) 46 
Critics also contend that constructivism shares too much with traditional theories, such 
as states as rational actors or the notion that states exist prior to the system (Keohane, 
2000: 125). Zehfuss asserts that if constructivism merely posits a particular form of 
reality, then actors will necessarily respond to that reality in specified ways. By doing 
so, responsibility is removed from an actor's decisions that will be articulated in such a 
way that the actor had no choice but to respond to the realities of international politics. 
By accepting a reality that is in fact fabricated, constructivism enforces the status quo, 
rather than fulfil the central tenets of constructivist theory, which is to comprehend how 
the current world order came about and suggest possibilities for change (Zehfuss, 2002: 
208-262). A possible means of overcoming this deficiency of constructivism is to wed 
constructivist theory with the international society conception propounded by the 
English School, which examines the evolution of international societies throughout 
history and explores the possibilities for change via Buzan's vanguard theory, whereby 
groups of states in a region integrate to the extent that the creation of "a single 
hierarchical political entity" becomes possible (Buzan, 2004a: 107,222-227). Such 
work has been influenced by structural realism, which will now be presented before 
tackling more recent developments in English School theory. 
as The Kyoto agreement on environmental standards is a case in point, as the US is a signatory, but has 
not ratified the treaty because of the effects the agreement would have upon constraining material factors, 
such as conditions placed upon industrial output, as well as limitations on energy and fuel use. See 
http: //edition cnn. com/2001/WORLD/europe/italy/03/29/environment. kyoto/ (accessed 26 June 2004). 
46 The same charge of splitting issues between social causes and materialist causes could be levelled at 
both realism and liberalism. However, Keohane argues that traditional theories take account of both 
material and ideational arguments in their work, whereas constructivism attempts to sideline material 
forces (Keohane, 2000: 127-128). Hence, some realist and liberal scholars are examining how material 
and social forces interact. 
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2.4 Structural Realism 
2.4a The Logic of Anarchy 
In The Logic of Anarchy, Buzan, Jones and Little develop what they refer to as 
structural realism, but adopt many of the central features of both neo-liberalism and 
neo-realism 47 First, they perceive the political sphere and in particular, the anarchical 
nature of the international system as being central to an understanding of international 
relations. Second, they believe the state to be the most important unit in the 
international system and that the primary interest of the state is its preservation against 
internal and external threats. Third, they accept Waltz's framework for the international 
structure as defined in Waltz's Theory of International Politics. However, in contrast to 
Waltz's work, Buzan, Jones and Little argue that the international structure is generated 
and can be transformed by the interaction and capabilities of states within the system 
(Buzan et. al., 1993: 9-16) 48 
Little examines the possibility of change within the international system by noting that 
Waltz himself believed that a system comes into being through the interaction of its 
units. 49 He also makes reference to Ruggie's concept of `dynamic density', which 
asserts that the amount, speed and range of interactions within a system will influence 
the nature of that system (Keohane, 1986: 148). However, the concept of `dynamic 
density' is then expanded into the notion of interaction capacity which is the sum total 
of technical capabilities within the system, shared norms between actors and 
4' Structural realism is closely related to Rationalist Theory, which incorporates both liberal and realist 
conceptions within its framework. 
48 Buzan outlines the structural realist theory by first elaborating upon the notion of a system. For Buzan, 
Jones and Little, a system is comprised of units, the interaction between those units, and the structure of 
the system. They argue that the international system does not have a conscious design and therefore it 
does not exist for a specific purpose or function (Buzan et al., 1993: 29-33). 
49 Hence, Buzan and Little characterise structure in terms of organization (whether units are located in an 
anarchical or hierarchical order), the functional differentiation of the units (how like or unlike are the 
units and how are the units designed to fulfil their purpose), and the distribution of capabilities (the 
number of Great Powers in the system). However, they also stress the socially constructed nature of the 
international structure (Buzan and Little, 2000: 84-85). For a full account of the neorealist position, see 
Waltz, 1990: 29,34,36. 
48 
organizations that regulate actor behaviour. The interaction capacity determines the 
social and technological possibilities for engagement between the units in the 
international system, and is contrasted with process in the international system, or the 
ways in which units actually interact. Interaction capacity is a prerequisite of both 
process and structure, and it is determined by geographical factors, as well as by the 
extent to which social and physical technologies impact upon communication and 
transport-50 As the interaction capacity of the international system increases, so the 
quality, scale and intensity of international relations may expand. The interaction 
capacity can thereby alter the international system by encouraging new processes, such 
as the development of common interests between states, improving the ways in which 
states correspond with each other and by providing a greater sense of stability between 
states (Buzan et. al., 1993: 69-73; Buzan and Little, 2000: 79-83). 
By incorporating interaction as a systemic feature, Buzan, Jones and Little point to the 
significance of sub-state actors that mediate on behalf of the state in its relations with 
other units in the international system-51 These human agents set out to intentionally 
reproduce the system through interaction with other agents so that common norms can 
be adopted which in turn facilitates the construction of institutions. 
52 Through this 
process of interaction, norm sharing and the creation of organizations, the interaction 
capacity of the system develops (Little in Buzan et al., 1993: 155-166). 
Interaction between states in the system occurs within four sectors: economic, political, 
societal and strategic. Hence, it is possible to comprehend the system as a whole or in 
so Examples of physical technology include the horse drawn cart, steam ships, jet airliners, telegraph and 
phone systems, and the Internet. Social technologies include shared language and ideas, rules and 
institutions, money and bills of exchange (Buzan and Little, 2000: 82-83). 
s' In structural realist theory the state is the main source of explanation for behaviour and outcomes in the 
international system. According to Buzan, states are comprised of their attributes and interactions and 
these provide the best means of explaining change in the system. Attributes are referred to as domestic 
characteristics, components and processes; these can be understood according to foreign policy analysis 
which proposes that a state's foreign policy is the sum of the interactions of its bureaucracy, the 
personalities of a state's leadership, the organization of government and the ideology of the state. 
Interaction denotes the process whereby actors respond to and accommodate or confront the actions and 
attitudes of other actors (Buzan et al., 1993: 48-49). 
52 This contrasts well with Waltz who believed that the system was reproduced unintentionally and 
therefore did not change as no actors sought alternatives to the existing structure of international relations. 
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terms of specified subdivisions (Buzan et al., 1993: 29-33). 
53 Structural realist theory 
thereby enables much more flexibility in interpreting international relations than realism 
does, as structural realism can explain differences between states by referring to the 
capabilities each state may possess in each sector of the system. Whereas Waltz 
describes all states as alike, Buzan, Jones and Little note the different capabilities of 
states which they are then able to compare. For example, Japan's strong economic 
power can be contrasted with its weaker military power, as opposed to the US which 
possesses both a potent military as well as a strong economy (Buzan et al., 1993: 44). 54 
For Japan, the problems of piracy and maritime terrorism concern all four sectors. The 
potential for terrorists or pirates to close the Malacca Straits, through which 80 percent 
of Japan's energy resources and trade pass (Emmers, 2004: 49), would have a 
detrimental effect upon Japan's economy and could affect Japan's strategic security. 
Protecting Japan's economic interests involves the application of strategic resources: 
dispatching Japan Coast Guard vessels to Southeast Asia on anti-piracy exercises; and 
political means: cooperation with Southeast Asian states concerning anti-piracy 
measures. Social, economic and political factors combine within Southeast Asian states 
to create the problems of piracy and maritime terrorism in that a lack of economic 
opportunity and political power, as well as social disruption caused through in- 
migration to coastal areas can encourage individuals to seek illegitimate means of 
sustaining themselves, such as piracy, or may make extremist solutions proposed by 
terrorist and separatist groups more attractive. Environmental factors could form a fifth 
sector in the structural realist conception of a system. Over-fishing and pollution cause a 
loss of maritime livelihood as well as deforestation which compels inhabitants of the 
hinterland to seek employment in overpopulated coastal regions further exacerbating the 
tensions that generate piracy and terrorism. Chapter 3 will examine these issues in 
greater detail. 
53 Buzan and Little note the possibility of an environmental sector also (Buzan and Little, 2000: 91). 
s4 Power is defined by Buzan as "the capability of units to perform specified tasks as a result of the 
attributes they possess" (Buzan et al., 1993: 44). Depending upon their attributes states can or cannot 
perform certain actions, such as construct nuclear weapons. State power is also constantly changing and is 
relational in the sense that it depends on how much power a state has in relation to other states. 
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Because interaction capacity is affected by geography, engagement between actors is 
easier, and often more significant, over short distances, structural realists note that 
regional issues should have priority within international affairs (Buzan et al., 1993: 77). 
This is instructive in the case of Japan's response to piracy and maritime terrorism as it 
places stress upon regional cooperation. This helps explain why Japanese policy-makers 
have been eager to promote regional institutions for dealing with piracy rather than rely 
on global frameworks for cooperation. Furthermore, structural realists' emphasis upon 
the interaction capacity of the system indicates that Japan's efforts to generate inter- 
state means of collaboration in the fight against piracy is an attempt to mediate anarchy 
in the international system by the promotion of common values, norms and institution 
building. This may ultimately encourage systemic change in the Southeast and East 
Asian region (Buzan et al., 1993: 76-78). Finally, structural realism's focus upon sub- 
state actors, such as bureaucrats and representatives of domestic and international 
shipping and maritime organizations, reveals that investigating Japan's response to 
piracy and maritime terrorism requires assimilating the views of those actors who 
represent the Japanese state in its cooperation with Southeast Asian countries in the 
fight against piracy and maritime terrorism. 
2.4b Structural Realism and the English School 
Structural realist theory notes that structure is not the overriding force in international 
relations, but one of many factors, including the importance of actors in the 
international system. The structural realist approach enables a deeper understanding of 
the study and practice of international relations as well as a means of interpreting 
continuity and transformation in global affairs as the interaction capacity of the 
international system may reach a level whereby processes that mitigate anarchy are 
realized. Hence, whereas neo-realists point to a system of competitive anarchy, 
structural realists indicate a system of cooperative anarchy (Buzan et al., 1993: 9-16,78, 
165-167). The notion of cooperative anarchy is comparable with the English School's 
conception of an anarchic society which shares many structural realist assumptions. 
However, the emphasis placed upon the influence of the interaction capacity and the 
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processes of the system, the significance of sub-state actors in conducting interaction 
between states and the division of the international system according to specific sectors, 
can help develop a better understanding of the English School's theory concerning the 
anarchic society. 
52 
2.5 International Society - The Contribution of the English 
School 
2.5a Grotius and the Anarchic International Socie 
Rationalist theory, also known as the English School, is concerned with how institutions 
and norms combine to maintain order in an anarchical international system. By doing so, 
rationalism seeks to provide the via media between realism and liberalism. 55 From 
realism, rationalism adopts the notion of an anarchical system with no overarching 
authority governing the behaviour of states and the principle that states in this 
anarchical system will be self-interested actors working primarily to ensure their own 
security by increasing their capabilities vis-ä-vis rival states in the system. However, 
rationalism also holds the cosmopolitan concern for humanitarian justice in common 
with liberalism as well as an understanding of `process' or the interaction between 
units 56 in the system. Recent contributions by Buzan aim to bridge the gap between 
rationalism and constructivism enabling an even more comprehensive theory of 
International Relations. 57 It is essential, then, to examine how the English School has 
evolved as a theory of International Relations in order to establish how the theory can 
be employed to understand Japan's response to contemporary maritime security issues. 
Bull and Watson define international society in their joint work, Expansion of 
International Society, as: 
a group of states (or more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not 
merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the 
calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and 
institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognise their common interest in 
maintaining these arrangements (Bull and Watson, 1984: 1). 
ss Articles that emphasise the merger of realist and liberalist theories include Nye, 1988; Niou and 
Ordeshook, 1994; Powell, 1994; Keohane, 1995; Buzan and Little, 2001. 
$6 A unit within the system may be either a state or any sub-state actor. 
57 Hurrell applauds the scope of the English School's research programme, which, he argues, can examine 
a vast number of questions in international relations (Hurrell, 2001: 489). Yet, Bull, one of the co- 
founders of the English School, placed more emphasis on the realist aspects of rationalism, such as the 
maintenance of order in the international society, in his seminal work: The Anarchical Society (Nye, 
1988: 249; Linklater, 1996: 94; Buzan, 2001: 474-476). 
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States can mutually establish rules and institutions via a `diplomatic culture' that 
governs the transactions that occur between them to mitigate the effects of the 
anarchical system. The incentive for states to contribute to this `diplomatic culture' lies 
not in a common culture that exists between states, but simply in the need for states to 
co-exist. 58 However, once these rules and institutions evolve to the extent that states are 
aware of common values that they share with fellow states, so the international system 
becomes instead, an international society. The notion of an international society is 
rooted in the work of Grotius, the seventeenth century Dutch jurist (Bull, 1995: 13,23- 
26). 
Bull lists the core institutions of the international society as the balance of power, 
international law, diplomacy, war, and the Great Powers. On a global level, the purpose 
of the balance of power is to prevent a hegemon emerging, whilst at the local or 
regional level, the balance of power serves to secure the independence of states. 
International law provides the rules that guide the conduct of states in their interaction 
with each other. 59 The fact that states generally conduct their relations with one-another 
peacefully, house diplomatic missions of other states, and trade between themselves 
demonstrates the salience of international law. 60 Diplomacy involves the interaction of 
designated actors of recognised political entities, which includes separatist groups and 
international institutions as well as states, in order to facilitate agreements, negotiate, 
sa Bull does suggest, however, that `diplomatic culture' could be strengthened by the existence of a 
common global culture. 
s9 The term `guide' is chosen instead of `govern' as there is no international power above the state in 
international relations. The international law referred to here denotes both primary rules where human 
communities collectively determine to avoid certain actions, such as war or slavery, and secondary rules 
which bestow specific rights and duties upon states, for example sovereignty and non-intervention (Bull, 
2002: 122-130,134-136). 
60 When a state violates one aspect of international law, it usually does so whilst conforming to most or 
all other aspects of international law. Furthermore, conformity to and violation of international law exist 
upon a scale from total conformity to unambiguous violation. Even once a state has violated a specific 
law, it will make efforts to show that it still feels itself bound by that law. This thesis will show in 
Chapter 4 how the actions of the Japan Coast Guard may be viewed as unlawful in firing on a North 
Korean spy ship in China's EEZ. In this instance the Japanese government went to great lengths, 
including salvaging and displaying the North Korean spy ship, to prove that the JCG's strategy was 
justified. Nonetheless, when international law, such as the principle of non-intervention, conflicts with the 
other institutions of the international society, such as the balance of power or war, international law may 
be set aside to ensure that order is maintained (Bull, 2002: 131-134,136-139). 
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collect information and maintain friendly relations between those political entities. 61 
The purpose of war as an institution of the international society is to uphold 
international law and the balance of power, though engaging in war is curtailed by the 
rules set down by international law. Finally, the Great Powers set the course of the 
international society by establishing its rules, maintaining the balance of power, 
containing international crises and wars, respecting the spheres of influence of fellow 
states and acting as a collective when the rules of the international society are violated 
(Bull, 2002,111-112,122-130,134-136,156-166,180-183,194-201). 
Whilst the achievement of an international society is significant, rationalists note that it 
is a fragile international configuration that could be over-turned by the emergence of an 
aggressive state. At the same time, international society is perceived to be an interim 
arrangement in world politics that could progress into a new international order amongst 
states wherein cosmopolitan issues of freedom and equality between all peoples are 
considered. The central concept for the advancement of international society is the 
provision of order amongst states that will then allow justice and affluence to spread 
globally (Linklater, 1996: 95-97). 
International society exists once three primary goals are secured. First, war between 
states must be restricted. Second, the property and territory of states must be respected 
by other states in the international system. Finally, agreements between states must be 
upheld (Bull, 1995: 4). Recognition of a state's sovereignty denotes a state's 
membership to the international society and sovereignty is conditional upon a state 
obeying the three goals of international society (Linklater, 1996: 98-100). The 
recognition of sovereignty coupled with the principle of non-intervention in another 
state's affairs represent the minimum purposes upon which states can agree to create an 
international society. Bull referred to these minimum criteria for an international society 
as the pluralist conception of international society as opposed to a solidarist conception 
of international society, whereby the use of force in world politics is subordinated to the 
61 Bull notes that increasingly, diplomacy is conducted by technical experts rather than by diplomats 
alone (Bull, 2002: 170-171). This is important for Japan's involvement in tackling piracy and maritime 
terrorism in Southeast Asia, as agreements have centred on the work of technical experts from the MLIT, 
as well as from MOFA. 
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common will of all states. In a solidarist international society, states agree to take 
`policing action' against law breaking states or in defence of human rights. Whereas the 
pluralist account of international society places emphasis upon the rights and duties of 
states, the solidarist position emphasises the rights and duties of individuals in the 
international system (Wheeler and Dunne, 1996: 94-95). Hence, the higher number of 
interventions in the post-Cold War world indicates a shift from a pluralist Cold War 
international society to a solidarist post-Cold War international society where a greater 
focus on justice enables the number of legitimate interventions to increase (Buzan, 
2001: 486-487). 62 
2.5b Order and/or Justice 
The evolution of international society hinges upon the balance between order and justice 
in world politics. For Bull, a pluralist, achieving this balance required emphasising 
order over justice. In The Anarchical Society, whilst acknowledging that there are some 
forces committed to the attainment of a more just global political arrangement, as 
reflected in the creation of the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, justice is only possible with world order. In fact, though the 
development of a cosmopolitan international society centring on the concepts of 
individual and human justice is possible in the long term, attempts to create such a 
society in the present day are labelled `disruptive' or `revolutionary'. Bull, therefore, 
stresses the importance of national interests and agreements between states formulated 
through bargaining and compromise and notes the lack of cosmopolitan notions of 
justice in the international society (Bull, 1995: 78-89). 63 
62 Buzan understands both pluralist and solidarist international society to be linked and as two ends of a 
spectrum along which the international society moves (Buzan, 2001: 479). In more recent work, Buzan 
has further developed this concept to examine the interaction between interstate society (which combines 
the international system and international society sectors) and world society (Buzan, 2004a). 
63 Whilst The Anarchical Society has a more realist bent, Bull's later writings and lectures expressed a 
solidarist tone. The essence of Bull's solidarism towards the end of his career was that the international 
society should be judged according to its contribution to human justice, that states are responsible for 
global welfare and that there should be a global redistribution of wealth in return for a commitment 
amongst all states in the international society to human rights. The conclusion of these solidarist 
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Bull's pessimism concerning the construction of a cosmopolitan international society 
places rationalist theory too close to realism, as it emphasises strategic considerations of 
states and national interests above the possibilities for human cooperation. 64 Adopting 
such a position omits the extent to which there must be a degree of solidarity concerning 
acceptable and unacceptable conduct in international affairs and how such conduct is 
framed in international law (Cutler, 1991: 55-57). However, Bull's cynicism may be 
justified in light of the repeated failure of developed countries to protect human rights in 
Africa, the slow response of developed countries to the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and 
the degree of self-interest implicit in the 1991 Gulf War. It is clear that in the post-Cold 
War world the concepts of non-interference and sovereignty are often more important 
than cosmopolitan notions of justice (Wheeler and Dunne, 1996: 101-106). Yet, the 
number of interventions in the sovereign affairs of other states has increased since the 
end of the Cold War and has recorded several notable successes, such as Cambodia and 
East Timor. The international community's failures vis-ä-vis intervention could well be 
described as initial attempts at intervention in a new solidarist era for the international 
society that should be learned from rather than chastised. 
Little expresses the possibility of a thicker international society evolving in the 
aftermath of the Cold War, as the demise of the Soviet international society left only the 
American dominated international society in 1989. For example, interventions in the 
US-led international society have examined whether the principles of sovereignty 
necessarily trump the rights and protection of human beings raising issues of justice in 
the post-Cold War world (Little, 2003: 452-453). Furthermore, the rise of transnational 
actors, such as NGOs, coupled with an increased concern for the welfare of human 
beings across the globe, as evidenced by the growing number of interventions since the 
end of the Cold War, may slowly challenge the supremacy of the state in international 
affairs (Buzan, 2004a). 
sentiments was that an international society without justice would not achieve order (Wheeler and Dunne, 
1996: 99-100). 
64 The fact that Bull wrote The Anarchical Society during the Cold War may explain his pessimism vis-ä- 
vis the construction of a cosmopolitan society. 
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Nevertheless, just as the creation of an international society based upon sovereignty and 
non-intervention was a protracted process, so the construction of a more cosmopolitan 
international society comprising a greater degree of human justice could prove even 
more complex. Altering social practices and identities may disrupt the stability of 
international relations, so states are unlikely to alter the status quo. Only when existing 
social practices and identities cannot solve current problems and when the rewards of 
transformation outweigh the costs of doing so, will states attempt to alter the system 
(Wendt, 1995: 148-158). States in the international system have not agreed upon the 
means of defining and enforcing human rights globally. Many states have also acquired 
negative sovereignty, in that they are free from external intervention in their affairs, but 
fail to satisfy the economic and political requirements of their citizens. The current 
international society therefore privileges order over justice in that states are recognised 
as the principal actor in global affairs (Linklater, 1996: 104-109), a fact reconfirmed 
following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. As Little notes, "[t]he debate now centres on 
tensions between systemic order and the societal rights of states when the threat to the 
international society is coming from within world society" (Little, 2003: 453). 
The pre-eminence of order over justice remains one of the core issues inhibiting 
responses to maritime security threats. In the case of Indonesia, for example, ethnic and 
religious conflict and separatist claims have been dealt with by government forces 
which have consistently employed repressive measures to ensure the territorial integrity 
of the state. The actions of the Indonesian military (the TNI) have often been 
rationalised in terms of maintaining order, yet the conduct of the TNI has tended to fuel 
conflicts and separatist causes (Huxley, 2002). As a result, internal violence, such as 
fighting between Aceh rebels and government forces, has spilt over into the seas 
surrounding Aceh where increased cases of piracy and maritime terrorism have been 
reported. 65 Conflict in the Aceh region indicates that a more solidarist approach which 
recognises the legitimacy of secessionist claims and upholds principles of religious 
tolerance may have more impact upon resolving Indonesia's security problems. Indeed, 
since the December 2004 tsunami hit the Aceh region, the Indonesian government has 
65http: //www. iccwbo. oriz/ccs/iiews archives/2004/aceh 2004. asp, accessed 29 June 2004. 
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negotiated with representatives of the GAM separatist group to settle the conflict in the 
northern Sumatran province. 66 
2.5c The Limits of International Order 
Constructivism and critical theory67 provide a possible link between the international 
society of today and the evolution of a cosmopolitan world society of the future. The 
task of critical theory and constructivism is to examine ways of moving beyond the 
current confines of the state system to provide better' political arrangements for 
governance, international citizenship and reforming international institutions. 68 By 
combining rationalism and constructivism, areas that remain understudied in the 
international society, such as ethics in political society and gender issues, could be 
addressed from the perspective of the current international society, but with a view to 
the development of a cosmopolitan international society (Dunne, 1995: 138-142). 
Essentially, this is what Buzan suggests when he describes the concept of the 
international society as progressive and layered. The present international society is 
merely one global political arrangement on a scale between a Hobbesian state of nature 
and a Kantian society of Perpetual Peace (Buzan, 1993: 332,337-340). This echoes 
Wendt's claim that different kinds of international anarchy are possible and that by 
66 For more information, see the Editorial in the Japan Times "Hope for Peace in Aceh" 30 July 2005, 
www. japantimes. co ip/cgi-bin/makeprfy. pl5? ed20050730a1 htm, accessed 25 October 2005. 
67 Constructivism and critical theory are two International Relations theories which both examine how the 
current international order came about and how this order may be changed. Both theories emphasise 
social factors as explanatory causes in international relations. 
68 Cosmopolitan and communitarian theorists represent two constructivist camps that have tackled the 
question of transformation of the international system. The cosmopolitan position emphasizes the need 
for human beings to develop a world community based on global rather than state governance. The 
communitarian argument, by contrast, notes the importance of states as the ultimate community in world 
politics and the need to work within the society of states in order to expand moral inclusion and 
reconstruct social relations amongst actors. Cochran argues that the debate between cosmopolitans and 
communitarians has reached an impasse in that the differences between state and human conceptions of 
justice cannot be resolved as both positions fail to perceive norms as contingent. Only by identifying 
ethical claims as temporary and provisional, rather than as universal and absolute as cosmopolitans and 
communitarians do, can investigations and potential transformations of existing political arrangements be 
attempted (Cochran, 1999: 1-18,273). Recent developments in English School theory, led by Buzan, 
allow for ethical claims to be developed in the transnational and interhuman societies as well as the 
interstate society. Moreover, social relations amongst actors vary depending upon the nature of the 
interstate society along the pluralist-solidarist spectrum (Buzan, 2004a). Hence the notion of universal 
and absolute norms is abandoned in contemporary rationalist theory. 
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altering the social practices between states, systems of cooperative security may emerge 
whereby states identify positively with one another and take care of each other's 
security (Wendt, 1995: 138-144; Hopf, 1998: 174). 69 Buzan restates the connections 
between the English School and constructivism when he notes that Wendt's conception 
that anarchy is what states make of it ties in with the construction of the international 
society by its units (Buzan, 2001: 487), a connection which is made even more explicit 
in Buzan's From International to World Society? (Buzan, 2004a). 
Nevertheless, there remains a degree of pessimism as to whether the present limits of 
the international society can be broached. Demands for an elaboration of concepts and 
practices of human justice in world politics require states to adapt the principle of non- 
intervention and redefine the conditions by which states can claim sovereignty. Such 
action would entail a leap of faith for states to willingly erode the fundamental 
principles of the existing international society and replace these principles with ones 
based on concepts of human justice agreed upon by all members of the international 
society. Whilst such a dramatic change appears unlikely and thereby seems to confirm 
Waever's criticism that reflectivism is a `status quo' theory (Wwver, 1992: 121), the 
transformation of the international system may occur progressively as states collaborate 
to overcome common problems and realise common interests. Even the central tenets of 
the international society - sovereignty and non-intervention, are dynamic notions in that 
sovereignty may be understood in manifold ways (Krasner, 1999; Makinda, 2001) and 
the conditions by which states intervene in each other's affairs is evolving, particularly 
in the degree to which the UN is consulted in order to justify international intervention 
in a sovereign territory. Whilst the international society is the dominant framework in 
which states conduct their relations, the need to respond to new security threats and 
transnational phenomena on a case-by-case basis may slowly refine the rules and norms 
69 States may develop a system of cooperative security by perceiving the welfare of other states as being 
the best means of securing their basic interests and thereby transforming their identity to one that is 
collective in form. Rising interdependence coupled with the perception of common problems facilitates 
the construction of collective identities, as actors recognize that unilateral means will not suffice in an 
international context where each state is reliant upon the actions of other states in the system. In such an 
environment states may even come to see their identities as well as their interests as alike and therefore 
become more aware of other's vulnerabilities and needs. The more states interact with each other the 
greater the potential for common identities to evolve (Wendt in Der Derian, 1995: 384-391). 
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of international society itself, rather than simply reproducing these rules and norms as 
structural realism suggests. 
The structural realist notions of interaction capacity and process, as well as the stress 
structural realism places upon sub-state actors, such as bureaucrats and NGOs, can help 
rationalism explain how this transformational process might occur in different sectors of 
the international system. 70 For example, cooperation between sub-state actors in 
multilateral forum on security issues, such as piracy and maritime terrorism, is 
indicative of richer social processes enabled by higher interaction capacity. As piracy 
and maritime terrorism are problems for international society that are woven into a 
myriad of other security threats and transnational phenomena, such as environmental 
degradation, economic disparity and transnational crime, there is the potential for 
maritime cooperation to generate new cooperative opportunities which further expands 
the interaction capacity. Understanding the ways in which Japan's response to piracy 
and maritime terrorism is contributing to the development of collaborative frameworks 
in Asia is one of the core aims of this thesis. 7' 
Nonetheless, the international society exerts a powerful influence upon the ways in 
which Japan can respond to maritime security issues. The current rules of international 
society, such as the law of the sea, and the reluctance of sovereign states to have foreign 
powers patrol their waters or even pursue pirates into their territorial sea limits the 
extent of an international response to the problem. Only by raising the level of 
cooperation concerning maritime security issues might the current constraints of the 
international society be broached. Such was Bull's hope when he perceived that only by 
working within the current international society could contemporary issues of security, 
environment, inequality and justice be overcome (Bull, 1995: 284). 72 
70 The notion of international relations occurring in different sectors simultaneously has strong links with 
Bull's image of international politics being conducted on different chessboards, such as a strategic nuclear 
deterrence chessboard, a conventional military chessboard, international monetary affairs and 
international trade and investment chessboards, and a chessboard where influence derives from 
ideological appeal (Bull, 2002: 108). 
71 Marie-Anne Slaughter examines the phenomenon in her work: A New World Order. 72 lt should be noted that a decrease in the level of cooperation between states can occur when states 
disregard international rules and norms. Japan's response to North Korean spy ships in December 2001 is 
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2.5d Buzan and Recent Developments within the English School 
In his 2004 work, From International Society to World Society? English School Theory 
and the Social Structure of Globalization, Buzan seeks to clarify and elaborate on the 
current state of English School theory. In doing so, he re-examines the role and 
composition of world society, differentiates between global and sub-global 
developments, emphasises the economic sector, and redefines the boundaries between 
different kinds of international society (Buzan, 2004a: 11-22). Buzan also addresses the 
concerns of some American scholars that the English School's notion of the 
international society does not comprise a theory as it fails to produce testable 
hypotheses (Copeland, 2003: 427-428), by locating the English School within a 
European understanding of theory whereby theory "organises a field systematically, 
structures questions and establishes a coherent and rigorous set of interrelated concepts 
and categories" (Buzan, 2004a: 24). 
In redefining the boundaries of the international system, international society and world 
society, Buzan merges the international system and international society, which he then 
terms the interstate society. His rationale for doing so is that there is a need to 
distinguish between the different types of interstate societies that exist along a 
pluralist/solidarist spectrum. Hence, interstate societies range from asocial at the 
extreme pluralist end of the spectrum, progressively through power political, 
coexistence, cooperative, and convergence interstate societies, until confederative 
interstate societies are reached at the extreme solidarist end of the spectrum. Buzan 
argues that Bull's international system would be located in the power political interstate 
society and that Bull's international society would be found in the coexistence interstate 
society. The term `international society' is dropped in favour of the interstate society 
because states - not nations - are the primary actors in English School theory. World 
society is divided between transnational and interhuman societies, where the principal 
a case in point whereby JCG ships, in firing at the North Korean spy ship in China's EEZ, were not 
heeding international law. 
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actors are transnational groups and human beings respectively (Buzan, 2004a: 100,107, 
158-160). 
Constructivism plays a central role in Buzan's understanding of interstate and world 
society. By postulating that the units formulate interstate society, Buzan is employing 
Wendt's notion that "anarchy is what states make of it" (Buzan, 2004a: 95). Buzan goes 
on to incorporate Wendt's concept of mode/depth socialization, which focuses on 
whether societies are formed by coercive means employed by actors, the calculation of 
actors or the beliefs of actors. The more belief plays a role in creating a society the more 
stable that society becomes. It is therefore necessary to ask about mode/depth 
socialization for every interstate society (Buzan, 2004a: 102-108). The concept of 
calculation can be associated with pluralism in English School theory, in that states 
determine rules amongst themselves that will enable them to better co-exist. These basic 
rules were embodied in Bull's institutions of the international society. The notion of 
belief is connected with solidarism in that as the institutions of the interstate society 
become more elaborate, so states realize that by evolving common values between 
themselves interstate society can be further strengthened beyond pluralism (Buzan, 
2004a: 143-146). 73 This process can be observed in the creation and development of the 
European Union, which progressed through a series of increasingly sophisticated 
institutions to become what Buzan describes as "the thickest, most ambitious and most 
highly developed interstate society ever seen" and "the only example of a convergence 
interstate society ever seen, and the only one that even begins to approach a world 
society" (Buzan, 2004a: 211,208-209). 74 
73 Buzan associates calculation with the term gesellschaf (society) and belief with gemeinschaft 
(community), whereby "society [gesellschaft] becomes essentially about agreed arrangements concerning 
expected behaviour (norms, rules, institutions), and community [gemeinschaft] becomes essentially about 
shared identity (we-feeling)" (Buzan, 2004a: 111). Hence the construction of the interstate society is more 
a combination of societal factors (rule, norm and institution making) and communal factors (creating 
shared forms of identity). This differs from Buzan's earlier work in which he marginalized communal 
factors and emphasised societal factors, arguing that the gesellschaft conception of society, which is the 
conception that society is formed by acts of will, as opposed to the gemeinschaft notion of society, that 
comprehends society as emerging naturally, is at the heart of the evolution of international society (Buzan, 
1993: 331-336). 
74 For more on the development of the EU see Christiansen in Baylis and Smith, 2001,495-500. 
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The institutions of an interstate society determine both the attributes and the raison- 
d'etre of that interstate society. These institutions have evolved over time to comprise 
the actors of the interstate society as well as to define how the actors relate to each other. 
Buzan identifies primary institutions, 75 which are "durable and recognized patterns of 
shared practices rooted in values held commonly by members of interstate societies, and 
embodying a mixture of norms, rules and principles" (Buzan, 2004a: 181) and their 
derivatives, 76 as well as secondary institutions (Buzan, 2004a: 166-167,179-182). 77 The 
functional role of these institutions is to determine `membership' of the interstate 
society, establish norms of `authoritative communication', define the "limits to the use 
of force', `allocate property rights' within the society, as well as to ensure the `sanctity 
of agreements' (Buzan, 2004a: 187-189). 
An important place in regulating interstate affairs, is, however, reserved for the Great 
Powers. In Buzan's book The US and the Great Powers, he examines how the current 
configuration of one Superpower, 78 the US, four Great Powers, 79 Russia, China, the EU 
and Japan, as well as numerous Regional Powers8° interact and combine to control 
interstate relations (Buzan, 2004b). It therefore becomes clear that in responding to 
maritime security threats, Japan is fulfilling its role as a Great Power whose duty it is to 
work through the institutions of the interstate society to ensure that order is maintained 
in the interstate society. 
The institutions of an interstate society can change over time and vary in the extent to 
which they influence a particular interstate society (Buzan, 2004a: 181; Buzan, 2005: 
75 Primary institutions comprise sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, market, Great Power management, 
equality of people, environmental stewardship, and nationalism (Buzan, 2004a: 187). 
76 For example, international law and non-intervention are derivatives of sovereignty (Buzan, 2004a: 184). 
77 The UNHCR is an example of a secondary institution designed to uphold the primary institution of the 
equality of people (Buzan, 2004a: 187). 
78 Superpowers have the political, economic and military capabilities that can be extended to the global 
level. Furthermore, Superpowers play a role in upholding the security of all, or most, regions, as well as 
providing the core values of the interstate society. The legitimacy of the Superpower depends on these 
values being acceptable to all members of the interstate society (Buzan, 2004b: 69). 
79 Interstate actors react to Great Powers on the global and regional levels, as if that Great Power were 
able to acquire the military, economic and political resources to make a bid to become a Superpower 
(Buzan, 2004b: 69-70). 
80 Regional powers possess sufficient capabilities to determine how the security between states in any 
region is organized, but cannot extend these resources to a global level (Buzan, 2004b: 71). 
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185). For example, the primary institutions of sovereignty, territoriality and nationalism 
influence the interstate society of Southeast Asia more than they do the European Union 
(Buzan, 2004a: 237-238). Furthermore, the institutions of interstate society do not 
necessarily exist in harmony; in fact, pressures between them may lead to important 
developments in interstate societies (Buzan, 2004a: 186; Buzan, 2005: 187). In the case 
of maritime piracy in Southeast Asia, the institutions of the market and sovereignty are 
in conflict, as piracy threatens the free movement of goods, but sovereign boundaries 
prevent effective cross-border patrols. Resolving this tension has been one of Japan's 
main aims as a Great Power tackling maritime piracy in Southeast Asia and has the 
potential to reconfigure how Southeast Asian states conceptualise their maritime 
sovereignty. 
An English School perspective results in a far more layered and complex account of 
Japan's response to maritime security issues than other international relations theories. 
Realists, like Krasner, for example, argue that the rulers of states follow a logic of 
consequences, whereby rulers can ignore international laws and principles, which he 
terms the logic of appropriateness, when it is in their interests to do so (Krasner, 1999: 9, 
24,42,238). Whilst the English School acknowledges the possibility that the logic of 
consequences can trump the logic of appropriateness, rulers are also aware that the laws 
and principles of the interstate society work in their interests. Though Japan could 
dispatch warships to the Malacca Straits to protect Japanese mercantile interests, 
thereby transgressing the sovereign borders of littoral states in Southeast Asia, Japan 
has instead respected the sovereignty of states in the region. Great Powers have gone to 
great lengths to adhere to the logic of appropriateness, even when the adversary is an 
outlaw of the interstate society, as will be demonstrated in Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
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2.6 Human Security 
Buzan's work on the world society opens up a number of possibilities for exploring the 
relationship between the interstate society and the transnational actors and individuals 
who comprise the world society. One such prospect is to examine how security is 
viewed from the perspective of the world society and to explore ways of incorporating 
these perceptions of security into interstate security policies. Despite Acharya's 
comment that each International Relations theory has something to offer Human 
Security theorists (Acharya, 2004b: 355-356), the connection between the interparadigm 
framework of English School and Human Security has not yet been made. The 
advantage of amalgamating interstate and world society images of security is that the 
policies produced by such interaction will treat not only the symptoms of a problem, but 
also its causes. Hence, in the case of maritime piracy in Southeast Asia, the interstate 
response has been to increase coordination between and training of maritime security 
forces in the region, as well as to create frameworks for anti-piracy patrols. These 
policies do not tackle the underlying causes of piracy which include poverty, over- 
population, environmental degradation, and cultural factors (Vagg, 1995: 63-80). Hence, 
there is a failure to address human security from the standpoint of justice, in terms of 
the human right to economic opportunities, food, adequate health provision, a clean 
environment, personal safety, the right for a particular community to exist, and political 
representation (Edström, 2003: 211-213; Ogata, 2004: 25-28). Interstate attempts to 
address common security concerns, such as piracy, by enhancing order will be unable to 
resolve the fundamental causes of the specific security concern unless issues of human 
justice are addressed. 
2.6a Defining Human Securi 
Human Security takes human beings, rather than states, as the referent object of security. 
A security threat to an individual negatively affects the individual's quality of life. From 
the perspective of individuals existing within a state, an interstate society or a world 
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society, justice takes precedence over order. Non-state actors, including citizens groups 
and international NGOs, have a vital role to play in upholding the security of 
individuals and groups (McDonald, 2002: 279; Hampson, 2004: 350; Leaning, 2004: 
354-355). As globalisation and transnational conflicts impact on the lives of human 
beings in the post-Cold War world, so Human Security questions the primary interstate 
institution of sovereignty by striving to develop international humanitarian standards 
(Axworthy, 2004: 348-349; Hubert, 2004: 351). 81 
The key definitional problem for Human Security is in determining which security 
threats are included. There is division amongst Human Security scholars as to whether 
insecurity includes both freedom from want (insufficient food and clean water, 
environmental degradation, inadequate provision of health and education) and freedom 
from fear (violence perpetrated upon individuals). Such debates centre upon whether to 
keep development in international relations distinct from human security and when 
intervention should be sanctioned (Hubert, 2004: 351-352). Critics of Human Security 
argue that in casting the definitional net of security too wide, the concept of security 
loses its analytical value. Instead different issues, such as war, poverty and governance, 
should be treated separately in order for them to be understood (Mack, 2004: 367) and 
that Human Security should be focussed on freedom from fear if it is to have any utility 
for policymakers (Krause, 2004: 367-368). 82 
Yet, separating freedom from fear and freedom from want does not reflect trends in the 
post-Cold War world where conflicts, poverty, inequality and abuses of human rights 
83 combine to disrupt relations within and between states (Thomas, 2001,162-164). Such 
81 Though advocates of Human Security wanted to take advantage of changes in the international system 
at the end of the Cold War to promote their agenda, the concept of Human Security has its origins in the 
1980s notion of common security (Timothy, 2004: 19-24). 
82 Though Macfarlane agrees that the Human Security agenda is too wide for it to be useful for 
policymakers, he also notes that "[p]rotection from violence gives little solace to the starving or those 
threatened by potentially fatal preventable diseases or when individuals lack the resources to control their 
lives" (Macfarlane, 2004: 369). 
83 Thomas elucidates her point by quoting Smith, "When a privileged elite defends its too large share of 
too few resources, the link is created between poverty, inequality and the abuse of human rights. The 
denial of basic freedoms - to organise, to express yourself, to vote, to disagree - forces people to choose 
between accepting gross injustice and securing a fairer share by violent means. As conflict unfolds, the 
political leaders that emerge often find that the easiest way of mobilising support is on an ethnic basis. 
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interconnected threats to human beings have lead Thomas and Tow to conclude that 
integrated policies need to be implemented to respond to the military, economic, 
societal and political dimensions of a human security crisis. Furthermore, when 
domestic and international security concerns overlap, the international community has a 
right to intervene to restore order and justice, such as the use of military personnel in 
peacebuilding programmes (Thomas and Tow, 2002a: 188-189). These issues have been 
taken up by English School proponents, such as Little (Little, 2003: 452-453), and 
further by Buzan, who argues that in a solidarist interstate society, which is more 
concerned with justice than a pluralist interstate society, interventions are possible 
because the institution of sovereignty is weaker (Buzan, 2004a: 219-220). 
2.6b Critique of Human Securi 
The aim of Human Security as a framework was to create a policy-relevant approach to 
dealing with the protection and well being of individuals. However, it is difficult to see 
how a policy could be put into effect considering the multitude of issues that Human 
Security examines, as well as potential areas of conflict that exist between Human 
Security issues. How should states reconcile environmental concerns with the need for 
economic development, for example, if the one undermines the other? States are left to 
develop a response to such problems raising the criticism that states will only seek to 
address the human security concerns that benefit their national interest rather than 
attempt to secure all individuals everywhere. 84 There is a general belief running through 
the arguments of Human Security advocates that all people value security in the same 
way, thereby discarding cultural, ethnographic, social and religious understandings 
people may have of security (McDonald, 2002: 280-283). Furthermore, by leaving 
human security in the hands of states, the fact that states are often the entity that 
Thus do the various causes of conflict weave in and out. War will only end if, and when, and where its 
causes are removed. "(Smith, 1997: 15). 
84 It is worth reasserting Bull's position emphasized by Wheeler and Dunne, that without justice there can 
be no order (Wheeler and Dunne, 1996: 99-100). In other words, if the issues of justice that Human 
Security highlights, such as poverty, starvation and environmental degradation, are not treated, 
individuals and groups may act in violent ways to sustain themselves, thereby disrupting order. This 
thesis will investigate the link between order and justice in Chapters 4 to 6. 
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deprives individuals of their security is forgotten and the potential for human security 
concerns to generate change from within the state is lost (Bellamy and McDonald, 
2002: 373-374; Mack, 2004: 366). 
2.6c Human Security and World Society 
The English School provides a broad response to these criticisms which is primarily 
rooted in the interplay between the interstate society and world society. Action groups 
and NGOs both represent the interests of individuals in the world society, thereby 
undermining claims that human security is the providence of the state alone. Moreover, 
Buzan's stress on geography enables the perspectives of different peoples vis-a-vis their 
security to be taken into account. Finally, though operationalising human security 
interests may be complex, by encouraging communication between states and actors in 
the world society, so policy approaches can be advanced. Gilson and Purvis argue that 
the Japanese government should seek to incorporate NGOs into their foreign policy- 
making framework. This would benefit Japan's foreign policy because NGOs are better 
at working at the local level, as well as being able to act as watchdogs and advocates for 
change (Gilson and Purvis, 2003: 199,203-205). 
Because human security is associated most strongly with the notion of justice rather 
than order, policies that take individual and transnational perspectives of security into 
account are more likely to be formulated within confederate interstate societies where 
solidarism is at its most pronounced. Nevertheless, even in more pluralist interstate 
societies, concerns with justice can help to draw transnational and human actors into 
interstate affairs, raising the possibility of the emergence of a more solidarist interstate 
society over time. A conscientious effort, on the part of state, transnational and human 
actors, to enhance the interaction capacity between themselves is vital to advance justice 
and human security projects. Hence, in contrast to McDonald's criticism concerning 
which area of human security should be privileged when two human security issues 
clash, such as environmental security versus economic security (McDonald, 2002: 280- 
283), Buzan has argued that tensions between the primary institutions in the interstate 
society create opportunities for actors to cooperate and resolve the tensions, thereby 
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enabling the interstate, transnational and interhuman societies to evolve (Buzan, 2005: 
187). This thesis will examine how Japan is interacting with transnational and human 
actors in tackling contemporary maritime security threats and evaluate what the benefit 
of this interaction is in terms of resolving issues of justice. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
The three main theories of international relations, realism, liberalism and constructivism, 
fail to give an adequate account of Japan's response to maritime security issues. This 
thesis therefore adopts the more comprehensive English School as its theoretical 
framework. The primary focus of this thesis is upon the tensions created by maritime 
threats between the institutions of the interstate society and how Japanese policy makers 
have attempted to resolve such tensions. For example, Japanese policy makers are 
concerned about piratical attacks hindering trade through vital SLOCs. These pirates 
thrive in part because they have taken advantage of increased interaction capacity, such 
as modern weaponry, equipment and transport, and embedded social processes, such as 
a cultural acceptance of piracy in their native provinces and the norm of sovereignty that 
prevents foreign naval vessels pursuing maritime criminals across sovereign borders. As 
outlaws highlight deficiencies in the interstate institutions at managing order, so 
members of the interstate society, particularly Great Powers like Japan, will seek to 
transform the interstate society itself. This is not a theme unique to the current world 
order, as outlaws have plagued the security of international societies throughout history 
requiring a myriad of responses, from the creation of laws to force exercised by 
legitimate actors. Rather, resolving the threat posed to the international society by 
outlaws is a key reason for progress in international societies (Buzan and Little, 2000: 
66,136,177,200,204,400). 85 Hence, this thesis is concerned with maritime security 
cooperation between actors in the interstate, transnational and interhuman societies that 
leads to institutionalisation and a move towards a more solidarist interstate society in 
East and Southeast Asia. 
Depending upon the maritime security issue at stake, different institutions will play 
more or less important roles. Hence, as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, in combating 
maritime piracy in Southeast Asia, Japanese policy-makers place greater emphasis on 
the institutions of sovereignty, territoriality, and diplomacy, rather than on the equality 
8S Diplomatic interaction between Greek city-states to tackle the threat of piracy provides an illustrative 
example. The norm of proxenoi, a precursor to the modem-day ambassador whereby an individual would 
represent their native city-state in another city-state where they would reside, developed in part to counter 
the scourge of piracy (Buzan and Little, 2000: 210). 
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of people, nationalism and environmental stewardship. Emphasis on issues of 
sovereignty, territoriality and diplomacy, has led the response to piracy towards top- 
down solutions, such as the creation of an Information Sharing Centre in Singapore and 
the establishment of trilateral patrols in the Malacca Straits, that combat the symptoms 
of piracy. Japan's financial power and technical expertise in the maritime security field 
combined with the strength of the Japan Coast Guard as a model institution for 
Southeast Asian states to adopt, allows for Southeast Asian states to develop their 
maritime security capabilities in line with the norms and standards of the interstate 
society. Indeed, anti-piracy and anti-terrorism conferences and exercises sponsored by 
Japan are changing the practices of cooperation between states (Umezawa interview, 2 
April 2004). Japan is therefore playing the role of a responsible regional leader. 86 
Nonetheless, policymakers play down the significance of how human equality issues, 
nationalism and the environment exacerbate maritime violence and crime. Only by 
treating these three issues, which are primarily located in the world society, can bottom- 
up solutions be found that tackle the causes of maritime threats. Accordingly, this thesis 
will also seek to establish potential areas in which Human Security can contribute to 
develop the ways in which the interstate and world societies interact. 
Establishing links between the interstate and world societies encourages an examination 
of how the Southeast Asian region is developing. For example, whilst reliance on the 
institutions of sovereignty, territoriality and diplomacy, in dealing with piracy in 
Southeast Asia is suggestive of a cooperative interstate society based on order, a greater 
consideration of equality, nationalist and environmental issues could facilitate the 
emergence of a more solidarist interstate society based on justice and with more links to 
the transnational and human societies in Southeast Asia. By doing so, a progressive 
interpretation of regional politics is proposed in which interstate meetings between 
policymakers in a certain issue area are key to understanding regional developments. 
The means adopted by policymakers at these meetings are as important as the ends 
86 Watson explains core-periphery relations in the interstate society, by stating that the core "provides 
material goods, or money to buy them; technology, training and know-how; and markets in core 
economies for goods from the periphery" (Watson, 2001: 469). 
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those meetings are designed to meet. Hence, establishing links between the interstate 
society and transnational and human societies leads to ways of eradicating piracy that 
go beyond merely enhancing interstate patrols. For example, adopting means that 
enforce stricter environmental controls upon shipping transiting the Malacca Straits and 
upon coastal industries enables fishermen to take advantage of higher fish stocks and 
thereby avoid resorting to piratical acts to supplement their income. 
For Japanese policy-makers, however, the international structure in Southeast Asia 
appears unalterable in that the institution of sovereignty and the norm of non- 
interference inhibit responses to piracy and maritime terrorism. 87 These policy-makers 
therefore define their interests and take action in accordance with the conditions of this 
deep-rooted international structure. The next chapter will define each of the case studies 
in terms of the interstate, transnational and interhuman societies and determine which 
institutions exercise the greatest influence over Japanese policy making. 
87 Wendt notes that rationalists may be correct in their assumptions in stating that the structure of 
international society is fixed if the transformation of international society proceeds at such a slow pace as 
to make actor's interests and identities appear as given and if actors act as though their interests and 
identities are given (Wendt, 1995: 162). 
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3. Definitions 
This chapter defines the three case studies of the thesis as barbarian, pirate or infidel 
from an English School perspective that emphasises societal groupings in international 
affairs. By their actions, North Korea, pirates, separatists and maritime terrorists do not 
conform to the rules and norms of the international society and are therefore determined 
to exist on the periphery, if not wholly outside, the international society. These outlaws 
take advantage of tensions between the institutions of the interstate society in order to 
satisfy their interests. In seeking to rectify these deficiencies, members of the interstate 
society can combat the symptoms of maritime crime and violence. However, only by 
confronting the causes of contemporary maritime security threats can outlaw actors be 
socialized into joining or abiding by the rules and norms of the interstate society. 
Successful interstate cooperation both to eradicate maritime security concerns as well as 
to socialise outlaws can serve as an initial step towards the establishment of a more 
solidarist interstate society. 
This chapter begins by providing a broad exposition of how the categories of barbarian, 
pirate and infidel can be interpreted from an English School standpoint. Then the North 
Korean actions are explored to show how and why North Korea can be delineated as a 
barbarian state. Next, contemporary maritime terrorism and piracy are contrasted, so as 
to identify these activities as being perpetrated by outlaws and to present the causal 
differences between these two types of maritime offence. Furthermore, the limitations 
of current international legal definitions will be listed to present why current state-led 
responses to maritime terrorism and crime are hindered in their scope and impact. 
Finally, this chapter concludes by returning to the core issue of justice versus order in 
international relations. The wide ranging interests of the English School demonstrate 
how interstate responses need to take account of causal factors in the interhuman and 
transnational societal domains and how outlaw actors must be socialised if maritime 
violence and crime are to be effectively eliminated. 
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Defining Outlaws from an English School Perspective 
This thesis explores how Japan, a member of the interstate society, tackles maritime 
security threats posed by actors in, or rather on the periphery of, the interstate society 
(North Korea), in the transnational society (terrorists, separatists and transnational 
criminal groups), and the interhuman society (pirates). Yet, despite their location within 
these respective societies, North Korea, terrorists, separatists and pirates, because of 
their actions, are not fully-fledged members of the societies themselves. An example of 
how societies define full membership can be presented by examining the fate of a 
convicted criminal who, having broken the law, is removed from mainstream society 
and placed in prison. Similarly, only those actors who are recognized by their fellows to 
fulfil their responsibilities and obligations within their society can be designated a full 
member of that society (Adler, 2005: 181). 88 The criterion for membership of the 
interstate society entails compliance with the primary institutions of the interstate 
society (Adler, 2005: 175). 89 This involves recognition of territorial boundaries, 
compliance with international law, reliance upon diplomacy, defending the equality of 
people, adherence to the market, a commitment to safeguard the environment, respect 
for national identities and a willingness to defer to and support Great Power 
management (Buzan, 2004a). 
Whilst the bar for membership appears high, such that no state may fulfil all criteria at 
any given time, Buzan denotes six different interstate societies ranging from Asocial (at 
the extreme pluralist end of the interstate society spectrum) to Confederative (at the 
extreme solidarist end of the interstate society spectrum). 90 He delineates the East Asian 
interstate society, which for Buzan encompasses both Northeast and Southeast Asia, as 
88 Buzan describes the interstate society as an inclusive society in the sense that any state fulfilling the 
criteria for membership, should, in theory, be able to join if they so choose (Buzan, 2004b: 22). 
89 Adler describes interstate institutions as "intersubjective structures" which are "webs of meaning 
sustained by social communication... [and] constitute the content and boundaries of identities, practices 
and institutions. " Actors establish these structures and would be purposeless without them (Adler, 2005: 
176). In the interstate society, states, or rather sub-state actors representing their state, create primary 
institutions, not only to regulate interstate relations, but also as a means of constructing reciprocal 
identities. 
90 The criteria for membership of the interstate society outlined in the previous paragraph would most 
closely resemble those of a Confederate society, though membership is contingent upon regional factors 
and circumstances. 
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a coexistence interstate society with elements of a cooperative interstate society. The 
East Asian interstate society is therefore characterized by "little or no overall shared 
culture beyond that provided by the global level... [a] strong adherence to sovereignty, 
territoriality and nationalism... [with] a limited version of the market. [Whereby] 
[e]conomic nationalism remains strong, but with the understanding that the national 
economic development of each depends on a degree of openness to trade and 
investment, and acceptance of some market rules" (Buzan, 2004a: 238). 91 Buzan adds 
that without the US commitment to the security of the region, the interstate institution of 
war might play a more prominent role in the relations between East Asian states, but 
that the rise of China may also destabilize the balance of power in the region pushing 
states to focus on relative rather than absolute gains (Buzan, 2004a: 238). Hence, the 
key to membership in the East Asian region is observance of sovereignty, territoriality 
and nationalism, a commitment to fundamental market values, and deference to and 
acceptance of US dominance in the region. 
Defining the outlaws (barbarians, infidels and pirates) of the East Asian interstate 
society therefore involves identifying those groups that observe none of or act in 
defiance of these membership criteria. It is important to reiterate how these three broad 
groups differ, however. Pirates can immediately be separated from the other two 
categories, as pirates act for economic gains rather than out of a political motive. What 
differentiates infidels from barbarians is that infidels define themselves and are defined 
by states in the interstate society in mutually exclusive terms. 2 Whereas states in the 
interstate society can negotiate with barbarians, as well as recognise and potentially 
91 In stating that there is little common culture in the East Asian region, Buzan is dismissing, or at least 
playing down the importance of, the `ASEAN way' as a prevalent norm in the region (Buzan, 2004a: 238). 
Weatherbee defines the core aspects of the `ASEAN way' as a "mutual respect for sovereign authority 
and the nonuse of force towards one another" (Weatherbee, 2005: 121). Since these aspects are mirrored 
in Buzan's description of the East Asian interstate society, so the `ASEAN way' itself can be perceived as 
reflecting the nature of the interstate society, rather than a common culture (Bellamy in Beeson (ed. ), 
2004: 169-170). 
92 As Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, one of the founders of Jemaah Islamiya, has stated, "Allah has divided 
humanity into two segments, namely the followers of Allah and those who follow Satan" (Quoted in 
Abuza, 2003: 127). Such statements can be compared with comments made by President George W. Bush 
of the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that separated states into those that were for the 
US or for the terrorists. President Bush's `axis of evil' 2002 State of the Union Address similarly aimed 
to define which states were outside the interstate society. For historical examples of societies that are 
mutually opposed to one-another see Buzan, 2004b: 21. 
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guarantee the rights of those barbarians, diplomacy with infidels, who believe not in the 
interstate society but in an alternative structure, is impossible. Hence, the means 
available to states, like Japan, when dealing with outlaws, depends upon the type of 
outlaw. 
The problems caused by the outlaws examined in this thesis create tensions between the 
primary institutions of the interstate society. In order to resolve these tensions, Great 
Powers and/or the Superpower establish coalitions with other states through coercion, 
calculation and belief. These coalitions attempt to tackle the problem created by the 
outlaw by encouraging the enforcement of interstate society rules through normative 
means (providing knowledge and training) or material means (providing equipment). 
However, as Adler notes, in the post-9/11 world, re-examining conceptualisations of 
`self' through the enforcement of interstate rules, is as important as reforming images of 
`other' (Adler, 2005: 179). Hence, in the context of maritime security threats posed by 
outlaws in the interstate society, the definition of actors merely as outlaws, without 
addressing why actors behave in contention with the dictates of the interstate society, 
needs to be avoided (Buzan, 2004b: 22). Only by comprehending why outlaws act in the 
ways they do, can the means to socialize outlaws, transforming their identity through 
either coercion, calculation or belief, be constructed (Buzan, 2004b: 25-28). Whilst 
Litwak argues in favour of both coercive (sticks) and calculation-based means (carrots) 
in respectively containing and engaging `rogue states' in the international society 
(Litwak, 2000: 1-15), 93 ultimately, to join the interstate, transnational or interhuman 
society as full members, actors must believe in the tenets that bind actors together 
socially. Only by addressing the concerns of these outlaw actors, through perceiving 
security from their, a `human security', perspective, will these outlaws come to believe 
that social international arrangements best meet their needs. Hence, the strategies 
available to states in combating outlaws in the interstate society mirror Wendt's 
mode/depth of internalisation detailed in the previous chapter. The remainder of this 
chapter will profile the three cases studies in terms of the barbarian, infidel and pirate 
93 Whilst Litwak's interest lies in how and why states are defined as rogues, his argument can equally be 
applied to the definition of any outlaw. 
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labels, as well as highlighting the causes of outlaw behaviour and the inadequacies of 
the interstate society's response. 
3.1 North Korea and the interstate socie 
North Korea is often labelled a `rogue regime' because of its WMD programmes, which 
could potentially disrupt the balance of power in Northeast Asia or be exported, as well 
as its ideological, political and economic isolation from the interstate society. Indeed, 
President Bush counted North Korea among the `axis of evil' in his State of the Union 
Address in January 2002.4 Whilst the North Korean missile and WMD threats loom 
largest for Japan, abductions of Japanese citizens, clandestine operations and drug 
smuggling all conducted by North Korean spy ships, which violate Japan's sovereign 
territory, have further undermined relations between North Korea and Japan. From an 
English School perspective, therefore, territoriality and the balance of power are the key 
institutions influencing Japan's policy vis-a-vis North Korea. Yet, ongoing talks 
between Pyongyang and five members of the interstate society (Japan, South Korea, the 
US, China and Russia), as well as bilateral meetings have served to maintain North 
Korea's links with the interstate society, indicating the importance of the institutions of 
sovereignty, diplomacy and Great Power management. Relations between Japan and 
North Korea can be explained in terms of a power political interstate society governed 
by a mutual animosity which is tempered only by ongoing negotiations. 
However, North Korea is the exception in the Northeast Asian interstate society which 
is a society defined more by formal diplomatic relations, as evidenced by Japanese 
consulates and embassies in other Northeast Asian states, and a shared acceptance of 
international law. 95 Though war remains a possibility in Northeast Asia, evidence of 
94 David Frum, a Whitehouse speech writer in the first Bush administration, noted that North Korea had 
been added to the speech "as an afterthought" (Mann, 2004: 318). However, President Bush has also 
referred to Kim Il Jong as a "pygmy" and a "spoilt child at a dinner table", indicating the degree of 
hostility felt by the president of the US towards the North Korean leader (Newsweek, 27 May 2002). See 
also, "Now What? " The Economist, 13 August 2005. 
95 The choice to divide what Buzan terms the East Asian interstate society into Northeast and Southeast 
Asian interstate societies stems primarily from the unique situation in the Northeast Asian interstate 
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economic and even military cooperation between some states suggests that the 
Northeast Asian interstate society is best categorised as a coexistence, and even at times 
a cooperative, interstate society (Buzan, 2004a: 159-160). The term barbarian state can 
usefully be applied to North Korea in this context, as Pyongyang recognises and is 
recognised by the interstate society, but whose relations with the interstate society are 
mostly antagonistic, with the exception of China, with North Korea's leaders choosing 
to remain apart from the established Northeast Asian interstate society. North Korea's 
designation as a barbarian state will now be examined in light of the interstate 
institutions that denote full membership of the interstate society. 
North Korea -a barbarian state 
North Korea violates several of the key interstate institutions of the Northeast Asian 
interstate society. First, North Korea does not defer to Great Power management in 
international affairs, adhering instead to its own isolationist, jucke ideology to define its 
foreign policy. Second, North Korea, through its pursuit of WMD and missile 
programmes, as well as transgressions by its spy ships into foreign territory, does not 
comply with international law. Finally, the equality of people is not recognized by the 
North Korean state. This is true both among North Korean citizens, many of whom have 
suffered from starvation under Kim Jong I1's rule, and for foreign people, such as 
Japanese abducted by North Korean commandos. Each of these points will be addressed 
in more detail, before noting the reforms that may open up the possibility of the 
socialization of North Korea into the Northeast Asian interstate society over time. 
North Korea has eschewed full membership of the interstate society through its juche 
ideology. Juche is the principle by which Pyongyang asserts its right to exist 
independently of and defend itself against foreign interference or pressure in its affairs. 
Whilst Kim Jong Il's government is more than willing to bargain with foreign powers in 
order to acquire economic, technological, energy and food aid, it has done little to curb 
society caused by the presence of North Korea, a barbarian state, as well as antagonism between Taiwan 
and China. 
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its illicit activities or end its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes. In fact, North 
Korea's ability to target foreign antagonists with WMD lies at the heart of the juche 
rationale, as this capability prevents the outright invasion of North Korea (Park, 2000: 
544-546; McCormack, 2004: 97-98). 
North Korea has also sought to preserve itself through illicit sales of weaponry and 
drugs as a means of obtaining hard currency (McCormack, 2004: 97-98), whilst 
pursuing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and nuclear weapons programme 
to ensure its defence against foreign aggressors. 96 This rationale is ever strengthened as 
North Korea's WMD programme and ICBM technology develops. The more advanced 
North Korea's weapons and means of delivering them, the stronger Kim Jong Il's 
bargaining position becomes, as it provides the communist leader both with deterrence 
capability (Laney and Shaplen, 2003: 19-21) as well as more military resources to 
haggle with. Pyongyang is already in the business of selling its long-range missiles to 
foreign powers for hard cash and it is speculated that as its nuclear stockpile grows, 
nuclear material will be traded or expended in a missile test (Park, 2000: 542-544; 
Samore, 2003: 7,21). 97 Either of these scenarios entails a further augmentation of 
tension on the peninsula and emphasises the failure of the interstate society to deal with 
Kim Jong Il's WMD programme. 
Illicit sales of narcotics and missile deals provide one of the few means by which North 
Korea can obtain capital. The disparity between the North Korean people and the North 
Korean elite in Pyongyang grew after the end of the Cold War. The demise of trade 
96 On 12 April 2003, French and German authorities in the Mediterranean interdicted the French cargo 
vessel, the Ville de Virgo. The vessel was transporting 214 ultra-strong aluminium pipes weighing 22 
metric tons, which could be used to construct advanced centrifuges for the production of highly enriched 
uranium, to North Korea. French and German authorities also detained a vessel carrying sodium cyanide 
to North Korea in early 2003 and in April 2003, Japanese officials asked the Hong Kong authorities to 
inspect a shipment of high-tech transformers to North Korea that could be used in the production of 
missiles and nuclear weapons. In August 2003, Taiwanese officials seized 150 barrels of phosphorus 
pentasulphide, which is used in the production of VX nerve gas, from the North Korean container ship, 
the Be Gae Bong. As far as narcotics are concerned, the Australian authorities arrested the crew, including 
a senior member of the ruling Korean Workers' Party, and impounded 125 kilograms of heroin from the 
North Korean ship, the Pong Su, in April 2003 (Richardson, 2004: 102-106). 
97 By 2000, North Korea was already estimated to be the world's largest missile exporter. Between 1987 
and 1992, the CIA estimates that North Korea earned US$580 million from missile deals alone (Park, 
2000: 543). 
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relations with former Soviet bloc states, coupled with severe natural disasters beginning 
in 1995, exacerbated by years of official mismanagement of the agricultural sector, 98 
hastened the collapse of the North Korean economy by the end of the 1990s. The death 
toll resulting from starvation and disease is numbered in the millions and set to rise 
providing that North Korea continues to lack the energy to heat and light its hospitals 
and the food to feed its people 99 Furthermore, visitors to the country note the decaying 
infrastructure in terms of inactive factories and workers, a distinct lack of transportation, 
frequent electricity shortages and an absence of most consumer goods in the stores (Oh 
and Hasig, 1999: 287-289,296-298; Brown, 1999: 127-129; McCormack, 2004: 97- 
98). 100 By the turn of the century it had become clear that Kim Jong Il's regime could 
not provide the most basic human needs without the support of foreign food aid (Kim, 
2000: 162). 101 
Japan has repeatedly pledged foreign aid to Pyongyang in return for the cessation of 
North Korea's WMD programme, an end to spy ship activities, and the return of 
abducted Japanese citizens. The abductee issue has remained at the forefront of Japan's 
North Korea policy, since Kim Jong II admitted that North Korean commandos ferried 
by spy ships to the Japanese mainland had captured Japanese citizens to be used to teach 
Japanese language and culture to North Korean spies (Uriu, 2003: 86-88). This 
highlights a further human rights violation by North Korea that contravenes interstate 
society norms. The question remains as to whether North Korea can be socialised into 
the interstate society through reform. 
98 It should be noted that North Korea's intensive farming practices during the Cold War destroyed 
natural ecosystems, such as forested hillsides, which could have lessened the impact of these natural 
disasters upon the people by limiting the extent of flooding in rural areas. 
9' By 2000, North Korea had the highest malnutrition rate in East Asia according to a special report by the 
World Food Programme and the U. N. Food and Agriculture Organization (Kim, 2001: 27). 
100 Economic statistics emanating from Pyongyang are unreliable, both because of the inefficiencies of the 
system and the desire to disguise the regimes problems. Nevertheless, the GDP is estimated to have fallen 
5 percent per year since 1990, half of its GNP is debt, factories (outside the military sector) are said to be 
running at less than 30 percent capacity, and foreign trade has declined by over 55 percent (Oh and 
Ilassig, 1999: 297). 
101 The crisis has even affected North Korea's military forces, which reduced the number of exercises and 
are believed to have received significantly less military equipment in 1998 (Brown, 1999: 129). 
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Reform? The Possibilities of Socialization 
As the primary, centralised North Korean economy collapsed over the course of the 
1990s, so a secondary black market economy evolved amongst the people based on 
barter, illegal production, robbery and corruption, ' 02 whilst a further elite or `court' 
economy developed amongst the higher echelons of the party. Though there remains 
little left of the primary economy to reform, these secondary economies, which are 
based upon such capitalist economic principles as supply and demand pricing, are 
experiencing and inducing reform. In a sense, the government has lost control of the 
means of production and must do what it can to organise and regulate the secondary 
economies which now dominate North Korea's economy (Oh and Hassig, 1999: 289- 
291). Kim Jong 11 has been left with little choice but to reform and adapt to the new 
economic realities of North Korea. 
The reforms instigated to tackle North Korea's ongoing economic troubles may open 
the country up to foreign investment and encourage competition amongst domestic 
businesses. 103 Since 1995, farm workers have been allowed to keep surplus production, 
which they can sell or eat, after meeting state quotas. People's markets have also 
emerged as a trading venue throughout the country, enabling the sale of surplus food, 
manufactured goods, handicrafts and household goods. Even foreign investment 
projects are increasingly perceived to be a means of obtaining hard currency, 
particularly since the inauguration of the Hyundai-sponsored Mount Kumgang tourist 
project, which has brought South Korean sightseers to view this picturesque region of 
North Korea (Oh and Hassig, 1999: 291-294). ' 04 By 2001 the reform programme was 
102 The military have always been heavily engaged in the operation of this secondary economy, selling 
products from military owned industries on the black market (Oh and Hassig, 1999: 290). The use of spy 
ships to transport shipments of amphetamines abroad could be said to be part of the army run sector of the 
economy. In this sense it may be possible that certain spy ship operations occur without the knowledge of 
the government in Pyongyang. 
103 Although, efforts at reform of the North Korean economy can be dated back to the early 1960s when 
local responsibility initiatives were encouraged to promote production and reduce bureaucratic 
interference, Pyongyang's constant meddling prevented any measurable change in business, industry and 
agricultural practice. It was not until the collapse of the food distribution system in 1995 that centralised 
government interference in the secondary economies began to wane (Oh and Hassig, 1999: 291-294). 
04 Even this enterprise has experienced hitches, when, for example, a South Korean tourist was arrested 
and deported for allegedly suggesting their North Korean tour guide defect (Kim, 2000: 161). Further 
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said to be advancing, with new significance attached to the field of information 
technology, construction work undertaken to limit the effects of drought and 
agricultural reorganization to improve food production (Ahn, 2002: 47-48). 105 In 2005, 
North Korea received $1 billion in aid from South Korea and substantial energy and 
food aid from China. The Kaesong special economic zone also continued to develop 
with 4,100 North Koreans employed by 15 South Korean companies in 2005 and with 
hundreds more South Korean corporations interested in building factories in the 
economic zone (Woo, 2006: 51-52). 
Yet, the depth and scope of economic reforms have been hindered by fears amongst the 
ruling oligarchy that greater integration with the global economy, whilst bringing much 
needed capital, would also allow Western ideas of capitalism and democracy to 
permeate into North Korea, thereby threatening the existence of the Pyongyang regime. 
The ideological impact that reforms 106 have had upon the country has necessitated 
tighter social control from the Pyongyang government which fears the societal 
instability that may result. Internal volatility, as much as external threats, may be the 
reasoning behind North Korea's continued insistence on a `military-first policy' which 
ensures that financial and material resources are prioritised for the army rather than the 
people (Ahn, 2002: 47-48). 107 Pyongyang has, therefore, steered a middle course, 
instigating reforms where necessary, whilst upholding its iron rule over the people, 
inter-Korean projects include the promotion of joint ventures, like the Kaesong industrial zone, whereby 
South Korea invests the capital and provides the technical know-how while North Korea supplies cheap 
labour (Kim, 2000: 161-162; Park, 2004: 146). However, the development of other economic zones, such 
as the Shinuiju Special District near the Chinese border, is doubtful, indicating the difficulties of the 
Pyongyang government in opening up areas of the country to foreign investment and influence (Ahn, 
2003: 52-53). 
pos Additional reforms in 2002 and 2003 included: abolishing the rationing system; adjusting the foreign 
exchange rate to a realistic level so as to close the gap between official and black market rates; the 
introduction of younger, reform-minded ministers in the government; the issuing of government bonds 
designed to draw private money circulating in the people's markets back into government coffers; and 
preparations to adopt a market system, such as changes in management techniques and thinking (Ahn, 
2003: 49-53; Park, 2004: 145-146). 
106 It is argued by some analysts of the Korean Peninsula that many of the so-called reforms are merely 
official acceptance of the current economic circumstances and the need for the people to adapt to them 
(Ahn, 2002: 47-48). 
107 Woo asserts that North Korean economic reforms are progressing, however, as Pyongyang attempts to 
combine aspects of both a market and a planned economy (Woo, 2006: 55). Whether Kim Jong Il's 
regime can develop a successful economy whilst retaining social control over the North Korean people 
remains to be seen. 
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obtaining hard cash through weapons and narcotics sales, and threatening foreign 
powers with its WMD programmes in return for the aid upon which North Korea 
relies. 
108 
Owing to violations of human rights, international law and isolationist policy, North 
Korea can be termed a barbarian state separate from the interstate society. Nonetheless, 
Kim Jong Il's willingness to initiate reform shows not only the necessity to transform 
aspects of North Korea's centralised economy, but also signals the possibility that North 
Korea could reconcile itself with aspects of the interstate society. In doing so, 
investment and cooperative opportunities may evolve with North Korea's neighbours 
that engender bonds of reciprocity and interdependence which might over time ease the 
tensions between Northeast Asian states caused by the stand off on the Korean 
peninsula, as well as diminish North Korea's reliance upon illicit trade. This is not to 
say that the reforms themselves have reached an evolved stage, rather that a process of 
reform has begun which will be difficult to reverse and could if nurtured lead to a 
fundamental transformation of the North Korean system. The decision of whether to 
engage or contain North Korea lies in the extent to which the interstate society believes 
it can trust Pyongyang, which in turn depends upon how a state comprehends the North 
Korean missile and WMD threats. Japan's foreign policy vis-ä-vis North Korean spy 
ships will take into account the wider issues of WMD in the fourth chapter. The 
remainder of this chapter defines contemporary maritime terrorism and piracy. 
108 North Korea's fleet of spy ships have been instrumental in enabling Kim Jong 11 to steer a middle 
course between reform and repression, by engaging in the illegal amphetamines trade, as well as ferrying 
North Korean spies to and from neighbouring countries and conducting surveillance missions to ascertain 
the intentions of North Korea's enemies. 
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3.2 Defining Contemporary Maritime Piracy and Terrorism 
There are two reasons why the definitions of maritime terrorism and piracy are being 
considered together in this section. 109 First, whilst the intrusion of North Korean spy 
ships into Japanese waters is an issue located in the Northeast Asian interstate society, 
Japan has primarily responded to the issues of piracy and maritime terrorism in 
Southeast Asia. Second, the way in which international law has evolved in its approach 
to treating piracy and maritime terrorism needs to be outlined in order to contrast the 
two forms of maritime violence. At no point are the threats posed by these two distinct 
forms of maritime violence being conflated into a single threat as some have posited 
they should be (Luft and Korin, 2004: 61-71). Rather the argument here is that only by 
understanding how piracy and maritime terrorism differ, can their root causes be 
tackled. l1° 
This section argues that both pirates and maritime terrorists do take advantage of 
inadequacies in and tensions between interstate institutions. Namely, both pirates and 
terrorists perpetrate attacks on ships on the high seas or in another state's sovereign 
territory, only to retreat within the sovereign boundaries of their own native state where 
foreign powers cannot legally enter. Such inadequacies of international law and tensions 
arising from a failure to police sovereign territories, hinder Japan's response to piracy 
and maritime terrorism. Nonetheless, resolving issues of international law and policing 
sovereign territory only enable the treatment of the symptoms of maritime violence and 
crime, not the causes. Understanding and combating the interconnected causes of 
maritime terrorism and piracy requires adopting a human security perspective, as 
discussed in the previous chapter. The shortcomings of international law and the issue 
of hot pursuit across sovereign borders are addressed first. Then the current 
configuration of maritime terrorism and piracy is outlined, followed by the 
109 The term `terrorism' will be divided into global terror groups (infidels) and separatists (barbarians) 
later in this chapter. Maritime terrorism refers to any illegal act of politically motivated violence or crime. 
The different types of global terror groups and separatists will be examined in Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
110 Henmi offers several reasons why piracy is distinct from maritime terrorism. First, unlike terrorists, 
pirates work for private ends. Second, pirates will target any ship in search of financial reward. Third, 
pirates are limited to a certain territory. Henmi concludes by noting that there is no evidence of any 
cooperation between pirates and terrorists (Henmi, 2005: 153-154). 
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interconnected causes of these two maritime security issues. Finally, attempts at 
reconciling international law are presented as evidence of how states and international 
organizations have sought to overcome piracy and maritime terrorism. The case studies 
in Chapters 5 and 6 then detail Japan's response to piracy and maritime terrorism 
respectively, arguing that whilst the strategies Japan has proposed have alleviated some 
of the symptoms of maritime violence and crime, the causes remain to be resolved. 
3.2a The Limits of International Law - an Outdated Convention 
Anarchy in the international system is regulated by states forming pacts or alliances, 
establishing international institutions, and through the construction of international law. 
Although such regulatory phenomena provide evidence that states do make what they 
can out of anarchy, rules governing the behaviour of states within an anarchic system 
also construct the boundaries in which states can act. In short, the establishment of laws 
in international society determines the dividing line between what is normal and what is 
abnormal behaviour amongst states. 
International law defines maritime piracy specifically under Article 15 of the 
Convention of the High Seas (hereafter referred to as the Convention), formulated in 
1958, and partially revised at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) in 1982.111 Article 101 of UNCLOS states that piracy consists of the 
following acts: 
Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by 
the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such 
ship or aircraft. 
Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State ; 112 
Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of 
facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
... See Appendix I for all piracy related articles in UNCLOS. See also, Birnie 1987, for a historical 
account of the development of the law of the sea. 
.. Z Menefee points out that the seizure of a ship by passengers and/or crew could be construed as piracy 
according to clause 15-(a)-2. An act of piracy need not therefore require another ship to be present 
(Menefee, 1990: 60). 
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Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or 
subparagraph (b) of this article. 
This definition serves to constrain what states can do to counter the problems of 
maritime piracy and terrorism. First, by specifying that acts of piracy occur only on the 
high seas, the Convention distinguishes between acts of maritime violence that take 
place within the territorial waters of a littoral state, 113 from those that transpire beyond. 
Maritime authorities from one state, such as Japan, must therefore honour the sovereign 
boundaries of other states and not intervene in another's territorial waters, even to 
pursue and apprehend a pirate ship (Mo, 2002: 347). ' 14 Second, by failing to address the 
issue of the length of the seizure of a boat by pirates, the Convention does not 
differentiate between different kinds or levels of piratical activity that arise or refer to 
how different varieties of piracy may be linked. This hinders the development of an 
anti-piracy response that deals comprehensively with the roots of different kinds of 
piracy or the relationships between them. Finally, by classifying acts of piracy as being 
committed only for private gain, the Convention omits acts of maritime violence, such 
as the hijacking of a ship, crew or cargo at sea, port or at anchor, for political purposes 
or the use of a vessel in a terrorist incident (Ronzitti, 1990: 1-2). Japan lacks the legal 
foundations to respond to an act of terrorism beyond its own sovereign waters, however 
much such an act might impact upon the economic well-being of Japan or affect the 
lives of its nationals. ' 15 
113 The territorial waters of a state extend for 12 nautical miles beyond the shoreline of that state. 
However, a state's contiguous zone lies at 24 nautical miles from the shoreline. Though the contiguous 
zone is defined as part of the high seas, intervention in another state's contiguous zone is problematic and 
is usually avoided (Birnie, 1987: 172). A contiguous zone differs from an exclusive economic zone in that 
a state, which claims a contiguous zone, may enforce domestic laws when vessels either have violated the 
state's domestic law within the state's territorial waters or threaten to do so 
(httV: //www. un. ore//Depts/los/convention aizreenients/texts/tinclos/closindx. htm. accessed 3 May 2006). 
114 See also, Villar, 1985: 28; Hyslop, 1989: 6-7; Pugh, 1993: 3-8; Vagg, 1995: 64; Chalk, 1998: 95,103; 
Renwick and Abbott, 1999: 183; Herrmann, 2002: 444-446. Most accounts of maritime piracy take note 
of the definitional issue, particularly as concerns Clause 15 (a) which states that an act of piracy occurs on 
the high seas. 
113 There is no basis in international law enabling states to board a terrorist vessel, even if intelligence 
suggests the vessel may undertake an act of terrorism. This is because terrorists are not judged to be 
crimina juris genlium (criminals of mankind) under either the 1982 LOS Convention or the 1988 SUA 
Convention (Ronzitti, 1990: 1-11). The SUA Treaty does, however, allow for a vessel to be boarded 
should that vessel endanger the navigational safety of other ships (Beckman, 2002: 329-330). The case of 
the So San, a vessel bound for Yemen from North Korea is instructive. The So San, which was suspected 
of transporting weapons of mass destruction, could only be boarded and inspected by a Spanish navy unit 
after it was ascertained that there was no registered ship with the name So San and because it was not 
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The legal definition of piracy framed in 1958 upholds the sovereignty of states and fails 
to account for the diversity of contemporary maritime crimes. Rather than enabling 
governments to deal with the problem of piracy and maritime violence in all its forms, 
the Convention constrains governments. In so doing, the Convention is outdated as it is 
no longer suited to tackle the problems at hand. The next section will illuminate in 
greater depth the extent to which the Convention inhibits Japan's response to 
contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism. 
3.2b Sovereignty and Hot Pursuit 
The sanctity of state sovereignty in international law, which prevents the authorities of a 
foreign state pursuing pirates into another state's waters, is a core problem in the fight 
against piracy, as the majority of piratical incidents occur close to shore, within the 
national boundaries of states. 116 Modern pirates have changed significantly in their 
modus operandi when compared with their historical counterparts. Today, maritime 
criminals rely on current technology, such as fast, light boats, advanced radio and sonar 
equipment and military weaponry, to enable swift attacks on ships at berth or moving 
slowly through narrow sea-lanes, before the pirates retreat to a hideout on land. Because 
these pirates enter international waters briefly, if at all, they are difficult to apprehend 
and subsequently convict according to international law, a fact which pirates have taken 
advantage of (Pugh, 1993: 7, Frecon, 2002: 53-54,78-80). 
Although states are supposed to deal with acts of piracy that are committed within their 
own jurisdiction or by pirates who withdraw to that jurisdiction, not all states are willing 
flying a flag denoting its nationality. For Spanish troops to have boarded the ship otherwise would have 
been illegal under international law. Though 15 Scud missiles with conventional warheads were 
discovered, the cargo was allowed to proceed to Yemen because the shipment could not be deemed illegal 
according to international law (Richardson, 2004: 100,106-107). This incident encouraged the 
formulation of the PSI, which will be examined in Chapter 6. 
116 Although not a case of piracy, the December 2001 pursuit and engagement of a North Korean spy ship 
into China's EEZ by JCG ships was illegal under international law. This case demonstrates that state 
organizations, the JCG in this instance, have ignored the tenets of international law when they felt it 
necessary to do so. This example will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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or able to do so. 1 17 This may be because: members of the state apparatus are implicated 
in the act of piracy itself (Vagg, 1995: 68-69; Chalk, 1998: 94-95; Beckman, 2002: 
331); the state does not have the resources to deal with the problem or the cost of doing 
so is prohibitive; the region in which the act occurred is one in which the state does not 
have adequate control; or the pirates are simply too difficult to catch (Mo, 2002: 350- 
352). States may also be unwilling to attempt to resolve the problem of piracy because it 
might transfer a maritime issue that mainly affects major trading nations to a domestic 
security problem. An increase in anti-piracy patrols may deter acts of piracy on 
international shipping, but force pirates to continue their criminal careers within their 
own nation states. ' '8 Hence, Southeast Asian littoral countries may perceive anti-piracy 
measures as a means for maritime powers, such as the European Union, the US and 
Japan, to shift the problem of maritime crime that primarily affects their merchant 
shipping on to developing states in Southeast Asia. An anti-piracy response that 
comprehends the different types of maritime violence that are perpetrated and considers 
the development of alternative livelihoods for former pirates would mitigate the fears of 
Southeast Asian coastal states. 
3.3 The Configuration of Contemporary Maritime Violence and 
Crime 
Acts of contemporary maritime violence and crime encapsulate a myriad of criminal 
styles and motives. To limit the definition of a pirate as one who commits violence or 
robbery against ships on the high seas or to conflate maritime terrorism with piracy is to 
miss the subtleties of these phenomena. Pirate gangs and terrorist organizations differ in 
their size, weaponry, equipment and motivations, and these groups target vessels 
according to their capabilities. Yet, by adhering to the letter of international law, states 
fail to adopt comprehensive policies that deal with the root causes of contemporary 
117 Kessler and Nyhart note that less-developed countries often are disinclined to enforce international 
laws that they perceive were fashioned by developed powers for their own benefit (Kessler & Nyhart in 
Evans and Murphy (eds. ), 1978: 190-191). Indonesia, in particular, has been criticised for its failure to 
deal with piracy in its waters (Mukundan interview 22 April 2003). 
118 A possible exception to this would be state-sponsored pirates. 
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maritime violence and crime. As Makinda has recognised, whilst states may view 
security in `traditional' state-centric terms in the post-Cold War world, an alternative 
approach allows the analyst to understand security from the perspective of people 
(Makinda, 2001: 404-405). This is fundamental to studying a transnational issue, such 
as contemporary maritime piracy and terrorism, because those perpetrating the violence 
are non-state actors, the victims are ships belonging to the country of one state, usually 
flying the flag of another, with an international crew, and pirates and maritime terrorists 
transgress state boundaries freely. ' 19 It may therefore be unhelpful to ask `traditional' 
security questions, such as what motivates another state to attack or how can the 
aggression of a rival state be mitigated. Instead, to solve transnational security issues, 
like piracy and maritime terrorism, people-centred questions must be asked. These 
questions include who are pirates or terrorists, what are the different kinds of piracy or 
terrorism and what combination of causes has led people to pursue piracy or terrorism? 
These questions can be answered by adopting an English School approach that 
examines piracy and maritime terrorism from an interhuman or transnational 
perspective. 
Yet, even those commentators who have differentiated between different kinds of piracy 
have done so from the perspective of the victim rather than the perpetrator. Chalk 
divides piracy into three categories: low-level armed robbery (LLAR), medium-level 
armed assault and robbery (MLAAR) and major criminal hijack (MCHJ). Low-level 
armed robbery refers to attacks mounted close to shore, whilst a ship is anchored or at 
port, with small high-speed craft manned by a lightly armed crew which remove on 
average between US$5,000 and US$15,000 in personal items and cash from the targeted 
vessel. Medium-level armed assault and robbery refers to theft that occurs on the high 
119 The legal status of a vessel at sea that is the victim of a pirate or a terrorist attack is a complicated one. 
Though ships are under the jurisdiction of the flag they fly on the high seas (Ronzitti, 1990: 7-8), legal 
responsibility for the well being of the crew ultimately lies with both the crew's nation-state, as well as 
the shipowner. Furthermore, the cargo may belong to a party other than the shipowner. This is to say 
nothing of the authorities which might catch a pirate or a terrorist group or the nationalities of the pirates 
or terrorists captured. All these disparate groups must collaborate in the event of a pirate or terrorist attack. 
Establishing a framework for doing so has been hindered by the Convention, which specifies no 
coordinating body to draw these groups together in the event of a violent maritime incident. Yamada 
Yoshihiko notes that a dual-flagging system to confront this issue has been proposed, though he argues 
that Japanese ships should adopt a Japanese flag for maximum protection (Yamada, 2005: 48). 
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seas or in territorial waters by highly organised well-armed gangs prepared to kill or 
injure in the course of their raid. Major criminal hijack refers to the capture of vessels 
for the purpose of illegal trading. Boats used in this process of illegal trading are known 
as phantom ships as they have their identification documents altered or reregistered to 
give them a new identity. Major criminal hijacks are highly sophisticated operations 
involving transnational crime networks which make use of large numbers of trained 
agents equipped and prepared to use force (Chalk, 1998: 88-89). Chalk's classifications 
remain popular, as can be observed in Herrmann's use of them in his research 
(Herrmann, 2002: 442-443). 
Abhyankar and Ellen both adopt a similar classification to Chalk, but add cases of 
maritime terrorism; identifying attacks, such as that of the Achille Lauro, whereby 
passengers have been held hostage by armed gangs who sought to realise political 
objectives (Ellen, 1997: 48-49; Abhyankar, 1998: 184-187). By contrast, Beckman 
measures various piracy types according to four factors: the type of weapons employed, 
the treatment of the crew, the value of the property stolen and the level of threat to the 
safety of maritime navigation. Hence, the more lethal the weaponry employed in an 
attack is, the worse the crew are treated, the greater the value of the property stolen and 
the level of threat to other vessels or the marine environment, the graver the pirate 
attack becomes (Beckman, 2002: 319-320). By focussing upon how much damage was 
done to the victims, each of these arrangements can tell us what kinds of piratical threat 
exist, as well as the weaponry, equipment and propensity for violence employed by the 
pirates. Because these classifications do not identify the kinds of pirates that perpetuate 
the attacks, the causes of piracy suggested by these commentators are general and not 
connected to particular types of pirates who perpetrate specific kinds of piracy. 
Therefore, an examination of the deeper causes of maritime violence and crime is 
avoided and consequently solutions to the problem remain elusive. 
Yamada employs a further classification in his work: Umi No Terorisumu (Terrorism at 
Sea). Ile examines various acts of piracy and terrorism in terms of the groups 
perpetrating the act of maritime violence or crime. His categories are termed as follows: 
Robin-Hood style pirates, transnational criminal organizations, separatist groups, and 
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terrorists (Yamada, 2003: 96-106). 120 A further type of piracy mentioned by Yamada, 
but not separated into an individual category, is that of the participation of state 
personnel in piratical acts. One reason for the omission of official participation in 
piratical acts is that, while prevalent during the mid to late 1990s, the involvement of 
maritime officials and naval personnel in piratical acts has waned significantly as 
international conferences have paid more attention to the problem of piracy in general. 
After all, it is difficult for state representatives to attend an anti-piracy meeting, when 
members of their state's own coast guard, navy, or customs are implicated in acts of 
piracy. Nevertheless, a degree of official complicity is still alleged to occur in parts of 
Southeast Asia and so needs to be investigated separately from other kinds of piracy. 
The next five sections will examine each of these different types of piracy and maritime 
terrorism in turn to establish the current scope of the issue that policy makers in Asia 
face. 
3.3a Robin Hood Style Piracy 
"The piracy in the Malacca Straits is like Robin Hood. In return for food, the pirates share their 
plunder with the villagers. Because they blend in with the villagers, even the police can't touch 
them. " The words of Noel Chong, head of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, Kuala Lumpur - 
translated from Japanese by the author (Yamada, 2003: 160-161). 
Robin Hood style pirates occupy a specific niche within contemporary maritime piracy. 
In the Malacca Straits, groups of up to around ten pirates use speedboats to approach 
their targets or board ships in port. The pirates tend to carry machetes rather than 
firearms and disguise their boats as fishing vessels to avoid detection. The same group 
may strike several vessels during the course of the same night. The victims are usually 
unaware of the attack until it is underway or even not until after the attack has happened 
and the pirates have fled. Returning to their villages, the pirates are protected by their 
fellow villagers who conspire to hide them in return for a share of the loot. Yet, the 
120 These classifications are echoed in an article appearing in the Asahi Shimbun by Stewart MacMillan 
entitled "nijuiseki no kaizoku wo torishimare" (Controlling 215' Century Piracy) 
(http: www. asahi. com/international/aan/column/020403. html, accessed on 9 March 2004). 
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modern-day pirates of the Malacca Straits contrast with the brigands of Sherwood 
Forest. Whilst the legendary Robin Hood stole from the rich and gave to the poor, the 
pirates of the Malacca Straits target weak trading vessels and fishing boats (Yamada, 
2003: 160-164). 
Even in the late 1980s, the Malacca Straits were the most piracy prone waterway in the 
world. However, the attacks on ships were said to be far less violent than they are today. 
A pirate from the Riau archipelago quoted in the 1988 edition of Asia Week proclaimed, 
"These shipowners are very rich. While they're passing through the Straits we ask them 
for a donation. It's like a toll. We don't carry guns and we never injure anyone. We just 
accept whatever money they give us. If they have no money, we leave" (Hyslop, 1989: 
12-13). Abhyankar also noted the tendency for attacks in Asian waters to be less violent 
during the 1990s (Abhyankar, 1998: 184). If the violence now attributable to Robin 
Hood style piracy is connected with their preference for weaker targets, then it may be 
that a rise in awareness amongst the international shipping industry concerning the 
dangers of piratical attack has led to larger, commercial vessels improving their security. 
Hence, the response of the international shipping community may have made the 
problem of piracy worse rather than better in terms of weaker boats, and therefore 
poorer seafarers who cannot afford the costs to protect themselves, being attacked. 
The roots of piracy in the Malacca Straits are said to originate from colonial times when 
European navies began to dominate Southeast Asian kingdoms. 12' Looting European 
ships was perceived as a form of resisting foreign rule and recapturing the wealth of 
their lost dominions. There therefore exists a culture of piracy in the Malacca Straits 
which perceives the robbery of wealthy foreign ships as a legitimate enterprise (Andaya 
and Andaya, 1982: 92-93,130-133; Hyslop, 1989: 12; Yamada, 2003: 162-163). 
12' For example, the Kingdom of Malacca was subjugated by Portugal in 1511 (Yamada, 2004: 162). 
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3.3b Transnational Criminal Organizations 
Until 1989, little evidence pointed to the involvement of transnational criminal 
syndicates in piracy, though INTERPOL was investigating the possibility (Hyslop, 
1989: 6). By 1995, however, international crime groups were conducting acts of piracy 
in East Asia (Yamada, 2003: 96). Furthermore, an increase in the number of ship 
hijackings from 16 in 2001 to 25 in 2002 highlights the growing interest of transnational 
criminal organizations in perpetrating acts of piracy (ICC-IMB Piracy Report 2002: 16, 
23). 122 Attacks on vessels by transnational criminal organizations differ in respect of 
other forms of piracy in their level of sophistication, as well as the equipment used and 
123 the level of violence employed. 
The phantom ship phenomenon is often associated with transnational criminal 
syndicates. 124 A phantom ship is one whereby the vessel is hijacked, the original crew 
killed or disposed of (thrown overboard, set adrift or abandoned on a desert island), and 
the ship is repainted and given a new identity. It is reregistered on the basis of false 
information about the vessel's prior names, tonnages, dimensions and owners. The ship 
is given a new name, which is printed on the side of the ship. A phantom ship may 
change its identity several times over the years with each new cargo it acquires, making 
phantom ships notoriously hard to trace. 125 Phantom ships tend to be small bulk carriers 
'22 Despite a decrease in the number of hijackings in 2004 to a total of 11 hijackings, the figures rose 
again in 2005 to 23 hijackings suggesting an increase in transnational criminal piracy (ICC-IMB Piracy 
Report 2005: 10). It should be noted that separatist groups, terrorists or even corrupt maritime officials 
may have carried out these hijackings. However, transnational criminal groups are still always involved in 
hijackings on some level, whether it be trafficking pirated goods on the black market or selling on a 
hacked ship. 
121 Contemporary pirates have become increasingly sophisticated over the years in response to new 
technology. Even in the 1980s, pirates employed radios and informers in receiving warehouses in order to 
target specific cargoes (Birnie, 1987: 173). 
124 Phantom ships and falsifying the documents of a vessel are not new phenomena. Hepburn records a 
case in 1880, whereby Herbert Rennie Smith bought a trading ship named Ferret and reported the ship 
had sunk. The name of the vessel was then changed to India, a cargo of coffee beans was bought in 
Santos Brazil and sold in Cape Town for 11,200 British pounds. The vessel was later discovered in 
Australia by Lloyds of London (Hepburn, 1994: 196). 
125 In September 1988, the Dooyang Jade disappeared with US$7 million in cargo, later resurfaced as the 
Bona Vista 1, was arrested in Singapore on May 28`h 1992, over a dispute in ownership, as the Jasamas II 
and escaped to the Philippines where it sold its cargo of 4,200 tons of cashew nuts to The Far East 
General Feeds Corp. under the title of Gina 111. The Gina III finally ran aground in a storm in Songhkla, 
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or twin deckers under Honduran, Panamanian, Belize or St. Vincent flags, of 
approximately ten to twenty years of age and poorly maintained. Phantom ships are 
owned by phantom companies and manned by crews that earn two or three times a 
normal seaman's wage. The cargoes of phantom ships are often high in value, in great 
demand and easily disposed of 126 Alternatively, phantom ships are used for other illegal 
activities such as drug and people smuggling (Abhyankar, 1997: 58-59,72; Ellen, 1997: 
47). 127 
Such a complex operation involves several well-coordinated groups in order to be 
conducted successfully. First, a command group is required to organise the hijacking. 
Second, a gang is needed to hijack the ship and its contents. A third party sells the cargo 
on the black market and a further unit commands the hijacked ship. The command 
group alters the ship's documents, name and repaints the vessel. Each group is 
independent of the others to ensure that if one group is captured the others can escape 
(Yamada, 2003: 98). 
A degree of official complicity is often encountered in the case of a phantom ship. Low 
wages and a cultural acceptance of bribery are cited as reasons for the extent of official 
involvement with transnational criminal organizations in the Southeast Asian region 
(Tagliacozzo, 2001: 258). The pirate crew of the Celtic Ranger (previously the Samudra 
Samrat) were tipped off by corrupt local officials in Fengcheng and avoided capture by 
the maritime authorities, for example (Abhyankar, 1997: 67). In another case, stolen 
goods from a phantom ship were stored at an army base in Guanxi province until 
collected by gangsters. The criminal groups involved in these acts of piracy are often 
Chinese or of Chinese origin and belong to Cantonese, Shanghai or Fuken gangs which 
are controlled by a small number of highly experienced businesspeople in Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand. These syndicates have close links with 
government and allegedly one of Southeast Asia's royal families (Abhyankar, 1997: 67- 
Thailand in October 1992 after its anchor had ripped out the town's power supply (Hepburn, 1994: 201- 
203). 
126 Prime cargoes include oil, gasoline, kerosene, palm oil and aluminium ingots (Yamada, 2003: 97-98). 
127 The use of phantom ships for drug running is reminiscent of yacht piracy in the Gulf of Mexico and 
Caribbean during the 1980s. The crew would usually be killed or disposed of and the yacht employed for 
transporting narcotics (Birnie, 1987: 174). 
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72; Mortishead, The Times, 3 May 2003: 49). The hijackings of the Tenyu and the 
Alondra Rainbow, two Japanese ships, in particular have influenced Japan's response to 
piracy in Southeast Asia. These cases will be examined in Chapter 5. 
3.3c Official Complicity or State-Sponsored Pirac 
From a historical point of view, the greater the official sanctions in place the more 
piracy will flourish. Whilst state sponsored piracy ended in 1856 with the signing of the 
Treaty of Paris (Birnie, 1987: 163), some officials in Southeast Asia, still, either engage 
in or turn a blind eye to acts of contemporary maritime piracy (Tagliacozzo, 2001: 
265). 128 Though difficult to prove, Vagg indicates that the Indonesian military has been 
involved in attacks on shipping, pointing to the dominance of provincial officials and 
their potential to employ military personnel for illegal operations. The low salaries of 
military forces in Indonesia provide a motive for these individuals to engage in piratical 
acts (Vagg, 1995: 68-69). One instance of official complicity involving the Indonesian 
navy occurred on 17 March 2004, when an Indonesian naval patrol boat (KAL 
YOUTEFA, KAL-I-502) pirated the Yayasan Tujuh, a Malaysian general cargo vessel off 
Jayapura, Irian Jaya, Indonesia. After firing at the Yayasan Tujuh and forcing it to stop, 
naval officers beat up the Master and Third Officer, kidnapped them and demanded 
US$5000 in ransom. The Master negotiated the ransom down to approximately half this 
amount with provisions (ICC-IMB Piracy Report third quarter 2004: 29). 
Chinese officials have also been implicated in acts of piracy during the 1990s. In 
August 1992, Chinese armed security police harassed commercial ships in the waters 
around Hong Kong, seizing cargo and in one instance even hijacking a freighter (Pugh, 
1993: 2). Attacks involving the Chinese People's Liberation Army continued between 
1993 and 1995 (Menefee, 1996: 70; Menefee, 1997: 34-35). Furthermore, the case of 
the Anna Sierra, a ship that was hijacked in September 1995, its cargo (12,000 tons of 
128 In addition to the involvement of Chinese and Indonesian authorities in acts of piracy, the Thai 
government has also alleged that the Cambodian military have conducted acts of piracy (Watkin, South 
China Morning Post, 13 May 1998: 14). 
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sugar) stolen, the crew thrown overboard and the vessel itself later found in the Chinese 
port of Beihai under the title Arctic Sea, is suggestive of Chinese official complicity in 
piracy (Menefee, 1996: 72-73,134; Yamada, 2003: 99). Despite capturing the pirates, 
Chinese officials refused to try them in a court of law, later returning them to their 
native Indonesia. The Chinese authorities also demanded US$400,000 from the owner 
of the Anna Sierra for expenses and took part of the cargo instead when the owner 
refused to pay this sum. Similar incidents involving the Chinese authorities whereby 
captured pirates were repatriated without facing charges and extortionate fees for the 
return of pirate vessels, occurred again in 1998 with the hijacking of the Petro Ranger 
and Tenyu. Moreover, in the case of the Tenyu hijack, two of the repatriated Indonesians 
had been involved in the attack on the Anna Sierra three years previously, while nothing 
has been heard of the 14 man crew of the Tenyu since pirates seized the vessel. Since 
the Tenyu and Petro Ranger incidents and the stern criticism China received, the 
Chinese central government ordered a crackdown on acts of piracy. In 1999, the 
discovery of a small, pirated Thai tanker, the Shamshantuai, led to all the pirates 
arrested on board receiving death sentences (Yamada, 2003: 100,114-125; Graham, 
2006: 188-189). 
It is difficult to ascertain whether the motivations behind acts of piracy involving 
Chinese officials during the 1990s were for personal profit or amounted to an assertion 
of Chinese jurisdictional claims (Pugh, 1993: 2-3; James, International Herald Tribune, 
10 March 1994: 8). However, taking into account the territorial disputes in the region as 
well as Chinese naval expansion, an act of piracy in which the Chinese military or Coast 
Guard may be involved amounts to a show of force that makes regional opponents 
aware of Chinese power (Chalk, 1998: 93-94; Renwick and Abbott, 1999: 186-187). 
Furthermore, such piratical strikes can compel international shipping to avoid 
penetrating Chinese maritime boundaries, helping to secure these boundaries and 
enabling further extensions that might infringe upon the security and territorial claims 
of other nations (Calder, 1996). 
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A mix of condemnation at international piracy conferences and a stream of bad press 
have reduced instances of official complicity in piracy. 129 Still, it remains the case that 
many shipowners do not trust some Southeast Asian authorities and are therefore 
unwilling to report crimes against their ships (Gill, 1995: 1). This wariness of Southeast 
Asian officials is coupled with a perceived reluctance of the officials to treat the 
problem of piracy, even if they are not involved in a piratical incident (Ellen, 1995: 9). 
Considering that an investigation into a piratical incident can take days, costing the 
shipowner up to US$25,000 in operating costs and potentially damaging the reputation 
of the shipping company, incidents are often not reported (Young and Valencia, 2003: 
271). This undermines the efforts of the IMB in compiling statistical data that is used to 
ascertain the extent of the piracy problem and recent trends in maritime crime. 
3.3d Global Terror Groups 
Politically motivated maritime violence can be defined as: "any illegal act directed 
against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew, or against sea ports with the intent of 
directly or indirectly influencing a government or group of individuals" (Young and 
Valencia, 2003: 270). Such maritime violence would include cases of maritime robbery 
perpetrated by terrorists, for example the theft of nuclear materials for the purpose of 
producing a dirty bomb, 130 the use of vessels for terrorist action'31 and complicity in 
129 It should be noted, however, that many Southeast Asian states brushed aside cases of piracy involving 
Chinese officials, eager not to disrupt economic ties with their powerful neighbour (Ellen, 1997: 54-55). 
130 Newspaper articles have made the association between terrorists and pirates, particularly as concerns 
the robbery of nuclear materials at sea, though the extent to which these reports can be corroborated is in 
doubt. The likelihood of nuclear material being stolen at sea is also questionable. Newspaper articles 
include: "Al Qaeda `responsible for piracy"', Japan Times, Tuesday, 23 July 2002, "Terrorists as pirates", 
Japan Times, Thursday 25 July 2002. A BBC communique on 24 July 2002 echoed the content of these 
articles. Further articles have appeared in the South China Morning Post (17 May 2003), The New York 
Daily News (21 September 2003), and the Korea Herald (5 March 2004). 
13' The alleged use of a small boat laden with explosives in an attack upon the Limburg, a French owned 
supertanker, off the coast of Yemen is indicative of the kind of strike by a terrorist organization that could 
be termed an act of piracy. Henley and Stewart, The Guardian, 7 October 2002. In a similar attack, a 
dinghy carrying between 500 and 700 pounds of explosives struck the USS Cole on the morning of 12 
October 2000, killing 17 US sailors and injuring a further 39. Again, links with the Al-Qaeda organization 
were presented (Bergen, 2004: 189-196; Clarke, 2004: 222-224). These cases will be examined in 
Chapter 6. 
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piratical acts by terrorist organizations. 
132 These examples constitute illegal acts under 
international law, thereby placing global terror groups outside the bounds of the 
interstate society. Global terror groups perpetrate such acts in order to destroy the 
interstate society in specific regions and replace the interstate society with alternative 
regional societies based on their own beliefs; such groups may therefore be termed 
infidels. 
Since the September I Ith attacks on the US mainland, fears have grown over a future 
attack utilising a vessel laden with explosives or a weapon of mass destruction to strike 
a major port. 133 In particular, Al Qaeda's possession of some 15 cargo vessels has raised 
alarm at the possibility of such a scenario. Incidents like the ramming of the French 
supertanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen highlight the dangers of contemporary 
maritime terrorism (Young and Valencia, 2003: 275). In fact, the danger of maritime 
terrorism has been present for some time. 134 For example, the hijacking of the Achille 
Lauro by members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in October 1985, 
led one observer to conclude: 
The sea provides the perfect setting for a terrorist drama... [having] the ideal ingredients for a 
terrorist attack: an exciting and potentially hazardous situation, innocent people in a vulnerable 
position, and excellent communications (Parritt, 1991: 11). 
Considering the ease with which a terrorist incident could be enacted, the rarity of major 
terrorist incidents at sea is revealing. One reason explaining this scarcity is that 
destroying a vessel in congested international sea-lanes may have unwanted 
132 Nyhart and Kessler indicate four causes of maritime terrorism, "First, terrorists often seek publicity for 
their cause and an opportunity to expound their beliefs. Second, they often attack to extort funds, gain 
freedom for comrades, or effect policy changes. Third, they usually seek to intimidate the members and 
supporters of the government they oppose. Finally, terrorists sometimes attack simply to oppose the 
specific economic activity that the target performs" (Nyhart and Kessler in Evans and Murphy (eds. ), 
1978: 188). 
133 After 9/11, EU representatives stepped up discussions on maritime piracy fearing that one of their 
ports could be targeted (Herrmann, 2002: 448). The discovery of 750 tons of ammonium nitrate aboard a 
ship headed for Sudan coupled with threats by Group 272, a terrorist group in Southeast Asia, to destroy 
an oil tanker in the Malacca Straits highlights the possible dangers of politically motivated acts of 
violence (Becker, New York Daily News, 2003: 26). 
134 The historical nature of maritime terrorism is noted by Menefee, who mentions the seizure of the 
Cagliari in 1857 by Italian insurgents (Menefee, 1990: 58-59). Villar indicates cases of maritime 
terrorism in the early in 1980s in both the Philippines and Ireland, for which MNLF and the IRA were 
respectively responsible (Villar, 1990: 1985). 
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environmental and economic consequences. Ellen hypothesises that a similar incident to 
the Exxon Valdez in the Phillip Channel caused by an act of piracy or maritime terror 
could close down Singapore and disrupt fishing for many years (Ellen, 1997: 50). 
Whilst such a result may appear attractive to terrorist organizations intent on upsetting 
international trade, the interconnectivity between terrorist and criminal organizations 
that rely upon international waterways for illegal trade in arms, drugs and people, 
suggests that closing the Malacca Straits would impede the activities of terrorists and 
international criminals as much as it would legitimate shipping traffic. The 
environmental damage caused would also undermine support for terrorist or separatist 
organizations amongst coastal communities that depend upon fishing to sustain 
themselves. 
3.3e Separatist Groups 
A distinction should be made, however, between global terrorist movements, such as Al 
Qaeda, that conduct actions designed to cause massive loss of life and economic 
disruption in order to further their aims, and separatist movements that attempt to 
wrestle control of their region away from a central government, like Aceh rebels or 
Islamic separatist movements in the Southern Philippines. Although both global 
terrorists and regional separatist movements are interconnected, differentiating between 
their aims highlights alternative methods of pursuing their cause through acts of 
maritime violence. Furthermore, the roots of global terrorism and separatist movements 
are different, suggesting that governments treat each case differently. Finally, separatist 
groups aim to secure legitimacy amongst the interstate society that global terrorist 
organizations shun. Such separatist groups are therefore better described as barbarians. 
Attacks by Aceh separatist groups upon small tankers transiting the Malacca Straits, is 
said to represent a `new brand of piracy'. In these cases, Aceh rebels have allegedly 
fired automatic weapons at LPG tankers, gas tankers and oil tankers in attempts to board 
the vessels. The motive for such acts of `political piracy' is to finance the Aceh 
secessionist cause by robbing the crews of these ships and holding them for ransom. Yet, 
100 
the fact that ships transporting sensitive cargoes that could explode when fired upon are 
being targeted raises fears of an impending ecological disaster in the Malacca Straits. 
Commenting on this new trend, Captain Potengal Mukundan, Director of the 
International Maritime Bureau, has said, "Political piracy threatens to rewrite the rules 
of engagement... Authorities need to recognize the motives behind these crimes and 
adopt new methods of tracking and deterring them" 
(www. iccwbo. org/ccs/news archives/2003/piracy ms. asp, accessed 25 September 
2003; Kearney, South China Morning Post, 7 February 2004: 10). 35 
On the mainland, breaking the deadlock between government forces and the Aceh 
separatist movement GAM has proved difficult. The strategies adopted by the 
Indonesian armed forces, the TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia), and the brimoh (police 
mobile brigade) can hardly be said to have won the battle of hearts and minds over the 
Aceh people. Past atrocities committed by Indonesian armed forces include murder, 
torture and rape, all of which have encouraged the resistance. Whilst the TNI and 
brimoh are now said to conduct their operations according to stringent legal standards, 
there is no way of independently verifying this. However, the fact that the GAM 
network is deeply embedded into Aceh society, allowing them to operate freely within 
local communities, makes the job of the TNI to separate GAM supporters from the local 
population a difficult one. Demanding that 'loyalty pledges' be taken by villagers to 
secure their allegiance to the central Indonesian authorities has not made the task of 
distinguishing between the enemy and ordinary Aceh people any easier for the soldiers 
and police on the ground (Aspinall, 2003: 23-24; Budiardjo, 2003: 25-26; Taylor, 2003: 
364-367). 
Nevertheless, the Aceh conflict appears to have ended with the signing of a peace deal 
in the aftermath of the 26 December 2004 tsunami. The tidal wave devastated the 
northern Aceh coastline and over 220,000 Indonesians were killed or are missing. The 
'" Although Captain Mukundan has referred to `political piracy', the argument in this thesis is that such a 
category is confusing for two reasons. First, according to international law, piracy is an illegal act 
perpetrated for private not political ends. Second, the term `political piracy' suggests conflating politically 
motivated acts of maritime violence and crime with piracy. These two phenomena have different causes 
and therefore should be treated separately. Instead, the categories of barbarian, infidel and pirate are 
preferred in this thesis. 
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details of the peace accord included the return of GAM weapons, amnesty for GAM 
members, the withdrawal of TNI troops from Aceh, the creation of a truth and 
reconciliation commission, the establishment of an Aceh monitoring mission by the EU 
and ASEAN and the foundation of legitimate Aceh-based political parties. Despite 
encouraging signs that the peace will hold, abandoning the secessionist struggle in 
favour of a civilian life may be difficult for former GAM members. As the surviving 
population of the ravaged Aceh region struggle to rebuild their communities, the lure of 
quick financial gains through criminal activities, such as piracy, may prove to be 
irresistible. Furthermore, the Indonesian parliament has shown some resistance to the 
setting up of political parties in Aceh (BBC News Online, 
http: //news. bbe. co. uk/go/pr/fr/-/1 /hi/world/asia-pacific/4561922. stm, accessed on 25 
June 2006). Nonetheless, the reconciliation between GAM and the Indonesian 
government indicates the potential to bring barbarian groups back into the fold of the 
interstate society through diplomacy. 
Rebel groups in the southern Philippines have also been involved in acts of maritime 
violence and crime. The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which aims to create 
a Muslim state in the southern Philippines, has been implicated in attacks on shipping 
since the 1970s. On 26 September 1975, members of the group hijacked the cargo 
vessel Suehiro Maru and demanded US$133,000 for the release of the ship and its crew. 
In 1978, the MNLF began targeting inter-island ferries. Following a cease-fire between 
the Filipino government and the MNLF in 1996, splinter organizations, such as the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf have continued to target 
shipping to further their political aims (Menefee, 1996: 82-83; Menefee, 1997: 35-36). 
Advanced weapons, including M16s and rocket-propelled grenades, retrieved from 
pirates captured off the Sabah coast in Malaysia by the Royal Malaysian Marine Police 
also suggests a link with MILF (Renwick and Abbott, 1999). 136 
136 Interviews with the captured pirates could not confirm nor deny the connection between the weaponry 
they acquired and the MILF. Members of the MILF have also fired upon ships at port and the IMB has 
also alleged that the MILF and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a terrorist group in the region, have 
instigated further strikes (Renwick and Abbott, 1999). 
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In early 2006, MILF renewed peace talks with the Philippine government centring on 
the creation of a Muslim homeland and the restoration of former conflict zones. More 
progress is needed to determine how the region will be governed and MILF's 12,000 
strong rebel force be disarmed. Furthermore, MILF has had extensive links to Al Qaeda 
which has provided funding and dispatched specialists in terrorism tactics to train the 
Filipino rebels, as well as members of other regional terrorist movements, such as 
Jemaah Islamiya, at MILF camps in Mindanao, in the southern Philippines. Nonetheless, 
MILF has tried to distance itself from Al Qaeda since the 9/11 attacks in order to further 
their aims to create an Islamic state through negotiation. This decision is linked to two 
factors. First, rebels and Filipino government officials alike believe that if MILF 
maintains its links with Al Qaeda, the peace talks will be jeopardised and result in an 
extensive campaign to rout MILF. Second, the Arroyo administration in Manila has 
received substantial financial support and training from the US for the Philippine armed 
forces (AFP) in the fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), which has been labelled 
a terrorist organization. 
137 This US aid has strengthened the AFP to the extent that an 
anti-MILF military campaign would likely succeed (Abuza, 2003: 46-48,95-99,159, 
169,202-212). 138 
The key to the peace talks with secessionist groups in Aceh and Mindanao lies in how 
these groups are defined. Both GAM and MILF have eschewed links with global 
terrorist movements since 9/11, thereby preserving their ability to negotiate with the 
Indonesian and Filipino governments respectively. From an English School perspective, 
137 Factionalism within the ASG combined with the US-trained AFP campaign against the Filipino 
terrorist organization have disrupted ASG operations and commitment to build an Islamic state. It is 
questionable as to whether or not the ASG can mount significant terrorist attacks. Instead it appears that 
the ASG has transformed from an infidel or barbarian group into a criminal organization that specializes 
in kidnap and ransom activities. It is further alleged that the ASG has paid off military personnel and 
politicians in order to conduct its illegal operations (Abuza, 2003: 111-114,207-208). That said, in 
February 2003, the ASG did mount the largest terrorist attack in the Philippines to date, bombing a 
passenger ferry in Manila Bay, the Superferry 14, which killed over 100 people (BBC news online, 
http //newsvote bbc co uk/mpapps/paeetools/nrint/news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/I695576. stm, 
accessed on 25 July 2006). 
'38 For more on the conflict in the southern Philippines, see also, BBC news online, 
httn //newsvote bbc co. uk/mpaaps/naeetools/orint/news. bbc. co. uk/i/hi/world/asia-pacific/1695576. stm, 
httn //newsvote bbc co. uk/mpagps/Wagetools/print/news. bbc. co. uk/I/hi/world/asia-pacific/3023013. stm, 
httn: //newsvote bbc co uk/mpapns/rap-etools/print/news. bbc. co. uk/l /hi/world/asia-pacific/4684500. stm, 
httn"//newsvote bbc co uk/mpapps/naeetoole/nrint/nes. bbc co uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/4692076 stm, 
accessed 25 July 2006. 
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the terms barbarian, to denote secessionist groups in this instance, 139 and infidel, to 
designate organizations that seek the overthrow of the interstate society and cannot be 
bargained with, are useful as they delineate whether states confront a particular outlaw 
group with military (coercive) or diplomatic (calculation) means or a mixture of both. 
Barbarian groups also can understand from these labels that their actions and 
associations will determine how members of the interstate society treat them. 140 In this 
sense, to paraphrase Wendt, anarchy is what barbarians make of it. 
As far as maritime security is concerned, hostilities between government forces and 
separatist movements do not stop at the water's edge. The seas surrounding a war-torn 
region are rife with economic and political opportunities for secessionist groups to 
further their aims. It is therefore important to note the effect of zones of conflict upon 
maritime crime (Menefee, 1996: 132), or rather to understand a zone of conflict as 
encompassing both land and sea. After all, breakaway regions include maritime 
jurisdictions, which must be secured by political or military means. Acts of maritime 
crime involving separatist organizations are means of demonstrating authority, albeit of 
an illegitimate kind, over littoral waters. The fishing communities on the coasts of Aceh 
and the Southern Philippines are particularly attentive to which group controls the seas 
upon which the population depends for their livelihoods. 
3.4 Interconnected causes of contemporary maritime violence 
and crime 
Different forms of maritime crime and violence, be they piracy, terrorism, or smuggling, 
are interconnected and therefore demand coordinated national, regional and 
19 The term barbarian has also been employed to describe North Korea. The advantage of using the terms 
barbarian, infidel and pirate is that they can describe states in the interstate society, as well as groups and 
organizations in the transnational and interhuman societies. 
140 The Philippines President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has threatened MILF that if it did not cease 
attacks on civilians, the secessionist movement would be labeled a terrorist group (BBC news online, 
htttp: //newsvote bbc. co. uklmpapps/aaeetools/print/news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/3023013. stm, 
accessed on 25 July, 2006). On other occasions, Arroyo has fought to keep MILF off the UN and US 
terrorist lists (Abuza, 2003: 99). This is indicative of how states use labels to determine the parameters of 
political debate in the domestic and international realms. 
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international responses to deal with them (Menefee, 1997: 29). To an extent, the 
conditions that give rise to piracy and politically motivated maritime violence and that 
allow them to thrive are linked (Young and Valencia, 2003: 276). For example, 
Thailand's central position in the international drugs trade is due in part to a culture of 
money laundering and corruption that benefits transnational criminal organizations as 
well as separatists and terrorist groups. 14' Nevertheless, whilst certain causes may 
encourage piracy, separatism and maritime terrorism in general, the different kinds of 
pirate groups, separatists and terrorist organizations listed above are influenced by some 
conditions over others or in different ways. Hence, there is no blanket treatment for the 
problem of contemporary piracy and politically motivated maritime violence. 
Vagg has proposed a number of causes of piracy. In particular, he points to three main 
causes: economic dislocation, recognition of piracy as a cultural possibility, and 
opportunity. In addition, Vagg cites official corruption as engendering piracy. Most 
analysts of maritime crime have accepted these causes, though official corruption can be 
expanded as a division to include political instability and ineffective enforcement 
(Young and Valencia, 2003: 276). More research needs to be completed so that these 
causes can be fully understood (Johnson and Pladdet, 2003: 2,8). Finally, the political 
motivations of terrorist and separatist movements, coupled with the rise of Islamic 
Fundamentalism can also be construed as bringing about acts of maritime terrorism. The 
general causes of piracy will be examined before discussing how these causes affect the 
different kinds of maritime violence and robbery. 
3.4a Economic Causes 
Vagg stresses economic dislocation as the most significant cause of piracy. 142 In his 
opinion, migration into developing areas that cannot sustain a large influx of people 
X41 In fact, Aspinall argues that in the case of the rebel group GAM in Aceh, the separatists and the 
criminals are often hard to tell apart, if they are not in fact the same group (Aspinall, 2003: 24). 
142 A shipping consultant based in Kuala Lumpur, noted the significance of economic causes of piracy, 
when he asserted that eradicating maritime crime in Indonesian waters is "almost a mission impossible... 
you have more than 200 million people living in poverty next to the world's richest commercial shipping 
lane" (Barling, 2003: 12). 
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looking for employment, where wages remain low as the cost of living rises, forces 
individuals to search for alternative means of sustaining themselves (Vagg, 1995: 65- 
66). Vagg is supported by Renwick and Abbott's account of developmental dislocation 
in Batam, Indonesia. They note the increasing crime levels around Batam as living costs 
rise, wages remain low and employment is scarce. Indicative of this trend were the 
successes of the Indonesian authorities in uncovering 57 smuggling rings in Batam 
between 1991 and 1992 (Renwick and Abbott, 1999: 192). The 1997 Asian Economic 
Crisis exacerbated the gap between the rich and poor in Southeast Asia, driving 
squatters in coastal neighbourhoods to engage in piracy, as well as reducing funds for 
anti-piracy patrols and prompting more maritime officials to accept bribes in return for 
overlooking acts of piracy (Frecon, 2002: 65-66; Liss, 2003: 57-59). 143 
Environmental issues are also tied to the economic causes of piracy. Damage to roughly 
80 percent of Indonesia's coral reefs has had a negative impact on sea life, decreasing 
fish stocks. Indonesia's fishermen from poor coastal communities, who also pay higher 
oil prices and face competition from larger and more advanced commercial boats and 
foreign poachers, have therefore turned to maritime crime as a means of survival either 
by hiring themselves out to pirate gangs or by staging their own attacks. The booty from 
these acts of piracy is often used to fund the pirates' village (Liss, 2003: 60-62; 
McCawley, Wall Street Journal, 26 May 2004: 1). 
Whilst economic factors can elucidate a person's motivations for pursuing piracy, they 
do not specify how. This is a significant question as the emergence of pirate gangs and 
networks may help to explain the interconnectivity between the various types of piracy. 
Vagg does mention people needing `necessary skills', such as handling a boat, using 
firearms, or scaling a bamboo pole to reach the deck of a ship, in order to be pirates 
(Vagg, 1995: 66). This then implies the need for recruiting and training. If this is the 
case then it becomes necessary to ask where pirates are recruited and who trains them. 
Answering these questions can begin to unravel the complexity of pirate networks. 
143 Uban, a former pirate originating from East Timor, described how all the pirates he knew on the island 
of ßatam came from poor villages, were unemployed, and became pirates in order to survive (Frecon, 
2002: 63). 
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3.4b Cultural Acceptance of Piracy 
A cultural acceptance of piracy as a legitimate enterprise (Wright, 1976: 26; Pugh, 
1993: 2-3; Vagg, 1995: 67-68) may provide an answer as to how and where pirates are 
recruited and trained. In this instance, pirates are recruited and trained by pirate groups 
that have existed for generations. The norms of certain coastal communities in 
Southeast Asia condone, if not encourage, individuals to pursue piracy as a means of 
employment. Menefee mentions the existence of "pirate societies" that are "predisposed 
to maritime crime" and for whom piracy is "an inherited and unquestioned avocation". 
Pirate societies are insular in nature, maritime-orientated, traditionally independent from 
or resistant to central authority, use firearms and other weapons, and generally prone to 
glorify violence. Hence, changing cultural traits associated with piratical activity held 
by certain maritime societies may be necessary to curb the problem of contemporary 
piracy (Menefee, 1996: 132; Frecon, 2002: 45-51). 
An alternative explanation may be that organised crime groups employ and drill pirates 
to steal from ships. As discussed in the section on Transnational Criminal Organizations, 
the number of different groups required for the successful execution of a `phantom ship' 
operation indicates that transnational crime groups need to hire an array of skilled 
personnel: armed bands to steal a ship, a command group to coordinate an attack, people 
to sell the merchandise on the black market, navigators to control and steer the vessel, 
as well as a gang to repaint the ship. There may even be a means for individuals 
engaged in maritime crime to develop their skills and graduate to more advanced forms 
of piracy. Menefee states that individuals engaged in attacks against Vietnamese boat 
people graduated to hijack ships (Menefee, 1996: 135). 
3.4c Opportunity 
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A third cause of piracy: opportunity, offers some explanation as to why certain bodies 
of water are more susceptible to piracy than are others. Modem-day pirates rely on 
certain factors, such as fast boats to catch slower, less manoeuvrable container ships, in 
shallow water near to shore where an escape can be made. The geographical features of 
parts of Southeast Asia: the narrow Malacca Straits, the Riau archipelago off the coast 
of Singapore and the waters of the Southern Philippines, provide an ideal environment 
for pirates to strike quickly and retreat to a sanctuary on land. Furthermore, as these 
routes become congested due to the amount of shipping passing through them, vessels 
that have to reduce speed in order to navigate the treacherous shoals and sandbanks 
become increasingly vulnerable to pirate attacks. This is especially true of the Malacca 
Straits which provide mariners with the fastest passage from the Indian Ocean to the Far 
East (Pugh, 1993: 9; Vagg, 1995: 66-67; Menefee, 1996: 131; Chalk, 1998: 91-92; 
Renwick and Abbott, 1999: 190-191). 
3.4d Lack of government control and enforcement capabilities 
A lack of government control over the permeability of the borders of their own state, as 
well as over certain regions within their country, create conditions in which maritime 
violence and robbery can flourish. A lack of policing around Indonesian shores, in 
particular, allows criminal syndicates and separatists to operate unchecked. 144 The 
causes of the failure to enforce the will of the Indonesian government in parts of the 
state are due to a lack of manpower and equipment, as well as official corruption 
(Tagliacozzo, 2001: 256-260). Since the Asian financial crisis of 1997, fewer resources 
have been allocated to finance the police, customs and coast guard in their fight against 
crime and salaries have remained low. Poor pay has in turn encouraged corruption 
144 The ICC International Maritime Bureau describes the following coastal areas of Indonesia as piracy 
prone: Aceh, Adang Bay, off Anambas/Natuna Island, Belawan, Balikpapan, Bontang, Gaspar/Bar/Leplia 
Straits, North Sumatra, Pulau Laut and Tanjong Priok (Jakarta) (ICC-IMB Piracy Report 2005: 15). In the 
first three months of 2006, the Gaspar/Leplia Straits and Tanjong Priok (Jakarta) were listed as piracy 
prone areas (ICC-IMB Piracy Report I" Quarter 2006: 13). Indonesia is not the sole Southeast Asian state 
that is unable to control parts of its territory and people, Cambodia, for example, is said to be a haven for 
criminal groups, whilst the Thai-Myanmar border is notorious for arms smuggling (Tagliacozzo, 2001: 
258-259). 
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amongst law enforcement officers as a means of inflating their income. A dearth of 
resources coupled with official graft have allowed both transnational crime syndicates 
and terrorist organizations to flourish in Indonesia (Sullivan, Houston Chronicle, 13 
May 2001: 31). 
The Indonesian government seems reluctant to tackle piracy against international 
shipping at a time when Indonesia still faces internal problems (Valencia, The 
Washington Times, 4 June 2001: A12). By viewing the problem of maritime crime as 
affecting other countries' vessels, the administration in Jakarta fails to comprehend how 
maritime violence and robbery is not just an effect of Indonesia's disintegration, but 
also a cause. Providing a haven for gangsters and terrorists enables a criminal culture to 
evolve in which government authorities gradually loose their relevance. A rise in cases 
of lynching in Indonesia are indicative of the people taking matters into their own hands, 
but this engenders mob rule that further undercuts the legitimacy of the central 
government (Brown, 2004: 24-25). Indonesia is caught in a vicious circle whereby the 
government lacks the funds to fight crime and terrorism that undermine the legitimacy 
of the state and appropriate resources or prevent them from reaching the central 
authorities. Perceiving various types of violence and crime as interconnected is 
therefore essential to preserving the integrity of the Indonesian state. 
3.4c Separatist movements and Islamic Fundamentalism 
A distinct cause of politically motivated maritime violence and crime lies in the nature 
of the terrorist or separatist movement itself. A terrorist or separatist movement has 
politically motivated goals that encourage members to attack targets, including ships, 
either to finance the movement itself, draw attention to the organization's struggle, or 
because a maritime area is located within a zone of conflict. Political objectives are 
achieved either through a terrorist event, such as striking the Limburg with a speed boat 
laden with explosives, or by stealing or taking hostages as other pirates would. 
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Nonetheless, many of the factors stimulating piracy, such as unfavourable economic 
conditions and high unemployment in some Southeast Asian states, provide recruits 
both for terrorist cells and separatist groups. The same economic circumstances coupled 
with corrupt central governments feeds Islamic fundamentalist movements that support 
terrorist organizations. Failure on the part of central governments to adequately provide 
for their citizen's education has enabled the same Islamic fundamentalist movements to 
establish Islamic schools that teach a strict Wahhabist form of Islam and furnishes new 
initiates into terrorist organizations. The terrorist groups are also connected through 
personal contacts stemming from participation in the Mujaheddin in the Afghan war, 
which allows resources to be shared amongst organizations, joint training to be 
conducted, weapons to be procured and assistance in money-laundering and financial 
transfers. Individually weak terrorist groups in Southeast Asia benefit from the network 
that has been established between them. Al Qaeda are said to be at the heart of this 
network having set out to establish a new base of operations in the aftermath of US 
attacks on Afghanistan which ousted the Taliban government (Bergen, 2004: 221-223; 
Clarke, 2004: 233; Abuza, 2002: 427-434,446). Hence, the rise of terrorist groups and 
separatist movements in Southeast Asia are tied to the same factors which cause 
maritime crime. 
3.5 Tackling the Interconnected Causes of Maritime Violence 
and Crime 
A combination of economic factors, culture, geography and a lack of government 
control combine to cause various types and levels of contemporary maritime violence 
and crime. However, the separation of different causes of piracy and politically 
motivated maritime violence is artificial. In fact, causes combine in different ways to 
encourage the various forms of maritime violence and crime. For example, 
unfavourable economic conditions compel poor fishermen in coastal towns in Southeast 
Asia to seek alternative sources of income. A cultural acceptance of piracy within the 
community coupled with geographical factors makes maritime crime a possibility. 
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These factors have primarily stimulated Robin Hood pirates in the Malacca Straits. 
These same conditions provide transnational criminal syndicates, terrorists and 
separatist organizations with recruits, whilst a lack of government control enables these 
groups to thrive. 
Solving the problem of piracy in Southeast Asian states requires comprehensive policies 
that deal with the root causes of maritime violence and crime. Whilst experts emphasise 
the need for international cooperation amongst police forces and an amelioration of 
justice systems in Southeast Asian countries to deal with major criminal organizations 
(Mukundan interview, 22 April 2003), this does not address the economic and cultural 
issues that create a favourable environment for crime. Preventing acts of maritime crime 
and violence will mean improving the economies and environmental resources of 
coastal areas, so that poverty-stricken citizens have greater opportunities for legitimate 
employment. 
An up-to-date international legal convention that comprehends the complexities and 
interconnected nature of contemporary maritime violence and crime is required in order 
to construct a comprehensive response. In light of the above discussion on the roots and 
actualities of contemporary maritime violence and crime, the reluctance of Southeast 
Asian states to modify the existing international legislation is telling. The question then 
is why have states not revised the Convention. Is it because states have not perceived 
the various kinds of piracy that exist or because issues of sovereignty that lie at the heart 
of the treaty remain as important today as they did in 1958? 
3.6 Redefining Contemporary Piracy and Maritime Terrorism 
The UNCLOS Convention fails to define the complex problem of contemporary 
maritime piracy. however, the Convention itself can hardly be termed `contemporary'. 
Formulated in 1958 and only slightly revised in 1982, the Convention is dated and 
therefore could be amended. The Vienna Convention on Treaties necessitates that a 
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treaty be reworked should its meaning become ambiguous, so that the treaty may be 
more effective. This is on the proviso that a revised treaty does not undermine the 
objectives for which the treaty was first established (Birnie, 1987: 180-181). 
International law requires that states cooperate to confront common issues or problems 
concerning the usage of the seas (Brittin, 1989: 165). Hence, states are actually legally 
bound to update the Convention to bring it in line with current developments in piracy. 
3.6a Convention for the Suppression of Acts Against the Safety of International 
Maritime Navigation 
Countries that ratify the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Acts Against the 
Safety of International Maritime Navigation (SUA) may circumvent the deficiencies of 
the UNCLOS Convention's definition of piracy. The specific clauses of the SUA 
Convention concerned with piracy and maritime violence state those offences whereby 
a person illegally and deliberately: 
seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other form of 
intimidation, or 
performs an act of violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the 
safe navigation of that ship (Beckman, 2002: 321). 
There are five advantages of employing the 1988 SUA Convention as a tool to suppress 
maritime violence and crime. First, even attempted acts against shipping that threaten 
the safe navigation of vessels are included in the articles. Second, the SUA Convention 
applies wherever an act that undermines the safe navigation of a ship occurs, including 
within the territorial waters of a signatory state to the SUA Convention. Third, states 
that have ratified the SUA Convention are required to detain alleged offenders found 
within their territory and either extradite or prosecute them. Fourth, the treaty facilitates 
extradition procedures and court proceedings even in the absence of a bilateral 
agreement. Finally, signatories of the SUA Convention are obliged to cooperate with 
one another concerning any offences committed that are outlined in the SUA 
Convention (Treves, 1990: 71; Menefee, 1996: 9; Menefee, 1997: 38-42; Beckman, 
2002: 329-330). 
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The drawback of this treaty, as Mukundan points out, is that states in Southeast Asia are 
not party to the SUA Convention. Therefore, this treaty has no impact in the world's 
most piracy-prone region (Mukundan, interview, 22 April 2003). Southeast Asian states 
fear that signing the SUA Convention may allow the navies of foreign powers to 
encroach upon their sovereign territory in the pursuit of pirates, separatists and terrorists. 
It has been argued that foreign intervention in the sovereign waters of newly 
independent Southeast Asian states that have thrown off the yoke of colonialism would 
undermine popular support for the government and wound national pride. Furthermore, 
outside intercession in the domestic waters of a state is problematic because of the 
maritime territorial disputes in Southeast Asia which raise doubts about the intentions of 
rival powers when pursuing pirates. 
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Young and Valencia therefore propose that by conflating piracy and terrorism, dominant 
maritime powers, such as the United States, can garner support from Southeast Asian 
governments eager to suppress separatist groups in their states. However, more 
diplomatic efforts will be required to assuage the fears of Southeast Asian states as 
regards American regional ambitions, especially considering the sensitive nature of US 
involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as America's newly established alliance 
with India, which includes cooperative piracy patrols in the Indian Ocean and Malacca 
Straits (Young and Valencia, 2003: 277-278). Until the ambitions of Great Powers in 
the region are ascertained, attempting to combine piracy and terrorism as a single issue, 
as Young and Valencia suggest, will not promote the adoption of the SUA Treaty 
amongst Southeast Asian states. Moreover, whilst merging the issues of terrorism and 
piracy may have political benefits, failing to distinguish between the two problems 
means that the distinct causes of different types of piracy and terrorism are not treated. 
This is precisely the accusation that was levelled at Article 101 of UNCLOS and why 
piracy, separatism and terrorism are examined separately in this thesis. 
143 Since the unilateral NATO strikes in Kosovo, less powerful states view sovereignty as their last line of 
defence against bullying by more powerful states (Valencia, The Washington Times, 4 June 2001: A12). 
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3.6b Working Definitions 
As the SUA Convention has not been widely accepted by Southeast Asian states, so it is 
necessary to examine how alternative definitions of contemporary maritime violence 
might address the deficiencies of UNCLOS. The International Maritime Bureau, for 
example, offers a more comprehensive interpretation of contemporary piracy: 
an act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent intent to commit theft or 
any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that 
act (ICC-IMB Piracy Report 2002: 3). 
This definition covers actual and attempted attacks on ships regardless of where the act 
occurs and includes any act of maritime terrorism, except a case which does not require 
a ship to be boarded as in the targeting of the Limburg or USS Cole. The IMB's 
definition of contemporary maritime piracy is particularly significant because it is 
employed to determine reported acts of piracy that the organization's Piracy Reporting 
Centre in Kuala Lumpur has been established to catalogue. The weekly accounts 
published on the Commercial Crime Service's website by the Piracy Reporting Centre 
provide up-to-date, relevant information, such as recent piratical trends and current 
piracy prone areas. By logging on to this website persons involved in the maritime 
industry can determine the level of threat to their ships from pirates, who, unlike states, 
make no distinction between territorial and international waters when conducting their 
activities. 
Whilst the IMB's inclusive definition of maritime piracy is useful for compiling 
statistics that detail the actual condition of piracy worldwide, it has no legal force 
behind it. An attempt to bridge the gap between international law and the current piracy 
problem was proposed at the International Maritime Organization's 74th meeting of the 
Maritime Safety Committee where a draft Code of Practice was established. 146 The draft 
Code of Practice distinguishes between an act of piracy as defined by the Convention 
(Article 101) and armed robbery against ships, which "means any unlawful act of 
violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than an act of 
146 The IMO's 74th meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee occurred between 30 May and 8 June 2001. 
For details, see %ww. imo. orplrome. asn, accessed 26 October 2005. 
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`piracy', directed against a ship or against persons or property on board such ship, 
within a state's jurisdiction over such offences" (ICC-IMB Piracy Report 2002: 3). 
Because agreements between states focus upon the UNCLOS definition of piracy, the 
IMO's separation of piracy versus armed robbery against ships significantly avoids the 
same entanglement with legal terminology that the IMB definition has encountered 
(Renwick and Abbott, 1999: 192,196), whilst calling attention to the gap between 
international legal convention and transnational criminal reality. 147 The definition of 
piracy and armed robbery against ships proposed by the IMO, therefore, provides a 
significant alternative to Article 101 of the Convention. 
Following negotiations initiated by Japan at the `Asia Cooperation Conference on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships' held in Tokyo in October 2001, 
involving 16 Asian states, 148 the IMO's definition of maritime piracy and armed robbery 
was adopted. Southeast Asian states now acknowledge that instances of armed robbery 
against ships occur in their sovereign waters and are thereby encouraged to tackle these 
crimes (Umezawa, 
httn: // vww. soc. nii. ac. ip/isil/annual documents/2003/autumn/houkoku- 
abstr/Panel%20C4%2Umezawa%20paper. pdf, accessed 20 December 2005). An in 
depth examination of how Japan's efforts have led to this development will be detailed 
in Chapter 5. 
147 This is not to say that the IMO definition of piracy and armed robbery against ships has been 
universally welcomed. Indonesian authorities, for example, argue that statistics for piracy presented by 
the IMO are too high as they fail to recognise insurance scams on the part of the shipowner or theft by the 
crew (Ports World, 2003: 18). 
148 The states involved in the `Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships' included the ten ASEAN countries, as well as India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, South Korea, 
China and Japan (http: //www. mofi. go jplmofai/ ag iko/pirate/index. html, accessed on 19 December 2005). 
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3.7 Conclusion 
The United Nations Convention of the High Seas, ratified in 1958 and partly revised in 
1982, is out of touch with the realities of Southeast Asian maritime crime and violence. 
No provision is given in the treaty enabling states to pursue pirates across maritime 
boundaries despite the fact that most piratical incidents occur in sovereign waters. 
Furthermore, UNCLOS does not address the problem of politically motivated acts of 
maritime violence. Yet, this Convention is employed as the framework for negotiations 
between states attempting to resolve the issue of contemporary maritime violence and 
crime. The result is that states concerned with the issues of piracy and terrorism are 
limited as to how they perceive these problems and how they can actually respond. 
Although alternative definitions of contemporary piracy and maritime terrorism exist 
that fully comprehend the complexity and interconnectivity of the problem, these have 
no basis in law, or in the case of the SUA Treaty, have yet to be endorsed by most 
Southeast Asian states. 
The sanctity of state sovereignty and territoriality lie at the nucleus of the issue. Many 
Southeast Asian states are reluctant to permit foreign powers to intervene in their 
territorial waters, even when domestic policing fails to treat the present problem of 
maritime crime. Sovereignty and territoriality need not present a bulwark to overcoming 
security problems in Southeast Asia, as sovereignty can be split amongst different 
international institutions and actors, as was the case in Cambodia and East Timor 
(Makinda, 2001: 408-417). 149 Yet, in the case of contemporary piracy and maritime 
terrorism the issues of state sovereignty and territoriality remain intractable. Chapters 5 
and 6 will examine why Southeast Asian states are unwilling to compromise their 
sovereignty over a resolution to the present issue of maritime crime and violence. 
Overcoming the inadequacies of international law and the denial of hot pursuit to 
foreign maritime policing organizations, by institutionalising multilateral patrols for 
example would enable the symptoms of contemporary maritime security issues to be 
149 For more on Cambodia and East Timor, see Weatherbee, 2005: 80-85,235-236,242-245. 
116 
tackled. However, such strategies focus on maintaining order rather than securing 
justice in the international society and therefore only begin to combat contemporary 
maritime violence and crime. Rather, this definitions chapter has demonstrated that a 
lack of justice in the interhuman and transnational societies, such as economic disparity, 
repressive state policies in secessionist regions, or a lack of educational and social 
opportunities, results in disruptions of order in the interstate society. A human security 
approach that perceives a balance between order and justice is required to resolve the 
causes of maritime violence and crime. Such a focus on justice emphasises cooperation 
between states as well as shared interests and identity that may lessen the possibility of 
conflict in a region creating a more solidarist interstate society. The case studies in 
Chapters 4 to 6 examine the extent to which Japan has pursued such a policy in its 
response to contemporary maritime security threats. 
However, the existing interstate society and interstate institutions shape how Japan 
responds to maritime security issues. In the case of piracy and maritime terrorism in 
Southeast Asia, Japan is operating in a coexistence or cooperative interstate society in 
which the institutions of sovereignty, territoriality, international law and diplomacy are 
paramount. Whilst the Northeast Asian society can be similarly categorised as a 
coexistence or cooperative interstate society, relations between North Korea and Japan 
are based on power politics. Hence, Japan's response to North Korean spy ships 
revolves around the institutions of territoriality, war and the balance of power, during 
periods when Japan seeks to constrain Pyongyang, and sovereignty and diplomacy, 
when Tokyo engages North Korea. It is to the maritime threat posed by North Korean 
spy ships that this thesis will now turn. 
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4. North Korean Spy Ships 
4.1a Defining North Korean Spy Ships 
The North Korean ships that have entered Japanese waters illegally have been referred 
to in various ways. The most common references are kosakusen (spy ship) and 
fushinsen (suspicious or mystery ship). However, occasionally they are termed 
kokusekifumeisen (unidentified ships). 150 None of these appellations is necessarily 
incorrect, as at various phases an encounter with an illegal ship usually involves 
suspicion, mystery, spying and a lack of or a falsified identity. However, Kim Jong II's 
admission to Prime Minister Koizumi that spy boats had been dispatched on missions to 
Japan at their summit meeting in Pyongyang on 17 September 2002 clears up much of 
the suspicion and mystery surrounding the identity of the North Korean vessels 
intruding into Japanese waters. Of course, not every infringement of Japan's maritime 
space by a North Korean ship is necessarily a spy mission in terms of gathering 
intelligence, as such a vessel could be trading in illicit amphetamines for the Japanese 
market, for example. 
15 ' However, current research indicates that when boats from North 
Korea are involved in instances of unauthorised entry into Japanese waters they are 
commanded by covert operatives for clandestine purposes. The term North Korean spy 
ship is therefore preferred in this chapter, as even when suspicion and mystery remain 
as to the true identity and purpose of a North Korean vessel trespassing in Japanese 
waters, North Korean spies are highly likely to be present. Nevertheless, at certain key 
iso teilst kokusekifumeisen literally means a ship of unknown nationality, because a ship's identification 
centres on its nationality, followed by its registration number and name, so the term `unidentified ship' is 
preferred. 
s1 North Korea's illicit trade in narcotics to Japan is estimated to earn the North Korean regime 
approximately US$495 million per year. Until the December 2001 spy ship incident, North Korean spy 
ships were engaged in trafficking drugs into Japan. After the Japan Coast Guard's robust response in the 
December 2001 spy ship case, which resulted in the sinking of the spy ship, North Korean drug dealers 
resorted to shipping their illegal products to Japan via China. Chinese gangs have been engaged in this 
unlawful trade, encouraging the Japanese police 
force to crack down on Chinese criminal organizations 
operating in Japan. Arrests of Chinese dealers have caused the street price of North Korean stimulants in 
Japan to rise by a factor of five to around US$123,000 per kilogram. In an effort to garner Japanese 
financial aid, Pyongyang has detained some of its own narcotics dealers, demonstrating willingness to 
curtail North Korea's narcotics trade (Tamura, 2004: 89-90). It remains to be seen whether the North 
Korean government will take sterner measures to decrease its own reliance on the narcotics trade with 
Japan. 
118 
points in spy ship cases, the fact that the nationality of the vessel is merely suspected 
has important repercussions for international law. In certain instances the terminology 
`suspect ship' or `suspicious ship' will be employed. 
The Japanese authorities know of a total of 21 cases of DRPK spy ships penetrating 
Japanese sovereign territory. These incidents have mostly occurred in the Japan Sea 
between Niigata and Fukuoka Prefectures and have involved drug trafficking, abduction 
of Japanese citizens to serve as teachers for North Korean spies, intelligence gathering, 
as well as insertion and extraction of North Korean spies to and from the Japanese 
mainland. 152 The most infamous episodes of North Korean spy vessels entering 
Japanese territory occurred in March 1999 and December 2001. Though neither case 
represented a significant break in terms of North Korean maritime espionage, both 
occasions revealed Japanese intentions to adopt a more robust stance vis-a-vis 
incursions into its territorial waters. It is these two incidents that will be examined in 
detail in order to ascertain the threat posed by North Korean spy ships and how Japan 
has responded to these boats infringing upon its sovereign territory. However, several 
prior cases will first be treated to build a historical background with which to compare 
and contrast the more recent confrontations with North Korean spy ships. 
4.1b History of North Korean Spy Ship incursions 
North Korean spy ship incursions into Japanese territory before 1999 reveal much about 
the boat's appearance, modus operandi and purpose. For example, on 25 April 1985, a 
fishing industry patrol boat located a suspicious white ship of a 19-ton class, named 
Kvei Maru Number 31, off the coast of Hyüga City, Miyazaki Prefecture. The 
suspicious ship bore two-loop antenna, and five or six wireless antenna and radar. An 
investigation into the identity of the vessel revealed that a Köei Maru Number 31 did 
indeed exist, but was operating in a different area. Furthermore, the boat's identification 
number, OT2-3311, was false. The vessel was chased for two days by four Maritime 
12 A former North Korean agent indicated that North Korea has 150 spy boats, of which 30 are the same 
class of ship as the one that sank in December 2001 (Yamada, 2004: 51). 
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Safety Agency (MSA) planes and 23 ships for 1,100 kilometres and ordered to stop 
three times. The spy ship, reaching speeds of up to 40 knots, easily outran the MSA 
vessels which only managed 30 knots at best. During the pursuit of the Köei Maru 
Number 31 it was calculated that the spy ship could travel at top speed for 
approximately 1,000 kilometres, leading analysts to suspect that most of the hull was 
fitted with fuel tanks (Intelligence Affairs Research Group, 1999: 37; Afainichi Shimbun 
Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 8; Yamada, 2004: 51). Several characteristics of the 
suspicious vessel, including the number of antenna, the speed of the vessel, the false 
identification and its conduct in escaping, bear all the hallmarks of a North Korean spy 
ship. 
Spy ships have also been used in the abduction of Japanese citizens to be employed as 
Japanese language instructors in North Korea's secret service training camps, and to 
convey illegal narcotics into Japan. On 20 September 1977, a North Korean spy made 
the acquaintance of a single Japanese male from Tokyo, who was then taken to 
Ishikawa Prefecture and transferred to a North Korean spy boat to be taken to North 
Korea. On 20 June 1985, a Japanese male working in a Chinese restaurant in Osaka was 
abducted and taken to Aoshima in Miyazaki Prefecture. The Japanese man was then 
shipped out in a North Korean spy boat, his Japanese passport and identity stolen to 
enable the spy to collect intelligence on the South Korean military (Intelligence Affairs 
Research Group, 1999: 39). Also in 1985, a North Korean spy ship named the 
tllatsukami Afaru Number 12 and disguised as a Japanese fishing boat was discovered 
transferring amphetamines to a Japanese fishing boat chartered by a Japanese yakuza 
gang (Ishikawa, 1999: 98). 
The Matsukani Maru Number 12 was involved in a more recent narcotics case, in 
August 1998. In this instance, Japanese authorities seized 300 kilograms worth of 
stimulant of North Korean origin, valued at ¥18 billion at street value, off the coast of 
Kubokawa Town, Köchi Prefecture. Six Japanese suspects with links to a Sumiyoshi- 
kai gang were arrested and indicted, following the revelation that a member of the group 
had entered North Korea with Y6.4 million to finalise the details of the stimulant 
shipment. The delivery of the drugs was conducted at 4: 30 p. m. on 12 August in 
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international waters from the North Korean boat. 153 As the Japanese gang returned to 
Japanese waters they realised their ship, the Tama Maru, was being tailed by an MSA 
patrol boat, at which point they disposed of the stimulants overboard, with a view to 
collecting them at a later date. However, authorities from Aichi, Mie and Köchi 
Prefectures gathered and impounded the stimulants (Mizoguchi, 1999). 
Similarly, in April 1997, a North Korean cargo ship, Chison Number 2, was detained in 
Hosojima Port in Miyazaki Prefecture, after approximately 60 kilograms of stimulant 
drugs, worth almost ¥10 billion at street value, were uncovered in twelve 18-litre honey 
cans. 154 Several incidents since the Chison Number 2 have reconfirmed the use of North 
Korean spy boats in the drug trade. These include, the seizure of 100kgs of stimulant in 
April 1999 at Sakai Minato, Tottori Prefecture, 564kgs of stimulant in October 1999 in 
Kagoshima Prefecture, 249kgs of stimulant in February 2000 at Unotsu Port in Shimane 
Prefecture, and 151 kgs of stimulant in January 2002 in Fukuoka Prefecture. The fact 
that spy ships were being used for the purpose of shipping drugs after the December 
2001 spy ship incident is revealing in that it confirms that even if a number of spy ships 
are engaged by the JCG, the operation must still be profitable enough for this to be a 
successful mode of conducting business. Okabe states that only one in four spy ships 
need reach Japan in order for a profit to be made. The number of exposed cases leads to 
the assumption that many more shipments must escape detection. Between 1998 and 
2002, drugs of North Korean origin amounted to 34.6 percent of the total of imported 
narcotics into Japan, a figure which represents a total of ¥50 billion for North Korea 
each year (Okabe, 2003: 57-58). 
In a US Department of State report, North Korea was identified as having undertaken 
the cultivation of opium poppies and stimulant production as a means of acquiring hard 
153 This is known as delivery at sea or sedori. In this case, a US Marines P-3C patrol plane had spotted 
and taken pictures of the Matsukami Maru Number 12 as it waited in international waters from the 7 
August (Mizoguchi, 1999). 
154 The origin of the stimulants in this case was not identified as the Miyazaki police failed to test the 
adulterants in the narcotics seizure, favouring the testimony of the smugglers who said the drugs came 
from China (Mizoguchi, 1999). Nonetheless, the arrest of a North Korean party member, as well as the 
seizure of his North Korean codebooks, on board the Chison Number 2 affirmed the involvement of North 
Korea in drugs trafficking (Okabe, 2003: 57). 
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currency. 155 The "Strategic Report on International Narcotics Countermeasures" stated 
that between 4,500 and 7,000 hectares around the North Korean-Chinese border had 
been designated for the purpose of growing opium poppies, with an estimated yield of 
30 to 45 tons a year (though this amount would decrease when refined). It is clear from 
the amounts of drugs involved that the government in Pyongyang is active in 
developing its revenue from illegal narcotics sales (Mizoguchi, 1999) 
During the Cold War, North Korea had relied heavily upon Russia for cheap oil imports. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that these oil imports sharply decreased from 40 
tons in 1990 to 4.2 tons in 1991. As a result, Pyongyang turned increasingly to illicit 
means of funding, including narcotics sales, trading in counterfeit money and missile 
deals, to preserve the existence of the communist regime. Opium poppy growth, for 
example, rose by a factor of ten between 1992 and 1993. After Kim 11 Sung's death on 8 
July 1994, North Korea's drug industry expanded in terms of the quantity of narcotics 
produced and distributed abroad. North Korea's illicit drugs operation became 
increasingly sophisticated from the mid-1990s, with stimulants attaining 90-99 percent 
purity (Okabe, 2003: 56-57). 
The use of spy ships by North Korea in narcotic trafficking, as well as in the abductions 
of Japanese citizens and in spy operations against Japan, contravenes international law 
and transgresses Japanese sovereign territory. Such practices violate the obligations of a 
member of the interstate society to uphold the sanctity of sovereign borders and 
international law and therefore place North Korea on the periphery of the interstate 
society of Northeast Asia. For these reasons, North Korea has been designated in this 
thesis as a barbarian state with sovereign boundaries recognised by the interstate society 
and with which states in the interstate society negotiate, but which does not fulfil the 
criteria to be deemed a member of the interstate society. This chapter will address how 
Japan has responded to this barbarian maritime threat. The context of Japan-North 
Iss Whilst sales in legitimate goods from North Korea decreased by 42 percent from 1997 to 1998, illicit 
sales from narcotics and stimulants amassed US$100 million worth of revenue for Pyongyang (Mizoguchi, 
1999 - quoting a US Congressional Research Service Report, released in February 1999). 
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Korea relations in the aftermath of the Cold War will first be addressed to assess how 
this context has influenced Japan's response to spy ships. 
4.1c Japan's Perception of the North Korean Threat 
Japan has long viewed developments in North Korea suspiciously and has yet to 
normalise its relations with the country. This suspicion stems from the fear of a possible 
conflict on the Korean peninsula. The entire Japanese archipelago is in range of North 
Korea's missiles which could be armed with chemical, biological and possibly nuclear 
warheads. Confrontation with Kim Jong Il's `hermit kingdom' could therefore prove 
disastrous for the Japanese population, the majority of which is concentrated in densely 
populated metropolises where the effects of WMD would be at their most devastating. 
Added to the perception that a conflict on the Korean peninsula could result in the 
annihilation of much of Japan, 
156 is a general apprehensiveness towards North Korea 
concerning its clandestine operations. North Korea's spy activities include: the 
abduction of Japanese nationals during the 1970s for the purpose of teaching North 
Korean operatives Japanese language and culture, illicit trading, and intelligence 
missions on and around Japanese territory. All of these clandestine operations involve 
the use of spy ships. 
The greater threat by the mid-1990s, however, was arguably the political ramifications 
of dealing with North Korea. At this point in time, North Korea had yet to test and 
develop its nuclear and missile programmes sufficiently to be able to target Japan with 
WMD. The potential for bilateral progress in the relationship between North Korea and 
the US could divide the existing alliance systems in Northeast Asia. Both South Korea 
isb It should be noted that the accuracy of North Korea's missiles is far from certain (McCormack, 2004). 
Moreover, the lethality of chemical weapons is contested, leading some to argue that it should be 
removed from the WMD category altogether (Carter, 2004: 73). However, a chemical weapons attack 
ordered by Saddam Hussein on the Kurdish town of Halabja in Northern Iraq on 16 March 1988 that 
immediately killed approximately 5,000 people attests to the lethality of chemical weapons. The death toll 
reached 12,000 after three days and residents of Halabja continue to suffer the after effects of the attack 
(htt //p old krg orr, /reference/halabia/index. asp, accessed 10 June 2006). Finally, it is unclear how many 
missiles North Korea would be able to launch and how many would be downed by Japan's anti-ballistic 
missile, Patriot batteries in the event of a North Korean missile attack. 
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and Japan expressed concern that if diplomatic relations were normalised between 
North Korea and the US, then Seoul and Tokyo would have to follow suit and normalise 
relations with North Korea on unfavourable terms. Furthermore, substantial easing of 
tensions on the peninsula would create a rationale for the US to scale down its military 
forces in Japan and South Korea, prompting US withdrawal from Asian security 
problems (Hughes, 1996: 85-88). In fact, the US began redeploying some 12,500 troops 
from South Korea to Iraq in 2004, as part of the Pentagon's global strategy to reduce 
static troop deployments in favour of rapid response forces. This occurred in spite of a 
lack of progress being made over North Korea's nuclear weapons programme (Pollack, 
2005: 2,7-8). 
Japan's foreign policy towards North Korea has therefore had to take into consideration, 
not only the threat of missiles and WMD, but also the possibility of a change in the 
Northeast Asian security environment disrupting existing alliance frameworks. With 
this in mind, the approach of the Japanese government has tended to oscillate between 
containment, when the Japanese government perceived the physical threat of missiles 
and WMD was high, and engagement, when the Japanese government feared being 
caught out of the diplomatic loop of negotiations with North Korea. In containing North 
Korea, Japan has focussed its policy through the interstate institutions of the balance of 
power and territoriality, whereas the interstate institutions of diplomacy and sovereignty 
have guided Japan's engagement policy towards North Korea. 
Japan's policy began with the signing of the Agreed Framework in October 1994. The 
Agreed Framework evolved in the aftermath of North Korea's stated intention to 
withdraw from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in February 1993, in response to 
demands from the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect suspected nuclear 
weapons production sites in North Korea. The US responded with economic sanctions 
and tensions mounted on the peninsula as a second Korean War loomed. Conflict was 
averted largely thanks to the efforts of former US President Carter, who met Kim Il 
Sung and persuaded the supreme leader to resolve the situation diplomatically. In the 
negotiations that followed in Geneva, 1994, North Korea stopped the Yongbyon 
reprocessing plant in return for two light water reactors (LWRs) whose spent fuel would 
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be much harder to reprocess into a weapons form. Japan and South Korea were to fund 
the project, whilst the US would supply North Korea with oil and remove sanctions. A 
multinational consortium known as the Korean Peninsula Energy Development 
Organization (KEDO) would oversee the whole project (Langdon, 2001: 168-171; 
Martin, 2002: 51-65; Samore, 2003: 8-11). 
After the signing of the Agreed Framework in October 1994, which initiated a period of 
engagement with Pyongyang, four events have signalled a reorientation of Japan's 
policy towards North Korea. The first of these came in August 1998, when North Korea 
launched a Taepodong missile over Japanese territory, prompting the Japanese 
government to pursue a policy of containment with North Korea. 157 Second, following 
initial progress made on the implementation of the Agreed Framework in 1999, the US 
Secretary of State Madeline Albright visited North Korea in October 2000, signalling a 
warming of relations between the US and North Korea (Langdon, 2001: 168-171; 
Martin, 2002: 51-65; Samore, 2003: 8-11). Japan followed suit, renewing its 
commitments and increasing its engagement with Pyongyang. Third, the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks marked a transformation in US foreign policy, which began to take aim at states 
that harboured or helped terrorists. Of particular concern to the US were `rogue states', 
like North Korea, that pursued WMD programmes designed to target the US, its allies 
or its assets. 158 Once again, Japanese policy regarding North Korea shifted as the 
'" On 31 August 1998, North Korea launched what seemed to be a ballistic missile which soared over the 
Japanese mainland and disappeared into the Pacific Ocean. Though North Korea insisted that the missile 
was a failed attempt to send a satellite into orbit, suspicions were raised in Japan that the Taepodong-I 
long-range missile had been tested. Analysts surmised that the missile could deliver a small payload some 
3,300 miles, making the military implications of the launch clear. In response to the missile incident, 
Tokyo immediately cancelled its US$1 billion donation to the KEDO project to build two light water 
nuclear reactors (LWRs), refused to dispatch food aid to Pyongyang and gave up on normalisation talks. 
Though US pressure pushed Japan to stand by its commitment to fund the LWR scheme, by October, the 
threat posed by North Korean ballistic missiles, particularly if combined with WMD warheads, to 
Japanese cities now clouded relations between Tokyo and Pyongyang (Uriu, 1999: 123; Brown, 1999: 
129-130; Abramowitz and Bosworth, 2003: 124). 
15' US foreign policy hardened in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, culminating in President 
Bush's January 2002 State of the Union Address, in which North Korea was tagged, along with Iran and 
Iraq, as constituting an `axis of evil' (Gurtov, 2002: 405-407,411-412). The American stance towards 
North Korea stiffened as a meeting between Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly and North Korea's 
Vice-Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju on 4-5 October 2002, in Pyongyang revealed that Kim Jong I1's 
regime had been pursuing a uranium enrichment capability since 1997-98. Washington therefore 
demanded that North Korea dismantle its nuclear weapons programme in a way the US could verify. This 
deadlocked negotiations on the peninsula as North Korea retorted that by failing to deliver on the LWR 
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physical threat of North Korea's missiles and WMD were perceived anew. Finally, the 
meeting between the Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and the North Korean 
President Kim Jong 11 on 27 September 2002, during which Kim Jong Il announced an 
end to the dispatch of spy ships into Japanese waters, set the two states on a path to 
engagement that has continued with the return of the six-party talks in February and 
June 2005 (Pollack, 2005: 2). 159 As both the March 1999 and December 2001 spy ship 
cases occurred during periods of containment, so Japan's response was more resolute, 
focusing on military means to protect Japanese territory and to discourage Pyongyang 
with a show of force. 
160 Though this policy necessitated mobilising the MSDF and 
MSA to chase and inspect any vessels intruding upon Japanese territory, the Japanese 
electorate were no longer as cautious vis-ä-vis confrontation with Pyongyang. 
project and by refusing to guarantee the security of North Korea, it was the US that had reneged on the 
Agreed Framework. Subsequent embargoes on oil bound for North Korea and Pyongyang's response, 
ordering the restart of nuclear reactors, allegedly for electricity production, has signalled the end of the 
Agreed Framework (Samore, 2003: 11-16). 
's Pollack does stress that despite the return of the six-party talks, little progress was made to end North 
Korea's WMD programme (Pollack, 2005: 2). Moreover, a series of missile tests by North Korea on 5 
July 2006 threatens to derail the six-party talks. For international reaction to the launches, see 
h_ttp //www iapantimes. co. jp/,; 'eekly/ed/ed20060715aI. htm, accessed 18 August 2006. 
160 This contrasts with Japan's response to spy ship incursions prior to March 1999, which had not been 
countered so decisively by Japanese maritime forces. Though the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency 
began building faster patrol vessels, such as the Inasa, Afizuki and Kirishima, which can all reach up to 35 
knots, in response to the 1985 Miyazaki case (Yamada, 2004: 52), these patrol vessels were still not fast 
enough to catch their prey in March 1999. Furthermore, the kinds of threat that the spy ships posed, from 
abduction of Japanese citizens to illegal drug imports and clandestine surveillance, as well as the modus 
operandi of the spy ships were well known to the Japanese authorities. Of particular note were the 
increasing reliance of the regime in Pyongyang upon drug shipments for hard currency and the 
involvement of Japanese yakuza gangs in such operations. Clearly the Japanese government knew of the 
threat posed by North Korean spy ships before the March 1999 incident, but were reluctant to address it. 
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4.2 The 1999 Spy Ship Incursion 
4.2a Summary 
In the evening of 18 March 1999 suspicion was raised by American intelligence 
gathering satellites that indicated two North Korean fishing boats were leaving the port 
of Chongj in in North Korea in the direction of Japanese waters. The US high command 
passed this information on to the Defence Information Headquarters of the Japanese 
Defence Agency in Ichigaya on 21 March. The two North Korean ships were operating 
off the coast of the Noto Peninsula, when on 21 March 1999, a Japanese SIGNIT station, 
400km southeast of the ships' position, at Miho on the Shimane Peninsula in Tottori 
Prefecture, picked up their encoded radio transmissions. 161 On 22 March, the MSDF 
began an airborne search using P3C planes around the Sado and Noto coastlines. As the 
chase of the two spy ships developed, an increasing number of US and Japanese aircraft 
were employed to track the course of the pursuit, to watch for enemy planes and to 
analyse radio transmissions (Ishikawa, 1999: 101-103; Asahi Shimbun, 21 April 1999: 
4). 
Both ships were disguised as Japanese fishing vessels and named Taisei Maru Number 
1 and Yamato Maru Number 2.162 They had a water displacement of approximately 100 
tons, were 30 meters long, carried no visible fishing equipment, but had nine antennas 
on top of the bridge. A MSDF P-3C Orion confirmed the precise location of the two 
ships on 23 March, recording that one of the ships was navigating in Japanese domestic 
waters, 18km west of Sado Island. The MSDF were instructed to take `maritime 
security action' on 24 March, in order to subject the two suspicious ships to a stop-and- 
search inspection. During the chase that ensued, MSDF destroyers fired warning shots 
161 The SIGNIT centre at Miho is also known as the elephant's cage because of the structure of the 
multiple pylons and antenna there (Ishikawa, 1999: 109). 
162 The names were investigated and found to be forgeries. The real Yamato Maru Number 2 was from 
Tsuiyama port, Toyaoka City, Hyögo Prefecture and the Taisei Maru Number 1, which was scrapped in 
1994, was from Kasumi town in Hyögo Prefecture. It is believed that a North Korean spy took pictures of 
ships in the area for the purpose of appropriating the names of real fishing boats, as these two places in 
Ilyögo Prefecture are within 15 kilometres of each other (Ishikawa, 1999: 98). 
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and MSDF aircraft dropped bombs to persuade the two ships to stop. 163 The pursuit of 
the two spy ships was called off when the Yamato Maru Number 2 and the Taisei Marti 
Number 1 crossed Japan's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) 164 at 3: 20 a. m. and 
6: 06 a. m. respectively on the morning of 24 March (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 
March 1999: 3). Satellite intelligence later confirmed that the two spy boats entered the 
North Korean port of Chongjin, a known North Korean spy base mainly for intelligence 
activities directed towards Japan, at 7 a. m. on 25 March (Ishikawa, 1999: 96-97; 
Mainichi Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 1; Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 March, 1999: 1; Ball, 2004: 
75-76). 165 While the chase was ultimately unsuccessful, speculation abounded as to 
what the spy ships had been doing in Japanese domestic waters. 
4.2b Purpose of Spy Ship Intrusion 
The true purpose of the North Korean spy ships in entering Japanese waters in 1999 is a 
matter of speculation. However, comparison with earlier events reveals three main 
probable reasons for North Korean ships intruding into Japanese waters. Pyongyang 
may have sent the spy ships to collect information by monitoring radio waves, to insert 
or extract North Korean spies, or to ship narcotics. As there is no need for spy ships to 
come so close to the Japanese coastline to monitor radio frequencies the first of these 
hypotheses is the least likely. 166 The fact that two ships were in the same vicinity at the 
163 The MSDF had not taken such action against a vessel since 8 August 1953, when a Soviet spy ship 
was engaged off the coast of Cape Soya in northern Hokkaido. 
16' Ships and planes must identify themselves when entering Japan's ADIZ, which is 400-500km from the 
Japanese mainland. Failure to do so can result in the dispatch of the SDF (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 
24 March 1999: 1). 
165 A different take on this incident revealed that a total of seven spy ships entered Japanese territory and 
made for the Noto Peninsula coastline on 21 March. Five of the seven ships departed the same day in the 
direction of North Korea leaving the Taisei Maru Number I and the Yamato Maru Number 2. It is 
speculated that Yamato Maru Number 2 was guarding the Taisei Maru Number 1, which was 
experiencing engine trouble, until it got underway. The aim of the mission according to this scenario was 
to provoke Japan and raise tensions as a means of extracting aid from Japan (Tokyo Shimbun, 4 April 
1999). Though this account is not backed up by intelligence reports, it is worth taking into consideration 
as an alternative version of what happened. 
166 That said, Ebata Kensuke, states that it may be that the ships were collecting information from short 
range radio broadcasts which would explain why they were so close to the shore. After all, it is better for 
North Korean ships, when smuggling drugs, not to draw too much attention to themselves by having too 
many antenna (Asahi Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 39; Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 38). 
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same time indicates that large quantities of narcotics may have been transported in order 
to conduct a deal with the Japanese yakuza. However, the spy ships used in the 1999 
case differed structurally from the narcotics smuggling ship of the August 1998 case, 
having less and smaller windows as well as a different angle and curvature. Therefore, 
the spy ships in the March 1999 case may not have been the kind used to convey drugs 
(Mainicki Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 9). Instead, inserting and 
extracting spies is a more probable reason for the ships presence owing to North 
Korea's need to gather intelligence on Japan's changing military stance with the US- 
Japan Guidelines being discussed in the Japanese Diet (Tsuboi, 1999: 15; Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 24 March, 1999: 38). Of course, it is also possible that the ship's missions 
combined narcotics smuggling, insertion/extraction of spies and intelligence gathering. 
However, past instances tended to highlight that one ship had one assignment for every 
time it entered Japanese waters. This practice is only likely to change, if the dangers of 
sending spy boats into Japanese waters were such that the number of incursions needed 
to be decreased. 
Whatever the purpose of the ships, however, it is clear that the action taken by the North 
Korean spy ships in March 1999, was wholly in line with North Korean policy. A 
former North Korean Spy, Hwang Jang Yop, stated in his first interview since defecting 
from North Korea in February 1997, that Kim Jong Il's aim was to fortify the North 
Korean state through advancing its military strength, whilst frightening surrounding 
nations through missile launches and spy boat incursions, in order to obtain aid and to 
restrain neighbouring states from taking action against North Korea (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
25 March 1999: 6). Instead the real break with past instances of North Korean spy ship 
incursions was the largely improvised response of the Japanese security forces and 
government. It was precisely because the Japanese response was extemporised that 
inadequacies surfaced in terms of the cooperation between maritime agencies and the 
ability of the Japanese government to deal with crisis situations. 
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4.2c Cooperation between the JDA and MSA 
Perhaps the most glaring deficiency in the cooperation between the Japan Defence 
Agency (JDA) and MSA was the delay in processing the information related to the 
discovery of the spy ships. Even though the JDA had been aware of the presence of 
suspicious ships since 21 March, it was not until 11 a. m. and 1 p. m. on 23 March that 
the JDA contacted the MSA about the Yamato Maru Number 2 and Taisei Maru 
Number 1 respectively (Ishikawa, 1999: 95). The JDA blamed this delay on the fact that 
they only possessed fragmentary evidence that spy ships had transgressed Japanese 
waters until the morning of 23 March (Watanabe, 1999: 10). However, this excuse 
hardly squares well with the fact that an MSDF flotilla had already left port in search of 
the ships on 22 March. 
On the afternoon of Monday 22 March, a day after the US informed the JDA 
Headquarters of the presence of spy ships, a flotilla of three escort ships Haruna, Afyöko 
and Abukuma headed out to sea from the naval base of Maizuru. As 22 March was a 
substitute holiday for the Vernal Equinox Day that had fallen on the Sunday, the ships 
were not fully prepared to set sail. Hence, the morning of 22 March saw sailors from all 
three MSDF vessels hurrying about the port purchasing extra provisions, mainly 
vegetables and frozen foods, as they headed for their posts. 
167 People in the town 
remarked that the bustling activity resembled that of a year before during the 
Taepodong crisis. As the ships had been scheduled to begin a training exercise on 23 
March, it is hard to believe that the MSDF escorts had not been adequately supplied, so 
the hustle in Maizuru on the Monday morning might well be attributed to the sailors 
anticipating a lengthy expedition at sea. Commandant Yoshikawa attempted to conceal 
this mobilisation by saying that the vessels were simply heading out a day early for their 
training mission, but as police activities around the coast of Niigata, Toyama and 
Ishikawa prefectures were stepped up from 22 March, this pretence became difficult to 
maintain (Ishikawa, 1999: 99). 
167 Troops were called back to Maizuru port on the instructions that training would begin a day early 
because of bad weather (Asahi Shimbun, 7 April 1999: 2-3). 
130 
However, it was not just the fact that the information about the spy ships took too long 
to reach the MSA that the Japanese maritime authorities' actions were seen to be 
deficient. During the operation, both organizations lacked the joint training to 
coordinate their activities. Furthermore, no codes existed in 1999 for the MSA and 
MSDF to communicate with each other in secret. Instead, transmissions between vessels 
and the mainland were conducted using radio frequencies that the North Korean spy 
boats could overhear. The lack of cooperation between the MSA and MSDF is 
noticeable in the fact that as many as 41 MSA and MSDF vessels share the same name; 
though this was not thought to have caused problems in the spy ship chase (Taoka, 
1999: 14-15). 
Members of both agencies blaming each other for the ineffectiveness of Japan's 
response to the spy ships in March 1999 have not improved the lack of cooperation 
between the MSA and JDA. Kawamura Sumihiko, a former vice-admiral of the MSDF, 
for example, argues that not enough was done to protect Japan from North Korean spy 
ships in 1999. In particular, the incident revealed notable failures of the MSA, which is 
in charge of guarding Japan's seas and coastlines during peacetime, such as the failure 
of these ships to stop the spy ships and the slow speed of MSA patrol craft compared to 
the spy ships. He also notes that the warning shots fired by both the MSA and MSDF 
had little meaning as they were not followed by shots that targeted the spy ships directly. 
These shortcomings indicate that the MSDF should, in Kawamura's opinion, play a 
greater role in the protection of Japan's maritime territory (Kawamura, 1999: 140- 
146). 168 
Whilst Kawamura raises several significant deficiencies in the approach taken by the 
MSA in this instance, it is hardly fair to blame the MSA entirely. The MSA only 
received information about the two spy vessels around noon on 23 March, leaving scant 
opportunity to pursue the intruding ships with faster patrol craft. By comparison, 
mistakes made by the MDSF are equally prominent, as the MSDF flotilla also did not 
manage to prevent the spy ships from making their escape, despite setting sail on 21 
168 See also Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 2,23. 
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March. Of particular interest was the delay in ordering maritime security action which 
might have allowed the MSDF escort ships to take more expedient efforts in detaining 
the Taisei Maru Number 1 when it stopped on the evening of 24 March. It also became 
clear during the March 1999 spy ship incursion that MSA and MSDF laws were too 
restrictive in terms of what the Japanese authorities were entitled to do in a spy ship 
case and that the laws would have to be amended in the aftermath of the event so that 
future instances could be more thoroughly dealt with (Cossa, 1999). 
Clearly a lack of cooperation between the MSA and MSDF hindered the Japanese 
government's response to the spy ship incursion. Delays allowed the spy ships to sail 
away from Japanese maritime territory wherein the Japanese response would fall wholly 
under domestic rather than international law. A similar set of circumstances would 
unfold in the December 2001 spy ship case, but with the key difference that the 
Japanese government's response in March 1999 was far more attentive to the opinions 
of the interstate society. Nonetheless, a failure to tackle the March 1999 spy ship 
incursion decisively led to criticism that the Japanese government's crisis management 
was lacking. 
4.2d Government Crisis Management 
On 23 March 1999, at around 5: 30 p. m., Prime Minister Obuchi Keiz6 met with 
officials from the Ministries concerned in the spy ship pursuit. These included Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Nonaka Hiromu, JDA Director General Norota Hosei, Transport 
Minister Kawasaki Jir6, Foreign Minister Komura Masahiko, Deputy Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Furukawa Teijir6, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Foreign Policy 
Bureau Director General Kath Ry6z6 (Asahi Shimbun, 7 April 1999: 2-3). At 6 p. m., the 
Crisis Management Centre was established and headed by the Director of Cabinet Crisis 
Management Ando Tadao (Asahi Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 1). During the meeting, 
Transport Minister Kawasaki acknowledged that it would be difficult for the MSA to 
catch the spy vessels because of the high speed at which the two ships travelled. 
Nevertheless, it was determined that the government should act, as failure to do so 
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would result in public condemnation for the government (Asahi Shinibun, 24 March 
1999: 2). 
The perfect moment for action came at around midnight on 24 March. It was at this time 
that the Taisei Maru Number 1 suddenly stopped due to what may have been engine 
trouble (Ishikawa, 1999: 96). This provided the nearby MSDF vessels with an 
opportunity to capture the ship. The MSDF did not, because the order for maritime 
security action had yet to be given (Watanabe, 1999: 10). Director General Norota gave 
the order for maritime security action at 12: 50 a. m. on 24 March, after the Taisei Maru 
Number 1 had gotten underway again (Ishikawa, 1999: 96; Watanabe, 1999: 11). The 
reasons for this delay highlight the deficiencies of the Japanese government's crisis 
management skills at the time. 
Though Norota was able to detail the plan to order for maritime security action quickly, 
as the Emergency Countermeasures Committee, which Norota chaired, had already 
assessed the limits of a possible response to the situation, 169 Prime Minister Obuchi and 
Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka were less positive about ordering maritime security 
action. Both Obuchi and Nonaka wished to abide by the letter of the law and not upset 
the Republic of Korea, which might be alarmed if Japanese action went too far by 
endangering the lives of the North Korean sailors. 170 This hesitancy on the part of 
Obuchi and Nonaka, coupled with the exodus of Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Furukawa and a number of bureau directors general of the relevant ministries on 
standby from the Kantei as they rushed to catch the last trains home, delayed the order 
for maritime security action until after the opportunity to capture the Taisei Afaru 
Number 1 had passed (Watanabe, 1999: 11; Asahi Shimbun, 7 April 1999: 2-3; Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 25 March 1999: 3). 
169 Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshikawa and Konemura, the prime minister's secretary, supported 
the JDA director in his wish to have the prime minister order maritime security action (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
25 March 1999: 3). 
170 Prime Minister Obuchi talked with Kim Dae Jung, the South Korean president on the evening of 23 
March, and expressed concern that there might be some connection with a Taepodong missile launch 
(Asahi Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 2). 
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This reluctance to invoke the order for maritime security action, together with the 
departure of key officials from the Kantei before the pursuit of the spy ships had ended, 
greatly undermined the response of the MSDF. The situation underscored a key division 
in Japanese Foreign Policy, in the sense that there is an unwillingness to employ the 
MSDF to carry out an operation that may involve an element of danger, even though, as 
the JDA argued at the time, the MSDF flotilla was the best placed Japanese unit to 
respond to the incident. Prime Minister Obuchi's concerns about the MSDF sinking the 
spy vessel indicate a fear that MSDF actions may be badly received by the Japanese 
people as well as abroad. The prime minister's objective was therefore to abide by the 
letter of international law and to keep domestic opinion as well as the interstate 
society's interpretation of events foremost in mind. Yet it is precisely this risk aversion 
that allows North Korean ships to transgress Japanese territory in the knowledge that no 
harm will come to them. By 2001, a change of prime minister and Cabinet coupled with 
new international realities in the aftermath of 9/11 meant that a disinclination to act 
forcibly against North Korean spy ships was reversed. 
Despite the failure to order maritime security action promptly, the preparations of the 
government and JDA were at least thorough. At 7: 55 on the morning of 24 March, four 
MIG-21 aircraft took off from the Rajin airbase in North Korea. An MSDF E-2C early 
warning patrol plane detected the movement of these fighters on their radar and two 
Japanese F-15 jets launched from the Air Self-Defence Force (ASDF) base in Komatsu, 
Ishikawa Prefecture. The F-15s were ordered to undertake a Combat Air Patrol (CAP) 
in which they were to intercept any aircraft violating Japanese airspace. Even the 
Ground Scif-Defence Force (GSDF) were called back to barracks to strengthen the 
guard at military facilities during the spy ship chase (Ishikawa, 1999: 100). The launch 
of MIGs from Rajin is further evidence for the ships being of North Korean origin 
(Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 1) and it proved to the Japanese 
government that Pyongyang was prepared to act militarily should the spy ship chase 
escalate. Nevertheless, the fact that MSDF fighters were on stand-by for precisely such 
a move and that early warning planes were on patrol throughout the incident 
demonstrates a success both in terms of the JDA's preparedness and the government's 
will to respond resolutely. 
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4.2e Domestic and Foreign Responses 
Though the hesitancy of Prime Minister Obuchi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka 
were blamed for not approving the order for maritime security action fast enough, their 
indecision paid off in terms of the favourable responses of the Japanese domestic 
audience as well as actors in the interstate society. South Korean sources described 
Japan's response as careful and prudent, though they also stressed concerns that North 
Korea/Japanese relations may cool in the aftermath of the incident. The South Korean 
government also asked to know all the facts of the incident including the nationality of 
the spy ships (Asahi Shimbun, 25 March 1999: 2). 
171 Japan's opposition parties were 
also mainly in agreement with the government's response to the spy ship incident 
(Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 2). Finally, the support of the 
Japanese electorate for the government's actions against the spy ships was notable 
following the incident. Okasaki Hisahiko, a foreign affairs commentator, Yamamoto 
Makoto, a former MSDF commandant, and Morimoto Satoshi of Nomura Research 
Institute, stressed at the time of the incident that had the spy ships entered Japanese 
waters before the Taepodong missile launch, then public support would have been 
lacking. The government's ability to read the change in Japanese public opinion vis-ä- 
vis Japanese military action was significant in the case of the March 1999 spy ship 
incident (}'vmiuri Shimbun, 25 March 1999: 4). 
In fact, disapproval for Japanese actions was quite muted. China, for one, felt that Japan 
had broken a taboo and expressed both caution and concern for Chinese ships in 
Japanese waters. Furthermore, Chinese sources were worried as to how the Senkaku 
islands dispute might be affected by the engagement (Mainichi Shimbun Evening 
Edition, 24 March 1999: 2). Nevertheless, the Chinese government did not condemn the 
incident. In Japan, Shindö Eiichi, then a Professor in International Politics at Tsukuba 
171 After several days of silence, North Korea rebuffed Japan's claim that the spy ships that transgressed 
Japanese territory were of DRPK origin (BBC Monitoring Newsfile, 27 March 1999; Japan Times, 29 
March 1999). 
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University, and Umebayashi Hiromichi, a commentator on Citizen's Movements, both 
argued that Japan should place more emphasis on working through such violations of its 
territory diplomatically (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 18). The 
Socialist and Communist Parties of Japan also expressed their concern that firing 
warning shots was a step too far considering Japan's so-called `peace constitution' 
(Mainichi Shimbun, 25 March 1999: 2; Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 
1999: 2). The lack of criticism towards the government in Japan was telling in terms of 
how the mood towards North Korea had changed in the wake of the Taepodong incident, 
especially concerning the legal minefield that Japanese maritime authorities had 
stumbled into. 
4.2f Letal Considerations 
The main legal considerations to be taken into account during the March 1999 spy ship 
incident involved the firing of warning shots by both the MSA and MSDF and the order 
for maritime security action to be taken by the MSDF. Both the MSA and MSDF ships 
fired warning shots at the two spy ships during the chase. The MSA were given special 
permission to fire upon the spy ships at 7 p. m. on 23 March. Before ending their pursuit 
of the North Korean vessels, the two MSA patrol ships, Chikusen and Hamayuki, fired 
warning shots with 20mm and 13mm machine guns into the ocean near the stem of the 
Yamato Maru Number 2 at 8 p. m. on 23 March and the patrol ship Naozuki opened fire 
with automatic rifles into the ocean near the Taisei Maru Number 1 at 8: 31 p. m. The 
Myökö, an MSDF destroyer, fired two warning shots with its five-inch guns at 1 a. m. on 
24 March (Asahi Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 1). The MSDF continued firing warning 
shots between 1: 19 a. m. and 2: 24 a. m. against the Yamato Maru Number 2 and anti- 
submarine bombs were dropped from a P3C patrol plane. Similar action was also taken 
against the Taisei Maru Number 1 (Mainichi Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 
1,9). Most of the MSDF warning shots were fired as the spy ships were approaching 
Japan's ADIZ. At that point in the chase it was clear that the ships would not stop for 
inspection and that the spy ships themselves would not be directly targeted, so that 
warning shots themselves were merely symbolic. The action of firing warning shots, 
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however, had two noticeable results. First, the Japanese public responded favourably to 
what they perceived to be resolute efforts by the MSA and MSDF to protect Japanese 
territory from North Korea, which had been demonised in the press since the 
Taepodong incident. Second, firing warning shots at the spy vessels sent a clear signal 
to Pyongyang that next time an incursion takes place the Japanese forces might ratchet 
their response up a level and target the ships directly. 
The government considered targeting the spy ships directly to disable their rudders, but 
it was feared that the five-inch cannons carried by the MSDF escort ships would sink 
their adversaries (Japan Times, 26 March 1999). Furthermore, targeting the spy ships 
directly might well be seen as excessive, especially considering that the only laws the 
ships are known to have violated were sailing under a false name and ignoring orders to 
stop (Asahi Shimbun, 25 March 1999: 3). 
172 In future instances, the MSDF were said to 
be considering the use of lighter machine guns that could be used to target unidentified 
ships directly. However, the use of the MSDF itself could be considered as excessive 
considering the fears of Rear Admiral Yoshikawa Eiji, commander of the Maritime 
Self-Defence Force Escort Flotilla 3, who was in charge of the MSDF pursuit of the spy 
ships, who speculated that even the wake of his escort ships could topple their 
opponents (Japan Times, 30 March 1999). 173 This shows the extent to which the 
Japanese government was mindful of how the tactics it employed would be interpreted 
by the interstate society and that any action that resulted in the sinking of the spy ship 
would be contrary to international law. 
As far as the order for maritime security is concerned, the SDF can undertake necessary 
maritime security action to preserve the peace, property and life in Japanese waters 
according to Article 82 of the SDF Law. The prime minister and the Cabinet must 
approve this action, before the JDA Chief can make the order. Article 82 doesn't allow 
172 It is important to note that while evidence pointed at the ships being North Korean, the fact that the 
only identification on the ships was Japanese, meant that the incident could not legally be understood as 
foreign vessels transgressing Japanese maritime territory. It is therefore more accurate from a legal 
perspective to label the ships `suspect ships' or `suspicious ships'. 
73 In a final attempt to catch the Taisei Maru Number 1, a 350 metre long by 1 metre wide net was cast. It 
was hoped that this net would entangle the spy ship's screws. The Taisei Maru, however, deftly avoided 
the net by swinging the boat out of the way of the net (Ishikawa, 1999: 96; Japan Times, 30 March 1999). 
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the MSDF to fire directly on spy ships, as opening fire is based on Article 7 of the Law 
Concerning Execution of Duties of Police Officials, which stipulates that a suspect can 
only be directly targeted in self-defence, once the suspect has fired on the Japanese 
authorities (Shikata, 1999: 7-8; Asahi Shinibun, 24 March 1999: 1). 174 Taoka Toshitsugu, 
a member of the Asahi Shimbun Editorial Staff, asserted that Japan's actions in 
pursuing the two spy ships had been in full accordance with international law and that 
firing directly upon the spy ships would also have been permissible. 175 Offering the 
example of the South Korean armed forces sinking of a North Korean submersible in 
1998, Taoka maintained that even had the ship been sunk, it would probably not have 
brought condemnation from other states (Asahi Shinibun Evening Edition, 24 March 
1999: 18). However, directly targeting the spy ships was also avoided because of the 
possibility that a Japanese citizen had been abducted and was on board the ship. 
Furthermore, the MSDF were concerned that the spy ship might escalate the situation 
by returning fire with heavy weapons or blowing itself up in order to hide evidence 
(Shikata, 1999: 8). 
Demands for the laws regarding MSDF and MSA involvement in a spy ship chase 
emerged in the aftermath of the 1999 spy ship incident. Both Liberal Democratic Party 
(LDP) lawmakers, as well as a number of journalists, argued for the MSDF to be able to 
stop unidentified vessels without the approval of the Cabinet and to use weapons in 
such an instance beyond firing in self-defence. Particular reference was also made to the 
anomaly between the ASDF being able to shoot down an aircraft that invades Japanese 
territory and the restrictions prohibiting the MSDF from firing on unidentified vessels in 
Japanese maritime territory (Japan Times, 30 March 1999; Asahi Shimbun, 30 March 
174 Although the Law Concerning Execution of Duties of Police Officials states that Japanese authorities, 
including the MSDF in the case of pursuing spy ships, can use weapons "to an extent required to arrest a 
culprit, prevent the culprit from running away, and to ensure the safety of those involved"; the law also 
inhibits causing injury except in self-defence (Asahi Shimbun, 30 March 1999: 2). Ebata Kensuke, a 
commentator on military affairs, notes that there is no precise law governing the conduct of the SDF that 
precisely determines when the SDF can fire warning shots or at an enemy directly (Asahi Shimbun, 24 
March 1999: 39), which is why the Law Concerning Execution of Duties of Police officials is used for 
the SDF. 
1" Article 111 of the UN Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states that an unidentified vessel 
can be pursued up to the waters of another country (Mfainichi Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 
3). 
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1999; Nabeshima, Japan Times, 7 April 1999). 176 Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka 
Hiromu, however, countered these requests for amendments to SDF and MSA law, by 
defending the law governing the protection of Japanese territory as appropriate and 
suggesting instead that the tactics of the MSDF and MSA should be reconsidered 
(Japan Times, 31 March 1999; Asahi Shimbun, 30 March 1999). Yet, an examination of 
the spy ship case in 1999 clearly reveals that at the critical juncture when the Taisei 
Maru Number 1 had stopped and the MSDF were on hand to capture the vessel, 
procrastination amongst Japanese government officials delayed the order for the law 
regarding maritime security action to be enacted which allowed the Taisei Maru 
Number 1 to get away. As Morimoto Satoshi of Nomura Research Institute maintains, 
incidents like the March 1999 spy ship case are all too common and both the MSDF and 
MSA lack the legal support they need to carry out effective missions to stop and inspect 
suspect ships (Mainichi Shimbun, 25 March 1999: 2). 
4.2i Explaining Japan's Response to the March 1999 Spy Ship Incident 
The government's response to the March 1999 spy ship incident is framed entirely by 
the context of Japan's containment of North Korea in the Northeast Asian interstate 
society. The spy ship incursion occurred some six months after the launch of the North 
Korean Taepodong missile over Japanese territory. This fact encouraged the Japanese 
electorate to favour a robust response which in turn prompted further government 
containment strategies (Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 2). These strategies included 
the passage of the US-Japan Defence Guidelines, maritime security cooperation with 
Russia and South Korea, the establishment of constitutional revision committees in the 
Diet, as well as exploration into the adoption of Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) and 
spy satellites (Shikata, 1999: 8-9). Each of these points will be examined in greater 
detail in order to assess the ramifications of, as well as the context surrounding Japan's 
response to the March 1999 spy ship incident. 
16 In 1987, the ASDF fired tracer and machine guns at a Russian reconnaissance plane that had invaded 
Japanese airspace. The sinking of a North Korean semi-submersible in December 1998 by South Korean 
military forces also suggested the MSDF response to the March 1999 spy ship incident had been 
inconclusive by comparison (Mainichi Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 2). 
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At the time of the March 1999 spy ship incursion, the controversial US-Japan Defence 
Cooperation Guidelines had been debated in the Diet for 11 months. The core issue 
under discussion concerned the kinds of non-combat roles the SDF could undertake to 
support the US military in `areas surrounding Japan'. The geographically ambiguous 
phraseology, which failed to define what these surrounding areas were, raised fears in 
China that an altercation in the Taiwan Straits might involve the Japanese military (Kaji, 
1999: 55-57). The Japanese government decided on language in the US-Japan Defence 
Cooperation Guidelines that was `situational' rather than `geographical' in order to keep 
Japan's defence options open without overtly antagonising China by specifying areas 
the Chinese regard as within their sphere of interest, notably the Taiwan Straits (Hughes, 
2004: 100-101). '77 
Yet, in March 1999, the government still had to garner public support for the Guidelines 
to ensure that the Guidelines Bill would be passed in the Diet. The spy ship incursion 
combined with the Taepodong missile launch highlighted the North Korean threat, 
reinforcing in the minds of the Japanese electorate a sense that the `areas surrounding 
Japan' were not safe and that legislation would be required to protect Japanese territory. 
This feeling of insecurity was heightened, as legislation at the time was partly to blame 
for the failure to catch the spy ships (Asahi Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 39; Asahi 
Shimbun, 25 March 1999: 2). By adopting a resolute stance, the actions to apprehend 
the North Korean spy ships ordered by the Japanese government enabled the prompt 
passage of the controversial US-Japan Defence Cooperation Guidelines in May 1999. 
The Japanese government put a certain amount of spin on the event to ensure the 
electorate would connect the North Korean military threat with the passage of the 
Guidelines. Professor Maeda Tetsuo of Tokyo International University noted at the time 
of the incident that it was somewhat unusual for the government to set up a strategy 
room and call a press conference for what was essentially a violation of Japanese 
177 On this point Tanaka Akihiko, professor at the University of Tokyo, commented: "It is not wise to 
pinpoint a geographical area. Taiwan is close to Japan's Yonaguni island. For the sake of Japan's defence, 
we cannot say that [Taiwan] is excluded. If we declare that Taiwan is part of it, such would make an 
enemy of China. We need some ambiguity in our security policy" (Asahi Shimbun, 2 April 1999: 2). 
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territory by unidentified ships, which is a frequent occurrence in Japanese waters. 
Moreover, the fact that the government stressed the need to approve the Guidelines at 
the same time as emphasising the government's crisis management skills, shows a 
willingness on the part of the government to use the spy boat incident as a means to 
boost the administration's popularity whilst encouraging the passage of the Guidelines 
(Mainichi Shimbun, 24 March 1999: 31). 
However, the ramifications of the March 1999 North Korean spy ship incursion were 
not limited to the passage of the US-Japan Security Guidelines. The Japanese 
government's interest in TMD swelled following the Taepodong missile test and the spy 
ship incident, with Japan promising to fund US$174-260 million of a joint project with 
the US. Tokyo also signalled its desire to develop a satellite-based surveillance 
programme to gamer intelligence from North Korea. 
'78 The Diet set up special panels to 
discuss potential revisions to the Japanese constitution, in particular focusing on Article 
9, the anti-war clause. 179 Furthermore, there were demands for the use of weapons, 
based on Police Law, to be relaxed in order for the MSDF to be able to target the spy 
ships themselves in the future (Watanabe, 1999: 12). Security cooperation between 
Tokyo and Seoul increased, signalling a new sense of unity between countries 
threatened by North Korea's missiles and an end to the historic animosity between 
Japan and South Korea (Park, 2000: 537-538; Uriu, 2000: 146-148; Langdon, 2001: 
180-182; Harnisch, 2002: 857-858). Finally, Japan and Russia determined to boost 
maritime cooperation in the aftermath of the 1999 incident, signalling the potential for 
Japan to develop further maritime policing ties with other neighbouring countries 
(Japan Times, I April 1999; Nabeshima, Japan Times, 7 April 1999; Yomiuri Shimbun, 
178 At a press conference after the 1999 spy ships incident, Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka detailed that 
the advantages of having a domestic spy satellite were that it would allow the Japanese government to 
respond quickly to a situation, and that Japan has the technology to produce an effective spy satellite with 
up to one-metre resolution (Asahi Shimbun Internet Edition, 1 April 1999). The development and 
construction of the satellite would fall to Mitsubishi Electric which stood to gain from the technological 
spin-offs the project would provide (Nihon Keizai, 8 April 1999: 1,13). 
9 The Lower House Constitution Study Committee, chaired by Nakayama Tarö, is focused on the issue 
of revising Article 9. For more information on amendments to the Japanese constitution, see the transcript 
of "The Future of the Japanese Constitution" with Richard Samuels, Leonard Schoppa, Akihiko Tanaka 
and William Breer, 10 June 2005, CSIS, Washington, D. C. 
www. csis. ore/medialcsis/events, 105061 0 constitution. pdf accessed on 25 October 2005. 
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4 April 1999: 1; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 8 April 1999: 1,13; Uriu, 2000: 146). 180 In 
terms of preparations and equipment for future spy ship incursions, the MSDF 
determined to build two advanced missile boats to be stationed at Maizuru, Kyoto 
Prefecture. The boats, of approximately 200 tons displacement, would carry four anti- 
ship missiles and a 76mm machine gun, travelling at a maximum speed of 40 knots 
(Tokyo Shimbun, 6 April 1999: 27). 
Japan's determination to deal with North Korea firmly on the spy ship issue, therefore, 
led to significant transformations of Japan's defence posture and the capacity of the 
Japanese military to respond to incursions into Japan's sovereign maritime territory. 
These changes would strengthen Japan's position when negotiating with Pyongyang on 
missile, abduction and narcotics trafficking matters (Shikata, 1999: 8-9). Nonetheless, 
the Japanese government was clearly attentive to how its actions would be interpreted 
by the interstate society and was careful not to order strategies that could lead to the 
sinking of the spy ships in contravention of international law. 
4.2h Japan's Diplomatic Response 
Having determined that the spy ships were North Korean, the Japanese government 
lodged a protest with the North Korean government via diplomatic channels in Beijing 
and at the UN in New York. Furthermore, Tokyo asked for full details of the operation 
to be made public and the crews and ships to be handed over to the Japanese authorities 
(Japan Times, 30 March 1999; Mainichi Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 1; 
The Glasgow Herald, 26 March 1999). These diplomatic moves were unlikely to have 
great effect, however, as representatives of the North Korean government in New York 
and Beijing tend to spin information they relay to Kim Jong 11 in a positive light. Hence, 
the possibility of Japan's desire to see the spy ships extradited and operations ended 
reaching the ears of Kim Jong 11 was remote (Mainichi Shimbun, 1 April 1999: 5). 
180 Russia dispatched three patrol boats at Japan's request when the two spy ships crossed Japan's ADIZ 
and entered Russian waters (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 2). The Russian patrol 
boats did not intercept the spy boats, which did not enter Russian domestic waters but headed for North 
Korea instead (Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 March, 1999: 1). 
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After the incident the Japanese government decided not to implement sanctions against 
North Korea in an effort to draw a line under the event and continue negotiations with 
North Korea on normalisation issues (Sato, 1999: 13). An interview with Foreign 
Minister Komura Masahiko noted that this included abiding by Japan's responsibilities 
as detailed in the KEDO agreement. Komura did state, however, that Tokyo's approach 
vis-ä-vis North Korea would be one of dialogue and deterrence, whereby constructive 
discussion would always be welcome, but resolute action would be taken if necessary 
(Mainichi Shimbun, 7 April 1999: 2). 
The Japanese government concentrated on normalising relations with North Korea in 
the aftermath of the spy ship case, so that Japan could communicate its apprehensions 
about aggressive North Korean activities, whilst using aid as a bargaining chip to 
dissuade further spy ship instances in the future. Evident in this strategy, though, was a 
lingering fear, generated in August 1998 by the firing of the Taepodong missile over 
Japanese territory, of North Korea's military strength that centred upon Pyongyang's 
WMD and ICBM capabilities (Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 March 1999: 1,18). The 1999 spy 
incident, therefore, presented a Japan that was trying to flex substantial military muscle, 
yet constrained by the legal devices that lie at the core of the Japanese constitution and 
limit the role the SDF can play. In this strategic environment, a contradiction emerged 
in Japanese diplomacy, whereby a fear of North Korea's military strength, despite being 
far less potent in technological, equipment and training terms compared with the 
Japanese military, led simultaneously to the expansion of the SDF's role in protecting 
Japanese territory, whilst raising the need for negotiation with North Korea to prevent a 
future missile attack. This position is bound to have sent mixed signals to Pyongyang, 
encouraging the North Korean leadership to maintain a similar strategy of emphasising 
their military power, whilst attempting to increase communications with foreign powers. 
Amongst North Korea's stratagems was also a continued reliance upon the activities 
conducted by spy ships, signalling the potential for a future maritime debacle between 
North Korea's covert forces and Japan's maritime agencies. 
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What was significant about the response of the Japanese government to the March 1999 
spy ship case is that the MSDF chased the North Korean vessel to the edge of Japan's 
EEZ, firing warning shots without contravening international law. The deployment of 
the MSDF was in line with a state's right to protect its sovereign territory and, in the 
aftermath of the event, the Japanese government turned to diplomatic means to maintain 
negotiations with the regime in Pyongyang. Hence, by considering interstate opinion 
and not violating international law, the Japanese government was able to maintain 
diplomatic negotiations easily, opening up the possibility of shifting the Japan-North 
Korea relations from containment to engagement. 
There are several reasons that the Japanese response did not transgress the rules of the 
interstate society. It was the first time the MSDF had been mobilized to chase down 
North Korean spy ships and the government sought to exercise caution, believing that a 
more robust response would upset neighbouring governments as well as ongoing 
negotiations with North Korea. Second, because the MSDF were dispatched, in place of 
the MSA whose duty it is to police Japanese waters, authorisation permitting the MSDF 
vessels to target the North Korean spy ships directly was delayed. Finally, in spite of the 
August 1998 Taepodong incident, the government did not believe that public opinion 
would support the MSDF directly firing upon the North Korean vessels. By December 
2001, however, the Koizumi government combined with an altogether different set of 
global circumstances allowed for a stronger response to an incursion by a North Korean 
spy ship. 
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4.3 The December 2001 Spy Ship Incursion 
4.3a Summary 
In early December 2001, US reconnaissance satellites discovered three suspicious ships 
leaving North Korean ports in the direction of Japan. '8' On 18 December, a Japanese 
SIGNIT station on Kikaijima, in northern Okinawa Prefecture, picked up radio 
transmissions from one of the suspicious boats operating southwest of Kyüshü. The 
MSDF were unable to locate the suspicious ship from the data collected from the radio 
transmissions and so dispatched a P-3C to investigate. The aircraft found one of the 
North Korean ships sailing 250km northwest of Amami Oshima in Kagoshima 
Prefecture, within Japan's EEZ (Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 26 December 2001: 
1; Ball, 2004: 76). 182 On 22 December 2001, the JDA contacted the JCG to inform them 
that a suspicious ship had been located navigating in the jurisdictional waters of 
Kagoshima Prefecture, off the west coast of Amami Oshima. The JCG responded 
swiftly by dispatching ships, planes and helicopters to pursue the suspicious ship. At 
6: 20 a. m. on 22 December, an JCG plane discovered the suspicious ship about 240km 
northwest of Amami bshima and at 12: 48 p. m., the JCG ship Inasa, assigned to the 
Nagasaki JCG, began tailing it; ordering it to stop in Japanese, Chinese, Korean and 
English for inspection according to domestic fishing laws. The spy ship began to zigzag 
in an attempt to shake off the Japanese authorities. In response the Inasa started firing 
warning shots into the air and sea in accordance with Article 20, Clause 1 of the JCG 
law. The suspicious ship ignored these shots and continued in its efforts to escape 
(Yamada, 2004: 34-36). 183 
'a' The ship is said to have sailed from Haeju on the west coast of North Korea, stopping at Nampo to 
collect special warfare soldiers from North Korea's 8th Corps (Virtual Information Center, 28 December 
2001: 9). The US military were also monitoring radio communications between the suspect ship on a 
frequency used almost exclusively by the North Korean ruling party (Virtual Information Center, 28 
December 2001: 6-7). Such intelligence will have raised suspicions that the spy ship was North Korean at 
an early date. 
182 Despite the information from the US intelligence satellite, the suspicious ship that was found bore 
Chinese markings and flew a Chinese flag, leading the Japanese authorities to question whether or not the 
ship was in fact of Chinese origin (Japan Times, 23 December 2001). 
183 The JCG emphasises that warning shots were first fired on the Japanese side of the Japan-China 
equidistant line (Sekai Editorial Board, 2002: 277). The reason for the JCG's insistence on this point is 
connected with the Japanese government's assurances that the JCG engaged the North Korean spy ship 
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By three o'clock, the Inasa had been joined by the JCG patrol ship Mizuki, assigned to 
the Fukuoka JCG, and began to target the suspicious ship directly using an automatic 
targeting device to fire at the bow and stem of the ship. The JCG had not aimed at a 
ship directly since 1948. In spite of the action taken by the JCG, the suspicious ship 
continued to flee; jettisoning oil drums and packages off the stem of the ship. These oil 
drums and packages sank to the bottom of the East China Sea and could not be 
recovered. It is believed that this was an attempt to hide evidence of drug smuggling 
activity (Yamada, 2004: 36-38). 
Two other JCG patrol vessels joined the chase. These were the Amami, assigned to the 
Naze JCG, and the Kirishima, assigned to the Kushikino JCG. 184 These two ships drew 
alongside the suspicious ship in order to board it. 185 As the boats approached, however, 
the suspicious ship opened fire with automatic weapons and anti-tank RPG launchers on 
the Amami, Kirishima and nearby Inasa, injuring three members of the JCG crew. 186 
The Amami, whose bridge was scarred with bullet holes, 187 withdrew from the 
engagement, whilst the Inasa returned fire in self-defence, according to Article 20, 
legitimately and that the JCG's actions were systematic. This is important because both the JCG and the 
Japanese government felt the need to justify the outcome of the chase to demonstrate that the JCG had 
acted in full accordance with international law. Hence, Japan was responding to a maritime security threat 
within the boundaries specified by the interstate society. However, the JCG was heavily criticized for 
ordering its ships to continue to fire on the North Korean spy ship after it had entered China's EEZ. The 
legal case will be detailed later in this chapter. 
ýa Amami's role was to film the incident in order to use the film as evidence should the ship be captured 
and its crew tried in court. The Amami, as the largest JCG vessel present in the chase, was also given the 
task of drawing alongside the spy ship in order to board it (Yaji, 2005: 220). Collecting evidence in order 
to arrest and prosecute a case in court is one of the most significant factors distinguishing the JCG from 
the MSDF. This role is the principal reason that the JCG and not the MSDF were tasked with pursuing the 
North Korean spy ship. For more on the differing roles between the MSDF and JCG, see Hirose and 
Hayashi, 2003. 
185 There was some concern that if the suspicious ship was not inspected at that point it would be lost 
amongst a group of Chinese fishing boats (Asahi Shimbun, 26 December 2001: 1). At this point the North 
Korean spy ship was located in China's EEZ. 
186 The injured JCG personnel were Nagatomo Yoshiharu, 54, a navigation officer, and Kinjb Yoshitake, 
49, chief mate from the patrol ship Amami (Japan Times, 23 December 2001; Asahi Shimbun, 24 
December 2001: 27). Ageno Toyofumi, a crew member on the Amami, was later found to have been 
injured in the right eyelid by a metal fragment (Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 December 2001: 1). 
18 The Amami's navigation system and Global Positioning System (GPS) were broken and the stern 
loading door mechanism was also crippled. This damage reduced the speed of the Amami as it returned to 
port (Yaj i, 2005: 221). 
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Paragraph 1 of the JCG law (Asahi Shimbun, 23 December 2001: 1; Yamada,. 2004: 38- 
39). 
The Inasa was able to damage the spy ship with its state of the art weaponry, 188 but the 
spy ship was unable to respond in kind, its crew finding it hard to target their 
adversaries in stormy weather. 189 Three minutes after the Inasa commenced firing in 
self-defence, there was an explosion and the spy ship sank within a mere two minutes. 
The bulkhead between the aft engine room and the section which housed a small boat 
was detonated and the doors at the back of the boat opened, which allowed the seawater 
to rush in and sink the ship quickly (Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 December 2001: 1). It was 
later ascertained that the North Korean crew were ordered by wireless radio to scuttle 
the ship to hide any criminal evidence on board. 190 Though the JCG used infra-red 
equipment to locate the spy ship's crew who had jumped or been blasted into the water, 
they were not rescued; 191 the JCG having received reports from their South Korean 
counterparts that North Korean sailors might blow themselves up using hand grenades if 
taken alive (Brooke, New York Times, 24 December 2001: A. 9; Japan Times, 26 
December 200 1). 192 Two drowned bodies were lifted from the surface of the ocean the 
188 Two of the three Coast Guard ships in pursuit of the spy ship were equipped with a Remote Firing 
System (RFS) which improves the accuracy of the 20mm machine guns (Japan Times, 25 December 
2001). 
189 The waves were 4 metres high or more and the wind speed reached 15 metres per second (Yaji, 2005: 
218). In such conditions the accuracy of the JCG's guns must be doubted. Could the JCG patrol ships 
really be sure that their warning shots would not injure or kill the North Korean crew? 
190 The JDA monitored a radio transmission to the two spy ships during the March 1999 incident ordering 
them to scuttle themselves if captured (The Korea Times, 15 August 1999). This previous case suggests in 
part why the JCG believed the spy ship in December 2001 had sunk itself. 
91 According to some reports, the JCG threw life buoys at the North Korean crew (Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 
December 2001: 1), however, these would not save the North Korean crew from exposure and 
hypothermia in the freezing and stormy conditions of the East China Sea. At a press conference after the 
incident, a coast guard official, Sakamoto Shigehiro, was quoted as saying, "it was unthinkable for the 
coast guard not to do their best (to rescue the men)" (Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 December 2001: 1). Other 
accounts blamed bad weather for the failure to rescue the North Korean crew (Asahi Shimbun, 24 
December 2001: 26) or stressed that the JCG were awaiting the arrival of a special guard unit by 
helicopter to save the North Korean crew, but that the unit did not arrive until 12 a. m. by which time the 
crew had vanished from the surface of the ocean (Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 27). Clearly, the 
JCG were wary of the fact that despite the North Korean crew being surrounded by armed JCG patrol 
boats, the JCG had not rescued a single man. This criticism is all the more telling in that, the JCG were 
not entirely sure, even at that stage, that the ship was North Korean. Also, why would the JCG fear that 
the crew would blow themselves up, yet, minutes before the sinking of the suspicious ship, JCG officials 
were preparing to board and inspect the vessel? 
192 12 coast guard ships, ten aircraft and two MSDF P3C planes were involved in the search for the crew 
members (Japan Times, 29 December 2001). Considering that the JCG were not intending to rescue the 
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next morning and six, grey, ossified cadavers were pulled from the sunken ship when it 
was salvaged in September 2002.193 The North Korean crew were of strong build and 
between 20 and 50 years of age (Yamada, 2004: 39-42). 194 
The Japanese government immediately sought to justify the action taken by the JCG in 
the aftermath of the incident. However, the reaction of the JCG had a profound effect 
upon the expansion of the SDF's role too. The Japanese Cabinet approved a record 
US$38 billion defence budget a day after the spy ship sank, and Prime Minister 
Koizumi called for both the JCG and SDF to be allowed to respond more robustly to 
violations of its maritime territory (Brooke, New York Times, 24 December 2001: A. 3). 
The call for legal amendments to enable the JCG or MSDF to fire upon suspect ships in 
Japan's EEZ could have important repercussions. South Korean boats are frequently 
stopped by the JCG for violating Japanese fishing grounds and Chinese survey ships are 
often forced out of Japanese waters. Bestowing too much power upon Japan's maritime 
authorities could lead to serious diplomatic altercations with Japan's neighbours 
(Valencia and Guoxing, 2002: 731). However, as North Korea is regarded by many 
states in the interstate society as a pariah or rogue state, so determined or forceful action 
taken against its spy ships are arguably more defensible considering the unique range of 
threats that North Korean spy ships pose to Japan. 
North Korean crew who they had watched disappear from the surface of the ocean through infra-red 
sighting equipment over the course of an hour after the ship sank, the only reason for engaging so many 
craft seems to have been to recover evidence from the dead bodies. 
193 In total, 15 North Korean crew were seen drifting on the surface of the ocean after they scuttled their 
ship. As only 15 North Korean crew members are required to undertake a mission to transport drugs to 
Japan, the recovery of a further six bodies from the sunken vessel raises the possibility that the ship's 
mission included picking up North Korean spies from Japan (Yaji, 2005: 221). 
194 One report notes that one of the bodies pulled from the water after the incident in December 2001 had 
a bullet wound in his leg (Japan Times, 27 December 2001). It is somewhat surprising that the other 
cadavers did not have bullet wounds considering the number of shots fired by JCG guns at the spy ship. If 
this is testimony to the skill and technological capability of the JCG crew and weaponry, the JCG claimed 
they had only put down `suppressing fire' (Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 27), then it raises the 
question why the North Korean crew scuttled their ship. After all, scuttling the ship would be a last resort 
and if they were not endangered by the JCG's highly accurate fire which targeted only the stem of the spy 
ship, then why not continue fighting using the full range of weaponry aboard? In fact, when the Inasa 
returned f ire in `self-defence' it mainly targeted the pilothouse (Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 26), 
which is where most of the North Korean crew were. It is therefore incredible that the North Korean crew 
recovered had no bullet marks on them. 
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4.3b Purnose of the 2001 Snv Shi 
Though the threat posed by the spy ship that entered Japanese waters in December 2001 
can only be surmised, a number of factors about the instance indicate several 
possibilities. To send spy ships out in such heavy seas suggested that the ship was on an 
important mission, such as inserting a specialized operative into Japan or transporting 
illegal merchandise, like a large narcotics shipment to help fund the North Korean party 
through the winter (Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 3; Intelligence Research Group, 
Chian Foramu, 2002: 9). The hypothesis that the ship was transporting drugs is 
strengthened by the fact that there were a number of reasons that the North Korean 
regime would need to make a substantial amount of money at that time. Life in North 
Korea in 2002 would be punctuated by a succession of expensive celebrations. These 
included Kim Jong Il's sixtieth birthday on 16 February, the commemorative ninetieth 
birthday of Kim Il Sung on 15 April, and the seventieth anniversary of the foundation of 
the Korean People's Army on 25 April. Furthermore, from April to June, at the same 
time as South Korea co-hosted the World Cup, the `Arirang' mass games would be held 
involving 100,000 people. With the economy experiencing a prolonged depression, the 
number of tourists visiting Mt. Kumgang decreasing and action being taken to inhibit 
the remittance of funds from North Korea nationals abroad, it was difficult to see how 
Pyongyang would raise the capital for the festivities if not through illicit means. 195 
Finally, when the spy ship in this December 2001 debacle and that from the August 
1998 narcotics smuggling case were compared, they were found to be the same ship 
(Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 1; Yuri Doku Min, 2002: 111; Yaji, 2005: 218). 
Moreover, clues to why the spy ship in December 2001 was at sea for a couple of weeks 
according to US intelligence may lie in a comparison with the 1998 spy ship incident, 
whereby the spy ship was at sea for several days awaiting a rendezvous with a ship 
195 Japanese maritime authorities were tipped off by Chinese intelligence in early January 2002, some two 
weeks after the sinking of the spy ship, about a drugs shipment coming from China. The 330 pounds of 
amphetamines, with a street value of US$70 million in Japan, on board were found to be of North Korean 
origin (Brooke, New York Times, 14 January 2002: A. 2). It should also be noted that there is a custom of 
raising `winter funds' for the ruling party (Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 3) and that these drugs 
shipments coincide with New Year's celebrations in Japan when demand for amphetamines may be 
higher. 
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chartered by a yakuza gang. It is likely that spy ships inserting or extracting covert 
operatives to and from the Japanese mainland do not waste time on the ocean, but 
transit the Japan Sea as quickly as possible. Finally, it is believed that the spy ship was 
accompanying two other North Korean ships, leading to the suspicion that either the 
ships were gathering intelligence or smuggling drugs. Spy ships involved in inserting or 
extracting operatives usually act alone (Virtual Information Center, 28 December 2001: 
5). 196 
The slow speed at which the North Korean spy ship attempted to escape from the 
Japanese authorities signalled a contrast with earlier instances when North Korean spy 
ships easily outran their quarry and this may have been due to the purpose of the ship. 
The slow speed of the spy ship indicates either that it was trying to divert the attention 
of the JCG away from a more important `mother ship' or that it was experiencing 
engine trouble and so had difficulty achieving higher speeds. 197 The fact that the North 
Korean spy ship crew fired on the JCG ships, before scuttling their ship to hide 
evidence differs from previous spy ship cases (Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 1; 
Intelligence Research Group, Chian Foramu, 2002: 5). The reaction of the North 
Korean spy ship in the December 2001 case is largely attributable to the fact that the 
JCG patrol boats were attempting to board and inspect their ship, a tactic that had not 
been attempted in previous cases. It is therefore unclear that a last-ditch attempt by the 
North Korean crew to break away from their pursuers or to sink their ship when all was 
lost would have been any different had it occurred prior to December 2001.198 
196 The fact that more than 15 North Korean bodies were believed to have been on board the spy ship does 
suggest that the vessel was engaged in more than drugs trafficking as only a 15 man crew is usually 
required to transport narcotics (Yaji, 2005: 221). 
197 US satellite photos revealed that the vessel that was sunk was operating with at least another ship that 
was able to return to North Korea (Japan Times, 31 December 2001). The JCG analysed infrared pictures 
from one of its planes and was able to calculate the temperature in the engine room of the spy ship 
leading it to conclude that one of the engines had broken down (Yomiuri Shimbun, 29 December 2001: 1). 
Earlier in the chase, the JCG had fired at the bow of the spy ship causing a fire to break out. This should 
have damaged the coolant pipes for the engine rooms (Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 25 December 
2001: 15). This action may have served to aggravate the engine trouble experienced on board the spy ship. 
198 Indeed, prior cases of North Korean incursions into South Korean waters revealed that the North 
Koreans would sooner blow themselves up than be captured (Intelligence Research Group, Chian Foramu, 
2002: 5). It was this information that deterred the JCG from rescuing the North Korean survivors who had 
jumped or been thrown into the sea as their ship sank. The weather may also have slowed the spy ship 
down, the high waves and heavy winds lifting the boat out of the water, its propellers spinning in mid-air 
(Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 3). 
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Nevertheless, the heavy armament does raise questions of what the North Korean crew 
had intended the weapons for (Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 December 2001: 26), especially 
considering that much of the weaponry used by the crew of the spy ship was ineffective 
at sea. 
4.3c Cooperation between the JDA and JCG 
Once again, in the immediate aftermath of the spy ship incident, while the purpose of 
the spy ship could only be surmised, the coordination between the JCG and JDA was 
widely criticised. The JCG were only notified of the presence of the spy ship after an 
MSDF plane in the East China Sea had confirmed it at 4 p. m. on 21 December, nine 
hours after an SDF P3C plane had first spotted the suspicious ship. 199 This delay had 
serious repercussions in the spy ship chase. The Amami, as the largest ship involved in 
the chase, was charged with boarding the spy ship, despite the fact that the Amami was 
equipped with neither RFS guns nor did its bridge have bullet-proof glass. Only the 
Inasa and the Mizuki possessed adequate weaponry to open fire on the spy ship. 
Furthermore, the Special Maritime Police Unit, which was ordered to capture the North 
Korean crew, were dispatched from Osaka too late to arrive before the North Koreans 
had disappeared beneath the surface of the water (Asahi Shimbun, 29 December 2005: 
3). 
Even Prime Minister Koizumi stated that the coordination between the two maritime 
organizations would have to be reviewed (Japan Times, 25 December 2001; Jiji Press, 
27 December 2001: 1; Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 2; Yomiuri Shimbun, 23 
December 2001: 26). Furthermore, Commandant Nawano Katsuhiko of the JCG 
exclaimed that as it was now harder to distinguish between a country's use of military 
force and terrorist action, the JCG, charged with dealing with crimes at sea, and JDA, 
'99 The MSDF blamed part of this delay upon the lack of equipment to electronically relay pictures taken 
by the P3C plane which discovered the suspicious ship to the JDA headquarters in Tokyo. This meant that 
the P3C had to return to base before the photos were sent to Tokyo to be analysed (Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 
December 2001: 3; Asahi Shimbun, 26 December 2001: 2). This delay signalled a deficiency in the JDA's 
Information Technology capabilities, particularly the fact that few P3C's were equipped with air-to- 
ground high resolution digital image transmission apparatus (Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 December 2001: 27). 
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responsible for national defence, would have to work closer together (Japan Times, 31 
December 2001). Yet, despite these statements, on 5 September 2002, when the JDA 
detected a North Korean ship flying a North Korean flag, but of the same proportions as 
the previous spy ships, just outside Japan's EEZ, it took over four hours to notify the 
JCG (Japan Times, 6 September 2002). 
A lack of cooperation between the JCG and JDA had been one of the main reasons that 
the North Korean spy ships had escaped in March 1999 and this failure to coordinate the 
activities of the two organizations led to the formulation of a guidebook detailing how 
the JDA and JCG would work together to combat the problem of spy ships. 200 However, 
the reoccurrence of miscommunication between the JDA and JCG in the December 
2001 spy ship case made it seem as though no progress had been made (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 25 December 2001: 2). The time taken by the JDA to inform the JCG of its 
intelligence concerning the spy ships, meant that the JCG patrol ships only caught up 
with their adversary as the ship was leaving Japan's EEZ and attempted to board the spy 
ship in China's EEZ201 Had the JCG received information about the spy ship earlier, 
the whole affair might have been wrapped up in Japan's EEZ which would have 
lessened the criticism that Japanese forces had not acted in accordance with 
international law. 
Nevertheless, Japan's maritime authorities did learn certain lessons from the March 
1999 incident which they were able to put into practice in December 2001. One 
amendment that was made to JCG equipment was the introduction of high precision 
machine guns that could target a ship's stem even in winds up to 20 metres per second 
and 4-5 metre waves and avoid hitting the crew. The Vulcan 20mm multi-barrelled 
revolving machine gun fitted to JCG patrol boats after March 1999 is capable of 
200 This manual was again to be revised after the 2001 incident to give the SDF a greater role in spy ship 
instances, enhance coordination between the JCG and SDF, improve the ability of both the JCG and SDF 
to capture spy ships and improve armaments to deal with such situations (Virtual Information Center, 28 
December 2001: 5-6). 
201 An SDF official was quoted as saying that the delay in informing the coast guard was because "we 
wanted to explore any possible danger and determine whether the ship was armed. We didn't waste six 
hours" (Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 December 2001: 1). Yet, the fact that the SDF did not anticipate the spy 
ship to fire on the coast guard demonstrates that the danger the spy ship presented was not determined by 
the SDF. 
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penetrating the steel plate of a ship or the fuselage of a plane, giving the JCG a much 
greater potential to damage an illegal vessel (Asahi Shimbun, 23 December 2001: 27; 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 December 2001: 3). 
4.3d Government Crisis Management 
The Japanese government's crisis management was also called into question following 
the December 2001 spy ship debacle. Believing the suspicious ship to be a Chinese 
smuggling vessel belonging to the snakehead gangster organization, Deputy Chief 
Cabinet Secretary Abe Shinzö left the prime minister's residence at 8 p. m. on 23 
December. Sugita Kazuhiro, the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management, 
and other government officials who felt that the JCG could handle the situation by 
themselves followed him soon after. This judgement was taken despite claims by the 
Defence Agency Director Nakatani Gen at a press conference at 6 p. m. on 23 December, 
that the ship resembled the spy ships spotted off the Noto Peninsula in 1999. It was not 
until after the ship had sunk that the officials concerned returned to the prime minister's 
residence, Abe, himself, turning up at 11: 30 p. m., around the time that the North Korean 
survivors were last seen alive (Yomiuri Shimbun, 23 December 2001: 27; Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 25 December 2001: 1). It was clear from the departure of key officials from 
the prime minister's residence that the sense of crisis had been lost (Yomiuri Shimbun, 
24 December 2001: 3). 
By entrusting the JCG to resolve the incident, the government voluntarily relinquished 
its ability to check the JCG's strategy. This is a key difference with the March 1999 
incident when Prime Minister Obuchi himself did not permit the MSDF to fire on or 
board the spy ships. The Koizumi Cabinet's failure, in this instance, to reign in the JCG 
demonstrates that the response of the interstate society was not adequately considered. It 
was only after the incident that the Japanese government realised the magnitude of the 
event and decided to raise the stakes with North Korea by determining to salvage the 
ship. 
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4.3e Salvaging and Displaying the Spy Ship 
The spy ship was salvaged in September 2002202 and put on display at the Maritime 
Science Museum at Odaiba, Tokyo from 31 May 2003 until February 2004203 After the 
ship was displayed for six months in Osaka, it was finally housed in the JCG Reference 
Centre in Yokohama from 10 December 2004 (Yaji, 2005: 218). The vessel was bigger 
than most ordinary fishing boats, measuring 30 metres long by 5 metres wide, and it 
carried 24 tons worth of fuel. The bow was also unusual, as it was of a V-shape, so the 
ship could obtain higher speeds, rather than the normal flat-bottomed shape of a fishing 
boat that gives more stability. There was a Chinese name and port written on the ship's 
side and back. Close inspection revealed that the salvaged ship was none other than the 
Matsukami Maru Number 12 that was involved in a drugs smuggling case in August 
1998 (Yamada, 2003: 48; Yaji, 2005: 218). 204 At the stern of the spy vessel there were 
doors that opened to release a small white boat of 2.9 tons, 11.1 metres long and 2.5 
metres wide. The small boat was powered by three Swedish made gasoline engines, 
each with a 300 horsepower capacity enabling a potential top speed of around 50 knots 
(93km/h), and also carried squid lights on board in order to masquerade as a Japanese 
fishing boat (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 11 September 2002: 1; Asahi Shimbun, 
202 Before the salvage took place, on the 5 September 2002, a North Korean ship flying a North Korean 
flag, yet of the same shape and size of previous spy ships, appeared just outside Japan's EEZ (though 
conflicting sources say it may have entered Japan's EEZ). The purpose of the ship's presence remains a 
mystery though it may have been a show of force to tie in with both the upcoming summit and the salvage 
of the spy ship (Yomiuri Shimbun, 5 September 2002: 1-2,39; Japan Times, 6 September 2002; The 
Statesman, 6 September 2002: 1; Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 September 2002: 1; Jiji Press, September 6 2002: 
1; Asahi Shimbun, 6 September 2002: 3). Once again, the cooperation between the MSDF and JCG was 
called into question; the JCG complaining that it had taken too long for them to be informed (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 6 September 2002: 4; Yomiuri Shimbun, 7 September 2002: 2). Some analysts also cautioned 
against the salvage. Most notably, Marc Valencia and Amae Yoshihisa of the East-West Centre in 
Honolulu, argued in the Washington Times that if the ship was raised and turned out to be Chinese or 
some kind of Chinese connection was uncovered, then it would have severe ramifications upon regional 
affairs. They also stress that nationalist pressure upon Prime Minister Koizumi may increase if the ship is 
actually North Korean and that it will provide an excuse for the expansion of Japan's military (Valencia 
and Amae, The Washington Times, 22 March 2002: A16). 
203 The bullet-marked wheelhouse of the patrol ship Amami was displayed at the JCG headquarters in 
Kasumigaseki, Tokyo, so that recruits to the organization would understand the dangers they might face 
(Virtual Information Center, 8 May 2002: 12). 
204 See Appendix II for photographic evidence on the salvaged North Korean spy ship. 
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14 September 2002: 33; Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 10 September 2002: 1; 
Yamada, 2004: 31-32). 
The spy ship sank at a location in China's EEZ, 205 thereby requiring the permission of 
the Chinese government for the ship to be salvaged. Representatives of MOFA and the 
JCG undertook negotiations with the Chinese authorities at the end of May 2002. 
Initially, the Chinese demanded several hundreds of millions of yen in compensation for 
losses to their fishing industry, but settled on a payment of ¥100 million. 06 The work to 
raise the ship from a depth of 90 metres began on 25 June 2002,400 kilometres from 
Amami Öshima Island in Kagoshima Prefecture. Seventy-nine days later, on 11 
September, the spy ship was lifted from the ocean bed. 207 The salvage work had been 
delayed by a total of ten typhoons which had forced the salvage crews to return to 
Kyüshü on each occasion. These delays, coupled with the compensation for the Chinese 
government, raised the cost of recovering the vessel to ¥5.9 billion (Yamada, 2004: 42- 
43). 
The number of weapons recovered from the spy ship was beyond the expectations of the 
authorities who had been involved in the chase, though it was acknowledged that even 
more weapons may have been ditched overboard or lost when the ship sank. The 
weaponry recovered included a Russian 14.5mm anti-aircraft machine gun, two light 
machine guns, four automatic rifles, eight hand grenades, two Russian anti-aircraft SA- 
16 missile launchers, one 82mm recoilless gun, and two PG-7 rocket propelled grenade 
launchers. 208 Though this amounts to a substantial arsenal, it should be kept in mind that 
many of these weapons are outdated. Nevertheless, commentators have shown particular 
interest in speculating the purpose of the Russian anti-aircraft SA-16 missile 
205 The exact location of the sunken ship was 29 degrees, 31.1 minutes north latitude, 125 degrees, 24.9 
minutes east longitude. 
206 See also, Virtual Information Center, 8 May 2002: 4; BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 4 May 2002: 1, 
and BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 4 June 2002: 1. 
207 The private salvage vessel used in the recovery operation was the 15,850 ton Yoshida Maru Number 
60. 
208 The origin of the weapons is North Korean unless otherwise specified. 
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launchers. 209 Other items on board the ship included badges of Kim Il Sung, North 
Korean tobacco and sweets. 210 If this was not sufficient evidence to declare the vessel 
North Korean, then any lingering doubts about the identity of the craft were put to rest 
when Kim Jong Il admitted that North Korea employed spy ships at his summit meeting 
with Prime Minister Koizumi on 17 October, 2002, in Pyongyang. Moreover, the ship 
that sank on 23 December 2001 was involved in an earlier drug smuggling case in 1998 
(Yamada, 2004: 44-49). 211 
As well as the weapons found on board the spy ship, a number of other significant items 
were discovered. Explosives to blow up and scuttle the ship were located in front of the 
section housing the small boat, lending credence to the theory that the ship had been 
scuttled to hide evidence. 212 Camouflaged diving suits and water scooters were also 
uncovered that were similar in design to water scooters discovered in the estuary of the 
Kurobe River in Toyama Prefecture earlier in 2001. Japanese high technology 
equipment, including a pre-paid mobile phone, a pocket computer, a radar and a Global 
Positioning System (GPS), were recovered from the sunken spy ship. 213 It was hoped 
that these instruments might reveal in detail the contacts, course and plans of the spy 
ship. However, the records held by the mobile phone company had expired by the time 
of salvage and JCG officials expressed doubt that information could be retrieved from 
209 A heat-seeking missile launched from an SA16 could down a helicopter, plane or seriously damage a 
warship. The JCG patrol boats sat too low in the water to be targeted by a SA16, which may explain why 
the weapon was not used by the North Korean crew (Ishii, 2002: 22). 
210 The professionalism of North Korean spies must be questioned as items bearing North Korean insignia 
or pictures of Kim 11 Sung have been found on spies before (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 11 September 
2002). The fact that items of clothing had tags with hangul written on them and that sweets and tobacco 
made in Pyongyang were found, suggests a rather blase approach towards espionage. 
211 The six yakuza involved in the drugs shipment case were prosecuted in November 2001 (Japan Times, 
25 December 2001). 
"2 Intriguingly, when the spy ship was raised, the lack of a blast hole in the hull suggested that the theory 
that the North Korean crew had caused an explosion to scuttle the ship had been false (Japan Times, 12 
September 2002). The JCG surmised that the explosion which they had heard had actually been the crew 
of the spy ship blowing up key equipment, such as the wireless radio and code machines. The ship may 
have been sunk by opening the door at the stern of the ship (Asahi Shimbun, 12 September 2002: 37). 
Conflicting reports argued, however, that four blast holes found under the bridge were the cause of the 
vessel sinking together with the stern door being opened (Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 1I 
September 2002: 19). 
213 That North Korean spies were using high technology Japanese manufactured equipment was not 
surprising. A small North Korean submarine that sunk in South Korea in June 2001, revealed a number of 
electronic devices and navigation equipment that had been made in Japan (Virtual Information Center, 8 
May 2002: 7). 
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the waterlogged gadgets (Ishii 2002: 20-23; Yomiuri Shimbun, 6 October 2002: 1). Still, 
inspection of the mobile phone did uncover the phone numbers of members of Japanese 
criminal gangs and of a known North Korean narcotics smuggler, Mr. Wu Ji-Young, 
who was resident in Japan until his arrest by Japanese authorities in March 2004 
(Tamura, '2004: 90; Yaji, 2005: 218). This evidence further raised suspicions that the 
North Korean spy ship was involved in narcotics smuggling. 
Considering how much was already known about the ship, the total cost of salvage 
seems out of proportion to the items that were retrieved from it. According to Transport 
Minister Ogi Chikage, in the aftermath of the December 2001 spy ship incident, the 
rationale for raising the ship lay in determining the nationality and goals of the ship 
(Japan Times, 26 December 2001). In fact, whilst the nationality of the ship was more 
or less ascertained when the spy ship sank and North Korean articles were recovered, 
the goals of the spy ship remain obscure even after the salvage. This raises the issue of 
whether or not the exercise in recovering the spy ship had been worthwhile. 
Nonetheless, by displaying the ship at Odaiba, the Japanese government was able to 
present to the Japanese people a tangible example of the North Korean threat. At the 
Maritime Science Museum, the rusted shell of the North Korean spy ship was aligned 
with the numerous weapons and the small boat designed for approaching Japan's coast. 
As a public relations exercise it helped focus the Japanese electorate's attention on the 
dangers Japan faced and thereby eased public criticism of bills designed to increase the 
role of the SDF. The reality of the situation on 23 December 2001 was that the spy ship 
had crossed into Chinese waters pursued by 25 JCG patrol vessels, 14 aircraft and an 
MSDF destroyer. Even with its armament, the spy ship had little chance of defeating the 
Japanese forces aligned against it. Therefore, the Japanese government exaggerated the 
threat posed by North Korean spy ships in its display, by failing to balance the 
exhibition with a detailed presentation of the strength and capabilities of the JCG and 
MSDF which guard Japan's waters. 
In salvaging and displaying the spy ship, the Japanese government was also able to 
justify the actions of the JCG to the interstate society. Bull notes that even when a 
157 
member of the international society breaks international law, the state will go to great 
lengths to show that it remains in conformity with the bulk of international law, so as 
not to be perceived by fellow members of the international society as having a 
reputation for disregarding international law (Bull, 2002: 131-136). The Y5.9 billion 
price tag for raising the spy ship paid for upholding Japan's reputation in the interstate 
society by assuaging the concerns of members of the interstate society, particularly 
South Korea and China, that the Japan Coast Guard had violated international law. This 
again underlines the significance states attach to how they are perceived in the interstate 
society. 
Raising the spy ship just before his summit meeting with Kim Jong Il, gave Prime 
Minister Koizumi additional diplomatic ammunition with which to begin negotiations 
(Japan Times, 12 September 2002). Koizumi left Pyongyang with a number of key 
concessions regarding North Korean spy ship incursions into Japanese territory, 
including an admission of North Korea's involvement both in spy ship operations and 
abductions of Japanese citizens and a promise that spy ship operations would be 
discontinued (Jiji Press, 4 October 2002: 1). However, the sinking of the spy ship in 
December 2001 also had substantial diplomatic repercussions in Japan as well as 
throughout the East Asian region. 
4.3f Domestic and Foreign Response 
Japanese relations with North Korea since the 9/11 terrorist attacks had been unsteady 
and can be characterised in terms of containment. Japan's `H-2a' satellite missile test 
coupled with the dispatch of Japanese forces to assist the US in the Indian Ocean 
antagonised Pyongyang, which perceived a remilitarisation of Japan and feared future 
Japanese territorial expansion. Though the extent to which these apprehensions run deep 
in the North Korean leadership cannot be known, the siege-like mentality in North 
Korea, largely cut-off from the interstate society and facing the overwhelming military 
force of South Korea, the US and Japan combined, is bound to stir up alarm amongst its 
citizenry and use this sense of dread as a bargaining chip in negotiations with foreign 
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powers. Therefore, the December 2001, sinking of the North Korean spy ship led to 
predictable consternation and remonstrance from Pyongyang (Ahn, 2003: 53-54). North 
Korean spokespeople talked of `an unprecedented historical event' in which `Japan was 
guilty of a criminal act in another state's territorial waters'. They elaborated that 
`[Japan's] act of modern-day terrorism is hard to forgive', especially as the Japanese 
referred to their `act of piracy in terms of self-defence' (Sekai Editorial Board, 2002: 
280). The Japanese government responded to these comments, Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Fukuda Yasuo asking if such language was appropriate and emphasising that the JCG 
had acted in accordance with international laws (Virtual Information Center, 28 
December 2001: 4). Prime Minister Koizumi later elaborated upon the possibility of a 
North Korean military or terrorist threat on NHK public television, drawing the incident 
within the bounds of the `war against terrorism' initiated by the US after the 9/11 
attacks (Virtual Information Center, 28 December 2001: 16). 
The South Korean response voiced concern about Japan's reckless action outside its 
domestic waters. The South Korean press described the JCG's involvement in the 
sinking of the suspicious ship as `excessive' and `arrogant' and that the event would 
freeze North Korean relations with Japan and isolate North Korea (Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 
December 2001: 7; Sekai Editorial Board, 2002: 280). In particular, an editorial in the 
English language newspaper Choson Ilbo, commented that while the Japanese 
government had proclaimed that the JCG had acted in self-defence, it was in fact the 
JCG which had fired directly on the suspicious ship first. Furthermore, Japan could not 
legally justify firing at a foreign vessel in Chinese waters. The editorial piece ended by 
stating that Japan's actions in this case should be placed in the context of Japan 
developing the scope of its military forces, adding that since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
the SDF had been dispatched to a war zone for the first time in its history (BBC 
Monitoring Asia Pacific, 24 December 2001: 1). 
The Chinese government also expressed a desire to understand on what legal basis the 
spy ship was sunk (Virtual Information Center, 28 December 2001: 6, originally 
People's Daily, 28 December 2001; Asahi Shimbun, 29 December 2001: 3). Zhang 
Qiyue, a spokeswoman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, stated, "China is seriously 
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concerned about the Japanese side employing arms while pursuing the boat, and about 
the fact that it sank in China's exclusive economic zone. We are requesting the Japanese 
side to brief us further on relevant situations. The Japanese side should fully respect 
China's rights, interests and concerns" (Brooke, The San Diego Union Tribune, 26 
December 2001: A-35). It was clear from the reactions of the South Korean and Chinese 
governments that Japanese actions had gone beyond what they considered justifiable by 
a member of the interstate society. 
In Japan the mood towards the JCG's actions were generally positive. Of the 577 
messages that the JCG received in the immediate aftermath of the December 2001 
incident, 98 percent praised the actions of the JCG patrol boats. 214 Nonetheless, tensions 
mounted with an increase of `phantom' reports of North Korean spies, such as a group 
of operatives landing on the small tourist island of Enoshima, in Kanagawa Prefecture 
and a report of a mysterious ship that turned out to be a fishing boat from Nagasaki 
Prefecture. 215 Inspections of North Korean merchant vessels, like the Sonamu trading 
ship, were undertaken and the dangers of North Korean narcotics were raised in the 
nation's weekly papers (Sekai Editorial Board, 2002: 280-281). Furthermore, opposition 
parties questioned whether firing upon a foreign vessel outside Japan's EEZ was in 
accordance with international and domestic laws and demanded an investigation (Asahi 
Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 3; Yomiuri Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 4). 
4.3a Legal Considerations 
After the March 1999 spy ship incident, Japanese law was adjusted to allow shots to be 
fired directly at a ship that was trespassing on Japanese domestic maritime territory. 
214 The highest praise, however, came from the Vice Secretary of State Richard Armitage (Sekai Editorial 
Board, 2002: 281). Armitage stated that he believed the sunken ship to be North Korean and offered to 
provide the Japanese government any assistance it might need (Brooke, New York Times, 14 January 
2002: A. 2). 
215 In the case of the Nagasaki fishing boat, 13 JCG ships and planes and nine helicopters were dispatched 
(Asahl Shimbun, 26 December 2001: 31). This is indicative both of the tension in the immediate aftermath 
of the spy ship sinking and also the immense resources, and presumably cost, in checking out cases of 
unidentified vessels in Japanese water. 
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This legal revision was ratified and enforced from November 2001. Even though shots 
were fired by the JCG outside of Japanese domestic territory (Asahi Shimbun, 23 
December 2001: 3; Japan Times, 25 December 2001; Sekai Editorial Board, 2002: 278), 
there are a number of legal statutes supporting the JCG pursuit of and action taken 
against the spy ship in December 2001. First, operating a fishing vessel without 
permission in Japan's EEZ is illegal according to Article 5, Paragraph 1 of the laws 
concerning the execution of sovereign rights and privileges within a country's EEZ. 
Article 74, Paragraph 3, of the same law code, stipulates that the country concerned can 
order the unauthorised ship to stop for inspection. If the ship attempts to escape, the 
JCG has the right to pursue the vessel according to Article 141, Section 2, of the 
Japanese Fisheries Law. This pursuit can continue up until the suspect vessel enters 
another country's maritime territory, as specified in UNCLOS Article 111, providing 
there are sufficient grounds for doing so. In the December 2001 case, the North Korean 
vessel had transgressed Japanese Fishery Laws and refused to stop for inspection, 
thereby justifying the JCG's pursuit of the vessel. Furthermore, the use of weapons to 
fire warning shots is legitimated by JCG Law Article 20, Paragraph 1, as well as Article 
7 of the Law Concerning the Execution of Duties of Police Officials. Finally, according 
to Articles 36 and 37 of the Criminal Law, the Japanese authorities can fire in self- 
defence or to prevent injury (Yamada, 2004: 49-50). Precedent also backs the action 
taken by the JCG. Russian maritime patrols fire on illegal fishing vessels from time to 
time (Valencia and Guoxing, 2002: 727). 
Nonetheless, the actions taken by the JCG in December 2001 against the North Korean 
spy ship were arguably illegal as they occurred within China's EEZ and not in Japanese 
territory. Invoking domestic laws to permit the targeting of a foreign vessel which had 
infringed upon Japanese maritime territory and subsequently refused inspection is not 
legally defensible if that action occurs in foreign waters. Furthermore, the JCG's claim 
that it was acting in self-defence is questionable on two counts. First, by firing shots 
directly at the suspicious ship, even if only to try to disable the ship, before the 
suspicious ship had fired any of its weapons, meant that the suspicious ship itself might 
have a better claim to self-defence. Second, the patrol ship Amami, by disengaging from 
the pursuit when its crew was fired upon, was acting in self-defence. The fact that the 
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patrol ship Inasa returned fire when it might have easily pulled away from the chase 
itself, also does not strengthen the case for the JCG having acted in self-defence. Even 
when the spy ship was within Japan's EEZ, only warning shots are permissible and the 
use of force "must be avoided as far as possible, and where it is unavoidable, it must not 
go beyond what is reasonable and necessary under the circumstances" (Valencia and 
Guoxing, 2002: 728). Finally, whilst the JCG maintain that they targeted the bow and 
stem of the ship where there were no people (Asahi Shimbun, 24 December 2001: 3), 
the JCG can not be sure that they were not endangering the lives of the crew of the 
suspicious ship. The JCG was unaware of the two North Korean crew hiding underneath 
a sheet at the stern of the boat, who appeared suddenly and opened fire on the Amami 
when it approached. Also, the JCG could not have been certain as to the equipment and 
ammunition aboard that might have exploded if hit. 216 
The actions of the Japanese government in the aftermath of the December 2001 spy ship 
incident seemed to recognise the absence of legal justifications for the JCG's actions, 
even whilst the government stressed that the JCG had acted in accordance with 
international law. Demands to simplify the use of weapons so that maritime security 
action could be rapidly authorised to enable the MSDF to respond to spy ship incursions, 
and to develop the details of the emergency law to permit an offensive response to spy 
ship situations, indicated the shaky juridical ground upon which JCG action stood 
(Virtual Information Center, 28 December 2001: 14). Taoka, of the Asahi Shimbun, 
reported that `offensive response' would violate the freedom of passage in the open seas, 
as granted by UNCLOS, and that even in Japan's EEZ, the Japanese response is legally 
limited to responding to transgressions of fishing and economic rights, which does not 
216 The SDF were unsuccessful in their attempt to ascertain the level of threat the spy ship posed in terms 
of the weaponry it was carrying. In spite of this, the JCG Chief, Nawano Yoshihiko, stated that he did not 
hesitate to order the JCG ships to fire directly at the North Korean spy ship, even when it was outside 
Japanese waters, providing that `safe areas of the vessel were targeted' so that the crew would not be 
harmed. Nonetheless, there is sufficient reason to believe, considering the lack of knowledge the JCG 
possessed about the spy ship and the rough weather, that the lives of the North Korean crew were placed 
in danger when the Inasa and Mizuki fired upon their ship. Should a member of the North Korean crew 
have been killed or injured by a JCG bullet, then the JCG would have been liable under the National 
Police Enforcement Law and the Maritime Safety Law because the ships were outside Japan's EEZ 
(Asahi Shimbun, 29 December 2001: 3). 
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permit the sinking of an illegal vessel (Sekai Editorial Board, 2002: 278-279). 217 
According to Tagawa Shunichi, a maritime lawyer, "The EEZ is basically open water 
and anyone can sail through it including naval warships" (Virtual Information Center, 
28 December 2001: 8). 218 The fact that the rationale for pursuing the spy ship was based 
upon a violation of the Fisheries Law, suggests the inadequacies of the Japanese laws 
governing MSDF and JCG action (Intelligence Research Group, Chian Foramu, 2002: 
3). Despite Japanese government claims to the contrary, the JCG's actions in the 
December 2001 case contravened international law. 
4.3h Explaining Japan's Response to the December 2001 Snv Shin Incident 
Japan's response to the December 2001 spy ship incident was conditioned by both the 
international climate after the 9/11 attacks, as well as the previous response to the 
March 1999 spy ship incursion in which the North Korean vessels had escaped. Intent 
upon capturing the spy ship in December 2001, the JCG went to great lengths to try and 
stop Japan's adversary, even attempting to board it within China's EEZ. Though legal 
revisions in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington 
supported the actions of the JCG to an extent, a clear legal basis enabling the spy ship to 
be targeted directly was absent once the North Korean boat had left Japan's EEZ. Had 
the spy ship belonged to any other state, it is likely that the political ramifications would 
have run much deeper. The conclusion to be drawn here is that members of the 
interstate society are able to violate international law and avoid punishment for doing so, 
217 Taoka's response to the December 2001 incident differs significantly from his claim that the MSDF 
would have been justified in firing directly on the spy ships in the March 1999 case (Asahi Shimbun 
Evening Edition, 24 March 1999: 18). 
218 The 1982 UNCLOS allows for: a 12 nautical mile territorial sea where coastal states retain sovereignty 
over most activities and where only innocent passage is allowed, that is passage which is not "prejudicial 
to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state", a 200 nautical mile EEZ where coastal states 
retain sovereign rights over resources and related activities, but maritime powers retain most of their 
navigational freedoms, and the high seas, beyond the EEZ, where navigational and other `freedoms' are 
unrestricted (Valencia and Guoxing, 2002: 723-724). 
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if the opponent is widely designated a barbarian state or actor outside the interstate 
society. 219 
Japan's response to the December 2001 spy ship transgression was resolute. By having 
the JCG pursue the vessel until it sank, the Japanese government gained the confidence 
of the electorate that they were prepared to act forcefully in the defence of Japan's 
shores. Nevertheless, the lack of JCG and JDA cooperation, coupled with the failure of 
the Japanese government's crisis management undermines much of the faith the 
government garnered from the Japanese population. Not only did the government fail to 
grasp the seriousness of the event, but also the JDA impeded the JCG's execution of a 
swifter response. 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of the Japanese government lay in its understanding of 
and ability to shape Japanese public opinion. Prime Minister Koizumi, in particular, was 
able to muster popular feeling in his dealings with North Korea. Not only was public 
opinion supportive of the government after both March 1999 and December 2001 spy 
ship cases, but also after Koizumi's visit to Pyongyang on 17 September 2002, in which 
Kim Jong 11 admitted to the abductions of Japanese citizens and the dispatch of North 
Korean spy ships (Uriu, 2003: 86-87; Ball, 2004: 76). It would appear that after the 
Taepodong missile crisis and the spy ship incidents which followed it, the Japanese 
public are much more accepting of a stronger foreign policy posture vis-ä-vis North 
Korea. 
Behind this stronger posture, however, is the evolving role of Japan's military and 
security forces. Some commentators have remarked that targeting the spy ship directly 
was indicative of the extent to which the rules of military engagement for the Japanese 
authorities had changed (Lincoln, 2002: 79). Indeed, spy ship incursions have provided 
a repeated security dilemma which Japanese forces could test themselves against. Spy 
21 This point also has substantial ramifications for Japan's response to contemporary piracy. Chapter 3 
noted that maritime authorities belonging to one state cannot pursue pirates across the sovereign 
boundaries of a foreign state. The different context of the interstate society in Southeast Asia is the key to 
comprehending why hot pursuit remains an issue in tackling piracy. Japan's response to contemporary 
piracy in Southeast Asia will be presented in the next chapter. 
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ship intrusions into Japanese territory must be countered as they pose a security risk to 
Japan in terms of North Korean agents gathering information about US and Japanese 
forces, as well as through illicit trade in narcotics with yakuza gangs. Because of North 
Korea's reliance upon spy ship activities, transgressions of Japanese waters occurred 
frequently until the December 2001 incident, 220 enabling Japan's maritime 
organizations to probe the legal limits of their response to North Korean spy ships. In 
the aftermath of an infringement of Japan's maritime territory by a North Korean vessel, 
the deficiencies of the Japanese maritime authorities' reaction were gauged and the legal 
limits placed upon their operations altered to allow the JCG and MSDF more room to 
manoeuvre. In this way, North Korean spy ships provide a test case, whereby a trial and 
error response enables the role of Japan's maritime security forces to expand. Though 
ships from other states transgress Japanese territory, such as Chinese survey ships 
entering the Japanese waters around the disputed Senkaku islands which both Japan and 
China claim, the response of both the MSDF and JCG is far more muted. It is North 
Korea's position as a barbarian state detached from the interstate society that has 
allowed Japan to react aggressively to spy ship intrusions. 
220 North Korean spy ship incursions into Japanese waters have declined significantly, if not ceased, since 
the December 2001 case. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
Combating Maritime Barbarians, Opportunity and Constraint within the 
Interstate Society 
Whether dispatched to gather intelligence on Japanese and US military manoeuvres or 
installations, to insert or extract operatives or to traffic narcotics, North Korean spy ship 
incursions into Japanese waters clearly pose serious threats to Japanese security. 
However, transgressions of Japanese maritime territory by North Korean spy ships has 
also provided the Japanese government with an opportunity to use its military and 
security forces and expand their operational roles. The transformation of public opinion 
in Japan following the Taepodong crisis has facilitated a more robust response to North 
Korean spy ships by accepting that tougher measures are needed to constrain North 
Korea and maintain order in the interstate society. 
The Japanese government has, for the most part, operated legitimately through the 
institutions of the interstate society to safeguard the order of the interstate society in the 
Northeast Asian region from North Korea. During times of rapprochement between 
North Korea and Japan, the Japanese government has sought to engage North Korea 
through diplomacy and Great Power management. Japan has acted bilaterally, through 
its alliance with the US on the one hand and talks with the Pyongyang leadership on the 
other, and multilaterally through the six-party talks. When tensions have been raised by 
North Korean operations deemed illegal under international law, such as spy ship 
incursions and the Taepodong missile launch, the Japanese government has reacted 
robustly through diplomatic channels, law enforcement measures and militarily, for 
example by dispatching the MSDF and JCG to protect Japanese territory. In contrast to 
the Obuchi government, which stressed the importance of observing international laws 
in the March 1999 spy ship incident, the Koizumi government allowed MSA vessels to 
pursue and fire directly at a North Korean spy ship in China's EEZ in December 2001. 
Ignoring the international legal constraints that are designed to prevent such behaviour 
sets dangerous precedents which other states might be inclined to follow. Understanding 
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the different reactions to the March 1999 and December 2001 spy ship cases requires an 
examination of the interaction between actors, structure and norms in the interstate 
society. 
In the March 1999 North Korean spy ship case, the Obuchi government acted in 
accordance with the constraints imposed by the structure and norms of the interstate 
institutions of the interstate society. It did so because whilst Japanese public opinion in 
the aftermath of the Taepodong missile launch favoured a strong reaction to the spy ship 
incursion, the Obuchi Cabinet were careful to restrain the response of the MSDF. 
Reining in the MSDF avoided likely condemnation by members of the interstate society 
that Japanese military forces had used excessive measures and presented Japan as a 
responsible actor concerned to obey the dictates of international law. This is in contrast 
to the December 2001 spy ship case whereby the Japanese government ceded 
responsibility to top JCG officials and to the commanders of the JCG vessels in pursuit 
of the spy ship. The failure of Prime Minister Koizumi's crisis management team to 
recognise the magnitude of the incident enabled JCG ships to fire directly at the North 
Korean spy ship in Chinese waters contrary to international law. 
Nevertheless, once the Japanese government regained control of the situation, it set 
about justifying the actions of the JCG. Essentially, the Koizumi Cabinet reasoned that 
as North Korea is not a fully-fledged member of the interstate society, so forceful action 
taken against it, even if not supported by international law, is possible 221 Hence, order 
in the interstate society is not necessarily maintained through the institutions of the 
221 This is in contrast to transgressions of Japanese territory by Chinese military forces which do not 
generate aggressive responses by the JCG or MSDF. A case in point was the intrusion of Japanese 
territory on 12 November 2004 by a Chinese submarine. At a press conference the same day, MOFA's 
Press Secretary, Takashima Hatsuhisa, replied to the following questions: 
Q: In 1999 and 2001, there were two incidents involving North Korea. Some suspicious ships entered the 
area of Japan. At the time, the Japanese Government said it could fire at these ships. The Japanese 
Government did not do that this time. What is the difference? Newspaper reports state that the ASDF 
aircraft asked the submarine to identify itself or at least come to sea level so that it could identify from 
which country the submarine came from. But it did not respond at all which is actually very serious or 
dangerous in terms of the nation's security. How come this time the Japanese Government did not take 
stronger measures toward this submarine? What is the major difference this time? 
Mr. Takashima: The SDF and the Japanese authorities have been taking the necessary measures on a 
case-by-case basis. Other than that, I have no comment, and I would like to refer you to the Defense 
Agency (http: //www. mofa. go. ip/announce/press/2004/11/1112. html#5, accessed 12 December 2005, 
italics mine). 
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interstate society when the threat comes from an actor outside or on the boundaries of 
the interstate society. Considering the war against Iraq initiated by the US and its allies 
that did not gain the approval of the UN Security Council, it may be that in the post- 
September 11 world states may deal with `rogue regimes' outside the interstate society 
as they please. Such a development in international affairs threatens to undermine the 
one of the pillars upon which interstate society is constructed; the principle that rules 
and laws govern the behaviour of states in their relations with each other (Ignatieff, 
2004) 222 
Even though the JCG broke international law in the December 2001 spy ship case, the 
Japanese government was quick to try to legitimise the pursuit of the North Korean spy 
ship into Chinese waters. This need to justify the JCG's response demonstrates the 
significance of international law for states operating within the interstate society, as Bull 
suggests (Bull, 2002: 131-136), because states regard how they are viewed by their 
fellows in the interstate society as important (Buzan, 2001: 476-477). Whilst there is a 
difference between how government organizations respond in crisis and how the 
government makes the best of the situation after the crisis, there is the sense throughout 
that the actions of the MSDF and JCG ultimately have to be squared with the rules of 
the interstate society. 223 
By flouting international law, Japan's actions in the December 2001 spy ship incident 
may increase tensions in the Northeast Asian region. China, for example, is wary of the 
expanding role and development of Japan's armed forces in the region. Japan argues 
222 For information on US contraventions of international law in the Iraq war, see The New York Times, 
24 September 2005, littp: //www. nytiines. com/2005/09/24/politics/24abuse. litml, accessed on 25 
September 2005. Abuse of prisoners by US troops and officials in the `war against terror' has generated a 
debate upon how the US acts in the world and the means states can employ to protect themselves in the 
interstate society from threats coming from outside the interstate society (The New York Times, 
http: //www. nytimes. com/2005/12/12/politics/12abuse. html, accessed on 12 December 2005) 
223 Mendelsohn argues that engaging non-state actors who threaten it can strengthen the interstate society 
itself. Mendelsohn is quick to point out, however, that state action must be legitimate within the interstate 
society in order to have such a positive effect (Mendelsohn, 2005: 45,66-68). Whilst the experience 
gained by the MSDF and JCG in dealing with North Korean spy ships has been used in training 
programmes to help Southeast Asian governments treat criminal acts at sea and has supported the JCG's 
participation in training exercises in these regions to protect international sea-lanes (Hirose and Hayashi, 
2003: 166-184), the broader argument that the ends do not justify the means remains. A failure to observe 
international law to suit the needs of individual states undercuts the normative power of the interstate 
society (Ignatieff, 2004: 145-146). 
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that the increasing power of the MSA and MSDF are designed to counter North Korea. 
However, the fact that Japan's armed forces are vastly superior to North Korea's in 
technological and training terms, coupled with Japan's security alliance with the US, 
means that a war between Japan and North Korea would be a complete mismatch. China, 
therefore, perceives Japanese military developments aimed at countering Chinese armed 
forces in an attempt to expand Japanese military influence over the Northeast Asian 
region (Valencia and Amae, 2003: 202-204). 
Valencia and Amae, therefore, argue that a better way of approaching the issue of North 
Korean spy ships might be to build a Northeast Asian maritime security regime 
involving Japan, South Korea, China, Russia and the US. Such an agreement should 
cover which actions are legally justifiable in a country's EEZ, measures to prevent the 
escalation of maritime incidents, augmenting military transparency, emergency 
consultation mechanisms, establishing rules regarding the apprehension of suspect 
vessels at sea, anti-piracy resolutions, coordinated joint patrols and cooperation 
regarding tackling illegal activities (Valencia and Amae, 2003: 204-205). To a certain 
extent, bilateral maritime coordination between Japan and South Korea suggests a move 
in the direction of a maritime security regime, as by combining forces, Japanese and 
South Korean maritime security organizations are able to combat common security 
concerns, including North Korean spy ship intrusions (Manosevitz, 2003: 821). Such an 
approach if expanded to a regional scale could greatly increase security in Northeast 
Asian waters, develop a sense of community between regional powers and diffuse 
current maritime disputes in Northeast Asia. This strategy would also constrain North 
Korean maritime activities, thereby decreasing the extent to which Pyongyang can rely 
upon illicit sales of narcotics and missiles transported by ship. In time, Pyongyang 
might even be encouraged to accept a dismantling of its WMD programmes in return 
for aid, as the illegal means of financing Kim Jong Il's regime dry up. Before taking 
such steps, however, it is necessary for the Japanese authorities to review their response 
to the spy ship incursions in March 1999 and December 2001 and ask how Japanese 
actions can be brought within the legal bounds of international justice. 
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5. Japan's Response to Maritime Piracy in Southeast 
Asia 
In 2003, of the 63,000 vessels that passed through the Malacca Straits, 28 ships reported 
an actual or attempted attack on their ship. Statistically, as a ship has a 0.04 percent 
chance of being pirated in the Malacca Straits, piracy does not appear to pose a 
significant threat to international shipping and trade. Nevertheless, according to Noel 
Chong, head of the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur, over 50 percent of 
piratical attacks go unreported, whilst a regional conference on piracy held in Singapore 
in 1999 estimated that as few as one eighth of attacks were recorded. Many shippers are 
reluctant to report instances of piracy that may lead to costly and lengthy investigations 
that merely serve to increase the financial costs for the victim of a piratical attack 
(Davis, 2004b: 38). Yet, attacks cost the shipping industry an estimated US$16 billion 
per year (Herrmann, 2004: 18) and have the potential to cause even more serious 
damage, such as a major environmental disaster that could block a sea lane, were an 
unmanned, pirated oil or liquid natural gas tanker to collide with a reef during a pirate 
attack. 
The Malacca Straits is Japan's most important sea-lane as 80 percent of Japan's oil and 
a substantial proportion of its trade passes through it. 224 The possibility that a piratical 
incident could close the Malacca Straits has therefore forced Japan to respond to the 
problem of contemporary piracy. High profile incidents involving Japanese ships, such 
as the hijacking of the Tenyu in 1998 and Alondra Rainbow in 1999, as well as the 
kidnapping of the Master, Chief Engineer and Third Engineer from the Idaten in 2005, 
have also encouraged the Japanese government to consider the financial and human 
costs that the Japanese shipping industry has incurred as a result of piracy. In response 
to the threat posed by piracy in Southeast Asia, the Japanese government has sponsored 
a number of regional conventions as well as promoted legal measures and dispatched 
Japan Coast Guard vessels on anti-piracy patrols and exercises. 
224 Approximately a quarter of the world's trade, as well as half of the world's oil shipments pass through 
the Malacca Straits (Richardson, 2004: 38). 
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This chapter will first assess the scope of the threat posed by piracy in Southeast Asia to 
Japanese shipping by examining piratical trends since the end of the Cold War. Next, 
reasons for Japan's response will be dealt with in greater detail by focussing on the 
hijackings of the Tenyu and Alondra Rainbow. The manifold ways in which Japan has 
sought to combat piracy in Southeast Asia will then be addressed together with 
explanations as to the opportunities and constraints within the interstate society that 
have conditioned Japan's response to piracy. The issue of sovereignty in Southeast Asia, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, is identified as the key factor limiting Japan's response to 
piracy in the region. The response of littoral states in Southeast Asia, as well as the 
shipping industry and international maritime organizations, will also be considered to 
outline the wider context in which the Japanese response to piracy should be placed. 
The Japanese response to piracy will be reviewed in light of the changing nature of 
maritime piracy in Southeast Asia by focussing on the case of the Idaten, a Japanese 
vessel that was pirated in March 2005, in order to ascertain how Japan's response to 
contemporary piracy has altered over time. In conclusion, the effect that Japan's 
response to piracy in Southeast Asia may have had upon the number of instances of 
piracy in the region will be examined. 
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5.1 Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia: Current 
Trends 
Graph 1: Total Numbers of Piracy Incidents Worldwide 1991-2005 
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The above graph compares the total number of piracy incidents worldwide with the total 
number of incidents for the Southeast Asian region (comprising Cambodia. Indonesia. 
the Malacca Straits. Malaysia, Myanmar. the Philippines. Singapore Straits and 
Thailand). From this graph, several trends can be ascertained concerning the growth of 
piracy worldwide since the end of the Cold War. However, the general trend has been 
for piracy attacks to increase in number. This increase can be broken down into four 
sections. The first section spans 1991 to 1994 where the worldwide total for piratical 
incidents was around 100 per year. During the next section. 1995 to 1998. the number 
of piratical incidents worldwide doubled to an average of about 200 cases per year. The 
third section. 1998 to 2000, shows a dramatic rise where worldwide cases of piracy 
double again to reach a peak of 469 piratical attacks in 2000. From 2000 to 2004. the 
fourth section. the number of piracy attacks have remained high. fluctuating between 
around 330 attacks and 445 attacks per year. 
The figure for 2005 is perhaps the most intriguing, as the total number of attacks 
worldwide dipped below the 300 mark for the first time since 1998. This decline is 
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reflected in the numbers for Southeast Asia. An examination of the figures reveals that 
the total number of worldwide instances of piracy decreased by 53, from 329 cases to 
276 cases, and attacks in Southeast Asia dropped by 56, from 158 cases to 102 cases. 
The only other region to experience a substantial fall in the number of pirate attacks was 
the Americas, where there were 20 less instances of piracy. All other regions 
experienced a slight increase in the number of attacks (ICC-IMB Piracy Report 2005: 5). 
Hence, the reduction of attacks worldwide was influenced by a similar cut in the 
number of attacks in Southeast Asia. There are three possible reasons why this drop 
occurred. First, maritime authorities may be better at catching or deterring pirate attacks. 
Second, peace treaties or cease-fire agreements signed between separatist forces, which 
engage in piracy, 225 in Indonesia and the Indonesian government, may have encouraged 
these rebel groups to relinquish maritime violence as a means of furthering their 
cause. 226 Finally, the tsunami which hit Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia on the 26 
December 2004 may have reduced the number of attacks in Southeast Asia, as pirates 
perished or suffered the aftermath of the disaster. Indeed, no attacks were reported in the 
Malacca Straits for two months following the tsunami (ICC-IMB Piracy Report 2005: 
15) 227 
With the exception of 1993, when Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore organised joint 
patrols in their national waters, 228 as well as in the Singapore and Malacca Straits, and 
2003, when a large number of cases were reported in Bangladesh (58 cases), India (27 
cases) and Nigeria (39 cases), raising the worldwide total, 229 instances of piracy in 
225 This thesis distinguishes between maritime acts perpetrated by separatist groups and instances of 
piracy, as separatists ultimately seek to secure political objectives rather than economic goals within the 
interstate society. The figures for the IMB do not make this same distinction. 
226 The same might be said of separatist forces in the Philippines. However, as the number of instances of 
piracy in Filipino waters only dropped from four cases to zero between 2004 and 2005, compared with a 
drop of 41 cases in the Malacca Straits and Indonesia where Aceh separatists operate, so the impact of 
peace deals with Filipino separatists upon acts of piracy appears less significant (ICC-IMB Piracy Report 
2005: 5). 
227 For more on the tsunami see 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/in depth/world/2004/asia quake disaster/default. stm, accessed 15 February 
2006. 
228 The national waters of a state extend up to 12 nautical miles from the shore of that state. In addition to 
a country's national waters, a state also claims sole rights over its Exclusive Economic Zone, or EEZ. 
229 Figures for Southeast Asia remained high in 2003 with 121 instances of piracy reported in Indonesia 
(the highest number of attacks ever recorded there) and 28 acts in the Malacca Straits (ICC-IMB Piracy 
Report 2005: 5). 
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Southeast Asia have amounted to around half the total number worldwide. The fact that 
the two lines on the graph follow a similar course shows that the total number of 
instances in Southeast Asia has a powerful affect upon the worldwide total and that it is 
primarily the increases in piracy in Southeast Asia that have forced the worldwide total 
to rise. 
Two tendencies may explain the rise in piracy in Southeast Asia. First, the rapid rise in 
piratical instances from 1998 to 2000 may be due to the knock-on effects of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997. Following this crisis, poverty expanded through Southeast 
Asian states, such that growing unemployment might cause individuals to seek an 
alternative and illegal means of subsistence through committing acts of piracy, whilst 
national governments in Southeast Asia might be less capable of financing effective 
patrols in their national waters. Second, the rapid increase in piratical attacks from 1998 
to 2000 came to the attention of major maritime states, such as Japan, whose ships 
traverse Southeast Asia's sea lanes and were therefore the victims of these piratical 
attacks. The efforts of these major maritime states may well account for the number of 
instances of piracy stabilising after 2000. Indeed, the number of piracy incidents in 
Southeast Asia continued to drop in the first quarter of 2006. Captain Mukundan, 
director of the IMB, suggested that this decrease was due to enhanced cooperation 
between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in policing the Malacca Straits 
(httn: //www. icc-ccs. org/main/news. php? newsid=67, accessed 3 May 2006). The recent 
collaboration between littoral states in the Malacca Straits will be addressed later in this 
chapter. In order to examine these two hypotheses, the evolution of piracy since the end 
of the Cold War in Southeast Asia must be understood. In addition, alternative 
explanations for the rise of piratical crime in Southeast Asia, such as the growing 
involvement of transnational criminal groups and the impact of state sponsored piracy, 
230 will be evaluated. 
230 Politically motivated piracy will be examined in the sixth chapter on maritime terrorism. 
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Graph 2: Locations of Actual and Attempted Piratical Attacks in the Southeast 
Asian Region, January-December 1991-2005 
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The above graph presents the number of Actual and Attempted piratical attacks that 
were reported by merchant ships in the Southeast Asian Region, for the period 1991- 
2005. It is clear from the graph that the greatest proportion of piratical attacks in the 
Southeast Asian region occur in Indonesian waters, followed by the Malacca Straits. 
The main areas of concern in 2005 were the Indonesian coast line of the Malacca Straits, 
particularly off North Sumatra, Aceh and Belawan, as well as Adang Bay. 
Anambas/Natuna Island. Balikpapan, Bontang, Gaspar (Gelasa)/Leplia Straits. Tanjong 
Priok (Jakarta) and Pulau Laut - all in Indonesia. 
231 The 79 attacks in Indonesian waters 
alone represent 28.6 percent of the 276 attacks worldwide for 2005 (ICC-IMB Piracy 
Report 2005: 5). Furthermore, whilst instances of piracy in Indonesian waters generally 
rose between 1993 and 2000, and continued to remain high after 2000, the number of 
cases in other states and maritime zones were low by comparison. 232 
- Five of these areas were also of concern during the first six months of 2003. These were Balikpapan, 
Dumai, Gaspar (Gelasa) Straits, Tanjong Priok (Jakarta), and Bintan Islands. Other areas, such as 
Samarinda and Pulau Laut were not considered piracy prone in the IMB Piracy report for the 3`d Quarter 
2004. This shows that in some places piracy decreases whilst in others it remains constant. This is of 
particular interest to this study if government initiatives are the cause of such changes (Piracy soars as 
violence against seafarers intensifies, http: //www. iccwbo. orJccs/news archives/2003, accessed on 25 
September 2003). 
-`' The exceptions to this were the Philippines in 1995 and 1996 and the Malacca Straits in 2000,2003 
and 2004, though the majority of the attacks of ships in the Malacca Straits were launched from Indonesia. 
The higher number of attacks in the Philippines in 1995 and 1996 is possibly related to the rise in acts of 
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Certain states have registered decreasing instances of piracy. In Malaysian waters, for 
example, no attacks were logged for the last six months of 2003. This result has been 
attributed to the enhanced anti-piracy patrols of the Royal Malaysian Marine Police 
whom Captain Mukundan of the IMB praised. The success of Malaysian anti-piracy 
patrols indicates the potential to curb piratical acts through the determined action of 
littoral states to allocate resources to maritime policing ("Piracy takes a higher toll of 
seamen's lives", http: //www. iccwbo. org/ccs/news archives/2004, accessed 30 January 
2004)233 Indeed the graph shows a steady decline in the number of attacks in Malaysian 
waters since 2000, indicating that steps taken by the Malaysian government have been 
effective in combating piracy in their national waters, though the pirates may be 
perpetrating maritime crime elsewhere. In actual fact, the primary aim of the Malaysian 
Maritime Police in increasing patrols was to prevent the illegal traffic of people from 
Indonesia to Malaysia following the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis; inhibiting piratical 
crime in its national waters was merely a side effect (Yamada interview, 10 November 
2004). 234 Nevertheless, the efforts of states like Malaysia are marred by the figures for 
Indonesia, which skew the total number of attacks in the Southeast Asian region. 
Furthermore, not only are the greatest number of piratical attacks recorded in 
Indonesian waters, the most violent piratical attacks are also located in Indonesia and 
the Malacca Straits. 35 
piracy in the Ilong Kong - Luzon - Hainan Island triangle during the early to mid-1990s. Critics claimed 
the Chinese government had sanctioned these attacks, see Chapter 3, Section 3.3c, 'Official Complicity or 
State-Sponsored Piracy'. However, authorities in Beijing blamed crooked members of the Chinese 
Customs and Public Security Bureaus ("Piracy Trends in East Asia", 
htt n non. zaidan. info/library/seikabutsu print view, accessed 19 December 2005). 
Z'3 Coordinated patrols between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia during the 1990s also had a positive 
impact upon the number of acts of piracy being perpetrated (Ebata, 1997: 38-39; Hesse, 2002: 60). 
234 Singapore has also made robust efforts to counter piracy in its waters (Emmers, 2004: 42-45). The 
anti-piracy strategies adopted by Southeast Asian states will be treated later in this chapter. 
23 See ICC-IMl3 Piracy Report 2005: 10, and "Fatal Attacks on the Increase, ICC report shows 
http: //www. iccwbo. org/ccs/news archives/20041Piracy report Jan-June 2004. asp., accessed 29 July 
2006. The case of the Global Semesta Salu, a tugboat, is representative of the violent attacks that occur in 
Indonesian waters. On Sunday 11 July 2004, the tug was underway in the Selat Bangka Strait, off the 
south-eastern Sumatran coast, when it was boarded by a pirate gang who threw the ten-man crew 
overboard and hijacked the ship. Only one of the Global Semesta Satu's crew was rescued and the fate of 
the other nine remains unknown (ICC-IMB Piracy Report third Quarter 2004: 34; Business Times, 16 July 
2004). 
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Other recent trends reveal that whilst hijackings of entire ships has decreased, acts such 
as commandeering tugs and barges and holding the crews for ransom have persisted 
(Xinhua News Agency, 27 January 2004: 1). International cooperation and measures to 
prevent piracy are partly responsible for the decline in hijacked vessels, particularly 
those hijacked by international crime syndicates which perceive less risk in targeting 
smaller cargo ships and tankers and robbing their cargo rather than capturing the entire 
ship or relying on drug shipments as a source of revenue (Terashima, 2001: 41). Two 
further explanations for the decline in the number of merchant vessels being hijacked 
can also be put forward. First, technological devices such as ShipLoc, a tracking 
mechanism, make it possible to track a vessel's course in real time, enabling maritime 
authorities to hunt down pirated vessels. Second, action taken by the Indian and Chinese 
authorities to prosecute pirates and impose lengthy prison sentences has been applauded 
by the IMB. Such action is said to deter future piratical attacks, contrasted with the 
shorter prison terms dolled out to pirate gangs indicted by the Indonesian authorities 
(Primer: Piracy in Asia, Virtual Information Center, 2001: 23; "Pirate attacks have 
tripled in a decade, IMB report finds", 
http: //www. iccwbo. org/home/news archives/2003, accessed on 25 September 2003; 
Glass, The Independent on Sunday, 11 January 2004: 8-13). 236 Nevertheless, a 22 
percent rise in attacks on tankers also concerns maritime experts who indicate the 
potential for an environmental disaster should a tanker be unmanned or under the 
control of unqualified pirates during an attack ("Piracy takes a higher toll of seamen's 
lives", http: //www. iccwbo. org/ccs/news_archives/2004, accessed 30 January 2004). The 
collision between the Japanese tanker, the Nagasaki Spirit, and the Ocean Blessing, 
which is believed to have been pirated and out of control, resulting in the spillage of 
13,000 tons of oil in the Northern Malacca Straits, attests to the environmental impact 
an act of piracy can produce (Carpenter and Wiencek, 1996: 81). 
236 The recent sentencing of pirates by the Chinese authorities contrasts with earlier Chinese responses to 
piracy. In the case of the hijacked Petro Ranger in 1998, the pirates were arrested but set free within a 
year. Moreover, the Chinese authorities took a quantity of the ship's fuel cargo which they classified as 
`evidence' and never returned to the ship's owner, Alan Chan (Glass, The Independent on Sunday, 11 
January 2004: 8-13). For more on the complicity of Chinese authorities in acts of piracy see Chapter 3. 
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Southeast Asian waters remain the most piracy-prone of any maritime territory in the 
world. An increase in instances of piracy since 1998, particularly in Indonesian waters, 
has driven the worldwide piracy figures upward. Furthermore, an increase in violent 
attacks and the possibility of an environmental disaster stemming from the hijacking of 
a tanker has begun to worry policy makers across the Asian region. Despite steps that 
have been taken to deter piracy - such as an increase of anti-piracy patrols in Malaysia 
and Singapore, prosecution of pirates in China and India, and the introduction of anti- 
piracy devices, like ShipLoc, by shipping companies - more effort is needed if piracy in 
Southeast Asia is to be significantly reduced. As a major maritime power in the 
Southeast Asian region, Japan determined to augment regional anti-piracy efforts and 
has played an important role in developing regional cooperation to fight maritime piracy. 
5.2 Explaininu the Threat to Japanese Shipping 
The Malacca Straits have been of strategic importance to Japan throughout the Cold 
War, during which Japan's economy grew to become the second largest in the world, 
and remains so today. It is through this body of water that 80 percent of Japan's oil 
imports are shipped together with a substantial proportion of Japanese trade. For Japan, 
the rise of piracy from 1998 to 2000 in Southeast Asia was especially alarming, and two 
incidents involving Japanese ships in particular encouraged Japanese policy makers to 
develop a response to the problem of piracy. These were the hijackings of the Tenyu in 
September 1998 and the Alondra Rainbow in October 1999. 
Attacks on Japanese Shipping 
The Tenvu incident 
In September 1998 the Japanese owned 277 foot Tenyu (2,600 tons) left the Indonesian 
port of Kuala Tanjung carrying 3,000 tons of aluminium ingots worth US$3 million 
bound for Inchon, South Korea. The Tenyu was crewed by two South Korean sailors, 
Captain Sin Yong-ju and Chief Engineer Pak Ha jun, and 13 Chinese (Sullivan and 
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Jordan, Buffalo News, 11 July 1999: A8; Terashima, 2001: 38-39). After leaving the 
port, pirates hijacked the Tenyu and the crew were never seen again. 
The disappearance of the Tenyu remained a mystery until it was found on 17 December 
1998, three months after it was hijacked, in Zhangjiagang port, Jiangsu Province, China. 
It had been renamed the Sanei 1,237 its fourth name since being hijacked, had an 
Indonesian crew and a cargo of palm oil. The 14 original crew members remain missing, 
but are presumed dead (Williams, South China Morning Post, 20 January 1999: 3; 
Sullivan and Jordan, Buffalo News, 11 July 1999: A8). The initial cargo of aluminium 
ingots is believed to have been sold in Burma (Sullivan and Jordan, The Washington 
Post, 5 July 1999: A18). 
The Indonesian pirate crew of the Sanei 1 were arrested, but later released by the 
Chinese Public Security Bureau and repatriated to Indonesia, despite the fact that at 
least two of the pirates, the chief officer Gary Elmar Philbert Mandry and the chief 
engineer, had been involved in the hijacking of another ship, the Anna Sierra, near 
Vietnam in 1995. To add insult to injury, the Chinese authorities even asked that 
Matsumoto Kisen, the Japanese owner of the Tenyu, pay for the pirates to be repatriated 
(Schloss, South China Morning Post, 18 July 1999: 4). Mr Guo Xin, China's permanent 
representative to the IMO in London, explained the behaviour of the Public Security 
Bureau in a letter to Lloyd's List in which he stated that the Indonesian pirates that were 
caught could not have been involved in the original hijacking as their passports were 
stamped after the ship had been pirated (South China Morning Post, 4 October 1999: 2). 
Nevertheless, it was clear to the Indonesian crew who took over the Tenyu that the 
original markings of the ship had been erased making the Tenyu a `phantom ship' 
(Schloss, South China Morning Post, 18 July 1999: 4). The former captain of another 
pirated vessel, Australian Ken Blyth of the Petro Ranger, even levelled allegations that 
officials from the Public Security Bureau had been bribed by the crime syndicate 
237 The real Sanei I was actually a cargo vessel of approximately the same size and description as the 
Tenyu and operating legally in the region. The name was therefore chosen by the pirates to avoid 
suspicion by local authorities (Williams, South China Post, 31 December 1998: 3). 
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responsible for the Tenyu incident and would therefore send the pirates home (Schloss, 
South China Morning Post, 21 February 1999: 3). 
A South Korean crime group is believed to be behind the hijacking of the Tenyu, but the 
involvement of Indonesian pirates, Burmese dockhands and illegal traders, as well as 
associates in China, points to the international scope of the operation (Sullivan and 
Jordan, Buffalo News, 11 July 1999: A8). The trail leading to the South Korean gang 
began intriguingly with the questioning of a former captain of the Tenyu, Kim Tae-kuk. 
Kim Tae-kuk had captained the Tenyu between 1988 and 1993, but was now involved in 
recruiting crews for shipping companies. In 1998, Kim Tae-kuk recruited the crew of 
the Tenyu who have been missing ever since the Tenyu was pirated in September 1998. 
In mid-1999, when the Tenyu was returned to Matsumoto Kisen, Kim Tae-kuk was 
serving a 21-month jail sentence for illegally smuggling people from Southern China 
into Japan. Kim Tae-kuk's involvement in people trafficking indicates that he had 
connections with the kinds of triad and yakuza gangs in China and Japan that are also 
involved in piracy (Schloss, South China Morning Post, 18 July 1999: 4; Schloss, South 
China Morning Post, 21 February 1999: 3). The involvement of a South Korean gang 
was further uncovered with the prosecution under Korean law of four Koreans 
suspected of hijacking the Tenyu (Inahara, 2002: 131). Lee Dong-gul was convicted 
with a three year sentence for illegally purchasing and selling the Tenyu's cargo, and his 
three accomplices were given suspended sentences (Lloyd's List, 1 November 1999: 16). 
Despite the prosecution of South Korean members of a criminal gang, in terms of 
innocent lives lost and the cost to a Japanese shipping company, the hijack of the Tenyu 
was the most damaging attack on a Japanese owned ship in the 1990s. The owners of 
the Tenyu, Matsumoto Kisen, have since avoided sending their ships through Southeast 
Asian waters, which it regards as too dangerous. The Japanese company recovered the 
Tenyu and put it into service again in June 1999, having paid Y20 million to a Chinese 
shipping firm that had acquired the ship (Whymant, The Times, 16 July 1999: 17). 
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Matsumoto Kisen's overall losses in the Tenyu case were estimated at Y60 million 
(Lloyd's List, 30 November 1999: 20). 238 
In the aftermath of the Tenyu incident, governments were heavily criticised by the Asian 
Shipowners' Forum for failing to meet the growing problem of piracy and armed 
robbery against ships (Whymant, The Times, 16 July 1999: 17). 239 The Japanese 
Ministry of Transport and concerned organizations responded by setting up a committee 
to propose concrete measures addressing piracy. In July 1999 at the ASEAN Regional 
Forum, Japan called for a cooperative approach to combating piracy (Toneyama, Asahi 
Shimbun, 22 November 1999: 4). However, further efforts were obviously required 
when, just over a year later, another Japanese ship, the Alondra Rainbow, was hijacked 
from the same port of Kuala Tanjung, carrying the same type of cargo of aluminium 
ingots. 
The Alondra Rainbow Incident 
Despite the fact that the fate of the crew of the Tenyu remains unknown, it was the 
Alondra Rainbow incident which is most often referred to as the case which galvanized 
policy makers in Tokyo to develop a thorough response to the problem of contemporary 
piracy in Southeast Asia (Terashima, 2001: 38). At 8: 10 p. m. on 22 October 1999, the 
Alondra Rainbow, a 7,762 ton cargo ship belonging to the Imura shipping company of 
Ehime Prefecture, departed the Indonesian port of Kuala Tanjung bound for the port of 
Miike, Fukuoka Prefecture. The Alondra Rainbow carried 7,000 tons of aluminium 
ingots worth between ¥11-12 billion. The 15 man Filipino crew were under the 
command of a Japanese captain, Ikeno Kö, and chief engineer Ogawa Keno. At around 
238 It wasn't until after the Alondra Rainbow incident that Sumitomo Marine and Fire Insurance Co. 
offered a specific insurance policy covering piracy, the first of its kind in Japan (Lloyd's List, 30 
November 1999: 20). In an effort to make a greater profit selling more expensive insurance, The 
Economist alleges that marine underwriters are encouraging shipowners to purchase war-risk polices as 
opposed to standard insurance policies 
(http: //www. economist. com/finance/PrinterFriendly. cfin? story id=6837144, accessed 13 May 2006). 
139 The response and roles of the Japan Shipowners Association and the Asian Shipowners Forum will be 
addressed in Section 8.4. c, `The Response of the Shipping Industry to Piracy in Southeast Asia', in this 
chapter. 
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10: 05 p. m., the ship was seized by a pirate gang of over ten men armed with pistols and 
knives. The Alondra Rainbow was located 50 kilometres southeast of Kuala Tanjung in 
the middle of the Malacca Straits when it was attacked (Hino, 2000: 104; Terashima, 
2001: 38; Takai, 2002: 6; Mukundan, 2002: 62). 
The pirates immediately took control of the wheelhouse and disabled the emergency 
warning device. The crew were bound and blindfolded and the ship was turned around. 
The following day, around 2 a. m., the crew was transferred to a 1,500-2,000 ton vessel 
where they were kept for six days, before being set adrift on an eight by two metre 
rubber dinghy with no life jackets and little food and water on 29 October in the Bay of 
Bengal . 
240 Eleven days later the crew were picked up by a Thai fishing boat, the Yod 
Duangporn 2, in the middle of the Andaman Sea 80 miles south of Phuket. All crew 
members survived (Chuennirun, The Bangkok Post, 10 November 1999: 1; Hino, 2000: 
104; Terashima, 2001: 38; Takai, 2002: 6; Mukundan, 2002: 62) 241 
There was a delay in the shipping company informing the Japanese Ministry of 
Transport about the Alondra Rainbow's disappearance and possible hijacked status 
(Toneyama, Asahi Shimbun, 22 November 1999: 4). The reason for the delay was that 
the Alondra Rainbow had been hijacked on Friday night so that the shipping company 
didn't learn that something was amiss until Monday morning when they, at first, 
assumed that there was trouble with the communication equipment (Hino, 2000: 105). 
240 The 17 men had between them: a day's worth of canned fish, rice and water, 20 concentrated nutrition 
packs, two 15-litre plastic containers and sixty 0.5 litre bottles of water. They divided the nutrition packs 
into four Icm units and every man nibbled 3-4 millimetres of the nutrition packs three times a day. Each 
day, a crew member received 200cc of water and as it rained only once (on the ninth of November) the 
crew were nearly reduced to drinking their own urine. On the first and third days, the crew's hopes were 
raised when they spotted a tanker and large cargo ship respectively. Though they lit smoke candles, their 
signals were either unseen or ignored (Ishihara, Yomiuri Shimbun, 17 November 1999: 39; Ishihara, 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 18 November 1999: 38; Ishihara, Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 November 1999: 38; Hino, 
2000: 104). 
241 The crew were lucky to be rescued, as the Captain of the Thai fishing boat was wary that the drifting 
dinghy was itself full of pirates. The Thai Captain was only convinced when one of the Filipino crew 
produced a passport that he had managed to keep hidden (Hino, 2000: 104). Captain Ikeno (67 years old) 
returned to Japan from Bangkok on the 13 November 1999. When asked about his ordeal, he exclaimed, 
"Every day, we thought we'd die the next, as there was no guarantee that we would be rescued even if we 
survived. I was constantly thinking of how I could get my crew back to Japan alive". Chief Engineer 
Ogawa (69 years old) came home a few days later, having been in worse condition than the Captain 
(Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 13 November 1999: 14; Yomiuri Shimbun, 14 November 1999: 1; 
Ishihara, Yomiuri Shimbun, 19 November 1999: 38). 
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Therefore, it was not until five days after the disappearance of the Alondra Rainbow that 
the Japanese Maritime Safety Organization and Japanese Shipowner's Association 
asked coastal states for information pertaining to the whereabouts of the ship. The 
International Maritime Bureau began its own investigation when it became apparent that 
the ship had in fact been hijacked by pirates (Takai, 2002: 6). In addition, the Ministry 
of Transport, through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, urged the Indonesian government 
to arrest the pirates; believing that the Alondra Rainbow might still be in Indonesian 
waters (Asahi Shimbun, 12 November 1999: 37). 242 Finally, a helicopter-carrying patrol 
boat and surveillance plane were dispatched to locate the ship by the Ministry of 
Transport. The search was limited to the high seas in the East China Sea and Gulf of 
Thailand. The Ministry of Transport was careful not to alarm Southeast Asian states that 
would be wary of an armed Japanese vessel in their waters. Hino believes that an 
opportunity to publicise the search and call on the help of regional maritime authorities 
was missed in this instance (Hino, 2000: 105). Nevertheless, the reluctance of the 
Ministry of Transport to send the patrol boat through the Malacca Straits is perhaps 
more indicative of the sensitivity towards sovereign borders in Southeast Asia and a 
determination not to inflame the sentiments of Southeast Asian peoples, keeping in 
mind Japan's militaristic past (Emmers and Sebastian in Weatherbee, 2005: 175). 
Around 4 or 5 November, the Alondra Rainbow was seen in the Malaysian port Mili, in 
Eastern Sarawak, then heading west towards the Indian Ocean. These facts were relayed 
to the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur which then publicised the information. 
On 13 November, the IMB reported that a ship resembling the Alondra Rainbow had 
been spotted en route to the Middle East. The Indian Coast Guard, acting on this 
information, located a vessel named the Mega Rama flying a Belize flag and asked the 
IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur for information concerning the 
authenticity of the ship. The Piracy Reporting Centre replied that the vessel was fake 
and the Indian navy deployed three ships and two planes to detain and search the Mega 
Rama. On 14 November, a Dornier aircraft from the Indian Coast Guard spotted the 
Mega Rama. The Indian naval frigate the INS Prahar fired warning shots from midday 
242 Considering the high levels of piracy in Indonesian waters, the Japanese MOT and MOFA officials 
probably believed the hijackers to be Indonesian. 
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on 15 November to before dawn on 16 November when the pirates stopped the vessel, 
set fire to the stem and tried to scuttle the ship by opening a valve to let in sea water. 
The pirate's attempts failed and Indian naval officers boarded the ship and arrested 15 
Indonesian pirates at a location 430 kilometres west of Goa (The Hindu, 17 November 
1999: 1; Orr, The Times, 18 November 1999: 21; The Hindu, 21 November 1999: 1; 
New Straits Times, 29 November 1999: 29; Hino, 2000: 104-105; Takai, 2002: 6-7; 
Mukundan, 2002: 62-63). 243 
Documents found aboard the Mega Rama revealed that the actual identity of the vessel 
was the Alondra Rainbow. The Alondra Rainbow was then sailed to the port of Mumbai 
where the captured pirates were interrogated. Questioning revealed that half the ship's 
cargo of aluminium had been transferred to another ship whilst the rest was bound for 
Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As India lacked a law on piracy at the 
time and had not ratified the SUA Treaty, the pirates were tried for foreign offences, 
robbery, endangering life at sea, interference with the execution of official duty, 
attempted murder, disobeying an official order and falsification of documents (Suzuki, 
Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 November 1999: 1; Takai, 2002: 7, Mukundan, 2002: 63). The 
pirates were sentenced to seven years of hard labour on 25 February 2000 (Yamada, 
2003: 136; Hirose, http: //nippon. zaidan. info/library/seikabutsu, accessed 19 December 
2005). 
There were several aspects of the Alondra Rainbow hijacking case that distinguishes it 
from previous incidents, such as that of the Tenyu. First, it was specifically the fact that 
two Japanese lives were at risk that the incident caught the attention of the Japanese 
media and government. Though the hijacking of the Tenyu the previous year, in which 
the crew remain missing, undoubtedly added to a growing sense of apprehension 
regarding maritime crime, it did not have the same impact as the Alondra Rainbow 
incident (Terashima, 2001: 38-39)244 Furthermore, the dramatic chase and capture of 
243 All signatory states to the UNCLOS have an obligation under Article 100 to assist in suppressing 
piracy on the high seas. The details concerning how states may proceed under international law in seizing 
a pirate ship are noted in Articles 105-107. See Appendix I for articles in UNCLOS on piracy. 
24 Terashima also notes that the fact that the Alondra Rainbow was bound for Japan was significant in the 
sense that the ship was hijacked on Japan's main transport route (Terashima, 2001: 38-39). However, as 
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the ship, which was described as being in "almost scrap condition" when it arrived in 
Mumbai, having received significant damage to its decks and engine room (Yomiuri 
Shimbun, 24 November 1999: 1), coupled with the survival story of the crew adrift at 
sea, made for compelling reading in the Japanese press. It became clear as the news 
story developed that Japanese lives and shipping were at risk in the Malacca Straits, the 
most important sea-lane for Japan. 
It was not just the government that took note of the hijacking of the Alondra Rainbow; 
Japanese shipowners also took action, taking out insurance policies to protect their ships 
financially should they be pirated, though these policies cost a mere ¥200,000 to 
Y300,000 per year. Japanese shipping companies paid the Indonesian navy an 
undisclosed sum to protect their ships transporting aluminium ingots from the 
Indonesian port of Kuala Tanjung, the same port the Tenyu had sailed from a year 
earlier. This scheme was founded by 12 Japanese shipping companies with the support 
of the Japanese and Indonesia governments. The Japanese Ministry of Transport 
negotiated on behalf of the Japanese shippers. Japanese aluminium importers even 
considered changing their supply sources should piratical attacks continue in Indonesian 
waters (Lloyd's List, 30 November 1999: 20). Hence, the Alondra Rainbow incident 
significantly raised awareness amongst the Japanese shipping industry about the 
dangers of piracy and encouraged the industry to adopt a more proactive approach. 
The main reason for the Japanese shipping industry's action was the fact that the 
hijacking of the Alondra Rainbow was so similar to that of the Tenyu the previous year, 
pointing both to lawlessness and inadequate policing of the Malacca Straits. Not only 
were similar ships, both carrying aluminium ingots, attacked leaving the same port of 
Kuala Tanjung, but also one of the hijackers involved in the Alondra Rainbow hijacking 
was identified as having been involved in the attack on the Tenyu the previous year 
(Mukundan, 2002: 63; Mortishead, The Times, 3 May 2003: 49). Moreover, the 
hijacking of the Alondra Rainbow was the work of a transnational criminal organization 
that had the capacity to organise the hijacking of a ship off the coast of Indonesia, have 
the Tenyu was attacked near the same port as the Alondra Rainbow in Indonesian waters and heading 
towards South Korea, so the Tenyu was also hijacked on Japan's main transportation route. 
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half the goods transferred to another ship and sold in the Philippines, whilst the 
remaining half travelled to the UAE to be traded, and operate another ship to manage 
and dispose of the original legitimate crew off the coast of Thailand. Considering that 
forged documents were used as a means of changing the identity of the ship and origin 
of the cargo, the Alondra Rainbow incident also suggests official compliance in this 
piratical act (Mukundan, 2002: 63). The pirates were well organised, with different 
positions on board ranging from captain and chief engineer to cooks, clerks and storage 
crew. The captain and chief engineer were found in possession of credit cards and a 
range of foreign currencies, including US dollars, Japanese yen as well as currency from 
Switzerland, Colombia, Indonesia, Taiwan and Brunei. The captain and chief engineer 
were also certified, the captain being in possession of a master's certificate from Belize 
and the chief engineer having passed a marine engineering examination at an Indonesian 
university (Suzuki, Yomiuri Shimbun, 26 November 1999: 1; Lloyd's List, 23 November 
1999: 5). For criminal organizations to carry out this kind of highly organised attack 
upon Japanese shipping placed the whole industry at risk. 
The Japanese government did, however, learn the importance of international 
cooperation from the hijacking of the Alondra Rainbow. Not only did the Indian navy 
capture the pirated Alondra Rainbow, but also Filipino Intelligence also later seized 
3,000 tons of aluminium ingots from a warehouse in the suburbs of Manila. According 
to the investigative records, within one month of the Alondra Rainbow incident, a ship 
named the Victoria landed at Olonza Po in Subic Bay and unloaded the stolen 
aluminium ingots using falsified documentation. Fifteen trucks then transported the 
aluminium to the warehouse. The involvement of Japanese, Indian, Filipino, Indonesian 
and international organizations indicated the need for international cooperation to deal 
with the scourge of contemporary maritime piracy (Takai, 2002: 7) and prompted the 
Japanese government to become more deeply involved in the fight against maritime 
violence and crime. The rapidity with which the Japanese government took action to 
deal with the problem of piracy could be observed in the dispatch of a Japan Coast 
Guard ship and plane to seek out the hijacked Alondra Rainbow. 
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Serious pirate attacks against Japanese ships continued with the hijacking of the Global 
Mars on 24 February 2000. It was attacked by 20 pirates two days after departing port 
Klang in Malaysia with a cargo of 6,000 tons of palm oil. The crew of the Global Mars 
were transferred to a fishing trawler in a similar manner to the crew of the Alondra 
Rainbow. The Global Mars was later identified near Hong Kong, whereby the Chinese 
authorities captured the pirated vessel and returned it with some of its original cargo to 
its Japanese owners (Wong Joon San, South China Morning Post, 14 August 2000: 1). 
Summing up the Threat: The Protection of Shipping, Trade and Lives 
From an English School perspective, acts of piracy in Southeast Asia affect Japan's 
economy by threatening Japanese trade in addition to potentially disrupting the 
interstate institution of the market should an act of piracy block a vital sea lane. The 
importance of Southeast Asia's sea-lanes for Japan's national security cannot be 
underestimated. Any disruption to these sea-lanes, particularly the narrow Malacca 
Straits, 245 would be detrimental to Japan's trade and economy as shipping costs would 
rise, delivery of vital resources would be postponed causing delays in production. This 
in turn could have knock-on effects upon Japanese companies, workers and the wider 
Japanese society in general, should an economic downturn lead to unemployment. With 
this in mind, the Nippon Foundation, a Japanese NGO, has paid ¥10 billion over the 
past 30 years to set up, inspect, repair and replace beacons and channel marks in the 
Malacca Straits to ensure the safe passage of shipping. In the same vein, Japan has taken 
the lead in bringing Asian states together to cooperate in the fight against piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia. 
246 Yet more financial and technical 
support is still needed from other states that make use of Southeast Asia's sea-lanes to 
ensure the safety of trade and the ocean environment (Terashima, 2001: 41). 
245 Approximately 20 percent of ships traversing the Malacca Straits are related to Japan in some way 
(Kaiyöhöanchökokusayika, 2002: 144). 
246 All ASEAN countries, as well as India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, South Korea and China, attended the 
Japan sponsored `Regional Conference on Combating Piracy' held on 27-28 of April 2000. 
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Even if shipping is not disrupted in the Malacca Straits, piracy in Southeast Asian 
waters continues to be a concern for the Japanese shipping industry and Japanese 
seafarers. In the mid-1990s piratical attacks against Japanese ships increased rapidly 
from an average of ten attacks per year to over 20 (Toneyama, Asahi Shimbun, 22 
November 1999: 4). In early 2003, the Japanese Ministry of Transport conducted a 
survey on piratical attacks to Japanese shipping. According to this survey, piratical 
attacks on Japanese vessels decreased from a peak of 39 cases in 1999,247 to 31 in 2000, 
10 in 2001 and 16 in 2002. Most attacks were of a low level, occurring at night when 
the ships were in port or at anchor and resulting in the theft of the ship's stores or items 
found on deck, such as ropes and life jackets. Nonetheless, a Chinese captain was 
wounded in one of the attacks in 2002 and crews were threatened and tied up in four of 
the attacks. Seventy-five percent of the attacks on Japanese ships in 2002 occurred in 
Indonesian waters and Japanese sailors were only on board a pirated ship in two out of 
the 16 cases (http: //www. mlit-go. jp/kasha/kisha03/10/100206_. html, accessed on 21 
October 2003). In 2003, attacks against Japanese ships declined again to a total of 12, 
reflecting the efforts of Southeast Asian states in combating piracy (Jiji Press, 6 
February 2004: 1). Despite the decline in piratical attacks against Japanese vessels, 
Southeast Asian seas remain dangerous for Japanese vessels and have affected the 
Japanese shipping industry in a variety of ways, including increases in transport and 
insurance costs (Richardson, International Herald Tribune, 23 November 1999: 10) 248 
The threat from piracy in Southeast Asia to Japan is not what the international relations 
theory of realism would define as a traditional threat, whereby a state is threatened by 
another state. Instead, piracy amounts to a non-traditional security threat, whereby non- 
247 The 1999 figure represented a five fold increase in attacks on Japanese ships compared with attacks in 
1996 (Virtual Information Center, Primer: Piracy in Asia, 2001: 7). 
248 The highest insurance payment made for an act of maritime violence was to the owners of the Limburg, 
a French oil tanker, that was rammed by a speedboat laden with explosives off the coast of Yemen in 
October 2002. The payment totaled US$70 million (The Economist, 20 April 2006). Insurance premiums 
soared by 300 percent for ships transiting Yemeni waters after the Limburg incident (Barkham, The 
Guardian, 25 July 2006). This case is examined in greater detail in section 6.2a. There is some 
uncertainty amongst shipowners as to which insurance packages will cover them in the event of an act of 
piracy. An example of marine insurance available that will cover an act of kidnap and ransom, such as the 
act perpetrated against the Idaten, addressed in Section 5.5 of this chapter, is the CrewSEACURE policy 
offered by Seacurus Ltd. (The Shiptalk Newsletter, 
httn: //www. shit)talk. com/newsletter/isps special text only. html, accessed 27 July 2006). 
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state actors, pirates, target ships for their own personal gain. These pirates may have 
connections with international crime gangs involved in the illegal trafficking of drugs, 
humans or arms, they may rely upon military or official connections to ensure they are 
not caught, or they may be fishermen who, having suffered as a result of the Asian 
financial crisis or because ecological damage has reduced fishing stocks in their waters, 
have turned to piracy as a means of survival (Webster and Vadukul, 
http: //www. southstseaport. org/magazine/articles/1997b-05. shtm#top, accessed 17 June 
2006), as Chapter 3 demonstrated. Responding to each of these different kinds of piracy 
requires a variety of different policies aimed at targeting the financial transactions of 
international criminal groups, overcoming graft amongst government officials in 
Southeast Asian states, as well as improving the living standards of coastal communities 
and the ecology upon which they depend in order to live. Nevertheless, whilst such a 
human security based approach would be possible within a nation, sovereign boundaries 
prohibit interference by foreign states in Southeast Asian countries, as stressed in 
Chapter 2. Hence, despite the threat of piracy originating from non-state actors, Japan 
must slowly build cooperation amongst Southeast Asian states when responding to the 
problem of piracy. 
5.3 E, xaminint Japan's Response to Maritime Piracy in 
Southeast Asia: What has Japan done? 
It is clear from an analysis of contemporary maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea 
that Japan cannot take unilateral action because of the sanctity of sovereignty in 
international law. Though certain coastal states, like Indonesia, lack the ability and 
resources to tackle piracy in their national waters, major maritime states are unable to 
deploy their naval forces to pursue pirates when they escape to a foreign territory. The 
pirates themselves are well aware of these limitations on states and therefore take 
advantage of them. In Takai's view, coastal states need to redefine piracy and cooperate 
with other states to suppress it. Nonetheless, the IMO's attempt to reinterpret piracy by 
distinguishing between piratical acts that occur on the high seas according to 
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international law and armed robbery against ships, which may be identical in form but 
occurs within national maritime boundaries, has been resisted by some littoral states in 
Southeast Asia, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia (Takai, 2002: 10). The issues 
concerning how piracy is defined according to international law, as well as by 
international organizations, were addressed in Chapter 3. The primary reason why 
Southeast Asian states spurned a more inclusive definition of piracy is that it increases 
the number of piratical acts in their waters which reflects badly upon the state and 
thereby forces the state to act. State complicity in acts of piracy combined with the fear 
that the deployment of the naval forces of major powers to tackle piracy in Southeast 
Asia will allow the major powers to dominate the domestic affairs of Southeast Asian 
states has also encouraged the rejection of alternative definitions of piracy that might 
permit hot pursuit 249 
However, since the piracy `peak' in 2000, the extent of the piratical threat in Southeast 
Asia has become known and Southeast Asian states have been less able to deny that acts 
of piracy occur in their waters. Japan has therefore attempted to build regional 
cooperation in Southeast Asia by re-examining how piracy is defined. In 2001, Japan 
sponsored a conference entitled: The `Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea', marking a significant step towards dealing with 
piratical incidents as defined by international law and acts of armed robbery that occur 
within a state's jurisdiction. The definitional problem appears to have been overcome 
with the establishment of the Information Sharing Centre in Singapore on 11 November 
2004. This Centre which was promoted by Japan works on the agreed principle that the 
signatory states, the ten ASEAN states, Japan, China, Korea, India, Bangaladesh and Sri 
Lanka, must tackle both piracy on the high seas, according to UNCLOS, and armed 
robbery at sea, based on the IMO's code of practice 
(http: //www. soc. nii. ac. ip/jsil/annual documents/2003/autumn/houkoku- 
abstr/Panel%20C4%2OUmezawa%2Opaper. t)df, accessed on 20 December 2005). The 
249 An interesting parallel can be drawn with the JCG's pursuit of the North Korean spy ship that 
transgressed Japanese waters in December 2001. The main difference between hot pursuit in Northeast 
Asia and Southeast Asia is that tensions between Japan and North Korea, centring upon North Korea's 
status as a barbarian power, warranted hot pursuit from the Japanese perspective. More cooperative 
relations in the Southeast Asian interstate society promote greater respect for sovereign maritime 
boundaries. 
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way in which this agreement was reached will be outlined in the legal section of Japan's 
response in this chapter. 
The international dimensions of contemporary shipping and the widespread use of flags 
of convenience further complicate piracy in Southeast Asia. The countries that issue a 
flag of convenience, such as Panama, the Bahamas, Liberia, the Maldives and Malta, 
have jurisdiction over a ship, but have no means to enforce their jurisdiction (Takai, 
2002: 1). The case of the Star 4, a bulk carrier flying the flag of land-locked Mongolia, 
is indicative of the problem of flags of convenience. On 7 February 2004, whilst 
anchored at Chittagong, Bangladesh, a group of armed pirates boarded the Star 4, shot 
and killed two watchmen and made off with some of the ship's property (ICC-IMB 
Piracy Report third Quarter 2004: 40). It is far from clear that Mongolia can truly 
exercise jurisdiction in this case or indeed would want to (Yamada, 2005: 48), 
especially as the Mongolian Ship Registry lacks the resources and the manpower to 
become involved in an investigation. 250 Flags of convenience are easily and cheaply 
bought and come with few regulations that ships must obey. The difficulty comes when 
a ship flying a flag of convenience is pirated and there is no authority to turn to in the 
flag state. Furthermore, the crew, shipowner, shipper and receiver of the goods may all 
be of different nationalities, thereby complicating a legal resolution of a pirated ship. 
Considering the international dimensions of contemporary piracy and armed robbery 
against ships, a cooperative international response is imperative. International law also 
dictates that states should cooperate to resolve piracy (Article 100 UNCLOS). Japan has 
recognised the need for an international approach, and since former Prime Minister 
Obuchi's call for an international conference on piracy in November 1999, Japan has 
been at the forefront of efforts to build international cooperation to tackle piracy in 
Southeast Asia (Takai, 2002: 1-2,8). 
The response of the Japanese government to piracy is briefly outlined in MOFA'S 
Diplomatic Bluebook, Section 4: "Global Problems", Chapter II: "Japan's Foreign 
250 Intriguingly, North Korean ships seeking to avoid inspections under the PSI may look to acquire a 
Mongolian flag to hide the ship's connection with North Korea. See, Brooke, "Landlocked Mongolia's 
Seafaring Tradition", http: //www nlobalpolicy. ori/nations/flags/2004/0702landlocked. litin, accessed 6 
August 2006. 
191 
Policy in Major Diplomatic Fields", Part C: "Transnational Organized Crime, Illegal 
Drugs, and Piracy" (MOFA Diplomatic Bluebook 2002, 
http: //www. mofa. g. jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/index. html, accessed on 19 
December 2005). The information given in this report can be divided into three main 
areas: political measures, operational measures, and legal measures. Political measures 
include regional meetings sponsored or promoted by Japan to raise awareness or build 
cooperation in the fight against maritime piracy. The principal meetings are the 
`Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships' held in 
Tokyo in April 2000, at which the `Asia Anti-Piracy Challenge 2000' statement and 
`Model Action Plan' were announced, and the `Asia Cooperation Conference on 
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships' held in Tokyo in October 2001, 
attended by representatives of 16 Asian states and Hong Kong, as well as IMO and IMB 
delegates. Operational measures comprise hosting training programmes, conducting 
anti-piracy patrols and exercises, and establishing systems and centres for enhanced 
information sharing. Finally, legal measures include attempts to address and promote 
international anti-piracy laws and agreements. All of Japan's efforts at promoting 
regional cooperation for the creation of an anti-piracy policy have been welcomed by 
the IMB (Nakamura, 2001: 18). These efforts will now be addressed in detail. 
5.3a Political Measures 
International Conferences 
Since Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi proposed that a `Regional Conference on 
Combating Piracy' should be held at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference convened 
in the Philippines in November 1999, Japanese prime ministers have consistently taken 
the lead to promote international conferences to resolve the problem of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asian waters. Obuchi also suggested that a 
regional coast guard be established and although this idea was spurned, it did indicate 
the willingness of the Japanese government to see key sea-lanes protected. At the 
November 2000 ASEAN+3 meeting in Singapore, Japanese Prime Minister Mori 
advocated that a Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery at 
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Sea be held in Tokyo in 2001. Prime Minister Koizumi also used the occasion of the 
ASEAN+3 summit in Brunei in November 2001 to stress the importance of a 
governmental experts' meeting to devise a regional agreement on combating piracy and 
armed robbery at sea (Herrmann, 2002: 447; Emmers, 2004: 51-52; 
http: //wwtiv. mofa. go. ip/niofai/gaiko/pirate/index. html, accessed on 19 December 2005). 
Koizumi repeated his intention to build regional cooperation to fight piracy whilst 
touring the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore in January 2002, 
stating at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore on 14 February 2002: 
I believe we need an agreement for regional cooperation on piracy, and I will promote 
consultation to achieve that end. We must band together to eradicate the plague of piracy. In 
addition, I would like to strengthen cooperation between the Coast Guard of Japan and [its] 
ASEAN counterparts (quoted in Emmers, 2004: 52). 
Each of these regional conferences and meetings will be examined in turn. 
The Regional Conference on Combating Pirac 
The `Regional Conference on Combating Piracy', which was held on 27-28 April 2000, 
represented the first gathering of governmental and maritime officials throughout Asia 
to discuss the problem of piracy. The conference was jointly sponsored by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transport, and the Maritime Safety Agency with the 
backing of the Nippon Foundation. The meeting comprised government representatives 
concerned with maritime affairs and members of the shipping associations of ten 
ASEAN countries, as well as India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, South Korea, China, Hong 
Kong and Japan. Delegates from the IMO were also in attendance. As a result of this 
conference a resolution was declared entitled the `Tokyo Appeal' (Appendix III) 
together with guidelines for combating piracy and armed robbery against ships titled the 
`Model Action Plan' (Appendix IV). Furthermore, the `Asia Anti-Piracy Challenge 
2000' (Appendix V) was adopted (Asahi Shimbun, 28 April 2000: 3; 
Kaiyöhöanchvkokusaijika, 2002: 145; 
http: //%vww mofa. go. ip/niofai/gaiko/pirate/index. html, accessed 21 October 2003). The 
`Tokyo Appeal' stressed the need to better understand and combat piracy in Asian 
waters by encouraging the reporting of piratical instances, improving the preventative 
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measures adopted by the shipping industry, strengthening the capacity of maritime 
enforcement agencies to aid pirated ships and counter pirates in the territorial waters of 
Asian states, enhancing multinational cooperation in the fight against piracy, and 
encouraging the adoption of the SUA Convention, to encourage greater interstate 
cooperation as Chapter 3 demonstrated 
(http"/hvww. mlit. go. ip/english/mot news/mot news 000428, accessed on 27 October 
2003). The `Model Action Plan' provided a step-by-step guide to how the aspirations 
outlined in the `Tokyo Appeal' should be carried out 
(http"//www. mlit. go. jp/english/mot news/mot news 000428, accessed on 27 October 
2003). 
The `Asia Anti-Piracy Challenge 2000' has five principal aims. First, to promote and 
strengthen cooperation and coordination between maritime authorities in the region. 
Second, to exchange views and information quickly through the creation of a directory 
containing the contact details of maritime personnel in the Asia region. Third, to 
strengthen regional anti-piracy measures. Fourth, for governments in the region to 
provide assistance to pirated vessels and crews. Fifth, for maritime officials to 
participate in a regional experts meeting enabling the furtherance of cooperation and 
coordination between each country. The measures taken by regional states following the 
`Regional Conference on Combating Piracy' were proven effective when, on 25 May 
2000, less than a month after the conference had taken place, a distress signal was 
picked up from a ship sailing east of the Philippines via the INMARSAT satellite 
system. The cargo ship flew a Panamanian flag and is referred to simply as "H". In 
accordance with the proposals outlined in the `Model Action Plan' and `Asia Anti- 
Piracy Challenge 2000', the directory of contact information on maritime authorities in 
the region was consulted. The Philippine Coast Guard then sent a unit to investigate and 
placed patrol boats and planes on stand-by. By 12: 30 p. m. on the 26 May the ship "H" 
was guided safely into the port of Tabao, the Philippines. As it happened the emergency 
transmitter had been activated by a crew member by mistake, though the response of the 
Philippine maritime police indicated the extent to which Asian maritime authorities 
were mobilised to act in the aftermath of the `Regional Conference on Combating 
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Piracy' (littp: /hNww. kaiho. mlit. go. jp/info/books/report2001 /special/ol . html, accessed 
on 21 October 2003). 
The `Regional Conference on Combating Piracy' was the first occasion for Coast 
Guards and maritime authorities throughout the Asian region to make concrete efforts at 
cooperation (Terashima, 2001: 39). The involvement of representatives from all 
ASEAN states, as well as six other countries and Hong Kong, showed the extent to 
which participants were prepared to engage in a truly region-wide meeting to address 
the problem of piracy. Furthermore, the drafting of the `Tokyo Appeal', the `Model 
Action Plan' and the `Asia Anti-Piracy Challenge 2000', all indicated that the first steps 
to resolve the problems of piracy in Asia were being taken. The shortcoming with the 
conference was that no state had really committed itself to doing anything, despite 
having voiced a general agreement concerning the contemporary threat of piracy. 251 
Japan, therefore, advanced bilateral operational steps, such as the dispatch of Japan's 
Coast Guard ships to conduct anti-piracy exercises with Coast Guards and maritime 
police throughout the Asian region, which will be detailed in Section 8.3. b, labelled 
`Operational Measures', and sponsored a second regional anti-piracy conference entitled 
`The Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery'. 
The Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbe 
On the 4-5 October 2001, the `Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and 
Armed Robbery' was held. The conference was sponsored by Japan's Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and involved attendees of the same 16 countries and the region of Hong 
Kong as the `Regional Conference on Combating Piracy' the year before. A broader 
range of delegates participated at the October 2001 conference, including government 
representatives, members of shipping associations, as well as researchers and 
representatives of both the IMO and IMB. The conference addressed the increasingly 
2 51 In fact, China spurned Japanese proposals for multilateral patrols in the Malacca Straits because of 
concerns that anti-piracy cooperation led by Japan might build maritime alliances balancing China's 
growing naval power (Bradford, 2004: 491). 
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violent and organised instances of piracy in the Southeast Asia region and proposals for 
information sharing and enhanced regional cooperation were discussed. There were four 
main results of the conference. First, it was agreed that a regional response, spanning 
government, citizen and international organization levels, was indispensable to deal 
with the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea. Second, the initiatives of Asian 
states to combat piracy in the Asian region were emphasised. Third, a government 
experts' meeting was inaugurated to formulate concrete plans to tackle piracy and 
armed robbery against ships. Fourth, the need to develop regional cooperation and 
publicise the results of the conference were stressed 
(http: //www. mofa. go. jp/mofaif ag iko/pirate/index. html, 
http: //www. mofa. go. jp/policy/piracy/state0l I O. html, accessed 27 October 2003). 
Despite the wider participation at the `Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating 
Piracy and Armed Robbery', there remained precious little in terms of concrete 
measures to deal with the growing problem of piracy. Once again a regional response 
was stressed and the individual efforts of states were highlighted, but no plan to develop 
coordinated patrols targeting piracy was evolved (Mainichi Shimbun, 5 October 2001: 
5)252 The main two achievements were perhaps the title of the conference itself, which 
suggested that states now agreed that the problem was not simply one of piracy in 
international waters, but also a matter of armed robbery within the sovereign maritime 
boundaries of littoral states, and the creation of a Maritime Policy Bureau's Expert 
Meeting to Tackle Piracy. 
The Maritime Policy Bureau's Expert Meeting to Tackle Piracy 
The Maritime Policy Bureau's Expert Meeting to Tackle Piracy was held on 12-13 
March 2002, and was comprised of representatives from 16 countries in the Asian 
252 Critics advocated the need to enhance understanding about piracy and armed robbery at sea in the 
Asian region and therefore encouraged the Japan Coast Guard and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to engage 
in more information sharing, exchange of personnel and technical aid (Mainichs Shimbun, 5 October 
2001: 5). 
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region as well as members of the IMB and IMO253 The agenda of the Maritime Policy 
Bureau's Expert Meeting to Tackle Piracy was threefold. First, representatives from the 
IMO and IMB elaborated upon the current problem of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships in the region, focussing in particular upon the increasing number of hijack and 
ransom cases. Second, each maritime bureau presented its policies and efforts in 
implementing the steps specified in the `Model Action Plan', proposed at the `Regional 
Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships' held in Tokyo, 
April 2000, and especially praised the shipping industry's efforts in employing 
measures to protect their ships. 254 Third, participants put forward concrete efforts to 
improve the regional response to the problem of piracy. These efforts included: a 
continuation of international cooperation through information exchange, an improved 
system to coordinate the transfer of information between states regarding pirated ships, 
domestic measures to tackle current trends of hijacking and ransom cases, and the 
promotion of studies that examine the connections between piracy and maritime 
terrorism (http: //www. mlit. go. jp/kisha/kishaO2/10/100228 html; 
http: //www. mlit. go ip/english/news/news02/100313; 
http: //w%vw. mlit. go. jp/kisha/kisha02/10/100313 . html, accessed on 21 October 2003). 
In addition, negotiations on the Agreement to Cooperate in the Asian Region to tackle 
Piracy were held regularly every month to two months in 2003 to hammer out concrete 
measures that Asian states could take to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships 
in the region. Participants included section chiefs and department heads of Foreign and 
Maritime Agencies and Ministries from the same 16 countries that convened for the 
Maritime Policy Bureau's Expert Meeting to Tackle Piracy. Japan took the lead in these 
negotiations drafting a common proposal text and a common negotiation text on the 
subject of a regional Information Sharing Centre on piracy and armed robbery against 
ships (http: //www. mofi. go. ip/mofai/gaiko/kaiyo/kaizoku 3. html, accessed on 21 
October 2003). By the sixth round of negotiations held in Tokyo from the 23-26 
September 2003, discussions were conducted at the bureau chief level. At the sixth 
253 The 16 countries were Bangladesh, Brunei, Cambodia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and Sri Lanka. 
254 The contribution of the shipping industry to tackling piracy is detailed in section 8.4. c `The Response 
of the Shipping Industry to Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia'. 
197 
meeting, a complete draft of the functions and operation of the Information Sharing 
Centre was accepted and bargaining began on where the centre should be established 
(http: //www. mofa. go. ip/mofaj/gaiko/kaiyo/kaizoku 6. html, accessed on 21 October 
2003). On 11 November 2004, over a year after this sixth meeting, Singapore was 
chosen to host the Information Sharing Centre (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 11 
November 2004: 1; http: /hvww. mofa. go. ip/mofai/gaiko/pirate/index. htinl, accessed 19 
December 2005). 
The establishment of the Information Sharing Centre marked a significant achievement 
in the regional dialogue process initiated by the Japan-sponsored anti-piracy 
conferences. During the process of the negotiations, the 16 participant countries agreed 
to include the IMO's definition of armed robbery against ships as a means of tackling 
piracy within their sovereign waters, thereby overcoming a fundamental definitional 
issue that had stymied international cooperation on piracy (Umezawa, 
httl2: //www. soc. nii. ac. ip/isil/, innual documents/2003/autumn/houkoku- 
abstr/Panel%20C4%2Umezawa%2Onaper. ndf, accessed 20 December 2005). 
Furthermore, the Information Sharing Centre moved Asian measures to tackle piracy 
and armed robbery against ships to the operational level, whereby real-time information 
would be used to aid littoral maritime organizations pursue and capture pirates. This 
achievement took over four years since the initial `Regional Conference on Combating 
Piracy' was held in April 2000. For the shipowners and crews who suffered at the hands 
of pirates during this period, the time spent discussing measures to deal with piracy 
seems long. However, considering the sensitivity to foreign interference in sovereign 
affairs in Southeast Asia, as examined in Chapter 3, that regional consensus concerning 
a jointly operated anti-piracy centre was reached at all is quite remarkable. Moreover, 
the dialogue process, because of its attention to detail and sensitivity towards the 
positions of the member states, helped to establish an informal regional network of 
maritime officials committed to tackling the problem of piracy (Mukundan interview, 
22 April 2003). Finally, the creation of an Information Sharing Centre saw the 
consolidation of Japan's political, operational and legal measures to deal with piracy 
and armed robbery against ships. Until the establishment of the multilateral Information 
Sharing Centre, Japan's operational efforts had largely been bilateral in nature and the 
198 
legal aspects of tackling piracy continued to be hampered by the outdated UNCLOS 
Convention, detailed in Chapter 3. Japan's operational and then legal measures will be 
dealt with in turn. 
5.3b Operational Measures 
TraininE and Financial Assistance 
Following the `Regional Conference on Combating Piracy' in April 2000, the Japan 
Coast Guard Academy in Hiroshima began to accept exchange students for training in 
combating maritime crime including piracy and armed robbery against ships (Asahi 
Shimbun, 29 April 2000: 38). These students are following a six-year curriculum, 
including one year of Japanese language training, and are expected to return to their 
country of origin upon graduation in order to improve the capacity of their national 
maritime authority to fight piracy. A Maritime Crime Seminar was also held at the 
Kyüshü international centre involving 11 researchers from nine countries across the 
Asian region between October and November 2001 (Kaiyöhöanchokokusaijika, 2002: 
145; Kayyöhoandaigaku Kokusaiköryükikakushitsu, 2006: 38-41). Japan also agreed to 
help Southeast Asian states financially to build the capacities of their maritime 
authorities to be better able to confront the problem of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships (Asahi Shinibun, 29 April 2000: 38). In the aftermath of the Idaten incident, a 
piracy case examined towards the end of this chapter, the Japanese government 
proposed giving patrol ships to Indonesia to help in the fight against piracy. These 
efforts show the resolve of the Japanese government in dealing with piracy, but progress 
has also been achieved through the Nippon Foundation, a non-governmental 
organization. 
The Nippon Foundation has taken the initiative in combating piracy and armed robbery 
against ships by following a simple formula. First, political leaders must be made aware 
of the problem and be determined in their efforts to confront it. Second, the cooperation 
of the media is required to disseminate information. Finally, international organizations, 
governments and NGOs must work together to formulate a comprehensive response to 
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piracy and armed robbery against ships. Nevertheless, in order to develop an effective 
response to maritime crime, the capacities of Asian coast guards must be strengthened. 
The Nippon Foundation has facilitated the expansion of coast guard capabilities across 
Asia by funding scholarships for the personnel of maritime organizations and authorities. 
By June 2004, almost 300 students from 40 countries had received Sasakawa 
fellowships to attend the World Maritime University in Sweden. Not only have these 
students acquired valuable knowledge pertaining to their field, but also interpersonal 
networks have been created amongst the maritime authorities in the Asian region. 
Further scholarship programmes have been initiated with the International Maritime 
Law Institute in Malta, the Seafarers International Research Centre of Cardiff 
University and at the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea of the UN 
Office of Legal Affairs. A specialized curriculum has also been introduced at the 
Partnership for Observation of the Global Oceans (http: //www. Nippon- 
foundation. or jp/eng/speeches/2004658/200446582. html, accessed on 8 July 2004). It is 
anticipated that students at both the Japan Coast Guard Academy and those benefiting 
from Nippon foundation sponsorships will develop the skills and knowledge needed to 
fight piracy and armed robbery against ships. At the same time, however, Japan has also 
engaged in bilateral patrols and exercises to improve cooperation and coordination 
between regional maritime authorities in dealing with piracy and armed robbery against 
ships. 
Patrols and Exercises 
From 19 to 26 September 2000, the Japanese government ordered the dispatch of an 
"anti-piracy survey mission" comprising MOFA, MOT and MSA officials to the 
Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. The survey mission was intended to 
follow up the work of the April 2000 `Regional Conference on Combating Piracy'. The 
survey exchanged ideas concerning areas of cooperation and support, including visits of 
Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels and exercises, as well as the exchange of personnel, 
education, technical assistance (comprising the acceptance of exchange students to the 
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Maritime Safety Agency's Academy starting April 200 1)255 and seminars on combating 
piracy (beginning in October 200 1). 256 Following this mission, a Coast Guard patrol 
vessel visited India and Malaysia in November 2000 to conduct joint anti-piracy 
training missions (Kaiyohöanchökokusaijika, 2002: 145; 
http: //www. mofa. go. ip/mofai/gaiko/pirate/index. html, accessed 27 October 2003). 
Since the anti-piracy survey mission, the Japan Coast Guard has regularly conducted 
patrols and exercises with the maritime authorities of Asian states on a bilateral basis 
(see Appendix VI). The following examples give an overview of the details of two of 
these missions. In October 2001, the JCG vessel, Mizuho, was dispatched to the 
Philippines to conduct joint exercises with the Filipino Coast Guard. The exercise 
involved a mock hijacking of a Filipino patrol vessel which the Mizuho pursued and 
boarded with armed personnel. Until this operation, the Japanese and Filipino Coast 
Guards had exchanged opinions and the Filipino students had been sent to study at the 
Japan Coast Guard Academy in Hiroshima. The roots of this evolving bilateral 
cooperation lie in the `Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships' held in April 2000 in Tokyo (Asahi Shimbun, 1 November 2001: 39). In 
March 2002, the Yashima patrol boat was sent to Jakarta, Indonesia, and a Falcon 900 
was dispatched to Brunei and Jakarta on an anti-piracy patrol as well as to aid in a 
search for pirated vessels upon request (Kaiyöhöanchökokusaijika, 2002: 145). The 
Yashima, accompanied by two rotor-blade aircraft, conducted a joint training exercise 
with one Indonesian naval patrol ship and one Indonesian maritime police patrol vessel 
on 6 March 2002, in Jakarta bay. The contents of the exercise included the pursuit and 
capture of a fleeing pirated ship, as well as the rescue of the pirated ship's original crew. 
The Yashima also collected information on piracy from various national maritime 
bureaus in Asia as well as patrolled and maintained communications with Japanese 
ships to ensure their safety. The dispatch of both the Yashima and the Falcon 900 in 
March 2000 was set to coincide with the holding of an Expert's Meeting on Piracy and 
255 A total of five students from Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia were 
accepted as exchange students at the Coast Guard Academy in April 2001 
(http"//www kaiho mlit. go. ip/info/books/report200I/special/ol. litml, accessed on 21 October 2003). 
256 The seminars included other kinds of maritime crime, such as dealing with stowaway cases and illegal 
trafficking (http: //www. kaiho. mlit. go. ip/info/books/report200I/special/ol. html, accessed on 21 October 
2003). 
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Armed Robbery against Ships in Jakarta 
(http: //www. kaiho. mlit. go. il2/info/kouhoti/hl4/k200220215/index. html, accessed on 21 
October 2003). 
The fact that Japan has not been able to go beyond bilateral cooperation is significant 
(Emmers, 2004: 53). Japan has also yet to conduct patrols in the Malacca Straits (Takai, 
2002: 21), the maritime region which most concerns Japanese interests. Three reasons 
may account for this. First the issue of national sovereignty is important in the Southeast 
Asian region, as noted in Chapter 3. States refuse to allow foreign maritime powers the 
right to patrol their sovereign waters (Mainichi Shinzbun, 5 October 2001)257 Second, 
there is the question of Japan's militaristic past and a reluctance to see Japan evolve as a 
more proactive maritime power (Emmers and Sebastian in Weatherbee, 2005: 175). 258 
Finally, Southeast Asian states are also aware that too much cooperation with Japan in 
the fight against piracy may upset China, which suspects that Japan's involvement in 
anti-piracy patrols and exercises is merely the first steps in building regional alliances 
pitted against China (Bradford, 2004: 491; Emmers, 2004: 53-54). 
The types of maritime patrols and exercises are also significant in that they mostly 
resemble the hijackings of the Tenyu and Alondra Rainbow. 259 Whilst such exercises are 
257 Umezawa argues that joint training and annual anti-piracy exercises are the limit of Japan's 
operational response to piracy and armed robbery against ships in the Southeast Asian region (Umezawa 
interview, 02 April 2004). Despite the rise in piratical incidents, the sanctity of Southeast Asian state's 
sovereign territory remains paramount, inhibiting attempts to develop joint patrols between states 
(Kuribayashi, 2003: 39). 
258 That said, Indonesia's Ambassador to the United States, Soemadi D. M. Brotodiningrat, has argued that 
Japan's constitution, which restricts the export of military hardware from Japan, obstructs sale of essential 
equipment in the fight against piracy and terrorism to the Indonesian Coast Guard (Shorrock, 
http: //www. ips. orolasiaamerica/asianvoices/iapan5. htmil accessed 15 December 2005). Leavitt argues 
against the collective memory explanation that posits a fear of Japanese militarism in Southeast Asia. 
Instead, she maintains that realist accounts combined with ASEAN's strategic culture better explain the 
limited security cooperation between Japan and Southeast Asia (Leavitt, 2005: 229-230,232-237). This 
thesis supports Leavitt's view in the sense that maritime security cooperation has been increasing between 
Japan and Southeast Asian littoral states and because Southeast Asian states have not been critical of 
Japan's involvement in contentious maritime incidents, such as the sinking of the North Korean spy ship 
in December 2001, as noted in Chapter 4. Nonetheless, Japan's militaristic past still influences relations 
between China, North Korea and South Korea on the one hand and Japan on the other. In seeking to 
balance growing Chinese power in Southeast Asia, Southeast Asian states are wary of being too 
supportive of Japan's growing maritime role. 
259 The response of the Japanese government to maritime piracy has, therefore, mainly focussed on what 
Chalk refers to as medium-level armed assault and robbery (MLAAR) and major criminal hijack (MCHJ) 
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multi-purpose in nature, in that they involve the search, pursuit, capture, and rescue of a 
hijacked ship, making them applicable to various other piratical scenarios, the fact that 
hijackings of the Tenyu and Alondra Rainbow type have more or less ceased raises the 
question of whether exercises that reflect the current trends in piracy and armed robbery 
against ships would be more applicable to expanding the capabilities of littoral maritime 
organizations. For example, attacks off the Aceh coast generally involve heavily armed 
pirates in speedboats, executing fast, military-style operations in which crew members 
are seized, taken to strongholds on land and held for ransom. It is unclear whether the 
perpetrators of such attacks are associated with international crime groups, members of 
littoral navies or members of the Free Aceh Movement, GAM. The case of the Idaten, a 
Japanese tugboat from which three crew members were kidnapped and ransomed in 
March 2005, will be examined later in this chapter and the involvement of GAM 
fighters will be treated in the next chapter on politically motivated maritime violence 
and crime. 
Whichever group is responsible for such kidnap and ransom cases, exercises 
incorporating this kind of attack would be useful because the pursuit of the pirates could 
be coordinated between Japan Coast Guard ships in international waters and the 
maritime forces of a littoral state as the pirates quickly cross into the sovereign maritime 
zone of the littoral state. Such exercises would thereby address the issue of hot pursuit, 
as identified in Chapter 3, and would no doubt involve the coordination of the 
Information Sharing Centre in Singapore. Furthermore, the exercise could even involve 
police or military authorities on land, thereby developing better cooperation between 
land and sea authorities in the fight against piracy. The fact that exercises with the Japan 
Coast Guard tend to be of the Alondra Rainbow hijacking mould is indicative that this 
style of piratical attack is the one that has most concerned the Japanese government. Yet, 
Southeast Asian states, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, limit their participation in 
maritime policing exercises to those designed to tackle piracy on the high seas, such as 
rather than cases of low-level armed robbery (LLAR) (Chalk, 1998: 88-89). This suggests a top-down 
response to maritime piracy and terror that attempts to tackle major criminal and terrorist organizations, 
but largely ignores the low level criminals who make a living from maritime crime and violence. This 
omits important connections between the lower levels of piracy and the more major incidents, as well as 
failing to treat the social, political, cultural and economic problems of littoral communities who engage in 
piracy or protect pirate gangs, as noted in Chapter 3. 
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those centring on hijacking, rather than take part in exercises that cross their own 
sovereign waters. This indicates a significant gap between Japan's interests in tackling 
piracy, which take into account the transborder nature of contemporary piracy, and 
those of littoral states. 
Not only has Japan's involvement in the fight against maritime piracy and armed 
robbery against ships improved the capabilities of maritime authorities in Southeast 
Asia, but it has also prompted a number of changes to the make-up of the Japan Coast 
Guard. For instance the Coast Guard decided to introduce two large jet planes with the 
capacity to fly 12,000 kilometres for twelve and a half hours to conduct search and 
surveillance missions in the Malacca/Singapore Straits because of the rise in piracy in 
the 1990s (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 10 August 2000: 1). 260 Such modifications 
hint at the possibility of an enlarged role for the Japan Coast Guard over time. 
Nevertheless, the role of the Japan Coast Guard in Southeast Asia will largely depend 
upon how existing regional approaches to dealing with the problem of piracy evolve. 
The Information Sharing Centre has become the cornerstone of these regional 
approaches. 
Coordination: The Information Sharing Centre 
Delegates at the `Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships' held in Tokyo in October 2001 recognised the need to develop a 
framework that would allow maritime organizations to cooperate effectively in tackling 
the problems of violent maritime crime. The framework has four aims. First, the 
national laws of states in the Asia region are to apply national and international laws 
regarding the suppression of piracy. 
261 Second, states are to make every effort to enact 
effective measures to combat piracy facilitated through the assistance of regional states 
260 The pursuit of North Korean spy ships in March 1999 and December 2001 also influenced changes to 
the composition of the JCG fleet, as Chapter 4 detailed, including three waterjet patrol ships that can 
reach over 40 knots (Nawano, 2002: 47-49). 
261 The states involved in the `Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery 
against Ships' included the ten ASEAN countries, as well as India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, South Korea, 
China and Japan (http: //www. mofa aooip/mofai/gaiko/pirate/index. html, accessed on 19 December 2005). 
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to build the capacities of national maritime authorities in Asia. Third, maritime officials 
from across the region are to help establish an Information Sharing Centre. 262 Fourth, 
maritime bodies are to respond proactively to the requests of their counterparts in other 
Asian states (Umezawa interview 2 April 2004, Umezawa, 2004: 109-110). Of these 
four aims the establishment of an Information Sharing Centre became a focus for anti- 
piracy efforts in the Asia region. 
The creation of an Information Sharing Centre for combating piracy and armed robbery 
against ships is at the heart of regional attempts to tackle violent maritime crime. It is 
through this centre that the requests of maritime authorities to deal with an instance of 
piracy will be channelled so that another maritime authority can respond. As the `Asia 
Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships' 
upholds the sanctity of sovereign boundaries, hot pursuit is not permitted. However, by 
establishing a system by which maritime authorities can request assistance from 
neighbouring maritime organizations, a chase can be continued that would, in the past, 
have ceased at a country's maritime boundary. Hence, there is a need for the JCG to 
conduct exercises that focus on pursuing pirates across maritime boundaries, as 
discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, the information centre can create 
statistics that allow trends in maritime crime to be understood and thereby dealt with 
more effectively (Kuribayashi, 2003: 39; Umezawa interview 2 April 2004). On 11 
November 2004,16 Asian states at a regional anti-piracy meeting held in Tokyo signed 
the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against 
Ships in Asia (RECAAP) and decided to set up the Information Sharing Centre in 
Singapore (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 11 November 2004: 1; MOFA Press 
Conference, http: //www. mofa. go. jp/announce/press/2004/11/1112. htnil, accessed on 12 
December 2005). 
Two issues arise concerning the creation of an Information Sharing Centre regarding 
piracy and armed robbery against ships. The first issue concerns transparency. The 
262 The Information Sharing Centre appears to have been largely modelled on the information exchange 
system in the Baltic Region which was established by Norway, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Germany, Denmark, Sweden and Russia, in June 1997 
(http: //www. kaiho. mlit. go. ip/info/books/report2001/special/o1. html, accessed on 21 October 2003). 
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operations and efforts of maritime bodies throughout the Asian region that were hitherto 
secret, are now explicit and open to criticism. States cooperating in dealing with 
common maritime security issues therefore risk being pressurised to enhance their 
operations if their efforts are deemed insufficient. This could stretch the budgets of 
Asian states still recovering from the economic damage of the Asian financial crisis and 
the December 2004 tsunami, siphoning off resources to fight piracy which many Asian 
states still perceive as primarily a problem for major maritime powers. Alternatively, 
Southeast Asian budgets might already be stretched so thin that diverting funds to fight 
piracy may not be possible. Hence, even with the Information Sharing Centre it may be 
that states will simply lack the capacity to fight piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
Furthermore, cooperation is difficult to manage, especially in the Asian region where 
territorial claims are disputed and maritime territory overlaps make patrolling zones 
difficult to determine. It remains to be seen whether in the long-term, the information 
centre for combating piracy and armed robbery against ships will not be undermined or 
rendered obsolete by a lack of resources or the sheer difficulty of building maritime 
cooperation in Southeast Asia. 
The second issue concerns the extent to which the role and functions of the Information 
Sharing Centre overlaps with the duties of the IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala 
Lumpur. The IMB is apprehensive that the Information Sharing Centre will simply 
duplicate the work of the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur rendering the 
establishment of the Information Sharing Centre meaningless (Mukundan interview, 22 
April 2003). However, there may be further cause for concern, as captains reporting 
piratical incidents may favour one centre over the other, such that neither institution will 
receive complete information from which to compile statistics. Alternatively, the Piracy 
Reporting Centre may lose the private funding which enables it to keep running as 
shipping firms and organizations place their trust in the state-funded Information 
Sharing Centre. 263 Inaccurate statistics or the loss of the Piracy Reporting Centre's 
expertise would hinder the ability of states and the shipping industry in its fight against 
263 Yamada argues that the shipping industry are more likely to continue to rely on the Piracy Reporting 
Centre, rather than trust the intergovernmental Information Sharing Centre which is perceived by the 
shipping industry to be plagued by national rivalries between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia 
(Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). 
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violent maritime crime, particularly since substantial information concerning the 
whereabouts of hijacked ships is disclosed to the Piracy Reporting Centre that might not 
be divulged to an intergovernment body. Yamada Yoshihiko of the Nippon Foundation 
believes the Piracy Reporting Centre to be a better forum for fighting piracy than the 
Information Sharing Centre as ships transiting Asian waters tend to fly non-Asian flags, 
such as Cypriot, Panamanian and Nigerian flags, and are therefore not subject to the 
domestic laws of Asian states. It is therefore better to deal with the issue on an 
economic level (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). 
However, Umezawa Akima, who drafted the plan for the Information Sharing Centre, 
notes that, unlike the Piracy Reporting Centre, one of the benefits of the Information 
Sharing Centre is that it can handle confidential criminal juridical issues (Umezawa 
interview, 2 April 2004). Furthermore, the establishment of the Information Sharing 
Centre is useful in terms of creating an intergovernment network of maritime experts 
combating piracy on a real-time basis. Nevertheless, the compilation of statistics on 
piracy and armed robbery against ships by the Information Sharing Centre seems to 
unnecessarily copy the work of theIMB's Piracy Reporting Centre. This situation is 
further complicated by the fact that Southeast Asian states already disagree as to how 
statistics on piracy and armed robbery are compiled ("Indonesia disputes IMO report" 
Business Times, 14 July 2003). Governments have publicised the creation of the 
Information Sharing Centre without having given enough thought as to how the Piracy 
Reporting Centre and the Information Sharing Centre could work together, with the 
Piracy Reporting Centre collating and analysing data and the Information Sharing 
Centre distributing requests for action to be taken by littoral states. 
5.3c Legal Measures 
As Chapter 3 noted, perhaps the most difficult area to address in terms of fighting 
piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia has been that of legal 
measures. Two legal deficiencies in particular have inhibited constructive solutions to 
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the problems of piracy and armed robbery against ships. These are firstly the lack of 
national laws in Southeast Asian states regarding piracy to complement the definition of 
piracy according to UNCLOS. Secondly, Southeast Asian states have failed to ratify the 
SUA Treaty. 2M The norm of non-interference in Southeast Asian states' internal affairs 
makes dealing with either legal issue problematic. At the heart of this problem lies the 
definition of piracy in international law which stipulates that an act of piracy can only 
occur on the high seas outside the jurisdiction of a state. By adopting a national law on 
piracy, Southeast Asian states would be admitting the need for a legal measure to deal 
with piracy or armed robbery against ships in their national waters. In doing so, littoral 
states would be legally bound by their own laws to take action to resolve maritime 
crime in their own maritime territory (Takai, 2002: 11-13). The SUA Convention also 
poses problems for littoral states, as it allows for hot pursuit to be carried out across 
maritime boundaries and the extradition of criminals to a victim's state (Beckman, 
2002: 329-330). Littoral states feel that both these factors could undermine their 
sovereignty (Emmers and Sebastian in Weatherbee, 2005: 170-175). Nevertheless, the 
negotiations leading to the creation of the Information Sharing Centre enabled the 16 
participant states to adopt the IMO's definition of armed robbery against ships, allowing 
for pirates to be pursued and arrested within a state's own sovereign waters (Umezawa, 
http"//www. soc. nii. ac. ip/jsil/annual documents/2003/autumnlhoukoku- 
abstr/Panel%20C4%2OUniczawa%20paler. pdf, accessed 20 December, 2005). As a 
c 
result, Southeast Asian states have been more active in responding to piracy and armed 
robbery in their waters and beyond. 
It still remains to be seen whether or not Southeast Asian states will actually impose 
stricter sentences upon pirates they catch within their waters. China's response to piracy 
in its waters by prosecuting pirates and imposing the death sentence according to its 
national laws, demonstrated the significance of adopting legal means to suppress piracy 
(Takai, 2002: 13). Malaysia has also taken robust measures to arrest pirates in its own 
264 The hijacking of the Achille Lauro in 1985 by members of the PLO which resulted in the death of one 
American prompted the IMO to develop and adopt the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (Virtual Information Center, 
Primer: Piracy in Asia, 17 April 2001,16). This incident will be examined in more detail in Chapter 6. 
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waters and bring them to justice. Nine Indonesians who pirated the tanker, the NT 
Nepline Delima, pleaded guilty and have received seven-year sentences from a 
Malaysian court. A further Indonesian, who pleaded not guilty for the same offence, 
will face trial by the end of 2006 (ICC-IMB Piracy Report first Quarter 2006: 17-18). 
Nevertheless, there is little that Japan can do except to encourage other littoral states to 
adopt a more robust legal response to prosecuting pirates. 
5.4 The Response of Other Powers and the Shipping Industry 
5.4a The Response of Southeast Asian States to Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia 
Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, have been reluctant to allow anti-piracy patrols 
led by foreign forces to patrol their sovereign waters. Because the issue of sovereignty 
remains paramount in Southeast Asia, as discussed in Chapter 3, so Southeast Asian 
states have made the most encouraging efforts in fighting piracy. Anti-piracy 
cooperation between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore began in the early 1990s and 
culminated in extensive trilateral patrols in June 2004. However, the work of individual 
states has also had a positive effect on combating maritime violence and crime. 
During the 1990s a number of bilateral patrols were set up in the Malacca Straits and 
Phillip Channel by littoral states. In 1992, INDOSIN patrols, consisting of a battleship 
and patrol ship from the Indonesian navy as well as the Singaporean navy, were held 
four times per year for a period of 60 days each. Similar patrols in 2000 suppressed the 
number of attacks taking place in the Singapore Straits (Nakamura, 2001: 18). 265 
MALINDO patrols, comprising of two ships from both the Malaysian and Indonesian 
navies, held four times per year for a period of ten days and OPTIMA MALINDO 
patrols, involving four Indonesian naval vessels and one Malaysian naval ship, 
conducted once a year for a period of seven days further bolstered maritime policing in 
the Malacca Straits, though it was not possible to enter each other's sovereign territory 
265 Nonetheless, five attacks were recorded from September to December 2000 in the Singapore Straits 
(Nakamura, 2001: 18). 
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in order to pursue pirates according to these agreements (Takai, 2002: 16-17; Emmers, 
2004: 47-48). Moreover, in 1992, Malaysia and Indonesia established a Maritime 
Operation Planning team (MOP) designed to conduct maritime patrols in the Malacca 
Straits, and in 1993, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore agreed to provide armed police 
teams for ships if requested. Noel Chong notes that the combined efforts of Malaysia, 
Indonesia and Singapore in the early 1990s nearly eradicated piracy in the Malacca 
Straits (Yong Tiam Kui, New Straits Times, 17 August 2003: 4). Further examples of 
Asian states cooperating to fight maritime crime include the 1967 Anti-Smuggling 
Cooperation agreement and the 1995 Second Protocol between Malaysia and the 
Philippines to conduct joint sea border patrols, the 1975 Border Patrol Agreement 
between Indonesia and the Philippines which included the exchange of liaison officers, 
and the 1997 joint naval patrols held by Thailand and Vietnam that resulted in a decline 
in piracy (Emmers, 2004: 47-48; Herrmann, 2004: 24). 
Nonetheless, the Malaysian government argued that whilst the response of Singapore 
and Thailand was good in relation to combating piracy, Indonesia was not fulfilling its 
duties, the Philippines could not commit enough ships, and Myanmar and Vietnam's 
efforts were deemed insufficient (Takai, 2002: 16-17). Furthermore, the majority of 
anti-piracy patrols were restricted to a state's territorial waters (Takai, 2002: 18) 
inhibiting hot pursuit. Clearly, sovereignty issues prevented the creation of trilateral 
patrols whereby naval patrols in one state could make up for the deficiencies in terms of 
resources in a neighbouring state. 
Not only were the anti-piracy maritime patrols in Southeast Asia inadequate, there has 
also been a lack of coordination between maritime authorities and police to hunt down 
pirates as they leave or return to their bases on land (Hersutanto, The Jakarta Post, 31 
July 2004: 1). The failure to target pirate bases is largely responsible for the lack of 
arrests; pirates were only apprehended in two or three of the 344 cases of piracy in 2003 
(Webster, The Times, 31 October 2003: 25). Even when pirates are captured, the 
absence of national laws regarding piracy in Southeast Asian states often inhibits pirates 
being convicted. Only Thailand (Piracy Act 1991), India (Navy Act of 1957) and the 
People's Republic of China have laws regarding maritime piracy (Herrmann, 2004: 24). 
210 
Nevertheless, the inadequacies of anti-piracy patrols in Southeast Asia may be reversed 
following the inauguration of a system of joint patrols comprised of maritime 
authorities from Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore in June 2004. These patrols 
involved seven Indonesian battleships and five battleships from both Malaysia and 
Singapore. A month later an emergency piracy hotline was installed between the 
maritime authorities of these three countries to enable better cooperation in the fight 
against piracy and armed robbery against ships and to enable the pursuit of pirate ships 
to be continued across maritime boundaries (Kaneda, 2005: 46). 
The development of this trilateral joint patrol initiative evolved following Admiral 
Fargo's (US Navy) announcement in April 2004 that the US navy would be prepared to 
intervene with marines and Special Forces on stand-by should a pirate or terrorist 
incident occur in the Singapore or Malacca Straits (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 19 
September 2004: 13). Fargo's proposal was linked with the American-led `war on 
terrorism' which began in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York and 
Washington on 11 September 2001. Though welcomed by Singapore, the offer was 
rejected outright by both Indonesia and Malaysia who feared that their sovereignty 
would be infringed upon and that US naval involvement might actually encourage 
terrorist acts rather than deter them. 266 Malaysia and Indonesia countered Admiral 
Fargo's proposal by developing joint patrols in tandem with Singapore. Nonetheless, 
Malaysia's Defence Minister Najib Razak and Admiral Fargo did agree to sharing 
information regarding the security of the Malacca Straits in June 2004 and the US 
Secretary for Defence Donald Rumsfeld determined to limit US involvement in 
securing the Malacca Straits, so as not to antagonise Malaysia and Indonesia, stating 
that the US would not forget that the ultimate responsibility for the safety of the 
Malacca Straits would lie with the three littoral states (Maritime Industry Research 
Centre, 2004: 57). Franklin Lavin, US Ambassador to Singapore, echoed Rumsfeld's 
comments at a conference sponsored by the Singapore Shipping Association by 
266 Malaysia and Indonesia's rejection of Fargo's offer caused a rift to develop with Singapore 
(Ilendropriyono, The Jakarta Post, 25 August 2004: 2). It is significant, therefore, that trilateral patrols 
have been put into effect. 
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welcoming the trilateral patrols, stressing the non-involvement of US forces, but adding 
that more needed to be done to secure the Malacca Straits against piracy and terrorism 
(Rao, Fairplay, 30 September 2004: 9). Rumsfeld's message could also be read as a 
veiled threat, in the sense that while ultimate responsibility may lie with the littoral 
states now, should a terrorist event occur in the future which disrupts the safety of 
navigation through the Malacca Straits, then the US might be prepared to intervene. The 
impact of the trilateral patrols and Japan's response to terrorism will be examined in the 
next chapter. 
Though the development of trilateral patrols is expected to have a significant impact 
upon the reduction of piracy in the Singapore and Malacca Straits, there are concerns 
that a lack of resources may hinder the effectiveness of the joint patrols. Noel Chong, 
noted that international society should provide the three littoral states with resources 
and technical assistance to help combat piracy in the region (The BBC monitoring Asia 
Pacific, 21 July 2004: 1; Hersutanto, The Jakarta Post, 31 July 2004: 1; Hendropriyono, 
The Jakarta Post, 25 August 2004: 2; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 19 September 2004: 13). 
There is the opportunity to bolster the trilateral patrols in the Malacca Straits by 
providing a UN-led maritime force to protect the international sea lane until such a time 
when the three littoral states are better able to protect the Straits by themselves. 
Unfortunately, there is little political will on the part of major maritime powers to push 
for UN patrols and there would be little acceptance of them from Malaysia and 
Indonesia, if the rejection of Fargo's proposal by Indonesia and Malaysia is any 
indication. Nevertheless, the trilateral patrols will have the support of the Information 
Sharing Centre which should help the three coastal states provide more effective anti- 
piracy patrols. 
The issue of sovereignty has certainly hampered numerous efforts at effective 
multilateral cooperation in Southeast Asia. It was only after US Admiral Fargo 
suggested US marines might be deployed in the Malacca Straits that Indonesia, 
Malaysia and Singapore agreed to conduct trilateral patrols, suggesting that trilateral 
patrols amount to the lesser evil compared with having US forces patrolling the 
maritime boundaries of littoral states. Nonetheless, coupled with the creation of the 
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Information Sharing Centre, trilateral patrols have had a significant effect upon piracy 
and armed robbery against ships in the Southeast Asian region (http: //www. ice- 
ccs. orjz/main/news. php? newsid=67, accessed 3 May 2006). Equally important, however, 
are the individual efforts of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia in combating piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia. 
Singapore 
Of all the states in Southeast Asia, Singapore has taken the most extensive measures to 
suppress piracy in its waters. Anti-piracy patrols in Singapore's waters are undertaken 
by the Singapore Police Coast Guard (PCG) which consists of six patrol squadrons 
comprised of over 80 modem vessels, equipped with the latest digital communications 
and surveillance systems. The PCG also works closely with the Singaporean Navy and 
Air Force in tackling piracy in its waters (Emmers, 2004: 42-44). Patrols in the 
Singapore Straits in 2000 cut the number of piratical attacks from fourteen to five 
(Primer: Piracy in Asia, Virtual Information Center, 2001: 7). Piracy in the Singapore 
Straits has remained low as a result of the PCG's anti-piracy patrols, as shown in the 
section on piracy trends at the start of this chapter. Singapore has even deployed 
unmanned drones for surveillance purposes to tackle piracy in the Singapore Straits 
(Primer: Piracy in Asia, Virtual Information Center, 2001: 25). 
Malaysia 
Malaysia has followed Singapore's example and made efforts to crack down on piracy 
in it waters. A decrease in piratical incidents in the Malacca Straits between 2000, when 
there were 75 cases, and 2001, when there were 17 cases, is attributable to the 
Malaysian governments investment in anti-piracy patrols (Mukundan, 2002: 62; Yong 
Tiara Kui, New Straits Times, 17 August 2003: 4). In 2000, a special anti-piracy unit 
was set up and was responsible for the capture of two pirate groups by April 2001 
(Nakamura, 2001: 18). In addition, Malaysia also operates numerous security systems 
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including the Malaysian Sea Surveillance System (Swasla), the Malaysian Vessel 
Traffic System (VTS), and the Mandatory Ship Reporting System (Straitrep) (BBC 
Monitoring Asia Pacific, 12 October 2004: 1). 
Piracy in Malaysian waters and beyond is dealt with by the Royal Malaysian Marine 
Police (RMMP) patrols, together with a 20 man anti-piracy unit and surveillance planes. 
The Malaysian navy has also played a complementary role, pursuing the pirated ship, 
the Selayang, with the help of ShipLoc, for example. The Malaysian navy mostly leaves 
patrols around the Malaysian peninsula to the Malaysian maritime police, focussing 
instead their efforts on the Sabah region from which the Abu Sayyaf terrorist 
organization operates. Though Malaysia's efforts at tackling piracy are managed by the 
Maritime Enforcement Coordination Centre (MECC), Malaysia's response is 
complicated by the involvement of 22 organizations in the fight against piracy and 
armed robbery against ships. It is anticipated that this state of affairs will change once 
the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) is created, for which 2-3 
vessels and several helicopters have already been allocated (Takai, 2002: 15-16). The 
Japan Coast Guard has provided the model for and has therefore been consulted on the 
creation of the MMEA. The JCG has provided training for the MMEA and dispatched a 
maritime security specialist to Malaysia (Bradford, 2004: 500; Terashima interview, 22 
July 2004). 
Finally, both Malaysia and Singapore have welcomed the expansion of the Five Power 
Defence Arrangements (FPDA), which also includes Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand, to tackle non-traditional security issues such as piracy and terror. At the 2004 
Shangri-La dialogue, the FPDA increased their joint anti-terror exercises and 
information sharing activities with a view to including other military forces as well. The 
first of these exercises was scheduled for September and October 2004 in the South 
China Sea. Nevertheless, this arrangement would not include foreign patrols of the 
Malacca Straits (Virtual Information Center, 2004: 17-20; Weatherbee, 2005: 169). 
Since 2004, the FPDA has organized exercises between its navies, as well as 
Singapore's Police Coast Guard and the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency 
(http: //www. iiss. org/index. asp? ps,, id=13941, accessed 29 July 2006). 
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Indonesia 
In contrast to the efforts of both Singapore and Malaysia, Indonesia's economic troubles 
have exacerbated poverty in the country leading to an increase in instances of piracy 
(Young and Valencia, 2003: 269), whilst the maritime police and the Ministry of 
Transport are not able to pay for the fuel for patrol and rescue missions in Indonesia's 
domestic waters. Indonesia's chief of rescue operations of the Ministry of Transport's 
General Office of Shipping has stated that one patrol ship has enough fuel to patrol for 
six hours a month. Both the Ministry of Transport's General Office of Shipping and the 
maritime police are constrained by the lack of medium-sized patrol vessels needed to 
combat piracy and armed robbery at sea. 267 Furthermore, there are a lack of cooperation 
and coordination mechanisms between different maritime organizations, such as the 
navy, customs and maritime police (Hesse, 2002: 60, Mizutori interview 2 April 2004). 
The Indonesian navy, which is in charge of Indonesia's maritime security, undertakes 
the majority of patrols, but is itself under-resourced. It is said that the Indonesian navy 
can only operate 30 percent of its fleet of 113 ships because of a lack of funds. The 
Indonesian navy has 24-hour patrols around Banga Island and responds to emergency 
calls in other areas. Nevertheless, it takes two to three days for information on an act of 
piracy to reach the Indonesian navy as ships are worried that an investigation will result 
in delays and that pirates might exact revenge upon the ship (Takai, 2002: 14-15; 
Emmers; 2004: 44-46). Rectifying these deficiencies involves developing surveillance 
capabilities, improving command and control and enhancing the patrol vessels and 
aircraft (Herrmann, 2002: 451-453). 
There have also been allegations of corruption concerning the Indonesian navy. 
Terashima of the Nippon Foundation stresses that pay for maritime personnel was 
267 Of the 120-125 boats under the command of the Ministry of Transport's General Shipping Office, only 
nine vessels are of a medium size (approximately 40 metres in length). Moreover, these boats only work 
out of five bases throughout the country (Takai, 2002: 14). 
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reduced following the fall of Suharto, making it difficult for them to subsist. As a result, 
maritime officials engaged in illicit means of obtaining capital, such as passing on 
information to pirates, or overlooking acts of piracy in return for cash (Terashima 
interview, 22 July 2004). In the case of the Selayang, for example, the shipowner was 
asked to pay the Indonesian navy an extortionate amount for the return of the ship and 
there have been incidents where the Malaysian maritime police have caught Indonesian 
naval personnel committing acts of piracy (Takai, 2002: 14-15; Glass, The Independent 
on Sunday, 11 January 2004: 8-13; Hidayat and Mallet, Financial Times, 30 June 2004: 
2; The Jakarta Post, 22 July 2004: 6). The case of the KAL YOUTEFA, an Indonesian 
naval patrol vessel that pirated a Malaysian cargo ship on 17 March 2004, was 
mentioned in Chapter 3 (ICC-IMB Piracy Report third Quarter 2004: 29). Furthermore, 
Indonesian officials have frequently denied the extent of the piracy problem in their 
waters, dismissing the IMB's figures or suggesting that only petty criminals operate in 
Indonesian territory (Primer: Piracy in Asia, Virtual Information Center, 2001: 8). 
Nevertheless, the Indonesian government has shown a greater interest in fighting piracy. 
The Megawati administration committed six battleships to patrolling the Malacca Straits 
(Yong Tiam Kui, New Straits Times, 17 August 2003: 4) and Indonesia is cooperating 
with both Malaysia and Singapore in coordinated patrols. Indonesia has attempted to 
rectify deficiencies in its approach and ability to combat piracy and armed robbery at 
sea. In November 2001, with financial assistance from the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA), Indonesia was able to establish the Maritime Safety 
Information System (MSIS). This system is a means for sharing information concerning 
piracy, rescue operations, and marine accidents, between the maritime strategy 
headquarters in Jakarta and branches in Belawan, Domai and Tanju Uban, as well as 
concerned organizations and agencies in foreign states (Takai, 2002: 19). In December 
2005 MOFA was also considering an ODA project to fit out nine Indonesian Coast 
Guard fast patrol boats, as well as providing consultancy and training to enhance 
Indonesia's maritime security to the tune of US$46.8 million 
(http: /hvww. mofa. go. jp/policy/oda/longlist/indonesia. html, accessed 18 January 2006). 
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Whether or not Indonesia's response to piracy and armed robbery against ships 
continues to evolve depends largely upon the efforts of the Yudhoyono administration 
which gained power in 2004. As noted in Chapter 2, the Yudhoyono government has 
succeeded in brokering a peace deal with Aceh separatists in the aftermath of the 26 
December 2004 tsunami. By the end of 2005, TNI troops had withdrawn from the Aceh 
region and decline in piracy prompted the IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre to remove 
Aceh from its list of piracy prone areas (ICC-IMB Piracy Report first Quarter 2006: 13). 
Furthermore, an Indonesian anti-piracy initiative, Operation Gurita, has resulted in the 
capture of several pirate gangs in known piracy hot-spots and regional anti-piracy 
cooperation has reduced the number of piracy cases in the Malacca Straits 
(http: //www. icc-ccs. orglmain/news. php? newsid=67, accessed 28 July, 
http: //www. bkpm. izo. id/en/news. php? mode=baca&info id=4086, accessed 28 July, 
2006). However, despite these successes, the devastation caused by the tsunami and five 
major earthquakes have derailed the Indonesian government's reform agenda (BBC 
online, 
http: //newsvote. bhc. co. uk/mpapl2s/nagetools/print/news. bbc. co. uk/1/hi/ Norld/asia- 
pacific/country profiles/1260544. stm, 
http: //newsvote. bbc. co. tik/mpapps/nagetools/print/news. bbc. co. uk/l /hi/world/asia- 
pacific/4357096. stm, accessed 25 July 2006). Until the Indonesian economy improves 
and the economic causes of piracy are treated, robust anti-piracy patrols alone will not 
eradicate maritime crime and violence. 
Nevertheless, the willingness of Southeast Asian states to police piracy in their waters is 
paramount. This is because of a reluctance amongst Southeast Asian states, specifically 
Malaysia and Indonesia, to allow their sovereignty to be transgressed. Japanese calls for 
multilateral patrols to tackle piracy in Southeast Asia, such as Prime Minister Obuchi's 
suggestion at the ASEAN+3 meeting in 1999 to create a regional Coast Guard, have, 
therefore, been unsuccessful. Hence, Japan has had to work bilaterally with Southeast 
Asian states, restricting the input of Japanese specialists and Coast Guard officials to 
enhancing the technical and operational capabilities of Southeast Asian maritime bodies, 
rather than actively patrolling to eradicate piracy (Bradford, 2004: 490-493; Emmers, 
2004: 52-53). Japan has taken an active role in responding to piracy in Southeast Asia, 
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yet it is not the only major power to be affected by the problem. A comparison between 
Japan's efforts and those of other states in the following survey demonstrates that Japan 
has been the most influential in leading efforts against maritime piracy in Southeast 
Asia. 
5.4b The Response of Other Powers to Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia 
In general, the response of other maritime powers to dealing with piracy and armed 
robbery against ships in Southeast Asia has been lacking (Takai, 2002: 18). With the 
exception of Admiral Fargo's proposal for US marine patrols of the Malacca Straits, the 
US has largely shied away from becoming involved in fighting piracy in Southeast Asia, 
focussing instead upon its military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The European 
Union has also declined from becoming directly involved in the fight against piracy and 
armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia. For example, despite the resources, 
training and capability of the Royal Navy, the British Shipping Minister David 
Jamieson stated: "Given [piracy's] geographical spread it would be almost impossible 
for the Royal Navy to make even a minor impact on such a situation" (Crawford, 
Sunday Herald, 21 March 2004: 9). Whilst the minister's comments are realistic in the 
sense that the Royal Navy cannot tackle the global problem of piracy alone, the Royal 
Navy could have a major impact on specific piracy-prone areas like the Malacca Straits 
where British ships and seafarers are at risk. Such support in tackling piracy and armed 
robbery against ships from a non-Asian country would certainly be welcomed by Japan 
(Umezawa interview, 2 April 2004). Britain's involvement in combating piracy may yet 
increase, as, in addition to Britain's participation in the FPDA, a Parliamentary transport 
select committee has criticised the lack of an anti-piracy response by the Blair 
government. The select committee hopes that its report will spur the British government 
to take action. 268 
268 See, Barkham, "Stormy Waters", The Guardian, hn: //www. ijuardian. co. uk/Drint/O.. 329537439- 
103680.00.11tml, accessed 27 July 2006. 
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Australia, a fellow FPDA member, has taken some steps to combat piracy. 269 The 
Australian navy has taken on maritime policing roles around its waters and held 
maritime security exercises with a number of regional states (Bradford, 2005: 10). The 
Australian government has also provided financial assistance to Southeast Asian states 
to improve security in their ports (Banlaoi in Ho and Raymond (eds. ), 2005: 71-72). 
Nevertheless, Australia's anti-piracy efforts remain modest in comparison to Japan's 
endeavours. This can be partly explained by the poor security relations between 
Australia and piracy-prone Indonesia, which stem from Australia's leading role in the 
UN Peacekeeping Operation in East Timor from 1999 to 2000 (Weatherbee, 2005: 46- 
48). 
India has also been active in tackling the problems of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships. The Indian navy arrested the pirates on board the Japanese ship Alondra Rainbow 
on 14 November 1999. This event signalled the possibility for Japanese and Indian 
naval cooperation, as Japan began to perceive the joint role that both India and Japan's 
Maritime Self-Defence Forces could play in Southeast Asian waters. The timing of a 
naval dialogue developing between India and Japan was especially significant, as it 
followed the nuclear tests in India. Japan could therefore be seen to place the security of 
its ships and trade above its non-nuclear principles following the hijacking of the 
Alondra Rainbow (The Hindu, 23 November 1999: 1). 
In addition to capturing the pirated Alondra Rainbow, the Indian navy has also pressed 
its Asian neighbours to cooperate in the fight against crime. A former Indian Defence 
Minister George Fernandes even stated that the Indian navy could have a role in 
combating piracy as far as Japanese waters (Primer: Piracy in Asia, Virtual Information 
Center, 2001: 23). Such a role would also bolster Indian security over its island 
territories that lie closer to the troubled Indonesian region of Aceh than to the Indian 
mainland (The Statesman, 9 August 2004: 1). With this in mind, India and Japan have 
269 A report accessed from the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade details the actual and 
potential costs of maritime violence in Southeast Asia and stresses the need for states in the region to 
cooperate to combat piracy ("Costs of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy and the Benefits of Working 
Together", bttV: //www dfat cov au/publications/catalogue/costs of maritime security pdf, accessed 8 
August 2006). Australian trade is particularly dependent on the Straits of Lombok, through which it 
exports iron ore to China (Raymond in Ilo and Raymond (eds. ), 2005: 186). 
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strengthened naval ties by conducting a joint exercise on 2 September 2004. Ultimately, 
the respective navies hope to broaden cooperation and make their fleets interoperable. 
Furthermore, India is cooperating with Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore with a view 
to involving its navy in anti-piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits. American officials 
have approved of Indian involvement in the fight against piracy, as they perceive that 
robust anti-piracy patrols involving the Indian navy could also help ward off potential 
terrorist attacks (The Hindu, 16 September 2004: 1). 
Indian involvement in the fight against piracy does raise concerns of Indian military 
ambitions. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America, India has sought to ally itself 
with both Japan and the US in the fight against terrorism. Hence, India has sought to 
build reciprocal training exercises between the Indian and Japan Coast Guards with a 
view to creating a future naval alliance with Japan. Such a naval alliance between India 
and Japan would be most threatening to China, which is itself constructing a blue water 
navy. 
Beijing has ordered concerted efforts to develop the quality of the Chinese military. 
Expenditure on the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has risen from 121 billion yuan in 
2001 to 220 billion yuan in 2004 and is set to increase further. Pentagon officials argue 
that these figures for Chinese military spending may be a third to a half of the actual 
total. The PLA has also endeavoured to enhance its military technology, adapt from a 
conscription-based to a professional military, adopt modem strategies and training 
methods and expand its special forces. The Chinese navy, in particular, has been 
enhanced with the purchase of 23 new amphibious assault vehicles and 13 conventional 
attack submarines, as well as developing the type 093 nuclear powered attack submarine 
(flu, 2005: 23-27). 
In light of China's expanding navy, some analysts have argued that Japan's involvement 
in fighting piracy in Southeast Asia is designed to balance China militarily. Zha argues 
that an anti-piracy exercise in the South China Sea, involving Japan, India and Vietnam, 
was designed to show that the three countries involved in the exercise were determined 
to protect their national interests in an energy rich maritime zone which the region's 
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naval powers contest (Zha, 2001: 42-44). Mo has also detailed the concerns of Asian 
states concerning the potential rise of Japanese militarism and the beliefs of Western 
observers that Japan intends to enhance the power of its armed forces through the 
dispatch of Japanese missions to combat piracy in Southeast Asia (Mo, 2002: 350-351). 
Such action can be interpreted according to English School theory in terms of power 
balancing, which is a derivative of the primary institution of Great Power management 
(Buzan, 2004a: 187). However, whilst bilateral exercises to tackle piracy have enhanced 
security relations between Japan and Southeast Asian states, the key to these exercises 
is maritime policing and not alliance building. This is why the JCG, a law enforcement 
body, rather than the MSDF, Japan's navy, has been dispatched to help in the fight 
against piratical violence in Southeast Asia. 
Instead, the problem of piracy in Southeast Asia raises the possibility for cooperation 
between Japan and China. The JCG and the Chinese maritime authorities already agree 
on national laws and policing rights as concerns maritime law enforcement to combat 
piracy (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). Furthermore, China has participated in 
the conferences sponsored by Japan, as well as pursuing maritime cooperation with 
Southeast Asian states. China signed the Joint Declaration on Cooperation on the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, in November 2002, and joined the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC), in October 2003, indicating China's 
willingness to work with Southeast Asian states to resolve security matters peacefully 
and uphold international maritime norms and laws (Zhongchun and Yaqiang, 2005: 
187-193; Richardson, 2005: 198-207). These steps have encouraged further maritime 
cooperation, such as the Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation 
between China and the Philippines, signed on 27 April 2005. This memorandum covers 
the issues of maritime safety, maritime environmental protection against pollution, port 
state control, human resources development, and information exchange, as well as 
allowing for further areas of cooperation in the future (Appendix VII). Maritime 
cooperation between China and Southeast Asian states could arguably be geared to 
counter Japan's efforts in the fight against maritime violence and crime in Southeast 
Asia, but this maritime cooperation also indicates that both Japan and China have a 
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shared interest in enforcing international law to protect trade passing through the 
Malacca Straits. 
Building a cooperative framework between Japan and China to fight maritime violence 
and crime would be complex, requiring that the two states overcome their mutual 
concerns about the other's military power and strategy in the Southeast Asian region. 270 
However, Japan and China could shift the debate concerning maritime security in 
Southeast Asia away from naval balancing, by focussing on the interhuman and 
transnational aspects of maritime crime, such as the environmental, economic and social 
causes of crime detailed in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Collaboration between Japan and 
China has the potential to alter the dynamic of the Southeast Asian interstate society in 
favour of more solidarist interactions, as Chapter 2 indicated. In fact, in addressing the 
interhuman and transnational areas of piracy, Japan has supported the Japan Shipping 
Association and the global shipping industry, as well as international maritime 
organizations. 
5.4c The Response of the Japan Shipping Association and the Global Shinning 
Industry to Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia 
The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and 
Transport are aware that while they can play a role in cooperation with other Japanese 
Ministries and Agencies as well as Regional Governments in promoting and 
strengthening anti-piracy measures, much of the work in deterring acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships must come from the shipping industry itself. With this in 
mind, the shipping industry has been asked to implement safety measures against 
maritime crime at each of the international conferences sponsored by the Japanese 
government (Umezawa interview, 2 April 2004). The Japanese shipping industry, 
270 Enhancing transparency of military spending and intentions between Japanese and Chinese naval 
forces would be one means of reducing this mutual animosity. However, Japan has criticized China in its 
2006 Defence White Paper precisely on its lack of transparency as regards its military strategy and 
spending (Yoshida, "Paper hits North's missiles, China 
buildup", The Japan Times on line, 
htt "//www search ianantimes co in/n rint/nn2006O8O2a2. html, accessed 2 August 2006). 
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represented by the Japan Shipping Association, has responded to these requests by 
fitting their ships with anti-piracy devices and training their crews to deter piratical 
attacks. 
The work of the Japan Shipping Association (JSA) 
The JSA has been instrumental in promoting anti-piracy strategies among its 
membership. A rise in piracy in Southeast Asia during the 1980s led the JSA to start 
taking action on the issue of piratical violence, disseminating proposals to protect 
members against piracy in 1983 (http: /hNww. isanet. or. jn/e2-3/piO. htnil, accessed on 24 
March 2005). In July 1997, the JSA held the Piracy Prevention Measures Meeting, 
which was designed to draw up security plans for ships. A list of contact numbers was 
also circulated amongst members so that the proper authorities could be contacted in the 
event that a Japanese ship suffered an act of piracy (http: //wxvw. js inet. or jp/e2-3/pi2-4- 
1. html, accessed on 1 December 2004). In addition to pushing shippers to hold piracy 
watches in piracy-infested seas, the JSA in conjunction with the Nippon Foundation 
have promoted "Toranomon", a security detector device mounted on vessels 
(http: //www. isanet. or. ip/e2-3/ni2-4-3. htinl, accessed on 1 December 2004). At the 2001 
Asian Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, 
JSA officials emphasised the need to report all cases of piracy and for states to take 
measures to prevent the diffusion of small firearms, which are often used in piratical 
instances. Furthermore, the JSA has participated in anti-piracy exercises with the JCG 
in order to ensure that the JSA can mediate effectively on behalf of Japanese merchant 
ships in the event of a piratical incident (JSA Annual Report 2002, 
httn: //www. isanct. or. ip/c/shipning-e/index. litml, accessed on 1 December 2004). In 
addition to this, the JSA has supported the Japanese shipping industry to accept new 
technological developments and to make operational changes in order to deter piratical 
acts against Japanese merchant vessels. 
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Technological Developments: ShipLoc and Secure Shi 
Over the period of January 1999 to March 2000,14 percent of piracy attacks worldwide 
were against Japanese ships for a calculated total loss of Y21 billion. Furthermore, 
according to the Nippon Foundation, after the Alondra Rainbow incident, the Japanese 
shipping industry became more acutely aware of the threat posed by piracy and armed 
robbery against ships (Asahi Shimbun, 30 May 2000: 19). As a result, Japanese shippers 
have turned to a number of technological developments that have been marketed to fight 
the continuing problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea. These include tracking 
systems, sensors, and electric fences. The shipping industry has taken advantage of 
these developments and invested in innovative methods of protecting their crews, ships 
and cargoes. 
Tracking systems, including ShipLoc, 271 the Ship's Position Indicating System from the 
IMB and the Fleet Remote Monitoring System made by a Japanese company NYK, 
work off an independent electricity source and are hooked up to Global Positioning 
Systems (GPS) and the Internet. The tracking systems are difficult to locate and can be 
installed without the crew's knowledge so that even under duress the whereabouts of the 
tracking system cannot be known. The location of a ship can be monitored in real-time 
by the shipowner as well as maritime authorities and deviations from plotted courses 
can thereby be investigated. Such tracking systems have all but eradicated major cases 
of seajacking, such as the case of the Alondra Rainbow (Primer: Piracy in Asia, Virtual 
Information Center, 2001: 20-21; Herrmann, 2002: 452). 
The effectiveness of tracking devices in capturing pirate gangs and deterring ship 
hijacks is noted in the case of the Selayang. On 19 June 2001, the Selayang, a tanker 
transporting fuel oil, was hijacked whilst en route to Labuan, Malaysia. As the Selayang 
was equipped with ShipLoc, it was possible to track the ship's whereabouts in real-time. 
Initially, the Selayang was taken towards Singapore, presumably to take advantage of 
high prices there to sell the fuel oil on board. Its course then became more erratic 
271 ShipLoc is currently the cheapest tracking system available. Information on ShipLoc can be found at 
www. shiploc. com (Virtual Information Center, Primer: Piracy in Asia, 2001: 20). 
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weaving in and out of Indonesian and Singapore territory before turning South towards 
Java. On 27 June, the Selayang was boarded off the Samarinda coast by the Indonesian 
navy and ten pirates were arrested thanks to the ShipLoc device's detailed information, 
which the IMB was able to provide to the Indonesian navy (Mukundan, 2002: 63-64; 
Takai, 2002: 18). 
A further technological development that has been propounded by the IMB is an 
electrical fence, called Secure Ship that surrounds the deck of a ship. Would-be 
attackers are deterred from boarding by receiving an electric shock as they attempt to 
board. The problem with Secure Ship is that it cannot be fitted to volatile cargoes, such 
as oil and liquid natural gas (LNG), which could ignite (Mukundan interview, 22 April 
2003). An alternative device designed to deter pirates from boarding a ship is a sensor. 
Sensor mechanisms work when pirates reach the deck of a ship by activating an alarm. 
However, such devices are expensive and cannot always be relied upon to work 
(Herrmann, 2002: 452-453). Though the range of technological devices offers 
shipowners several means of deterring pirates from pirating their ships, cost and 
reliability issues, not to mention whether the type of device is suited to a particular ship 
or cargo, means that technology alone is not the answer to preventing pirate attacks. 
Therefore, shipowners have made efforts to train their crews to protect themselves and 
their ships from attacks at sea. 
Operational Changes: Training, Exercises and Practice 
Having the crew keep watch for pirates is an effective way of deterring pirate attacks. 
The increase in the number of attempted attacks in 2000 was largely attributable to the 
increased vigilance of crews. 272 Had watches not been kept, the attempted attacks which 
ended in the pirates fleeing would instead have added to the number of actual attacks, 
which in turn would have resulted in increased damage to shipping companies and 
crews (Nakamura, 2001: 18). Nevertheless, manning watches diverts crews from normal 
272 Attempted acts of piracy are those where an attempt to board to commit robbery is made, but is not 
successful. 
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duties and ultimately requires extra personnel to cover aspects of security on board. 
Despite the pleas of mariner's unions, such as the British Numast, shipping companies 
are reluctant to pay the added costs of securing their ships (McQuillan, The Glasgow 
Herald, 13 May 2004: 17). In fact, the automation of ships has led to a decrease in the 
number of crew manning a vessel, further inhibiting the defensive measures a ship can 
take (Glass, The Independent on Sunday, 11 January 2004: 8-13). This situation may 
change, however, with the implementation of the International Ship and Port Security 
Code (ISPS Code) on 1 July 2004, as the code stipulates that ships should have a crew 
member in charge of the ship's security and a detailed security plan. The ISPS Code 
will be examined in the next chapter. 
An alternative to keeping watches is to arm crews with weapons. Both Russian and 
Israeli commercial fleets have done so, greatly reducing the number of attacks against 
their ships. Russian and Israeli ships are manned by national crews, however, and are 
therefore not subject to the same tensions and communication problems that arise from 
having international crews. Moreover, representatives of the IMB and IMO have voiced 
a concern that arming crews will only cause pirates to engage in more violent attacks 
(Mukundan interview, 22 April 2003). 
Much of the work undertaken by the shipping industry has come about because of the 
efforts of the IMO and the IMB. Both the IMO and IMB have been instrumental in 
promoting efforts and passing resolutions to deter and combat piracy, as well as to 
publicise acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships. The work of the IMO and IMB 
has, in turn, received a boost from regional responses to piracy and the conferences 
sponsored by Japan. 
5.4d The Response of International Organizations 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) 
The origins of the IMO date back to 6 March 1948 when the Convention on the 
Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization was adopted. The Convention 
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came into force on 17 March 1958 and the institution began functioning on 6 January 
1959. The organization later changed its name to the International Maritime 
Organization to match amendments made to the Convention implemented on 22 May 
1982. The IMO's involvement with piracy began in 1983 when Resolution 545, which 
asked for states to respond to the problem of maritime piracy, was endorsed. 273 A rise in 
instances of piracy in the Malacca Straits between 1988 and 1989 encouraged the IMO 
to formulate two circulars, MSC 622 and 623, offering advice to governments and the 
shipping industry on combating or deterring piracy and armed robbery against ships 
(Hesse, 2002: 59-60). Two further resolutions were later enacted to tackle the growing 
problem of violent maritime crime in accordance with the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. These were Resolution A. 683(17) on "Prevention and 
suppression of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships" in November 1991 and 
Resolution A. 738(18) on "Measures to Prevent and suppress piracy and armed robbery 
against ships" in November 1993 (Primer: Piracy in Asia, Virtual Information Center, 
17 April 2001: 15). In 1999, MSC 662 called on governments to establish a system 
whereby the IMO would be informed of the type, location and method of piratical 
instances in order to make statistics, and MSC 663 gave detailed instructions for ships 
concerning what action to take in the event of a piracy attack. In November 2001, an 
investigation code for piracy was formulated (A. 922(22)) which included a definition of 
armed robbery against ships as well as training details for ships' crews to deter and cope 
with piracy and armed robbery against ships (Hesse, 2002: 60-61). The IMO's anti- 
piracy efforts since 1998 have been part of a long-term project to tackle maritime piracy. 
This project has comprised anti-piracy seminars and workshops, as well as evaluation 
and assessment missions to different regions. The signing of the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (RECAAP) 
in November 2004, establishing the Information Sharing Centre in Singapore, which 
was discussed earlier in this chapter in Section 5.3b on Japan's operational measures to 
tackle piracy, is testimony to the success of the IMO's anti-piracy work 
(llttp: //www. imo. org/home. asp, accessed 19 January 2006). 
273 The IMO did adopt Resolutions A. 461 (XI) and A. 504 (XII), which both addressed barratry and the 
unlawful seizure of ships, prior to Resolution 545, but Resolution 545 was the first to concentrate on 
piracy. (http: //www. imo. orL/lnfoReSource/mainfraine. asp? topic id=435&doc id=3717#4, accessed 19 
January 2006). 
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International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 
The IMB was established in 1981 to combat fraud in the maritime industry, tackle 
piracy, confirm that vessels arrive at scheduled ports, assist and offer advice to 
governments and corporations in confronting crime, provide training to counter crime, 
as well as to offer legal support and advice to shipping companies (Primer: Piracy in 
Asia, Virtual Information Center, 17 April 2001: 16-17). In addition to these duties the 
IMB established the Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur on 1 October 1992, 
which is funded by donations from the shipping and insurance industries. The services 
offered by the Centre are free, available to all vessels and accessible twenty-four hours a 
day, 365 days a year. The services include: the daily broadcast of reports of suspicious 
ships, pirate attacks and armed robbery against ships worldwide, the collection and 
analysis of data on piracy and armed robbery against ships culminating in the 
publication of quarterly reports, and the maintenance of contacts with law enforcement 
bodies to aid in the suppression of maritime crime (Primer: Piracy in Asia, Virtual 
Information Center, 17 April 2001: 17-18). 
The Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) 
In addition to the efforts of the IMB and IMO, the Council for Security Cooperation in 
the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) has also discussed measures to combat piracy and armed 
robbery at sea. CSCAP is comprised of representatives from strategic studies centres 
from throughout the Asia Pacific region and aims to "provide a more structural regional 
process of a non-governmental nature... to contribute to the efforts towards regional 
confidence building and enhancing regional security through dialogues, consultation 
and cooperation. " A Maritime Cooperation Working Group has been established within 
CSCAP and this group has formulated Guidelines for Regional Maritime Cooperation 
which contains a clause encouraging Asian states to address the problem of maritime 
piracy (Primer: Piracy in Asia, Virtual Information Center, 2001: 19). 
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Japan's response to piracy in Southeast Asia must therefore be seen in the context of the 
collective efforts of international organizations, as well as littoral and other regional 
states. The achievements of these efforts include Japan's provision of technical and 
financial assistance to Southeast Asian states, as well as hosting regional anti-piracy 
conferences and conducting bilateral exercises and patrols. Yet in spite of all these 
attempts to combat piracy and armed robbery against ships, maritime crime in Southeast 
Asian waters remains prevalent and dangerous, as the pirating of the Idaten, a Japanese 
tugboat, illustrates. 
5.5 The Case of the Idaten 
Pirated! 
On Monday, 14 March 2005, between 6: 00 and 6: 30 p. m. (7: 00 to 7: 30 p. m. Japanese 
time), the 323-ton, 42.55 metre Idaten, a Japanese tugboat belonging to the Kondo Kaiji 
company based in Kitakyüshü, was pirated in the Malacca Straits. The Idaten was 
towing the barge the Kuroshio 1 from Batam Island, Indonesia, to an offshore oil field 
mining project near Myanmar, 274 and was surrounded by 20 to 30 fishing boats when 
suddenly one of the fishing boats sped towards the Idaten. Pirates in the approaching 
fishing boat fired warning shots at the Idaten on the port side and five of their number 
boarded the tugboat. The crew of the Idaten, who were either eating or sleeping at the 
time, immediately surrendered. The Japanese captain, Inoue Nobuo (56), the chief 
engineer, Kuroda Shunji (50), and the Filipino third engineer, Edgardo Sadang (31), 
were kidnapped by 15 pirates armed with AK-47 and M16 rifles and rocket propelled 
grenade launchers in Malaysian waters. In addition to the hostages, the pirates stole 
between Y700,000 and Y800,000, as well as the ship's documents. The attack took 
about ten minutes in total, after which the pirates fled to Indonesian maritime territory. 
274 The Kuroshio is a pipeline laying ship. At the time of the attack on the Idaten, the Kuroshio had 154 
people aboard (Asahi Shimbun, 15 March 2005: 1). 
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The remaining 11 members of the Idaten's crew, of whom six were Japanese and five 
were Filipino, were unhurt. Malaysia immediately dispatched three patrol boats to 
locate the Idaten upon hearing about the attack. One of these patrol boats found the 
ldaten at 8: 45 p. m. on the Monday evening. The ship was inspected upon arrival at port 
Butterworth in Penang Province, Malaysia, at 4: 00 p. m. on Tuesday, 15 March, where 
five bullet holes were found in its hull and the incident was reported to the IMB's 
Piracy Reporting Centre. On the Tuesday, the Indonesian navy dispatched three vessels 
to search for the three kidnapped members of the Idaten and a Malaysian marine police 
spokesman stated that it was likely the pirates had fled to a hideout on North Sumatra, 
Indonesia (Takahara and Shimizu, Japan Times, 16 March 2005; Asahi Shimbun, 17 
March 2005: 39). It was the third major piratical incident in the Malacca Straits since 
the 26 December 2004 tsunamis (Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 15 March 2005: 1; 
Asahi Shimbun, 16 March 2005: 1; Japan Times, 17 March 2005). 
Police interviews with the Idaten crew who had made it safely to Butterworth port 
revealed the identification number of the pirate vessel as PFKB 1223 (Asahi Shimbun, 
17 March 2005: 39). The pirates were believed to belong to a criminal gang which 
hijacked fishing vessels to cover their tracks. One of these fishing boats, which was 
hijacked on 13 March, returned to the port of Utan-Marintan in Pela Province, Malaysia 
on 17 March. According to the crews of the hijacked fishing boats, the pirates were 
fishermen who wielded guns and stole 2000 ringit (approximately k 55,000), 2,000 
litres of fuel, the ship's Global Positioning System and the crew's mobile phones, as 
well as the owner's catch of fish. Ultimately, three hijacked fishing vessels, along with 
their kidnapped crews, that had been used in the Idaten attack, were returned to their 
Malaysian owners once the Idaten had been pirated. The engine of one of these fishing 
vessels had broken down due to the pirates forcing the vessel to travel at excessive 
speed during and after the Idaten attack. The pirates escaped with their hostages, the 
three crew members of the Idaten, after transferring to a boat waiting at the maritime 
border between Indonesia and Malaysia (Asahi Shimbun, 18 March 2005: 39; Asahi 
Shimbun Evening Edition, 18 March 2005: 15; Yomiuri Shimbun, 18 March 2005: 38; 
Asahi Shimbun, 20 March 2005: 38). 
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The Japanese Foreign Minister Machimura Nobutaka requested that Singapore, 
Indonesia and Malaysia help to secure the release of the captives unharmed, whilst the 
Defence Minister Ono Yoshinori appealed to the littoral states of Southeast Asia to do 
more to fight piracy. The Japanese Transport Minister Kitagawa Kazuo announced that 
the Japan Coast Guard would dispatch a vessel to aid Malaysian authorities in the 
search and rescue mission if requested. Though Chief Cabinet Secretary Hosoda 
Hiroyuki noted that the Japanese government had not yet been contacted by the pirates 
(Takahara and Shimizu, Japan Times, 16 March 2005), Prime Minister Koizumi 
ordered the establishment of a liaison room (Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 15 
March 2005: 1) and MOFA set up a situation headquarters' at 12: 30 a. m. on 15 March 
(Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 15 March 2005: 1). The Japanese government also 
contacted the Philippine maritime authorities for help in tracing both the victims and 
perpetrators of the piratical act (Japan Times, 23 March 2005). 
The managing director of the Kondo Kaiji company relayed to the press that it was not 
until 7: 40 p. m. (Japanese time) on 14 Monday that the company received a message 
from the Kuroshio 1 that the Idaten had been attacked. The company immediately 
attempted to contact the vessel and confirmed the ship had been attacked at 8: 00 p. m. 
By 12: 00 p. m. on Tuesday, 15 March, representatives of the Kondo Kaiji company's 
Tokyo branch office, headed by Hashimoto Shoji, the director of the Tokyo branch 
office, had met with officials from MOFA and MLIT to discuss the situation (Asahi 
Shimbun Evening Edition, 15 March 2005: 19). The president of the Kondo Kaiji 
shipping company, Kondo Kanji, travelled from Japan to Malaysia on the Wednesday to 
assist in the release of the three captives (Japan Times, 17 March 2005). From the start 
of the incident, employees of the Kondo Kaiji company as well as the victim's families 
did not speak to the press (Yomiuri Shimbun Evening Edition, 15 March 2005: 19). 
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Ransom and Release 
The initial ransom demands, made on 16 March, totalled US$250,000, but the Kondo 
Kaiji shipping company asked for the ransom to be reduced to US$100,000, before 
finally paying the sum of US$120,000 (Japan Times, 23 March 2005; Shukanshincho, 7 
April 2005: 56). Even still, this ransom was high compared to usual ransom demands 
that are usually in the tens of thousands of US dollars, rather than the hundreds of 
thousands (Asahi Shimbun Evening Edition, 15 March 2005: 1). 275 According to an 
anonymous MLIT official, Kondo employed a Thai negotiator to reduce, then pay, the 
ransom by bank transfer (Shukanshincho, 7 April 2005: 56). 276 Regarding this ransom, 
Somkiat Chiotan, the senior marine police officer who headed the operation to rescue 
the hostages, stated that "[Kondo Kaiji] has set a bad precedent. The pirates would start 
looking for foreigners, especially Japanese" (Japan Times, 23 March 2005). 
In fact, it is unlikely that Japanese crews will be singled out in spite of the high ransom 
paid for the crew of the Idaten. Since the Idaten incident, Kondo Kaiji has stopped 
operating in the Malacca Straits and there are no other Japanese shipping companies 
running tugboats in the Malacca Straits. Whilst Japanese on tankers or container ships 
could be targeted, tugboats remain the victim of choice for pirates, as they can easily 
board tugboats. 
The three crew members were given US$200 by their captors and released on Saturday 
19 March after four days in captivity. They were subsequently questioned by the 
Malaysian police concerning their internment to generate evidence regarding the 
275 A risk management company executive has been quoted as saying that ransoms in Southeast Asia can 
reach up to US$100,000 per person, so Kondo must have had a good negotiator (Shukanshincho, 7 April 
2005: 56). Other accounts place an initial demand made by pirates at US$180,000, which can be 
negotiated down to under US$10,000 (Aoki, Wakasa, Honda, 2005: 34). 
276 A Japanese government source has estimated that the final payment made by the Kondo Kaiji 
company amounted to US$200,000, of which US$125,000 were the negotiator's fees and the remaining 
US$75,000 was for the release of the hostages themselves (the fee for each of the Japanese captives being 
approximately US$30,000 each and the remaining US$15,000 being for the Filipino engineer). The 
negotiator in question was a Singaporean resident of European origin. The Kondo Kaiji company spent a 
further US$300,000 on flights, hotel fees, port expenses and other miscellaneous costs. The final ransom 
was higher than the usual amounts paid to pirates in such hijacking cases, for which the highest known 
amount was US$16,000 (personal correspondence). 
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identity of the pirates. In a press conference on Monday, 21 March, the three Idaten 
crew members revealed that they had been treated respectfully by their captors. They 
also stated that the pirates acted like soldiers and that they were moved around seven 
ships after their kidnap (Asahi Shimbun, 22 March 2005: 1). When walking across 
beaches, the captives were ordered to cover their tracks. The fact that none of the 
victims was harmed in the initial attack indicates the importance for the pirates to avoid 
injuring their source of income in ransom cases (Asahi Shimbun, 15 March 2005: 39; 
Aoki, Wakasa, Honda, 2005: 32). 
The testimonies of the captives and of the crew revealed that the pirates spoke 
Indonesian, some reports indicate that the pirates spoke in Aceh dialect, and looked 
Indonesian in origin (Asahi Shimbun, 16 March 2005: 1, Japan Times, 17 March 2005). 
The case of the Idaten was described by the director of the IMB, Captain Mukundan, as 
being typical of Indonesian crime groups, adding that it was unlikely that the Japanese 
crew were specifically targeted (Asahi Shimbun, 15 March 2005: 1). An Indonesian 
naval spokesman blamed GAM for the attacks noting the similarity with prior incidents 
that the separatist group is alleged to have perpetrated (Yomiuri Shimbun, 16 March 
2005: 1; Yomiuri Shimbun, 18 March 2005: 9). 277 Nevertheless, Saeki Natsuko, the 
Secretary General of Indonesia's Democratization Network, stated that it is hard to 
imagine that GAM was behind the incident considering the extent to which TNI 
operations had restricted their activities (Aoki, Wakasa, Honda, 2005: 33). 
Other possible suspects include organized criminal gangs, the Indonesian navy or the 
Indonesian maritime police. Organized criminal gangs in the region are usually run by 
Malaysian Chinese and concentrate their illicit activities on trafficking illegal 
immigrants across the Malacca Straits and into Malaysia. An increase in the illegal 
traffic of humans into Malaysia after the 1997 Asian economic crisis forced the 
Malaysian authorities to strengthen maritime surveillance of their waters. As well as 
improving Malaysia's capacity to deter illegal immigrants, more Malaysian maritime 
patrols led to a decrease in other forms of maritime crime in Malaysian waters, such as 
277 The attack on the Idaten was similar to an attack on the Afitorautama, a vegetable transporter, whose 
Captain was taken hostage and ransomed for about US$11,000 (Yonduri Shimbun, 18 March 2005: 9). 
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piracy (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004; Aoki, Wakasa, Honda, 2005: 33-34). 
Evidence that elements of the Indonesian navy were involved in piracy surfaced in the 
case of the Yayasan Tujuh, a Malaysian general cargo vessel pirated by the KAL 
YOUTEFA, an Indonesian naval vessel on 17 March 2004, as detailed in Chapter 3 
(ICC-IMB Piracy Report third quarter October 2004: 29). 
Imnlications for Janan's Anti-Piracy Polic 
Until the case of the Idaten, the Japanese government's response to piracy aimed to 
improve the capabilities of the littoral states of Southeast Asia. The means of doing so 
included the dispatch of MOFA and MLIT surveys to Southeast Asia on an annual basis, 
training maritime personnel from the region and conducting exercises. Following the 
attack on the Idaten, talk of granting ODA to Indonesia in the form of patrol ships was 
revived. The patrol ships in question were CL type patrol boats of 20 metres in length 
with a cost of x¬700 million per ship. The CL type patrol boats have a small turning 
circle and are fast. The head of the Japan Coast Guard declared it the perfect craft to 
navigate the Malacca Straits' numerous islands. Though weapons were not included in 
the deal being negotiated, as this would be an infringement of Japan's Export Control 
Ban, training in Japan and the dispatch of personnel to teach the Indonesian maritime 
authorities how to pilot the boats was being considered. Initially, larger 30 metre patrol 
vessels were proposed, but the idea was dropped due to concerns that the boats could 
easily be militarized and deployed to quell internal conflicts with separatists or for 
military purposes (Asahi Shimbun, 16 March 2005: 1). On 15 June 2006, the Japanese 
government decided to donate ¥1,921 million to Indonesia for the purpose of 
constructing three patrol vessels. The patrol vessels will be bequeathed to the 
Indonesian Marine Police based in Riau, North Sumatra and Jakarta. As the patrol boats 
are bullet-proofed, they are considered as military vessels. The Japanese Cabinet were 
therefore required to make an exception to the Export Control Ban in this instance 
(littp: //www. mofa. go. jp/announce/announce/2006/6/0616-3. html, accessed 16 July 
2006). 
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The case of the Idaten highlights a number of issues concerning Japan's response to 
piracy in Southeast Asia. First, the donation of patrol boats indicates a ratcheting up of 
cooperation between Japan and Indonesia as such measures begin to overcome the 
operational deficiencies of Indonesian anti-piracy patrols. Second, the swift payment of 
the ransom for the three captured Idaten crew shows Japan's sensitivity to the welfare of 
its citizens, a human security issue, especially when compared with the Alondra 
Rainbow incident. Third, the Indonesian and Malaysian response to the Idaten case 
proved that cooperative measures initiated by Japan had taken root in the Southeast 
Asian region. A comparison with the hijacked Selayang, detailed in the technological 
developments section of this chapter, in which the Indonesian maritime authorities took 
eight days to find and board the vessel, despite the fact that the Selayang was equipped 
with a ShipLoc tracking device, reveals the transformation of the littoral state's 
response to piracy. Finally, the extent of organization, equipment and weaponry 
required to board and kidnap three of Idaten's crew illustrates the continuing threat to 
international shipping posed by pirates in Southeast Asia. 
5.6 Conclusion: What affect have Japanese initiatives had? 
Both Malaysia and Indonesia share concerns that multilateral security cooperation to 
combat piracy in their waters will result in transgressions of their sovereign territory by 
Superpowers and Great Powers in the interstate society. This apprehension reflects a 
long standing focus on domestic security issues and development in order to strengthen 
the government's command of material and normative power to govern their respective 
polities, as specified in Chapter 2. Consequently, the onus on fighting maritime crime 
has been placed on littoral Southeast Asian states. It is therefore no surprise that these 
states have taken the most encouraging steps to combat piracy, notably the 
commencement of trilateral patrols between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore in June 
2004. Though sufficient resources will need to be provided for these patrols to be 
effective. 
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As Japan has not been able to intervene unilaterally to combat piracy, so Japanese 
assistance has been limited to political measures, such as international conferences to 
raise awareness and build cooperation, and limited operational assistance, such as 
training and anti-piracy exercises. Building international cooperation and conducting 
bilateral exercises between states in Southeast Asia has taken over four years since the 
first `Regional Conference on Combating Piracy' was held in Tokyo in April 2000. 
Nevertheless, Japanese initiatives, including the creation of an Information Sharing 
Centre, technical and financial assistance, as well as the creation of an informal network 
of maritime experts across the Asian region, have all begun to tackle many of the 
deficiencies of littoral maritime authorities in addressing the problem of piracy. In 
particular, the institutionalisation of the Information Sharing Centre in Singapore led to 
the acceptance by Southeast Asian states of a broader legal framework that included 
acts of armed robbery inside littoral state's domestic territory, thereby countering the 
deficiencies of the IJNCLOS piracy definition outlined in Chapter 3. The Japan Coast 
Guard has also provided a model for Southeast Asian states to copy, as Malaysia has 
done. It is anticipated that the growth of national coast guards throughout Southeast 
Asia will facilitate interstate cooperation, as it is easier for law enforcement bodies, like 
the JCG, to collaborate with similar organizations and matching objectives as opposed 
to navies (Tcrashima interview, 22 July 2004). Furthermore, as the response to the 
Idaten piracy case demonstrated, littoral states in Southeast Asia are more motivated to 
cooperate with extra regional powers to confront piracy than they were before Japan 
initiated the series of international conferences on piratical violence that this chapter 
detailed. 
Japanese anti-piracy proposals have therefore built and sustained momentum in fighting 
maritime crime in the Southeast Asian interstate society and no other state can be said to 
have led the anti-piracy fight with the same vigour as Japan. Increasingly, experts 
attribute the levelling off of pirate attacks in Southeast Asia, as detailed at the start of 
this chapter, to anti-piracy strategies rooted in the series of international conferences 
proposed, organized and sponsored by the Japanese government, shipping industry and 
NGOs (http: /h%ti%-%v. icc-ccs. ort, /main/news. plip? newsid=67, accessed 3 May 2006). The 
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achievements of Japanese initiatives must also be understood in the wider context of the 
efforts of the Japanese and global shipping industries, as well as international 
institutions in tackling the problem of piracy. The anti-piracy endeavours of these 
organizations have all been promoted by Japan. 
The endeavours of the shipping industry and seafarers have had an impact on curbing 
the threat of piracy through the adoption of anti-piracy technology and by stressing 
security measures for vessels. The use of technological devices, such as ShipLoc, for 
example, have significantly reduced piratical acts, akin to the hijacking of the Alondra 
Rainbow and Tenyu which galvanised the Japanese policy making elite into taking 
action to suppress piracy and armed robbery against ships in Southeast Asia. Strategies 
to secure vessels against piratical attack, such as keeping watches, have also deterred 
acts of piracy, although the ISPS Code, which was implemented in the aftermath of the 
9/11 attacks, has engendered the most significant changes in terms of vessels protecting 
themselves. The ISPS Code will be examined in greater detail in the following chapter. 
Whilst anti-piracy initiatives have had an impact on the problem, much more effort is 
required to counter the basic causes of piracy. Poverty and high unemployment are two 
of the main causes of contemporary piracy and armed robbery against ships worldwide. 
With this in mind, at the `Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery against Ships' held in Tokyo, 27 April 2000, then Senior State Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, Esaki Tetsuma, voiced the Japanese government's intention to continue 
to give financial and technical assistance to enable Asian states to develop in the 
aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 
(http: // ww'w. niofa. go. jp/policy/piracy/speech0004. htnil, accessed 27 October 2003). Yet, 
whilst Japan continues to grant aid to Southeast Asian states, there is no link made 
between piracy-prone areas and the provision of this aid (Mizutori interview, 02 April 
2004). In other words, Japan does not use its financial assistance to Southeast Asian 
states to target economically impoverished coastal zones where piracy is rife, in spite of 
the connection between poverty, unemployment and piratical crime. Japan could also do 
more to tackle environmental degradation in Southeast Asian seas, and to promote 
reforms that discourage official complicity and corruption in Southeast Asian states. 
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However effective Japan's response to maritime piracy has been, the perceived and 
actual threat of maritime terrorism has augmented. The perceived threat is the 
possibility of a terrorist attack on vulnerable shipping in vital international waterways or 
ports; in particular, experts point to the attacks on the Limburg and USS Cole as 
examples. This perception was greatly bolstered by the September 11 terrorist attacks on 
New York and Washington. However, the actual threat may come from Aceh and 
Filipino separatist groups, who have stepped up their engagement in acts of maritime 
terrorism. Japan's response to these threats will be dealt with in the next chapter. 
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6. Janan's Resnonse to Maritime Terrorism 
This thesis has focussed on Japan's response to maritime outlaws of the interstate 
society and has defined these actors as barbarians, infidels, and pirates in order to better 
understand the methods and motives of these outlaws. In turn, these new definitions 
may improve interstate responses to the threats these actors pose. In this chapter, the 
definition of terrorism will be examined in greater detail and in light of the 9/11 attacks. 
This chapter contends that since the 9/11 attacks, the US-led `war on terror' has created 
tensions between the interstate institutions of Great Power management on the one hand 
and international law on the other. Should alleged terrorist detainees at the US military 
facility at Guantanamo Bay be held without charge or a date of trial? What is the 
legality of CIA `black-site prisons' or the invasion of Iraq? To what extent can the US- 
led `war on terror' be described in terms of maintaining order in the interstate society at 
the expense of justice? This thesis has argued that responding to outlaw behaviour 
involves both maintaining order, by organizing maritime patrols for example, as well as 
tackling issues of justice that are the key to treating the causes of maritime violence and 
crime, such as environmental or economic factors, as Chapter 3 demonstrated. It is 
equally important, however, to distinguish whether an outlaw is categorized as a 
barbarian, an infidel or a pirate, in order for states to devise an appropriate response. 
The argument in this chapter is that `terrorists' can be split into two groups in terms of 
the interstate society depending on whether a terrorist is motivated to destroy the current 
interstate society, an infidel, or whether they are an actor who can be negotiated with 
and ultimately encouraged to renounce acts of illegitimate violence in order to join the 
interstate society, a barbarian. As this chapter will demonstrate, this division is far more 
useful than the term `terrorism' to understand the methods and motives of maritime 
outlaws, as well as being more accurate in terms of the state responses to maritime 
outlaws. Although US-led efforts in the `war on terror' have global ramifications, 
Japan's response to maritime barbarians and infidels is primarily focussed on key 
SLOCs in the Southeast Asian region and WMD proliferation by North Korea. This 
chapter will identify key barbarian and infidel actors in the Southeast Asian region, 
address the North Korean WMD proliferation issue in the section on the Proliferation 
239 
Security Initiative (PSI), as well as the threat maritime barbarians and infidels pose to 
Japanese citizens, trade and interests. Finally, US initiatives to fight maritime terrorism 
will be reviewed with a view to understanding Japan's participation in them and their 
ramifications for Japan. 
6.1 a Responding to Terrorism post-9/1l 
The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington have had a significant impact upon the 
conduct and content of international affairs. The images of the event transmitted live 
worldwide remain embedded in the conscience of all who observed the catastrophe 
unfold. The tragedy of 9/11 engendered the reorientation of the Bush administration 
regarding US foreign policy from an isolationist agenda to a dynamic unilateralist 
strategy designed to ensure international security against Al Qaeda and its affiliate 
organizations. Yet, it is argued, by some, that no fundamental change in the structure of 
the international system occurred. Instead, US supremacy and its role in ensuring 
international stability was confirmed through the swift victory of the American forces 
and their, primarily Afghan, allies in Afghanistan routing both the Taliban and Al 
Qaeda (Cox in Booth and Dunne, 2002: 153-160; Gray in Booth and Dunne, 2002: 226- 
234; Waltz in Booth and Dunne, 2002: 348-353; Woodward in Calhoun et al., 2002: 
212-237; Zolbcrg in Calhoun et al., 2002: 285-299; Berzins and Cullen, 2003: 8). 278 
Acharya, in noting the tendency for Asian powers to support the US in the `war on 
terror' even in spite of the anti-US sentiments among their populations, was among the 
numerous scholars to declare that individual state interest encapsulated by the realist 
theoretical tradition governed post 9/11 international affairs (Acharya in Booth and 
Dunne, 2002: 195-202). 
Nevertheless, whilst the academics mentioned above argue for the dominance of the 
tenets of realism in guiding the decisions of national policy-makers, Keohane asserts 
_" Woodward actually refers to the failure of states in the international system to reconsider security in 
tcrms of 'human security' as dictated by the Copenhagen School (Woodward in Calhoun et al., 2002: 
234). Japan's human security agenda was briefly examined in Section 2.7 of this thesis. 
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that realism has no means of explaining the attacks themselves which were perpetrated 
by non-state actors. States that respond only to the symptoms of terrorism by relying 
upon military power as dictated by realism, leave themselves open to future and 
potentially more destructive terrorist attacks (Keohane in Calhoun et al., 2002: 77-91). 
Instead, explanations of the 9/11 attacks lie in understanding the root causes of 
terrorism which can be identified in the motivations and tactics of the terrorists 
themselves. Doing so requires a different theoretical lens, that of `human security' as 
proposed by the Copenhagen School of security studies. Focusing on human as opposed 
to state security enables the political, economic and cultural grievances of Islamic 
radicals to be addressed (Kuran in Calhoun et al., 2002: 71), whilst maintaining 
international legitimacy by upholding international law, defending global human rights 
and bolstering the power of the International Court of Justice. In sum, the key to 
establishing international security lies in promoting global justice by melding the 
progress of economic globalization with the development of social justice worldwide 
(field in Calhoun et al., 2002: 92-105; An-Naim in Booth and Dunne, 2002: 162-168; 
Rogers in Booth and Dunne, 2002: 215-225; Linklater in Booth and Dunne, 2002: 303- 
312; Sassen in Booth and Dunne, 2002: 313-324) 279 As Held puts it, "Kant was right; 
the violent abrogation of law and justice in one place ricochets across the world. We 
cannot accept the burden of putting justice right in one dimension of life - security - 
without at the same time seeking to put it right everywhere. A socio-economic order in 
which whole regions and peoples suffer serious harm and disadvantage independently 
of their will and consent, will not command widespread support and legitimacy" (Held 
in Calhoun et al., 2002: 92-105). 
Whilst pleas for a more equitable distribution of global wealth might ultimately reduce 
the threat posed by terrorism to states in the international system, this did not occur in 
the of ermath of 9/11. Instead, it is states which have adjusted the rules and laws of the 
international system in light of the events of 9/11 to protect their collective interests. In 
the domain of maritime trade, for example, states have enacted a series of measures, 
279 Fukuyama notes that it is not simply the poverty, political grievance and social disorientation of 
globalization that is to blame, but instead points to the role that Islamic societies have to play in 
modernizing their societies by opening their economies up to the global economy and using wealth 
gleaned from the sale of oil to establish industrial states (Fukuyama in Booth and Dunne, 2002: 32-34). 
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which this chapter will detail, designed to enhance security at sea and in port against 
terrorism. Hence, whilst unbiased forms of globalization may be discussed, it remains 
the responsibility of, chiefly the most powerful, states in the international system to 
maintain global security against terrorists (Halliday in Booth and Dunne, 2002). 
6.1 h nefinini Terrorism 
The pivotal question for states fighting the `war against terrorism' is to ascertain who 
the enemy really is. To do so requires differentiating between the terrorist groups that 
operate in the world by defining what is meant by the term terrorism. Defining terrorism 
has always been a complicated task; there is a great deal of disagreement amongst both 
academics and policy makers as to what constitutes an act of terrorism. 280 Furthermore, 
politically motivated actors never perceive their actions to be those of a terrorist, rather 
they justify their actions in terms of their situation and motivations (Martin, 2003: 2,9- 
10; Silke, 2004: 59). Nonetheless, a number of key features appear in most definitions 
of terrorism. Those categorized as terrorists are politically motivated non-state actors 
who perpetrate or threaten violence with a view to influencing an audience, use 
unconventional methods and often target civilians or "passive military targets" (Martin, 
2003: 6,31-32). 281 
Goldstone has further divided terrorism into three types. First, national, regional or 
ethnic liberation movements that employ strategies of terror against a state or power that 
the movement perceives as illegally occupying its territory. Examples of ethnic 
liberation movements in Asia include (GAM), the Aceh separatist movement, and the 
210 Alex Schmid identified over 100 different definitions for terrorism in 1988 (Schmid, 1988, quoted in 
Martin, 2003: 31). 
Ist Even a general definition of terrorism fails to comprehend the motivations of individuals who, having 
been denied their human rights by a repressive state or group, see no alternative other than to take up 
arms in defence of their cause (Martin, 2003: 229). Nonetheless, the distinction between barbarians and 
infidels can help to differentiate between those politically motivated actors who employ terror-tactics in 
order to overthrow the international system (infidels), with those politically motivated actors who, in spite 
of their terror-tactics, can be negotiated with because their objectives can be legitimized in the eyes of the 
interstate society (barbarians). 
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MILF, based in Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. 282 Second, international 
movements that desire the destruction of a political order spread across several state 
systems, or even globally, and replaced with what they determine to be an improved 
political order. One example of such a movement in Asia would be the Japanese Red 
Army which engaged in several acts of terror in support of a communist political order 
during the Cold War. Finally, Goldstone refers to hybrid movements which combine the 
first and second types of movement. In the case of a hybrid movement, the national 
liberation movement gains financial and military support, whilst the international or 
global movement receives new areas to recruit, as well as bases for their operations, 
expansion and training. Goldstone refers to the third, hybrid type as "International 
Islamic Terrorism", the prime example of which is Al Qaeda (Goldstone in Calhoun et 
al., 2002139-149)283 
Both the first and third types of terrorist organization described by Goldstone are 
operational in Southeast Asia. However, because the lines between different terrorist 
movements in Southeast Asia are blurred it is more accurate to perceive Al Qaeda as the 
dominant International Islamic Terrorist organization with which other terrorist 
movements are affiliated to a greater or lesser extent. The movements involved in 
maritime terrorism with closer ties to Al Qaeda include Jemaah Islamiya (JI) and the 
ASG. The MILF is more of an independent ethno-nationalist group, though it maintains 
operational tics with Al Qaeda. Finally, GAM has the least close association with Al 
Qacda (Abuza, 2002: 427-465). Despite these links, distinguishing between these 
organizations is important as far as Japan's response to terrorism is concerned, as the 
different motivations of these terrorist movements lead them to adopt alternative tactics 
which require specific counter-strategies. Ethno-nationalist movements, Goldstone's 
first type, tend to use conventional weapons to undertake selected missions to highlight 
and ultimately rectify the actual or perceived injustices against a specific class or ethno- 
2t= Both of these movements were introduced in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
213 Al Qacda has been described in terms of `New Terrorism'. This term, employed by a number of 
experts in the field of terrorist-studies including Walter Laqueur, Bruce Hoffman and Ian Lesser, 
describes the global nature of the `New Terrorist' threat, whose tactics include the use of WMD. The term 
'New Terrorism' is confusing, however, as the Al Qaeda movement emerged from the Afghan war with 
Russia in the 1980s, and because an affiliated group attempted to blow up the World Trade Center in 
1993 using a mix of chemical weapons and conventional explosives. 
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nationalist group. International Islamic Terrorist organizations are generally comprised 
of a loose structure of terrorist cells, motivated by vague religious or mystical goals, the 
use of asymmetrical methods284 and a willingness to acquire and deploy Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD). Hence the tactics employed by ethno-nationalist terrorists 
are likely to be conducted on a smaller scale, though more frequently, than those of or 
affiliated with an International Islamic Terrorist organization which require more 
manpower, planning, technology, intelligence and equipment. Before examining the 
above mentioned terrorist groups in greater detail, the contemporary state of maritime 
terrorism will be assessed. 
6.2 Contemporary Maritime Terrorism 
There is virtually no security for what is the primary system to transport global trade. The 
consequence of a terrorist incident using a container would be profound... If terrorists used a 
sea container to conceal a weapon of mass destruction and detonated it on arrival at a port, the 
impact on global trade and the global economy could be immediate and devastating - all nations 
would be affected. No container ships would be allowed to unload at U. S. ports after such an 
event (Bonner, R. 2002,26 August, Presentation before the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, quoted in Szyliowicz, 2004: 353-354) 
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, states worldwide have 
been more alert to the threat that terrorism poses. In particular, the use of commercial 
aircraft in those attacks points to the potential further use of commercial shipping in a 
terrorist incident as the above quotation by Robert Bonner, the Commissioner of the US 
Customs Service, attests. Four possibilities for a maritime terrorist event have been 
propounded. The first involves the hijack of a cruise ship and holding the crew and 
passengers to ransom until certain political demands are met. A second scenario 
concerns attacks on commercial shipping, involving robbery or the hijack of crew, in 
order to finance a political agenda. The third possibility is that speedboats laden with 
211 Asymmetrical methods are described as "tactics, organizational configurations, and methods of 
conflict that do not use previously accepted or predictable rules of engagement" (Martin, 2003: Glossary 
G-3). These methods represent the strongest possible means for a weaker actor to attack a stronger actor's 
most vulnerable points. 
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explosives are driven into the side of a cruise ship, a naval vessel or a tanker. 285 A final 
scheme is that a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC), Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) or 
Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) tanker, or a vessel containing a Weapon of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) is sailed into a major port or shipping lane and blown up (Weeks, 
2003: 16; Okabe, 2004: 148-152). 86 Of these potential attacks, only the final scenario 
has not been actualised. 87 
These terrorist schemes can be divided into two categories according to the intentions 
and aims of the terrorists themselves. In the first two scenarios, the terrorists are either 
intent upon gaining certain political concessions, such as the release of political 
prisoners, international recognition of their cause, the return of some disputed territory, 
or acquiring capital to fund their activities. Both the first two scenarios therefore tend to 
be acts perpetrated by ethno-nationalist movements (type-one terrorist groups). Though 
both of these cases involve violence or the threat of violence, the intention is to bargain 
215 A study compiled by Sandia National Laboratory noted that terrorists could hijack an LNG tanker, or 
blast a hole in the side of an LNG tanker with rocket propelled grenades or missiles or a speed boat laden 
with explosives causing a massive fire with a damage radius of 1.6krn (Japan Times, 22 December 2004). 
The low-tcch nature of these terrorist scenarios is noteworthy when compared with the 9/11 attacks, as it 
indicates how mass-destruction can be achieved using simple methods and weapons. Critics have argued, 
however, that the damage caused by an attack on an LNG tanker has been exaggerated, as reports on the 
vulnerability of LNG tankers to a Cole-style terrorist attack have not taken the multi-hull construction of 
LNG tankers into account (Ilusscin, "LNG fights scare tactice', Fairplay, 21 October 2004: 16-18). 
Whilst LNG tankers have an excellent safety record, when changing from liquid to gas form, LNG is a 
highly flammable fuel. An explosive device could breach the tanks on an LNG tanker, releasing a vapour 
cloud, which if ignited could cause extensive damage to people and property nearby (Richardson, 2004: 
4345). 
266 Should a tanker be blown up in the shallowest and narrowest point of the Malacca Straits, which is 
approximately I nautical mile wide and 82 feet deep (fully laden VLCCs nearly reach this depth), the 
costs to the international economy would be substantial (En-Lai, The Patriot -News, 4 June 2004: Al 1). 
Over 50,000 vessels a year transit the Malacca Straits, transporting half of the global oil supplies and two- 
thirds of the world's LNG to East Asia (Burton, Financial Times, 18 May 2004: 9). Tankers would have 
to be rerouted around the northern coast of Australia at a daily cost of up to US$125,000 per tanker and 
approximately 80 extra tankers would have to be chartered to cope (Ellis, quoted in Shutzer, 2003: 3; 
Akimoto and Wcaval, 2004: 63). Some estimates range between US$200,000 and US$300,000 per ship 
(Graham, 2006,25-3 1). As a result, freight rates and the cost of new ships would rise and insurance 
premiums would increase exponentially (Lloyd Parry, The Times, 26 April 2004: 12; Burton, Financial 
Times, 18 May 2004: 9; Nocr, 1996, http: //www. ndu. cdti/inss/strforuni/SF 98/fbnim98. html, accessed I 
November 2005). It has been alleged that a group of Indonesians who fought with the Taliban in 
Afghanistan and call themselves: Group 272, have plans to attack a tanker in the Malacca Straits (Becker, 
New York Dail), News, 21 September 2003: 26). 
2117 On 14 March 2004, two terrorists entered Israel hidden in a container ship and carried out a suicide 
attack against the port of Ashdod that left ten civilians dead and 12 injured (Watson, Fairplay, 9 
September 2004: 18). This attack demonstrated that a vessel could be used to deliver weapons or terrorists 
in order to execute an act of terrorism in a port. For more on terrorist attacks against Israel, see 
//w%, vw. njfa, l;, QvJI, accessed on 24 May 2006. 
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and therefore the victims of the attack are only useful alive. The exception to this is a 
case of armed robbery, but even then, it is unlikely that the terrorists would intentionally 
set out to murder commercial seafarers. An act of armed robbery by a terrorist group is 
very similar to most piratical attacks, the key difference being that the spoils are used 
for political rather than private aims. There is little point in killing crews in a pirate-like 
attack, as this would be more likely to galvanize states into taking action against the 
terrorists by strengthening patrols or diverting commercial shipping. If states were to 
take such measures it would make it more difficult for terrorists looking to fund their 
cause through armed robbery against ships in the future. Hence, acts of terrorism in this 
category involve the restricted use of violence by type-one terrorist organizations to 
fund or further their cause. 
In the third and fourth scenarios, however, the objectives of the terrorists are different. 
In these cases, the target ship, port or sea lane belongs to or benefits an enemy state or 
states and therefore the intention is to cause the enemy state the maximum potential 
destruction primarily through massive loss of life and economic damage, though also 
with the added purpose of politically unsettling a regime or affecting its social 
cohesiveness. For example, the Madrid train bombings on 11 March 2004, in addition to 
the number of casualties and financial costs, also helped cause the defeat of the leading 
political party, the Popular Party, in subsequent national elections held three days after 
the bombing. Madrid was targeted in this instance because of its support for the US in 
the `war against terrorism' and the dispatch of Spanish troops to Iraq 
(http: //news. hbc. co. uk/2/hi/europe/3512222. stni, accessed on 2 February 2006). The 
third and fourth scenarios are therefore more likely to be the work of an International 
Islamic (type-three) terrorist group. The maritime threat posed by International Islamic 
Terrorist groups in Southeast Asia will first be considered, before examining the 
involvement of Ethno Nationalists in maritime terrorism. 
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6.2a The Maritime Threat from International Islamic Terrorist Movements 
The USS Cole288 
On the 12 October 2000, the USS Cole, an Arleigh Burke Class Aegis Destroyer (8,300 
ton displacement) was taking on fuel a short distance from the port of Aden in Yemen. 
The Cole was returning to its home port of Norfolk, Virginia, USA, via the Suez and 
Mediterranean after serving in the Gulf and Arabian Sea. At around 11: 35 a. m., as the 
Cole was finishing refuelling, a small boat containing two Arabs approached the 
destroyer on the port side. Because it was not unusual for the local community to 
approach a US naval ship to sell goods to the crew, the alarm was not raised. The small 
boat hit the side of the Cole under the funnel and the 500 pounds of explosive it carried 
were detonated causing a 40x45 foot hole that rapidly let in water. The crew managed to 
put out the fires caused by the explosion preventing further damage to the ship, and 
were lucky that the explosion had not reached the ammunition dump or missiles. In total, 
17 US naval personnel were killed and 42 were injured in the attack. The Cole was 
towed back to its home port where it underwent repairs for one and a half years, from 13 
December 2000 to 19 April 2002 (Nogi, 2004: 38-39,46). A House Armed Services 
Committee report of the incident could not find fault with the captain of the Cole, 
central naval command or the admiral of the fifth fleet. The report also noted that the 
incident could not have been predicted. The FBI arrested six men in connection with the 
attack on the Cole, including one repatriated Afghan militiaman (Nogi, 2004: 39-40). 
After the USS Cole incident, the US navy developed a number of responses to prevent a 
further act of terrorism being perpetrated on one of its ships. Anti-terrorist training of 
naval personnel has improved in tandem with procedures to warn of and react to a 
potential terrorist incident, including the introduction of onboard weaponry to eliminate 
211 Prior to the attack on the Cole, Muslim extremists attempted to destroy the USS Sullivan in January 
2000. The attack failed as the extremists' boat, over-loaded with explosives, sank in Aden harbour 
(Richardson, 2004: 18; Glass, The Independent on Sunday, 11 January 2004: 8-10). 
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close proximity targets. 289 Port security has also been enhanced to hinder terrorist access 
to naval docks (Weeks, 2003: 17). In November 2002, Al Qaeda's head of maritime 
operations, Abdul Rahim Mohammed Hussein Abda Al-Nasheri, who had 
masterminded the attack on the Cole, was arrested and confessed to plotting a series of 
terror events at sea including striking US and British warships in the Straits of Gibraltar 
(Becker, New York Daily News, 21 September 2003: 26). 
The Limhurz and Basra Oil Terminal 
Another case of an International Islamic Terrorist movement executing a maritime 
terror attack is that of the Limburg, a French oil tanker, which was struck by a 
speedboat carrying explosives on 6 October 2002 in Yemeni waters. The blast killed 
one crew member and set 55,000 tons of fuel alight (Glass, The Independent on Sunday, 
II January 2004: 8-10). The terrorist strike on Iraq's Basra oil terminal on 24 April 
2004, which involved three speedboats laden with explosives, caused US$28 million in 
lost oil profits and killed three US military personnel. This attack could also be included 
amongst acts undertaken by hybrid movements, as the motive of the attack was not to 
extract political concessions but cause maximum economic and political damage to the 
US-backed Iraqi regime in Baghdad and convince the US to withdraw from Iraq (South 
China Morning Post, 16 May 2004: 11; Herburt-Burns, 2005: 155-156). 
6.2h international Islamic Terrorist Groups in Southeast Asia 
The terrorist attacks on the USS Cole, the Limburg and the Basra oil terminal raise the 
possibility of similar incidents occurring in Southeast Asian waters. There are a number 
of International Islamic Terrorist organizations operating in the Southeast Asian region 
which might perpetrate such an attack. The principal organization is Al Qaeda, which in 
turn maintains tics with Jemaah Islamiya (JI), Kumpulan Mujaheddin Malaysia (KMM) 
2=9 For example, Mk38 25mm Chainguns and M2 12.7mm automatic rifles are attached to Oliver Hassard 
Deny Class Frigates of the US Navy (Nogi, 2004: 47-48). 
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and the ASG. Though terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia have different agendas 
and no proven link has been established between these different groups, Al Qaeda's 
capacity to equip, finance and train like-minded individuals and groups indicates that 
there is a strong possibility that terrorist groups in Southeast Asia cooperate (Okabe, 
2004: 150-152). Furthermore, members of all of these organizations include former 
Mujaheddin veterans who had fought in Afghanistan, enabling a network of personal 
contacts to develop amongst various terrorist groups in Southeast Asia (Abuza, 2002: 
428-431; Fealy in Beeson, 2004: 152-154). Connections between terrorist groups also 
facilitates involvement in the illegal trade in drugs and weapons, which move across 
national borders between terrorist groups and help to fund the terrorist's activities 
(Martin, 2003: 201). These illegal trades are conducted in the absence of stringent visa 
restrictions, a lack of checks on financial transactions, insufficient border patrols, 
official corruption and abundant stocks of illegal arms. However, the growth of radical 
Islam in the Southeast Asian region has not simply relied upon transnational Islamic 
networks, but has also increased due to economic hardship, political repression, and the 
deterioration of state education compared with the rise in madrasah (Islamic schools) 
aligned with Wahhabism and Salafi Islam (Abuza, 2002: 428-434). Therefore, the 
combination of economic and social factors coupled with the bonds of cooperation 
between different terrorist organizations have served to bolster the strength and 
capabilities of International Islamic movements in Southeast Asia. 
Fears that International Islamic groups will use their capabilities to target international 
waterways and ports have been voiced in maritime security circles. On 18 February 
2004, Dominic Donald, an analyst at Aegis Defence Services, a security and crisis 
management consultancy firm based in London, hinted in a communique with Reuters 
that Al Qaeda was already planning a maritime terrorist spectacular. His fears have been 
echoed by Tony Tan, the deputy prime minister of Singapore, 290 and Michael 
Richardson of the Southeast Asia Research Centre based in Singapore. Richardson has 
suggested that Al Qaeda operatives could use forged documents to gain employment on 
290 At the 2004 Shangri-La dialogue, Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong noted that Northeast 
Asia's help would be needed if a terrorist attack on Southeast Asia's waterways is to be prevented 
(Virtual Information Center, 2004: 7). 
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board a container ship that the terrorist organization could use to deliver a radiological 
weapon, also referred to as a dirty bomb, atomic device or other WMD. The fact that a 
total of 230 million containers are transported worldwide every year makes guarding 
against the threat of a major terrorist incident a security nightmare. Furthermore, a 
terrorist event in a large international port, such as Singapore or Hong Kong, could 
bring international trade to a standstill, in addition to causing large numbers of civilian 
casualties and destruction (Okabe, 2004: 150-152). In fact, Al-Faruq, a Kuwaiti-born Al 
Qaeda financier who rose to become Al Qaeda's chief of operations in Indonesia, told 
US intelligence officers after capture that he had planned suicide attacks against US 
naval vessels in Surabaya in May 2002, but was unable to gather sufficient operatives to 
carry out the attack (Abuza, 2002: 448-449). In addition, an attack on the Indonesian 
tanker, the Devi Madrim, on 26 March 2003, suggests that terrorists are preparing for a 
major maritime incident. The Devi Madrim was commandeered in the Southern 
Malacca Straits by ten pirates armed with automatic weapons, knives and VHF radios. 
After sailing the Devi Madrim for about an hour, the pirates abandoned the vessel, 
hinting that the attack was a form of practice run for a future terrorist attack (Davis (b) 
2004: 41). Whilst it is clear that a wide range of threats emanating from International 
Islamic Terrorism have been discussed, it still remains to ascertain the extent to which 
the hybrid terrorist network in Southeast Asia has the capacity to carry out such attacks. 
To do so requires that each organization be analysed individually. 
Al Qaeda291 
Al Qaeda, led by Osama Bin Laden of Saudi Arabia and the late Muhammed Atef from 
Egypt, is different from most other terrorist groups in five respects. 292 First, the 
291 Al Qaeda is often translated as "The Base" in the media. However, Islamic radicals usually understand 
aeda to mean "precept" or "method" (Burke, 2004: 18). 292 
Martin actually notes six unique aspects of the Al Qaeda network, however, one of these is the 
assertion that the movement's political goals are ill-defined. This point is contentious in that, although the 
movement may not have any legitimate claims over a particular space unlike a separatist terrorist 
organization, their aim to remove the US presence from the Middle East and the establishment of a 
caliphate throughout the Middle East serve as the organizations' main over-arching aims, which Martin 
himself acknowledges (Martin, 2003: 234). The objective to replace the interstate society with a caliphate 
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organization does not hold territory, but is instead a fluid network of like-minded 
groups that can operate in any given territorial space. Second, being a fluid network of 
groups, Al Qaeda is horizontally structured in that there is no vertically aligned system 
of hierarchical ranks to which individuals are promoted. Third, Al Qaeda does not 
represent the political ambitions of a particular ethno-nationalist group, but rather fights 
for all militarily and politically repressed Muslims throughout the world. Fourth, the 
organization receives virtually no state funding. Finally, the organization's 
understanding of world affairs is entirely religious. The estimated total number of Al 
Qaeda operatives ranges between 35,000 and 50,000, though the precise figure is 
difficult to determine owing to the impact of the American led `war on terrorism' on the 
group. On the one hand, the success of the 9/11 attacks, coupled with the insurgency in 
Iraq following the fall of the Hussein regime, will have potentially increased Al Qaeda's 
recruits. On the other hand, the fall of the Taliban government in November 2001 in 
Afghanistan disrupted Al Qaeda's operations and led to many of their number being 
killed or captured (Martin, 2003: 115,194-195). Burke maintains that until the US-led 
`war on terror', "Al Qaeda functioned like a venture capital firm", by donating funds, 
resources and training to militant Islamic fighters. Following the exodus of the Taliban 
from Afghanistan, Al Qaeda's central base of operations were severely disrupted, but 
the goals Al Qaeda pursues have grown in strength and popularity. These goals include 
the expulsion of the West from the Middle East and the establishment of a caliphate (a 
single Islamic state) extending across Islamic countries worldwide (Burke, 2004: 18-19). 
The proclivity for Al Qaeda to employ asymmetrical forms of warfare, such as the use 
of commercial aircraft in the 9/11 attacks, as well as the use of chemical weapons by an 
affiliated group in an attempt to destroy the World Trade Centre buildings in 1993 
coupled with a desire to inflict mass casualties indicates that future strikes may involve 
WMD (Martin, 2003: 5-6,15-16). 293 Kweilen Kimmelman, an analyst at the 
in the Middle East is the core reason why Al Qaeda are viewed as infidels rather than barbarians in this 
thesis. 
293 The extent of the WMD threat is debatable, however. The Aum Shinrikyo attacks against the Japanese 
subway system in March 1995 are usually stated as the prime example of the threat posed by WMD 
wielding terrorists, in spite of the fact that explosives used in terrorist attacks have a far higher kill-ratio 
compared with the sarin gas attacks in the Tokyo subway which ultimately killed 12 people. The Aum 
strike did injure 3,796 others, however, indicating the wider, non-lethal affect that WMD can have 
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Washington-based think-tank, the Maritime Intelligence Group, argues that Al Qaeda 
are said to possess between 15 to 25 ships which are used to transport people and 
weapons worldwide (En-Lai, Oakland Tribune, 4 June 2004: 1). Moreover, Al Qaeda's 
connections with the attacks on the Linzburg and Cole demonstrate that Al Qaeda has 
both the motive and means to perpetrate acts of maritime terror on its own. However, 
the US-led attacks on Afghanistan, which destroyed Al Qaeda's central base of 
operations, may have seriously disrupted the operational capabilities of the group. The 
true extent of the maritime threat posed by Al Qaeda in the aftermath of 9/11 lies in its 
ties with other Islamic terror groups in Southeast Asia. 
Jemaah Islamiya (. 11 
Jemaah Islamiya (JI - the Community of Islam) first evolved in Indonesia in the 1960s 
when the radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir founded a pirate radio station propounding the 
establishment of Shariah law. Bashir, with the help of another cleric, Abdullah Sungkar, 
went on to create Islamic schools (madrasah and pesentren) where students would be 
instructed in the strict Islamic philosophy of Salafi Wahhabism. Selected pupils from 
these Islamic schools would then be sent to Afghanistan and Pakistan for training in Al 
Qaeda bases or to MILF camps in Mindanao, where they would learn terrorist strategy 
and organization. Between 1994 and 1995, JI was formally established and developed 
cells in the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia and received funding from 
Al Qaeda. Arrests made by the Singaporean authorities in December 2001 and August 
2002 revealed that the Singaporean JI cell was planning USS Cole-style attacks on US 
(Hoffman, 1998: 92,120-127). The 11 March 2004 train bombings in Madrid, Spain, which killed 191 
and injured 1,800 people, and the 7 July 2005 bombings in London, England, which killed 52 and injured 
700 people, were a clear indication that terrorists could achieve their aims through conventional means 
(http: //news. bbc. co. uk/2/hi/curope/3597885. stm, and 
http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/shared/spl/hi/uk/05/london blasts/what happened/html/default. stm, accessed 1 
February 2005). Indeed, recent reports indicate that the threat posed by WMD is much lower than is 
generally reported in the media or over the course of political campaigns. This is because of the 
difficulties faced in acquiring and detonating many different kinds of WMD (Rothstein, Auer and Siegel, 
2004: 3641,44-47,73; Burke, 2004: 24). 
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naval vessels and personnel in and around Singapore. 294 On 12 October 2002, JI 
executed the Bali bombings in which nearly 190 people were killed (Abuza, 2002: 450- 
459; Glass, The Independent on Sunday, 11 January 2004: 8-10). JI leaders that have 
been arrested have testified that the group also considered attacks on Malacca shipping 
(Nakashima and Sipress, The Washington Post, 2 June 2004: A12; Ilendropriyono, 
Jakarta Post, 25 August 2004: 2). 295 Despite these clear links to terrorism, the 
Indonesian government has not outlawed JI, as it is believed such a move would rally 
the wider Muslim community against the Yudhoyono administration (Benvenuti, 2006: 
283-284). 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
A further group with links to Al Qaeda are the ASG. The ASG was founded in 1991 by 
Ustadz Abdurajak Janjilani, a Moro fundamentalist who had served as a Mujaheddin 
fighter and trained at the Khost camp in Afghanistan, and Ramzi Yousef, a bomb maker 
who had been an instructor at the Khost camp and was responsible for the 1993 World 
Trade Centre bombing. 296 The aim of the group is to create a Muslim state in the 
southern Philippines. 297 Bin Laden, who wanted to expand Al Qaeda's global operations, 
sent funds to support the establishment of the Abu Sayyaf group in the southern 
Philippines. Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya have both provided the ASG with technical 
planning and expertise. Since its creation, the ASG has been responsible for numerous 
terrorist attacks in the Philippines, including the bombing of Philippine Airlines 747- 
294 The Singapore JI cell apparently intended to procure 21 tons of ammonium nitrate to attack targets in 
Singapore (compared with between one and two tons of ammonium nitrate used in the terrorist strike 
against the Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995). In fact, the group only purchased four tons of 
ammonium nitrate, though this disappeared from the warehouse where it had been stored (Glass, The 
Independent on Sunday, 11 January 2004: 8-10). 
295 Bashir himself was arrested in connection with the Bali bombings, though he was not convicted for 
participating in the attacks. Instead, Bashir received a four year prison sentence for sedition, as a number 
of the Bali bombers had studied at his school (Smith Kipp, 2004: 63). 
296 The title `Abu Sayyaf derives from the name of the Islamic scholar, Abdur Rab Rasul Sayyaf, who 
taught Wahhabi Islam at the Khost training camp in Afghanistan which he also ran (Abuza, 2002: 440). 
Ramzi Yousef later developed a separate cell that he used to conduct terrorist missions independently of 
ASG, which he believed lacked the ability to `carry out serious terrorist acts' (Abuza, 2002: 443). 
297 The main reason for not delineating the ASG as a separatist group in spite of its aims are its strong ties 
to Al Qaeda which means that it functions more as an agent for Al Qaeda than an independent separatist 
movement that could renounce its struggle in return for political concessions (Abuza, 2003: 99-101). 
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200 Flight 434 from Cebu to Tokyo which killed a Japanese businessman (Abuza, 2002: 
439-443; Martin, 2003: 195). The group has also been active in the Sulu Sea,. 
kidnapping ship's crews for ransom. 
The ASG is comprised of 300400 Filipino members based on islands in the Sulu and 
Basilan provinces of the Philippines. ASG also possesses fast-vessels and well-armed 
crews able to seize ships. Members of ASG usually form raiding gangs of 10-20 men 
anned with M16 rifles and occasionally M79 grenade launchers and general purpose 
machine guns. In April 2000, an ASG operation targeted the Sipadan diving resort in 
the Celebes Sea, south of the Sabah port of Sempoma. In this raid, 21 Western tourists 
and resort employees were kidnapped, their ransom raising US$25 million dollars for 
ASG (Davis (b) 2004: 39-41). Abu Sayyaf also exploded a bomb on board Superferry 
298 14 on 27 February 2004. The blast and subsequent fire claimed the lives of over 100 
of the 899 passengers on the ship (Rivera, 2005: 130; Banlaoi in Ho and Raymond 
(eds. ), 2005: 67). Though the attack on the Superferry 14 proved Abu Sayyaf's ability to 
carry out a major act of terrorism, an article in the Economist reported that the bombing 
was in response to a failure to extort money from the feffy company (The Economist, 19 
February 2005: 33). The indication here is that, since the death of Janjalani in 1998 and 
the capture of key commanders, such as Ghalib Andang, Abu Sayyaf have broken into 
little more than a criminal syndicate with ties to official collaborators in local 
government, the military and police (Abuza, 2003: 111-113,207-208; Rogers, 2004: 15- 
20; Rivera, 2005: 130). From an English School perspective the ASG might be better 
characterised as pirates or criminals than barbarians or infidels, as the ASG's goals 
appear to have become economic rather than political. 
Nevertheless, whilst Al Qaeda funding to the group has been cut, foreign jihadists still 
train at ASG camps. The ASG is also perceived as an organization that could forge 
deeper links with Al Qaeda, especially as Al Qaeda's top leadership has been on the run 
since the 9/11 attacks (Abuza, 2003: 113-114). Therefore, stronger ties with Al Qaeda 
would draw ASG into the infidel category. With this in mind, the US and Filipino 
298 Abu Sayyaf had attacked a ferry prior to this incident killing 45 passengers and crew (Glass, The 
Independent on Sunday, I1 January 2004: 8-10). 
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governments designated the ASG as a terrorist group and a successful campaign against 
Abu Sayyaf has been launched by the Filipino military, with US special forces advisors, 
greatly reducing the capacity of the group to commit major acts of terrorism (Martin, 
2003: 196). Filipino troops were even pulled from their mission against Abu Sayyaf on 
the Southern Island of Jolo and dispatched to fight the greater threat posed by New 
People's Army (NPA) of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) on the island of 
Samar (Montesano, 2004: 95-96). Conversely, this may lead to the ASG undertaking 
lower-level acts of maritime violence (akin to action taken by type-one movements) 
more frequently in a bid to finance their activities in the wake of the military campaign 
to root them out as separatist movements in Southeast Asia have done. 
6.2c The Separatist Threat 
The Achille Lauro 
One of the most significant separatist incidents to occur at sea was that of the Achille 
Lauro. On 7 October 1985,400 passengers and crew aboard the Achille Lauro cruise 
ship, which was travelling from Alexandria to Port Said in Egypt, were taken hostage 
by four members of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) . 
299 The separatists demanded 
the release of 50 of their comrades held prisoner in Israel and killed one wheelchair- 
bound US citizen. After two days the hostages were released and the separatists flown 
out of Egypt on a 737 jet, only to be diverted by US navy F-14 Tomcats to Sicilia, Italy, 
where the separatists were arrested . 
300 The mastermind behind the attack, Abul Abbas, 
was later captured after the fall of Baghdad in April 2003. The ease with which the 
I" It is frequently reported that the PLF members had intended to attack the Israeli port of Ashdod, but a 
waiter on board the Achille Lauro disturbed the separatists as they were cleaning their weapons forcing 
them to act prematurely and take control of the vessel. However, contradictory testimonies given by the 
separatists in court coupled with the inadequacy of the separatists' weaponry for attempting an attack on 
Ashdod, indicates that Abul Abbas was attempting to conceal the separatists' true intentions to capture 
the ship itself. The need for this smokescreen can be explained by the need to make the act legitimate in 
the eyes of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), with which the PLF was affiliated. The PLO 
only sanctioned attacks on Israelis (Cassese, 1989: 109-113). 
300 The interdiction of the 737 jet in international airspace has been described as illegal, as it was a 
violation of international airspace. This raises doubts as to the legality of inspections conducted under the 
Proliferation Security Initiative, described later in this chapter (Valencia, 2005: 44). 
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separatists were able to hijack the Achille Lauro raised serious concerns about maritime 
security issues and consequently the Suppression of Unlawful Acts at Sea (SUA Treaty), 
which was examined in Chapter 3, was signed in March 1988 and went into effect in 
March 1992. The SUA Treaty covers any act that damages or threatens the control or 
management of a ship, its crew or cargo. The act represented the first multinational 
response to international maritime terrorism (Young and Valencia, 2003: 275; Jesus, 
2003: 388; Nogi, 2004: 44-45). 
6.2d The Ethno-nationalist Terrorist Threat in Southeast Asia 
Separatists or ethno-national communal terrorists differ from what Goldstone refers to 
as International Islamic Terrorism. Ethno-national communal terrorism involves the 
conflict between a group striving to maintain its cultural, historical, social, religious and 
ethnic identities against an opposed group. This type of terrorism often takes the form of 
a separatist or independence movement who wish to protect a specific people by 
breaking away from what the movement perceives or experiences to be an oppressive 
state (Martin, 2003: 124-125). The two main examples of ethno-national communal 
terrorist movements in Southeast Asia which target maritime traffic as a means of 
furthering their political goals are the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) based in 
Mindanao in the southern Philippines and the Free Aceh Movement (Gerak-an Aceh 
Merdeka - GAM) in northern Sumatra, Indonesia. 
Acch Attacks 
In 1976, Hasan di Tiro, a businessman and descendant of pre-colonial sultans, 
established the Aceh-Sumatra Liberation Front, which later became GAM, in response 
to the siphoning off of Acch's natural resources by the central government as well as to 
assert historical independence from Jakarta. Though chiefly involved in publicising 
their movement's cause, GAM were swiftly defeated by military action ordered by the 
Suliarto regime in Jakarta. By the end of the 1980s, however, the group had re-created 
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themselves as a liberation movement and began a bitter underground struggle against 
government forces in the province. Talks between Jakarta and GAM began after the fall 
of the Suharto regime in 1998, but have stalled frequently, resulting in a return to 
violence in the province. The military measures undertaken in Aceh since 9/11 have 
involved as many as 50,000 government forces against an estimated 5,000 rebels 
(Taylor, 2003: 364-367; Carey, P. 2004: 39). The Indonesian military (TNI) is one of 
the main causes of this renewed conflict, having engaged in abuses of human rights that 
fuel the dispute, but also because it is not in the TNI's political or economic interests to 
resolve the conflict. Aceh separatism is a raison detre for the TNI, which portrays itself 
as the only force capable of holding the fractious Indonesian state together and demands 
ever greater resources from the Indonesian government to be able to do so. Moreover, 
security contracts for protecting oil and gas fields in the Aceh region, as well as alleged 
military activity in extortion, drug tracking and illegal logging, all provide the TNI with 
substantial additional wealth (Huxley, 2002: 34-41,45-46; Collins, 2002: 603). The 
case of the KAL YOUTEFA, examined in Chapter 3 (ICC-IMB Piracy Report third 
Quarter 2004: 29), is evidence of the TNI's involvement in maritime crime; a 
connection that has often been alluded to (Shutzer, 2003: 9). A lack of political will to 
reform the Indonesian military coupled with the strength of the TNI, which pervades all 
levels of government and even has the power to determine up to 75 percent of its own 
budget, has ossified the political situation in Indonesia (Muna, 2004: 6-7). 
Continued TNI campaigns in Aceh have forced GAM to lie low. In doing so, GAM has 
had to develop covert means of obtaining capital to fund its cause. In 2003 a number of 
trends concerning piratical attacks evolved. These trends included the increased use of 
automatic weapons, attacks involving multiple ships and military style operations. 
There is a range of evidence that points to the involvement of Aceh separatists in these 
attacks on shipping. First, GAM, under pressure from Indonesian military forces on land 
coupled with the freezing of terrorist financial assets since 9/11, have had an incentive 
to establish alternative means of acquiring capital, such as armed robbery against ships 
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(Herrmann, 2004: 24). 301 Second, Aceh guerrillas possess the training and resources to 
conduct the kind of well organised maritime operations that were recorded in 2003 and 
2004. Third, the majority of these well organised attacks occurred within 30 nautical 
miles of the Acch coastline. Fourth, the objective of the attacks is to rob ships and seize 
302 
individual crew members who are held for ransom in Aceh (Okabe, 2004: 148-149). 
For example, on 2 February 2004, Aceh separatists armed with M16 rifles boarded a 
Malaysian fishing trawler near Pulau Jerajak in the Malacca Straits. The skipper of the 
trawler and nine crew members were held hostage and taken to Aceh where they were 
beaten. As well as stealing ship's documents, equipment and the catch of fish, Aceh 
guerrillas were paid to release their hostages on 5 February by the owner of the trawler 
303 (ICC-IMB Piracy Report third Quarter 2004: 16). Malaysian and Indonesian police 
also allege that Aceh guerrillas have been involved in a number of other attacks, 
including that against the Penrider in August 2003, the Aff Cherry 201 in January 2004 
and against barges and tug boats in the Malacca Straits (Bradsher, International Herald 
Tribune, 16 August 2003: 1; Yong Tiarn Kui, New Straits Times, 17 August 2003: 4; 
, 4sah! Shimbun, 22 August 2003: 
6; Okabe, 2004: 149-150; Mortishead, The Times, 29 
January 2004: 33; http: //,, vw, ýv. icc,. vbo. orv. /ccs/news archives/2003/pi racy ms. asp, 
accessed on 25 September 2003; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 19 September 2004: 13). 304 
301 Following the declaration of martial law in the Aceh region on 19 May 2003,45,000 Indonesian troops 
were dispatched to defeat the 3,000 to 5,000 Aceh guerrillas. Although this operation proved unsuccessful 
at destroying the GAM resistance, it did force the separatists underground and proved the dominance of 
the military in Indonesian politics (Kipp Smith, 2004: 67-68). 
302 A typical ransom for a hostage held by GAM starts at around US$ 100,000, but is often negotiated 
down to US$ 10,000420,000. Many ransom cases go unreported because shipowners will be blamed if 
they pay for the release of their crew or if the crew is killed (Davis 2004b: 39). 
303 Ransoms paid are negotiable and usually bartered down to a price affordable for the shipping company. 
This has led to a degree of acceptance amongst shipowners that paying off the pirates is part-and-parcel of 
doing business in Indonesian waters. Nevertheless, four kidnapped crew members of an oil tanker were 
killed when their owner failed to pay their ransom. In another case, the ransoms for 13 crew were 
bargained down from 400 million rupiah to 70 million rupiah, but when this sum was not delivered a 
month after the kidnapping incident four of the crew were killed and the restjumped overboard to escape 
(Urquhart, 16 June 2004, http: //business-times. asial. com. sg/storyprintfriendly/0,4568,119862,00. htmi?, 
accessed on 22 June 2004). The case of the Idaten, addressed in the previous chapter, is an example of 
Japanese crew members being taken hostage and held for ransom. The involvement of GAM in the Idaten 
hkjacking has not been conf irmcd. 
30ý The Indonesian consulate in Penan, Malaysia, has nonetheless argued that pirate attacks are unlikely to 
be the work of Acch guerillas due to the extensive patrols undertaken by the Indonesian navy around the 
Acch coast (Asahi Shimbun, 22 August 2003: 6). This statement echoes that of the Indonesian Admiral 
Bernard Kent Sondakh who proclaimed that the IMB's piracy figures greatly overstated the extent of 
piracy in and around Indonesia. fie noted that whilst the IMB put the total number of piracy incidents at 
121 for 2003, he believed the actual figure to be 20 attacks (Rao, Fairplay, 2004: 4). The IMB has also 
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The hijacking of tugs and barges in the Malacca Straits is a recent trend. The slow speed 
and the low height of the deck from the waterline makes tugs and barges easy for pirates 
to board. Tugs and barges are also targeted as they are so commonplace that they can be 
used to transport illicit goods or people without arousing suspicion (Davis (b), 2004: 39). 
This suggests that engaging in maritime crime can benefit separatist groups like GAM 
by supplying the movement with capital, through the seizure of goods and ransom of 
crew, as well as providing a means for the group to conduct further illegal activities to 
fund their political objectives. However, as tugboats are used to pull a variety of vessels, 
including tankers and naval ships, in to port, so it is feared that hijacked tugboats might 
be rigged with explosives and used by terrorists in a clandestine strike on one of 
Southeast Asia's main ports (Akimoto and Weaval, 2004: 6 1). 305 Such a strike would be 
unlikely to involve GAM as they are adverse to establishing alliances with terrorist 
groups in the region, as these organizations do not share the same political goals. 
Instead GAM has focussed on targeting ships and facilities in areas that it claims as its 
own sovereign territory. For example, ExxonMobil assets have been attacked at 
Lhokseumave (Davis (b), 2004: 41), forcing one gas plant to close for five months 
(Glass, The Independent on Sunday, II January 2004: 8-10). Nevertheless, two leading 
figures in the Al Qaeda movement, Ayman al-Zawahiri and the late Mohammed Atef, 
have both travelled to Aceh where they were reportedly impressed by the environment 
in which GAM operated and the local support GAM received (Abuza, 2002: 446). 
GAM operatives have also trained abroad in Libya between 1986 and 1989 and in Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front camps in the Philippines (Dillon, Asian Wall Street Journal, 20 
October 2004: A. 7). 
noted the possibility of criminal organizations copying the modus opcrandi of Aceh separatists and 
engaging in hijack and ransom cases (http: //www. iccwbo. oriz/ccs/ýcws arch ives/2003/piracy ms. asp, 
accessed on 25 September 2003). This further complicates assessments of the true extent of politically 
motivated piracy. 
305 The IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre has been instrumental in recovering hijacked ships On a number of 
occasions. For example, on 8 January 2005, Malaysian authorities acting on information provided by the 
Piracy Reporting Centre discovered the hijacked Indonesian tug Christian and barge Flora at the port of 
Tawau in East Malaysia. The Royal Malaysian Police detained four individuals in connection with the 
hijacked vessels though the nine crew remain unaccounted for. A total of 23 attacks against tugs and 
barges occurred in 2004. Five of these incidents involved criminal gangs who kidnapped the master and 
crew and demanded ransoms http: //Nvww. icc-ccs. ora/niain/news. phi2? newsid=38, accessed 20 January 
2005). 
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Indonesia has responded to the maritime threat posed by GAM by deploying four 
warships and two Nomad surveillance aircraft around the Aceh coast under the Sabang 
Jaya Operation. These military forces have been given the additional task of identifying 
vessels smuggling weapons into the Aceh region (Virtual Information Center, 17 April 
2001). Yet while such moves have been welcomed by the IMB whose members have 
repeatedly stressed the impact that Indonesia's naval forces can have on deterring piracy 
when they take sufficient action (Rao, Fairplay, 2004: 4; 
http: //,, v-vvw. iccwbo-orp_/news arcbives/2004/acch 2004. asp, accessed on I July 2004), 
the presence of these warships have failed to stem the tide of maritime violence in the 
region. This is primarily because the conflict in Aceh is mired in an economic and 
social quandary that is mirrored throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Poverty 
combined with public demand for improved standards of living as well as debt as high 
as 140 percent of Indonesia's GDP have served to dcstabilise Indonesia (Huxley, 2002: 
7-27; Bulworth, 2004: 8-9). Responsibility for this debt does not lie merely on the 
shoulders of the Indonesian government, but also on the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and World Bank that have imposed inappropriate reforms and generated more 
debt (Setiawan, 2004: 12-13). 
The dangers posed by Indonesian instability are regional in scope. Taking the maritime 
actions of GAM as an example, threats posed by the separatist group to the ExxonMobil 
natural gas production plant in Aceh forced the facility to close in early 2001. As a 
result, ExxonMobil's Japanese and South Korean customers were forced to seek 
supplies from alternative sources. Furthermore, continued piratical and politically 
motivated maritime crime has forced insurance premiums upward to the extent that 
Japanese shipping companies have devised alternative routes for their vessels. However, 
it is not only piracy and terrorism, but also human and narcotics trafficking, the 
possibility of separatist fervour spreading and intensifying in the region, as well as 
ecological issues associated with the nexus between Indonesia's political, military and 
criminal elites that threaten the political, ecological and economic well-being of Asia 
(I luxley, 2002: 74-85). Hence, responding to the myriad of problems faced by Indonesia 
is an international as well as domestic matter. 
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However, the position of the international community led by the US has been 
ambiguous. On the one hand, the US State Department labels GAM as a separatist 
movement, despite recognition that the movement is involved in diverse crimes, 
including murder, kidnapping and blackmail, and therefore meets the State 
Department's criteria to be categorised as a foreign terrorist organization. The criteria 
are that a group is foreign, and engaged in terrorist acts that threaten the lives of US 
citizens or US security, as GAM attacks on ExxonMobil personnel, facilities, transport 
and its involvement in armed robbery against ships all demonstrate. Furthermore, GAM 
rebels have trained in Libya between 1986 and 1989, have connections with both Al 
Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiya, and train in Moro Islamic Liberation Front camps (Dillon, 
Asian Wall Sireet Journal, 20 October 2004: A7). On the other hand, the global 
community has not sought to intervene in the Aceh conflict, fearing that Indonesia will 
fragment should the province be allowed to secede. Instead, the global community has 
hailed the moderation of Indonesian democracy whilst largely ignoring the repression of 
separatist forces in Aceh by the Indonesian army (TNI). This is in spite of the fact that 
the actions of the Indonesian military and the paramilitary groups they recruited have 
been slated as causing numerous human rights violations (Collins, 2002: 589; Burchill, 
2004: 4-5). 
The impact of the 26 December tsunami which hit north Sumatra, including the troubled 
Acch region, led to hopes that the extent of the devastation and human loss might 
reconcile GAM and the Indonesian government in Jakarta. With this in mind, cease-fire 
talks between GAM and the Indonesian government began in early February 2005 in 
Finland (The Economist, I January 2005: 18; The Economist, 29 January 2005: 28), 
which resulted in a potential referendum for Acehnese independence to be held by 2015 
(Chow, 2005: 306-307). As Chapter 2 noted, the peace deal has ended the conflict in 
Aceh, though it remains to be seen whether economic and social improvements in the 
region will result in an end of piratical violence. 
261 
MILF Attacks 
A further separatist organization that continues to threaten international shipping 
through its maritime operations is the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The 
MILF is reputed to have between 12,000 and 15,000 fighters and is involved in a war of 
secession from the Philippines. Prior to the US occupation of the Philippines, the Moro 
region of the southern Philippines had existed as an independent sultanate. The MILF 
emerged in 1946 to demand the secession of the Moro region from the newly 
independent state of the Philippines. Despite its secessionist aims, the MILF benefits 
from links with international terrorist organizations (Akimoto and Weaval, 2004: 62). In 
1988, Osama Bin Laden sent his brother-in-law Mohammed Jammal Khalifa to the 
Philippines to enlist combatants in the war in Afghanistan. By 1991, Khalifa looked to 
build an Al Qaeda network in the Philippines, and, under the official guise of director of 
the Islamic International Relief Organization (IIRO) for the Philippines, began to fund 
and train MILF rebels. Though MILF denies links to Al Qaeda, an interview with Al 
IIaj Murad, the MILF vice-chairman for military affairs, revealed that MILF did receive 
"help and assistance" from Bin Laden and Khalifa. Furthermore, the existence of 
Middle Eastern and Pakistani trainers was confirmed when the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) overran the MILF headquarters, Camp Abu Bakar, in 2001 and 
uncovered passports and visa documentation belonging to the foreign instructors. MILF 
camps have also been used to train other jihadis in Southeast Asia, suggesting 
widespread links between separatist groups and international terrorist organizations 
(Abuza, 2002: 435-439). 
The MILF remain active, though a ceasefire called in the second half of 2003 and 
ongoing negotiations hold the key to resolving the 30 year old separatist dispute in the 
south of the Philippines (Montesano, 2004: 97-98). In October 2004, a peace monitoring 
team comprised of 51 Malaysian and ten Brunei officials arrived in Mindanao to 
oversee the continuing peace process (Rivera, 2005: 129-130). As noted in Chapter 3, 
since early 2006, continued peace talks between the Arroyo government and the MILF 
separatists have raised hopes that the conflict in Mindanao, which has claimed 120,000 
lives over the course of three decades of fighting, will finally be resolved 
262 
(litte: //news. bbc. co. uk/t/hi/world/asia-pacific/country profiles/] 262783. stm, accessed 
15 July 2006). 
The Ethno Nationalist maritime threat has been addressed in three ways that this thesis 
has already examined. Ethno Nationalist attacks at sea are similar in method, though 
crucially not in terms of motivation, to pirate attacks. Therefore, acts of maritime 
violence perpetrated by GAM are hindered by the coordinated anti-piracy patrols 
between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (examined in Chapter 5), and attacks by 
MILF are impeded by enhanced cooperation between the US and Philippine militaries 
(addressed in Chapter 3). Furthermore, the ISPS Code, which is examined later in this 
chapter, in demanding security plans for commercial vessels enhances their protection 
against boarding by barbarians, infidels or pirates. Finally, diplomatic responses to the 
Aceh separatist issue in Indonesia and the Mindanao secessionist problem have begun 
to tackle the political demands of GAM and MILF respectively that have motivated 
these groups to resort to maritime violence. 
6.2c Shipping Terrorist Weaponrv and Equipment 
A final concern for states since the advent of the 9/11 attacks has been the shipping of 
terrorist goods and materials belonging to either ethno-nationalist movements or 
International Islamic Terrorist organizations. Just as containerization. has facilitated the 
illicit trade in drugs, weapons, people and goods, so too could terrorist materials be 
shipped to a country where a terrorist incident is planned or to support separatist groups 
in conducting their activities (Johnston and Nath, 2004: 255; Price, 2004: 329). 306 For 
example, the capture of the Baltic Sky, which was carrying 680 tons of explosive and 
8000 detonators, in the Mediterranean Sea in June 2003 by Greek authorities suggests 
that terrorist groups may be plotting an attack on a major port (Akimoto and Weaval, 
306 in 2000,90 percent of the world's freight was transported in containers and 50 million containers were 
used to carry cargo between the world's ports (Slater, 2000, quoted in Szyliowicz, 2004: 353). 
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307 2004: 63-64). Of course, the large number of detonators found indicate that the Ballic 
Sky may have been transporting bomb materials to be used in several smaller-scale 
terrorist attacks on land. Therefore, maritime transportation networks provide both a 
medium with which to perpetrate terrorist acts as well as the means by which terrorists 
convey their resources. Considering the volume of global maritime traffic, it is difficult 
for states to protect themselves from terrorists using maritime transportation networks to 
perpetrate acts of terrorism (Szyliowicz, 2004: 351-368). 
Whilst the maritime terrorist scenarios envisaged as being planned by International 
Islamic Terrorism are certainly more devastating than action taken by ethno-nationalist 
movements, they are both less frequent and far more difficult to anticipate than ethno- 
nationalist maritime acts. Maritime terrorism perpetrated by ethno-nationalist 
movements poses a far greater threat to international shipping on a daily basis. 
Furthermore, enhanced patrols coupled with diplomatic negotiations with separatists 
could significantly decrease the threat of ethno-nationalist maritime terrorism. Though 
deals have been brokered between the separatist movements and the governments they 
oppose, international attention remains focused on countering International Islamic 
Terrorist organizations as demonstrated by the response of countries like the US and 
Japan in the aftermath of 9/11. 
6.3 US-led Maritime Security Initiatives and Japan's Response 
US policy regarding Southeast Asia has always tended to centre on military factors. The 
events of 9/11 revitalised US foreign policy towards this region by honing in on the 
threat from expanding terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia. As a result, the US has 
signed agreements with ASEAN powers designed to combat regional terrorism and 
even dispatched special forces to the Philippines as advisers to help indigenous forces 
defeat the MILF and ASG in the south of the country. Furthennore, the US has 
307 NATO had compiled a blacklist of suspect terror vessels to aid with the interdiction of ships like the 
Baltic Sky. I lowever, the Baltic Sky was not on this blacklist (Becker, New York Daily News, 21 
September 2003: 26). 
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maintained its forward-deployed military presence in the Southeast Asian region 
through its alliances with Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia, 
with a view to uphold regional stability and the safety of Southeast Asian SLOCs 
(Montesano and Hwee, 2004: 321-328). 
The US has also sought to encourage regional cooperation and active participation on 
the part of littoral Southeast Asian states to protect their domestic and adjacent 
international waters against the threats of piracy and terrorism. The US has persistently 
asked for Southeast Asian states to secure the Malacca Straits against piracy and 
terrorist attacks (Business Times, 27 July 2004). US naval vessels have even been 
dispatched to the Malacca Straits and participated in joint patrols of the Malacca Straits 
with the Indian navy in mid-April 2002 to act as a deterrent against terrorists or pirates 
(Weeks, 2003: 17). Nevertheless, the US itself has found it difficult to insert its own 
naval presence into the domestic waters of Southeast Asian states. In particular, the US 
has raised concem that the domestic maritime territories of Malaysia and Indonesia are 
under policed, leading to the assertion by Admiral Thomas Fargo, commander of US 
forces in the Pacific, on 31 March 2004 that a Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
(RMSI) be adopted whereby US marines on high speed vessels could be employed to 
secure the Malacca Straits. Admiral Fargo's statement was quickly retracted following 
strong rebuttals from Malaysia and Indonesia which both claimed that Fargo's proposal 
would infringe sovereignty rights and that the presence of marines in the Malacca 
Straits would draw more terrorists to the region (Business Times, 22 June 2004). 308 
In addition to military deployments, the US has initiated a series of measures to upgrade 
security at its ports. These measures include the introduction of security zones, Naval 
vessel protection zones, advance notice of arrival of ships and the publication of 
guidelines for port and vessel security. The Naval vessel protection zones inhibit a ship 
from sailing within 100 yards of a US Naval vessel in US waters and ships within 500 
yards of a naval vessel must proceed at no-wake speed. This measure is undoubtedly in 
301 It has been argued that Admiral Fargo's comments were taken out of context. However, his assertion 
that the "RMSI was still embryonic and that it was mainly concernedwith sharing information rather than 
the deployment of US forces in the region [my italics]" (Bronson, 2005: 2 1), is hardly convincing in that 
it does not rule out the deployment of US forces. 
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response to the attack on the USS Cole and the threat of a similar strike in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The advance notice of the arrival of a ship must be 
submitted 96 hours before the ship actually enters a US port and includes information 
on the port of embarkation and the destination of the vessel, complete biographical 
details of the crew members (including date of birth, nationality and passport number), a 
description of the cargo, and the vessel's name, registry and ownership details. Based 
on this information, the US Customs authority can determine whether or not to board 
the vessel for inspection (Roach, 2003: 354-36 1). 309 Whilst the inclusion of the crew's 
biographical details has raised alarm in certain quarters (amongst seaman's unions, such 
as Numast, for example) that crews are being unfairly targeted, the inclusion of registry 
details may have a significant impact upon flags of convenience. Ships fly flags of 
convenience because they are cheaper and easier to acquire than those of major 
maritime shipping powers, such as the UK, Japan or the US. However, if vessels from a 
particular flag state are regularly targeted by US Customs and delayed for inspection at 
port, it may prove cheaper over the long-term to fly the flag of a recognised maritime 
power. Allowing flags of convenience to be slowly phased out in this way is one of the 
best means of securing international waterways against terrorism, as the registration of 
vessels would be tightened (Luft and Korin, 2004: 70; Boutilier in Raymond and Ho, 
2005: 26). 
The US has also introduced measures to secure transportation networks from the threat 
posed by maritime terrorism. Before 9/11, the tendency regarding securing 
transportation networks, primarily aviation networks, against international terrorism 
was reactive rather than proactive. International transport organizations tended to put 
prevention measures in place after a particular terrorist incident had occurred, such as 
infra-rcd devices or metal detectors, installed after the use of the suitcase bomb which 
exploded on Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland (Hoffman, 
1998: 18; Price, 2004: 330; Szyliowicz, 2004: 356). The measures put in place by the 
US since 9/11 have been far more robust, however, spanning the four security domains 
of-. prevention, detection, response and recovery. Prevention entails the construction of 
309 Ships carrying hazardous cargo, such as explosives, oxidizing cargo, poisonous material or radioactive 
material, must detail the name, amount and location in stowage on the ship (Roach, 2003: 356). 
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security mechanisms and systems which stop a terrorist event from occurring. Detection 
refers to the use of intelligence to disrupt terrorist attempts to stage an attack. Response 
involves minimising the human and structural damage caused by a terrorist incident. 
Finally, recovery concerns the physical rebuilding of infrastructure and psychological 
rehabilitation of human survivors after a terrorist incident (Price, 2004: 331). Perhaps 
the most significant development for enhancing the security of the US was the creation 
of the Department of Homeland Security, which amalgamated a number of key US 
Departments and Agencies in order to improve evaluation of and response to terrorist 
threats. These include the Coast Guard, the Customs and Border Patrol, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Services, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (Weeks, 2003: 18-19; 
Naikoukaiun, 2003: 26-27). 
Of particular importance for Japan's response to maritime terrorism, however, were the 
steps initiated by the US in relation to the prevention and detection of terrorist maritime 
activity on an international scale. The events of 9/11, coupled with the terrorist attack on 
the Limburg, revealed to American policy makers the vulnerability of the US and global 
transport systems to attack. In order to strengthen US defences against terrorists 
carrying out an attack on US soil, either by transporting materials to be used in a 
terrorist attack by ship or by using a ship itself to perpetrate a terrorist strike, a series of 
international agreements and initiatives were drawn up. The US government prompted 
international organizations, such as the IMO, to formulate agreements like the 
international Ship and Port Facility Code (ISPS Code) and revisions to the Suppression 
of Unlawful Acts Against Ships (SUA) Treaty. Initiatives originating in Washington, 
however, intended to establish coalitions of willing states to respond to threats posed to 
the interstate society by terrorists (Beckman, 2005: 215). These initiatives included the 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), the Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Since 9/11, the US has been able to use its 
hegemonic position to pressure members of the interstate society to respond to maritime 
threats posed by terrorists (Naikoukaiun, 2003: 29). Japan has participated whole- 
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heartedly in these agreements and initiatives both as a staunch ally of the US and 
because Tokyo perceives the threat posed by global terrorism in common with the US. 
6.3a Exnlainin! Japan's Response to Maritime Terrorism 
Prior to the events of 9/11, Japan was party to a number of initiatives and international 
agreements established to help secure the safety of the world's international Sea Lanes 
of Communication (SLOCs). These include CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation 
in the Asia-Pacific) Memoranda 1,4 and 5, which encourage states to join the 1982 
United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), advocate cooperation to 
secure SLOCs, such as maritime surveillance and search and rescue operations, as well 
as to fight maritime crime. Although the CSCAP documents had no legal force, they do 
provide evidence, in addition to UNCLOS and the SUA Treaty, that efforts to enhance 
maritime security were in effect before the terrorist strikes on New York and 
Washington (Song, 2003a: 451). Nevertheless, Japan's response to maritime terrorism 
has received a significant boost by joining the international agreements and initiatives 
proposed by the US since 9/11. 
Several factors have encouraged the Japanese government to adopt firm measures in the 
fight against terrorism. These factors include the readiness of Prime Minister Koizumi 
to take resolute action, as witnessed by the Japanese government's response to the 
December 2001 spy ship incident, as discussed in Chapter 3, as well as the acceptance 
of a more robust Japanese military role by Southeast Asian states. However, prior 
310 experience with terrorism in the form of Aum Shinrikyo, the humiliation of Japan's 
chcquebook diplomacy after the 1991 Gulf War (whereby Japan offered to foot the bill 
of the campaign but failed to dispatch the SDF until after major hostilities had ended), 
threats to Japan's sea lanes by pirates, as detailed in the previous chapter, and the 
dangers of weapons' proliferation, particularly related to North Korea, have prompted 
the Koizumi government to develop its global security role (Midford, 2003: 329-330, 
"' The Aum Shinrikyo attack was mentioned in section 6.2b. For more information, see Hoffman, 1998. 
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337-341; Hughes 2004: 41-48). 311 Such sentiments were echoed by Ishiba Shigeru, then 
Japan's Defence Minister, at the 2004 Shangri-La dialogue where he stated: "In today's 
world, where terrorist attacks and the act of war are more difficult to be distinguished, 
we should further contemplate on the possibility of utilizing military power for 
policing" (Virtual Information Center, 2004: 6). Hence, the diversity of threats posed by 
both terrorism and North Korea have conspired to change the position of the Japanese 
government vis-a-vis the SDF's security role. 
The response of the Japanese government included the swift passage of the Anti- 
Terrorism Special Measures bill, which was passed on 29 October 200 1,312 as well as 
grants of economic aid to both India and Pakistan to help them in the fight against terror, 
the donation of US$ 10 million to the families of the victims of 9/11 and to facilitate the 
clean-up operation respectively. Of these, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures bill, in 
enabling the dispatch of the SDF to the Arabian Sea to provide logistical support for 
coalition troops during the war to oust the Taliban in Afghanistan and the subsequent 
reconstruction of Afghanistan, has had the greatest ramifications for the development of 
Japan's global security role (Midford, 2003: 330-333). However, in terms of maritime 
security against terror, Japan's adoption of the revised SUA Treaty, the International 
Ship and Port Security Code (ISPS Code), as well as the Container Security Initiative 
(CSI), the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) and the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) agreements have been central. 
"' Midford notes that a change in the security environment that Japan faces did not alter the opinions of 
the Japanese public regarding the dispatch of SDF troops to combat operations abroad (Midford, 2003: 
340). Other scholars have emphasized, however, that the Taepodong missile launch by North Korea in 
1998 has increased the Japanese public's perception of the threat of war (Agakimi, 2006: 4-5), as 
indicated in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
312 The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law (ATSML) was passed after only three weeks and 32 hours 
of Diet debate, an unprecedented time for a security related bill to move through Parliament (Hughes, 
2004: 15). 
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6.3b Maritime Agreements Prompted by the US 
ISPS Code 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the US government proposed that the IMO dedicate 
its 212th meeting held in December 2002 to international maritime security. In response, 
the Intersessional Working Group on Maritime Security (ISWG) and the Maritime 
Security Council (MSC) determined to revise Chapter XI of the SOLAS treaty by 
devoting Chapter XI-2 to maritime security, and formulated the ISPS Code, which was 
313 put into force on I July 2004. The ISPS Code contains articles and guidelines to 
strengthen ship and port security, establish domestic and international responsibilities 
and roles in ensuring maritime security, guarantee information exchange between the 
concerned authorities and to propose ways of appraising security. 314 The ISPS Code 
contains a number of provisions that are aimed at improving maritime security in the 
post-9/11 world. First, the 24 hour rule necessitates that 24 hours before a container is 
loaded on to a cargo vessel bound for a foreign state, a manifest of the cargo is sent 
electronically to the department, bureau or ministry responsible for screening in-bound 
cargoes. This information is then analysed and the possibility of a container being used 
to carry out a terrorist plot is assessed. To do this, current law enforcement information, 
the level of terrorist threat and a vessel's history are compared with the electronic 
manifest received. Second, ships that enter ports which are not compliant with the ISPS 
Code are labelled 'infected' and thereby subject to inspection and delays when the ship 
313 The deadline for shipping companies to detail security plans for cargo vessels and international 
passenger ships above 500 tons was I July 2004 (Naikoukaiun, 2003: 27). APEC countries, in 
conjunction with the private sector, introduced the Secure Trade in the APEC Region (STAR) initiative in 
October 2002 in order to hinder financial transactions by terrorists and safeguard key trade facilities. The 
STAR initiative essentially amounted to APEC's acceptance of the ISPS Code and the deadlines set 
within the ISPS Code (Wibisono, The Jakarta Post, 15 September 2003: 1; Song, 2003a: 453454). The 
organization of Economic Cooperation and Development has estimated the cost of implementing the 
ISPS Code to be over two billion US dollars for shipping worldwide (Wibisono, The Jakarta Post, 15 
September 2003: 1). 
314 Such measures include a detailed security plan for both ports and ships, training and exercises to 
maintain and improve the knowledge and abilities of concerned personnel, to record security information 
and to have these measures verified by a national authority (MLIT in the case of Japan, see 
http: //www. mlit. r, o. ip/scisakutokatsu/solas/c-index. litinti accessed 7 February 2006; Uyama, 2004: 67-68). 
Ports are also developing further facilities in response to the demands of the ISPS Code. The port of 
Manila in the Philippines, for example, has established a hazardous cargo control area (11CCA) to 
improve its security (Labita, Business Times, I September 2004). 
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leaves for an ISPS-compliant port. (Marine Log, October 2003: 32-34; Marine Log, July 
2004: 11-13). 
The ISPS Code also details three security levels (level three indicating the highest level 
of threat) and specifies progressive steps to be taken at each level. The security levels 
are based upon the reliability of security information, conclusive evidence of a specific 
threat and the probability of injury in the event of an incident. Shipping companies must 
designate security personnel to develop and instigate security plans aboard thcir ships. 
These plans form the body of an International Ship Security Certificate, which must be 
carried by all ships and be authorized by a national body. Responsibility for the security 
of any given vessel must also be clearly defined. The Code demands that ships, ports 
and offshore facilities possess detailed security plans and conduct vulnerability 
assessments concerning possible terrorist attacks. Automatic Identification Systems 
(AIS) are attached to larger ocean-going vessels so that their movements can be 
monitored in real-time. 315 The International Labour Organization (ILO) has also 
fingerprinted and issued security cards to over one million mariners worldwide since 
9/11 (Weeks, 2003: 18). States are entitled under the ISPS Code to deny entry to any 
vessel that does not satisfy the details of the ISPS Code and may even take forceful 
measures against ships if a ship is deemed an urgent security threat. As Japan is aware 
of the disruption that a maritime terrorist incident could cause to international sea lanes, 
the Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport has organized project teams to 
promote measures for the adoption of the ISPS Code (Jesus, 2003: 371,389-390; Song, 
2003a: 461462; Hesse, 2003: 331-336; Ninushi and Yuso, 2004: 15; Uyama, 2004: 66- 
70). By focussing on improving the security of ships and ports the ISPS Code aims to 
`5 Ships in the APEC region installed AIS equipment by December 2004 (Wibisono, The Jakarta Post, 
15 September 2003: 1). The deadline for the installation of AIS systems and security inspections for ships 
over 50,000 tons was I July 2004. For ships between 300 and 50,000 tons, security inspections had to be 
conducted by I July 2004 and AIS systems adopted by 31 December 2004 in accordance with the 
amendments to the SOLAS treaty (Naikoukaiun, 2003: 28-29). AIS cost between US$5,000 and 
US$ 10,000 per ship and infonn coast authorities of the name, course, speed, destination and cargo of 
foreign ships. However, AIS can be switched on and off by crew members or even transferred to a 
different ship, indicating that AIS alone cannot prevent a maritime terrorist attack. Furthermore, by the 
end of 2004, only ten of the 36 major US ports possessed the equipment to monitor AIS transmissions, 
which use VHF radiowaves on two frequencies and are liable to interference. Finally, Ebata argues that 
terrorists are more likely to use smaller vessels than larger ones equipped with AIS in a terrorist attack 
(Ebata, 2005: 4445). 
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deter maritime terrorist attacks and prevent shipments of terrorist material by sea. 
However, Richard Davey, a security consultant to MIS (the UK's domestic intelligence 
agency), believes that the ISPS Code will also identify what the terrorist threats to 
global shipping are by illuminating areas where security is lax both on board ships and 
in port (Business Times, 30 June 2004). 
Yet, when, on 1 July 2004, the ISPS Code came into force, 14 percent of ships and 31 
percent of ports remained uncertified after the deadline, leading to fears that 
international trade would suffer from delays (Meade, Fairplay, I July 2004: 6; 
http: //www. iccwbo. orL,, /ccs/news arch ives/2004/1 SPS. asp, accessed 24 September 
2004). This was in spite of the efforts of shipping companies, state authorities and the 
IMO. In the first two weeks after the ISPS Code was implemented worldwide, 45 ships 
were detained and eight were denied entry to US ports (Ninushi and Yuso, 2004: 15; 
Business Times, 8 July 2004). Nonetheless, by 22 September 2004,89.5 percent of ports 
and 90 percent of ships had been certified, proving the significance of the ISPS Code 
for international trade (littn: HwNv-, v. iccwbo. org/ecs/news arcliives/2004/ISPS. asp, 
accessed 24 September 2004). 
That said, the shipping industry noted that the ISPS Code had had no impact upon the 
increasing instances of piracy in ports. Hence, in a number of ports worldwide, security 
had not been significantly improved. Shipowners were also anxious that incorrect or 
fake identification was being presented to their crews in order to board and undertake 
inspections of the ship and that criminal organizations could, potentially, use such 
identification to enter and rob a berthed vessel. Fears have also been voiced that the 
ISPS Code unnecessarily targets ships crews. Both Peter Raes, managing director of 
TECT0316 and John Bainbridge of the International Transport Workers Federation 
(ITF)317 have argued that a concern for maritime terrorism has led to instances whereby 
ship's crews have been denied permission to go ashore simply because a crew member 
has an Islamic sounding name or because the ship has stowaways on board. This unfair 
316 TECTO is a European ship management company. Its homepage is: 
htti): //www. tecto. be/nap-es/home. asl2? Paýze= I &LanguageCode=Dl accessed 8 February, 2006. 
317 See bttr): //www. tfalobal. org/index. cfni, accessed on 7 February 2006, for more information on the 
International Transport Workers Federation. 
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treatment marginalizes seafarers whose expertise should be harnessed in the fight 
against terrorism (International Chamber of Commerce, Commercial Crime Services, 
http: www. iccwbo. org/css/news - archives/2004/CCS_conference. asp, accessed 
30 June 
2004). 3 18 Furthermore, cases where ships with personnel of certain nationalities were 
kept under armed guard at the expense of the vessel, cargoes being destroyed without 
sufficient reason, as well as unlawful threats by port authorities to detain ships were all 
recorded by the shipping industry since the implementation of the ISPS Code (Wilson, 
Fairplay, 28 October 2004: 16-17). A report by a UK-based security firm, Aegis 
Defence Services, argued that a committed hijacking attempt on a tanker or other high 
value target would probably succeed in spite of the ISPS Code (Burton and Huband, 
Financial Times, I July 2004: 7). Whilst it is clear that the ISPS Code alone cannot 
combat the myriad of possibilities for maritime terrorism that exist, the code does raise 
security awareness in the maritime industry that may well hinder or prevent some 
terrorist acts (The Jakarta Post, 29 July 2004: 6). 
Japan adopted the ISPS Code, publicising its Maritime Security Law in April 2004 .319 
The ISPS Code affects 128 ports in Japan, all of which have port security plans and 
defence measures. Furthermore, all Japanese ships over 500 tons engaging in the 
international transport of goods or people must possess a Ship Security Plan, a Ship 
Security Alert System and an International Ship Security Certificate issued by the 
Japanese Maritime Association. A Ship Security Officer (SSO) must be on board the 
ship and a Company Security Officer must be designated as in charge of the security of 
a company's fleet. Ship Security Officers must undertake a three day training course at 
a Japanese University of seamanship, or if the SSO is a foreigner, the officer may take a 
course in the officer's own country providing a certificate is issued by the Ministry of 
Transportation of the country's flag the ship flies (Song, 2003a: 464-466; Ninushi and 
318 Transport security cards for seafarers established by ISPS Code and MTSA help customs authorities 
analyze information concerning crews entering their country (Naikoukaiun, 2003: 28). 
319 The readiness of the Japanese government to accept the ISPS Code is evidenced by the fact that by the 
end of May 2002, the Japanese Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport was already in the process 
of examining how to fit Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) to Japanese ships, develop ship security 
plans and train officers, secure ports, ascertain the biographical data of crews in a manner that could not 
be counterfeited, safeguard containers and equip ships with alarm devices 
(http: //www. mlit., -Yo. ip/kisha/kisliaO2/10/100527 
html, accessed on 21 October 2003). 
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Yuso, 2004: 15-16). Ships intending to dock at Japanese ports must inform the Japan 
Coast Guard, which can carry out on-board searches and detain vessels deemed to be a 
threat to Japanese security (httn: //-,, YwNv. mlit. jzo. jp/seisakutokatsti/solas/e-index2.1itmi, 
accessed on 24 March 2005). 
There were some delays in establishing the ISPS Code in Japan's national law, in spite 
of the passage of the related bill through the national Diet. 320 As a result, the 
applications of some Japanese companies for certification were held up. Furthermore, 
Japanese companies referred their security plans to consulting firms which had little 
experience of security-related matters. The recommendations of these consulting firms 
focussed on the ship's weak points while at sea, in port or at anchor, as well as advising 
the introduction of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) on board (Ninushi and Yuso, 
2004: 17). As a result, whilst certification remained high amongst Japanese shippers, an 
enhanced maritime security awareness had not been established in the Japanese 
shipping industry (Meade, Fairplay, I July 2004: 7). 321 
It is believed that the ISPS Code will develop over time, even to the point where ships' 
designs will incorporate security features (Ninushi and Yuso, 2004: 17). Compared with 
the US post-9/11 tendency to act unilaterally and without the authorization of 
international organizations, the rapid implementation of the multilateral ISPS Code 
indicates the importance of the interstate society in fighting terrorism (Watson, Fairplay, 
I July 2004: 17). 322 Nevertheless, whilst the ISPS Code is an important first step, 
Captain Mukundan, Director of the IMB, asserts that the ISPS Code alone cannot 
combat the multiple security threats the shipping industry faces. Instead, Mukundan 
stresses the need to further develop the security capacities of ships' crews and port 
320 Delays in implementing the ISPS Code were not uncommon and mostly foreseen, however. One 
month before the deadline for implementing the ISPS Code, only 9 percent of the 20,722 ships requiring 
certification had been certified (though 57 percent had tendered their security plans and were awaiting 
certiFication) and 5.4 percent of ports' security plans had been authenticated 
(http: //www. iccwbo. or--/hoine/news arch ives/2004/1 SPS. 4m, accessed I June 2004). 
"' The case of Indonesia is far more troubling, however, as it is believed that it will take until 2007 before 
the ISPS Code is fully implemented there (Meade, Fairplay, I July 2004: 7). 
322 Though the ISPS Code was implemented rapidly, much of the code, especially as concerns enhancing 
port and ship security, has its origins in prior agreements, such as the Measures to Prevent Unlawful Acts 
Against Passengers and Crew on Board Ships (MSC/Circ. 443), which were approved in the aftermath of 
the Achille Lauro incident (Hesse, 2003: 328). 
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authorities in order to combat maritime crime and terror 
(httj2: //www. iccwbo. orWccs/news archives/2004/ISPa., alm, accessed 24 September 
2004). 
SUA 
The SUA Convention was initially established in the aftermath of the Achille Lauro 
incident to create international extradition and prosecution laws in order to facilitate the 
capture and trial of maritime terrorists. The 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington 
highlighted the fact that certain groups and individuals were willing to give their lives 
for their cause through the execution of a destructive act. The IMO therefore 
endeavoured to revise the SUA Convention in line with the development of 
International Islamic Terrorism. The primary area for revision has been to enlarge the 
juridical scope of the treaty to allow national police authorities to board, search, seize 
and detain suspect vessels in any maritime territory in the world. The SUA Convention 
may be further broadened to include acts that aim to destroy the marine environment, 
that target crew or passengers exclusively and that use a vessel as a weapon (Jesus, 
2003: 387-398; Richardson, 2004: 100). 323 Additional crimes have also been added to 
the original list of offences in the SUA Treaty. These include the presence of WMD 
related materials onboard ships. On 14 October 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
announced that Japan would adopt the protocol on the SUA amendments, specifically 
noting the Treaty's potential impact on curbing WMD proliferation and acts of maritime 
terrorism (http: //Nvww. mofa. izo. ip/annoiince/announce/2005/10/1014-3. html, accessed 9 
February 2006). Although the SUA Convention remains to be ratified by all the 
ASEAN states with the exception of Vietnam (Song, 2003a: 467-468), by expanding the 
scope of national authorities to interdict vessels suspected of carrying WMD, the 
revised SUA Treaty has begun to assuage the fears of the interstate society regarding the 
use of WMD by terrorists, as well as providing a solid legal basis upon which to 
establish the PSI, one of the key maritime initiatives introduced by the US. 
323 See also, http: //www. tin. orWDepts/los/consultative process/documents/no5 imo. pd accessed 9 
February 2006. 
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6.3c Maritime Initiatives Introduced by the US 
The MTSA, CST and C-TPAT 
The Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA)324 has been effective since 25 
November 2002 and works together with the ISPS Code. MTSA enables the US Coast 
Guard to deny entry of foreign vessels to US ports, should those vessels have originated 
from a port deemed susceptible to terrorist infiltration. Furthermore, the bill calls for the 
creation of identification and screening systems to ensure the safety of cargo transported 
to the US (Weeks, 2003: 18; Naikoukaiun, 2003: 28; Carey, C. E. 2004: 295-297). The 
cost of implementing the security systems specified by the MTSA have mostly been 
bome by the maritime industry (Price, 2004: 340-341), raising fears that security 
measures will be compromised by what the industry can afford to pay. 325 However, the 
passage of the MTSA through Congress means that shipping firms are now liable to 
compensate victims in the event of a terrorist incident involving one of their ships, if it 
is deemed that their security measures were insufficient or incorrectly implemented. 
Whilst it might be unreasonable to expect shipping companies to prepare for every 
possible threat to their ships, making companies liable for damages does create a 
significant incentive for the private sector to ensure that security plans are put into place 
(Carey, C. E. 2004: 307-313). 
Prior to MTSA, the CSI was initiated in January 2002 and allows US customs officials 
and the US Coast Guard to inspect and certify containers at 25 ports worldwide (20 of 
324 The MTSA is the amalgamation, in June 2002, of Senator Hollings' Bill concerning port and maritime 
transportation safety, passed in 200 1, and Congressman Young's 2002 maritime transportation against 
terrorism bill (Naikoukalun, 2003: 26). 
325 The same is largely true of security devices. For example, VIP systems of Houston have developed a 
remote control device that can monitor ships by video in real time and stop and disable a ship equipped 
with the VIP Ship Security System that has been sabotaged by terrorists. The VIP Ship Security System 
costs between US$ 100,000 and US$200,000 for a tanker, which, considering the cost of running a tanker 
as well as its cargo, is described by the company as minimal (Hensel, Houston Chronicle, 13 October 
2004: DI). However, shippers see this as an additional expenditure to be added to the running costs of 
their vessels. For some companies, such devices are luxuries. 
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these ports account for 70 percent of all container cargo to the US). The aim of the US 
government is to increase the number of ports protected by CSI to between 40-50 
(Watson, Fairplay, 9 September 2004: 17). High risk containers are assessed and 
screened by the inspector on-site in collaboration with the National Targeting Centre, 
using a variety of technologies, information databases and data from US intelligence 
agencies, before they are shipped to the US. 326 The US perceived the need to develop 
the CSI as no international legal measure existed to counter the possibility of terrorists 
transporting materials by container ships, and inspections of containers after they had 
arrived in the US could be too late to prevent a terrorist event at a US port (Romero, 
2003: 599; Roach, 2003: 344-345). Prior to the initiation of the CSI, security regarding 
the six million containers entering US ports every year, representing half the value of 
US imported trade, was almost non-existent (Roach, 2003: 342). 
The CSI agreement deters terrorists from targeting major international Ports by 
developing security at these ports. It is anticipated that CSI ports will be able to 
maintain levels of global trade even in the event of a terrorist attack against a port 
outside the CSI. The bilateral CSI pacts may expedite global trade by removing the need 
to screen containers on arrival at US ports by instead inspecting cargoes during the two 
or three day period that containers await loading on to cargo ships in foreign ports 
(Roach, 2003: 353-354). Ultimately, the US Customs intends to fit all US-bound 
containers with identification tags, anti-tampering devices and GPS equipment to 
further inhibit the use of containers to transport terrorist materials and resources (Roach, 
2003: 345-346; Weeks, 2003: 18-19; Price, 2004: 337; Szyliowicz, 2004: 358-359). 327 
Such measures promote America's global Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) or the 
ability of US Customs and coast guard officials to gather information, conduct 
surveillance, intercept and detain suspect vessels (Garrett, 
"" Information employed by the National Targeting Centre to detect suspect cargo includes the latest 
intelligence on terrorist activity and technology used by US customs officials, as part of the CS1 
agreement, comprise large-scale x-ray, gamma ray and radiation detection equipment that can scan a 
container for illegal goods, radioactive materials and even people, all in under 90 seconds. The CSI 
should not therefore inhibit trade (Roach, 2003: 345). 
327 The US Customs Services are developing electronic seals for containers that will indicate whether a 
container has been interfered with during its voyage. Such seals may incorporate motion, light or beat 
detectors to make them 'smarter' in the fight against terrorism (Roach, 2003: 345). 
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http: //ww-w. sofor. jl2/topics/2003 e/uscg. htmI#top, accessed 19 August 2004). Whilst it 
is too early to anticipate the impact of the bilateral CSI, US designs to expand CSI 
agreements indicate that maritime security threats to US economic interests are 
significant enough to entail further infringements upon foreign sovereign states through 
inspections of containerised trade (Romero, 2003: 605; Watson, Fairplay, II November 
2004: 10-11). 
The Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT) was created in 
conjunction with the CSI as a means of encouraging companies involved in the shipping 
trade to strengthen their security measures. The number of companies involved in C- 
TPAT increased from seven in 2001 to over 7,000 by the third anniversary of 9/11 in 
2004. Action taken by these companies to improve security is verified by customs, 
enabling the companies' goods to pass through custom's inspection processes faster, as 
well as allowing the companies to benefit from lower insurance rates and increased 
security for their cargoes (Watson, Fairplay, 9 September 2004: 17). Nonetheless, the 
C-TPAT agreement does little to prevent shipping agents outside the US taking bribes 
to place terrorist related materials in US-bound containers (Price, 2004: 338). The key 
to encouraging states and companies to be involved in both the CSI and C-TPAT 
initiatives lies in the preferential treatment a cargo will receive if the state is a CSI 
member and the company a C-TPAT participant (Richardson, 2004: 8 1). Hence, the US, 
as the world's largest economic player, has deployed its economic muscle to encourage 
participation in these two maritime security schemes, knowing that countries and 
businesses cannot afford the potential delays should they not belong to CSI or C-TPAT. 
However, in doing so, the US has also acknowledged the need to work on a multilateral 
basis within the interstate society in order to protect the US homeland from terrorist 
attack (Henmi, 2005: 152). 
The four largest Japanese ports of Yokohama, Tokyo, Nagoya and Kobe all entered into 
the CSI agreement on 26 September 2002, receiving US Customs and Border Protection 
(CBP) officials to inspect US-bound cargoes. These four ports represent 8 percent of the 
total volume of containers coming into the US. In return, Japanese Customs officials 
have been dispatched to the US to screen Japan-bound containers (Roach, 2003: 346, 
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349; Marine Log, July 2004: 13). 328 APEC countries, including Japan, have made 
efforts to secure trade in the region by introducing electronic manifests for containcrs in 
line with the Container Security Regime (Wibisono, The Jakarta Post, 15 September 
2003: 1; Song, 2003a: 474-475). Moreover, Japan aims to introduce electronic seals, 
and container tracking devices, as well as conduct checks on empty containers in line 
with the revised SOLAS Treaty. Such measures are intended to Prevent the illegal 
transportation of WMD or tampering with containers on route (Naikoukaiun, 2003: 28). 
Nevertheless, the Japanese government has raised concerns with the US government 
that Japanese companies still face delays in importing their goods into the US, despite 
belonging to C-TPAT (htti): //x),, ww. state. Lov/p/eap/rls/ýt/49017. litm, accessed 9 
February 2006). 329 
PSI 
The Proliferation Security Initiative was established to counter the perceived threat 
posed by the illegal traffic of WMD by land, sea or air. It evolved in the aftermath of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks and following the failure to seize a cargo of Scud missiles, 
warheads and missile fuel from an unflagged North Korean ship, the So San, bound for 
Yemen in December 2002. As the purchase of ballistic missiles by Yemen did not 
violate international law, the ship was released on condition of a verbal agreement made 
by the Yemeni President Ali Abdallah Saleh to US Vice President Dick Cheney that no 
more missiles would be purchased from North Korea (Joseph, 2004: 7; Richardson, 
330 2004: 106-107). 
328 The Japanese Customs and Tariff Bureau has determined which US ports to station its officials at 
(Roach, 2003: 349). The World Customs Organization is also discussing a similar programme to the CSI 
agreement to check container cargoes before they leave their port of embarkation regardless of their final 
destination (Watson, Fairplay, 9 September 2004: 17). 
321 These complaints have been made despite the introduction of the 'Green Line Status' for C-TPAT 
members at the end of 2005. The 'Green Line Status' allows cargoes from C-TPAT companies to freely 
enter the US without undergoing inspection providing the containers have sufficient security seals and 
sensors, are shipped from a CSI port and arrive with documentation assuring that the container has not 
been tampered with (Fairp*, 20 January 2005: 13). 
311 Yemeni support for the US war in Iraq was alleged to have been the deciding factor in the agreement, 
however. Despite the establishment of PST, were a similar incident to that of the So San involving 
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After the So San incident the need to intercept ships transporting WMD on international 
Sea Lanes of Communication became apparent. In response, US President Bush 
announced the creation of the PSI on 31 May 2003. States that are party to the 
agreement thereby mobilised their navies to intercept illegal shipments of WMD. PSI 
involves frequent meetings, intelligence sharing, as well as conducting regular stop-and- 
search exercises among members. The Statement of Interdiction Principles underlines 
the approach of PSI states, which is to board and search ships suspected of carrying 
WMD. Such searches are permissible if a suspect ship has violated any national or 
international laws, including customs violations or failure to fly a national flag. To date, 
the greatest publicised success of the PSI agreement was the detention of a vessel 
transporting uranium centrifuges to Libya in October 2003 (Joseph, 2004: 6-8). 
Because of the speed with which the PSI arrangement was put into place, there are a 
number of deficiencies with the initiative. First, a suspect ship on the high seas must 
have broken an international or national law in order for a naval ship to inspect it; 
otherwise the naval vessel would be violating the right of 'innocent passage' for 
ships. 331 As a result, naval ships have tended to inspect only ships docked at their own 
national ports. Second, PSI focuses primarily on the threats posed by both Iran and 
North Korea, whilst largely ignoring the potential of states like Pakistan to ship WMD, 
as occurred through A. Q. Khan's trading network. Third, the informal nature of the PSI 
agreement means that requests made by states within the PSI group to inspect a ship in 
their waters may still be turned down. Fourth, the absence of South Korea and China 
from the PSI group weakens the agreement by failing to grant PSI a wider acceptability 
amongst the interstate society. Fifth, it is difficult to assess the success of PSI as 
officials involved in the agreement remain tight-lipped as to any operations that have 
been undertaken (Joseph, 2004: 8-13; Yamada interview, 10 November 2004; 
Richardson, 2004: 104-105). Sixth, the definitions permitting interdictions are 
ballistic missiles to occur again, the shipment would still be allowed to proceed according to international 
law (Joseph, 2004: 7). 
"' Under the revised SUA Treaty the presence of WMD aboard a vessel would provide legal grounds for 
boarding. flowcver, this is difficult to prove and would be complicated if the suspect vessel was not in 
waters belonging to a SUA Treaty state. 
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contentious. The terms 'delivery systems' and 'related materials' could refer to dual use 
materials that can be legally traded according to UNCLOS. 332 Having 'good cause' or to 
6reasonably suspect' a ship of transporting WMD to or from a country of 'proliferation 
concern' depends on the subjective decision of a PSI state. Seventh, by indicating 
additional circumstances under which a vessel on the high seas may be boarded, the PSI 
is undermining UNCLOS which permits interdiction "if the country under whose flag 
the ship is sailing gives its permission; if the ship is stateless; if it is a pirate vessel; if it 
is transporting slaves; or if it is being used for unauthorised broadcasting" (Valencia, 
2005: 38-44). Finally, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld has indicated that the 
lack of cooperation by Southeast Asian states with the PSI measures leaves the world's 
busiest sea-lane, the Malacca Straits, vulnerable to a sea-borne attack (Virtual 
Information Center, 2004: 24). 
The future success of the PSI agreement depends upon whether it becomes more 
institutionalized and has greater international acceptance through the expansion of the 
initiative to include states that are not currently PSI members. However, high levels of 
institutionalization may prove difficult in Northeast Asia, due to South Korea's and 
China's position in the six-party talks concerning North Korea's WMD programme 
(Richardson, 2004: 104-105)9 333 as well as tensions between Japan and China regarding 
disputed territories and Japan's militaristic past. Hopes that the PSI will expand beyond 
its initial membership have increased following Russia's adoption of the initiative, in 
spite of tensions between Japan and Russia vis-A-vis the Northern Territories (The 
Econondst, 30 October 2004: 65-66). 334 Nonetheless, in terms of international maritime 
security, the ISPS Code has been far more revolutionary. 
332 The seizures of the cargo of aluminium pipes from the Ville de Virgo and phosphorus pentasulphide 
from the Be Gae Bong are two cases where dual use materials were impounded under the PSI. These 
examples were detailed in Chapter 3. 
333 Richardson notes that while China desires a nuclear-free North Korea, it does not want to antagonise 
Pyongyang by participating in what North Korea perceives as a maritime blockade (Richardson, 2004: 
104-105). 
334 For more information on Japan's dispute with Russia over the Northern Territories, see 
http: //w%vw. i-nofa. i-, o. il2/region/etirope/rLissia/territory/index. litmi, accessed 8 February 2006. 
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From a Japanese perspective, the PSI primarily targets illicit weapons shipments from 
North Korea. In this regard, the Japanese government has taken a number of steps in 
line with its PSI obligations. North Korea allegedly receives 90 percent of its 
technologically advanced missile parts from Japan via illegal shipments on a North 
Korean cargo ship, the Mangyonbon. The same ship was employed to transport 
unlawful quantities of Japanese Yen into North Korea from the port of Niigata. In 2004 
alone, an estimated V190 million was conveyed to Wonsan in North Korea. Japanese 
citizens movements, enraged by the abduction issue, 335 pressured the Japanese 
government to pass two bills regulating Japanese money entering North Korea and 
preventing specific North Korean ships from docking at Japanese ports. The adoption of 
the PSI has enabled Japanese authorities to conduct more intrusive inspections and 
surveillance of North Korean vessels (Richardson, 2004: 103; Takano, 2005: 118-121). 
The Japanese police arrested five businessmen involved in a deal to ship a massive 
trailer to North Korea. It was believed that the trailer could be employed to carry a 
ballistic missile launcher. 336 The Japanese government has also endeavoured to further 
non-proliferation initiatives in Asia. For example, at a meeting held in Tokyo, the 
United States, China, South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, and 
Japan all agreed to impose more robust controls over the export of WMD related 
technology and materials (Richardson, 2004: 102-103). 
Nevertheless, the Japanese government is concerned that inspections on the high seas 
could infringe upon the sovereignty of other states and has been far less enthusiastic 
about expanding the mandate of the JCG or the MSDF to board suspect vessels on the 
high seas. In the 2004 "Team Samurai" PSI exercise held in Sagami Bay, the 
participation of the JCG was limited to tracking and pursuing suspect vessels (Takano, 
2005: 118-12 1). 337 Valencia notes that there is disagreement between MOFA and the 
335 See Chapter 4 on North Korean spy ships for more on the abduction of Japanese citizens to North 
Korea. 
336 On 10 August 2006, Japanese police arrested Kim Young Gun the former president of a trading 
company in Tokyo for exporting a freeze dryer to North Korea in 2002 that could have been used in the 
production of biological weapons (litto: //search. japantimes. co. ipýprint/tin2OO6O8I IaI. html, accessed II 
August 2006). This case demonstrates the Japanese authorities' determination to enforce export controls 
related to WMD trade with North Korea. 
337 See also, http: //ww%v, mofa. i-, o. ipýpolicy/other/bluebook/2004/chap3-a. pd accessed 9 February 2006. 
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JDA as to the scope of the PSI. Whereas MOFA sees the PSI as an adjunct to existing 
export control agreements, the JDA perceives the PSI to have a much broader role in the 
security of Japan. Japan's reluctance to interdict vessels on the high seas under the PSI 
may change following the participation of the Shirane, an MSDF destroyer, and two P3- 
C patrol planes in a PSI exercise in August 2005 in Singapore (Valencia, 2005: 61-63). 
Furthermore, the firing of missiles by North Korea into the Japan Sea on 5 July 2006 
may prompt Japan to take a tougher stance on North Korean WMD possession and 
proliferation through the PSI. 
6.4 Conclusion 
The US has taken action in the maritime domain to enhance the security of international 
trade and the defence of the US homeland in the aftermath of 9/11. Beckman postulates 
that the US response has been 'two-pronged', firstly encouraging the IMO to fortify 
international maritime law (the ISPS Code and SUA Treaty, for example) and secondly 
by fostering 'coalitions of the willing' that target WMD proliferation (the raison d'etre 
of the PSI) or the use of vessels to carry out a terrorist attack (the rationale behind the 
CSI and C-TPAT) (Beckman, 2005: 215). These initiatives can all be located within 
Buzan's conception of the interstate society. The ISPS Code and SUA Treaty reinforce 
international law to protect the security of the market, whilst the "coalitions of the 
willing' are examples of Great Power or hegemonic management and diplomacy, 
designed to rectify deficiencies in international law without violating sovereign 
boundarieS. 339 
Such initiatives are designed to enhance order in the interstate society (as discussed in 
Section 2.6b 'Order and/or Justice'). However, in the case of the PSI, a lack of concrete 
definitions have led to double standards in determining which states are WMD 
6proliferators', and a lack of transparency has led to fears that UNCLOS may be 
338 For more on Buzan's scparation of the interstate society into institutions, which include Great Power 
management, sovereignty, boundaries, diplomacy and the market, among others, see Buzan, 2004a: 161- 
204. 
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undermined when vessels are interdicted under the PSI (Valencia, 2005: 39-45,73-74). 
The pursuit of order by Great Powers fighting terrorism can erode international 
confidence in international law or, in English School terminology, justice. A failure to 
balance justice with order weakens the cohesion of the interstate society as a whole, as 
states perceive self-help measures as a better means of achieving their interests than 
international cooperation and norms creating an increasingly pluralist interstate society. 
As maritime terror poses the greatest economic threat to Japan in terms of the damage a 
successful attack on international SLOCs could have on Japan's trade, not to mention 
concerns that Japanese ports themselves might be attacked, the Japanese government 
has accepted US proposals to uphold maritime order. Through the PSI, CSI and C- 
TPAT agreements, Japan has sought to pre-empt threats stemming from the 
transportation of terrorist weapons and equipment, with specific focus on the traffic of 
WMD. The Japanese government's adoption of the ISPS Code improves the security of 
vessels and ports against potential terrorist attacks. 339 These agreements have primarily 
targeted International Islamic Terrorists (infidels) and WMD proliferating states 
(barbarians), in the case of the PSI. 
Maritime violence perpetrated by Ethno Nationalist Groups (barbarians), which has 
posed a more frequent threat to Japanese shipping, 340 has been tackled through 
enhanced anti-piracy patrols and diplomatic initiatives, such as those encouraged by 
Japan that have resulted in a peace process for the Aceh region. The ISPS Code also 
addresses the problem of Ethno Nationalist maritime violence by strengthening vessels 
against attack. The interstate society's divergent responses to the maritime threats posed 
by International Islamic Terrorists and Ethno Nationalist Movements thereby justifies 
the adoption of the infidel and barbarian labels, rather than defining all political 
violence under the terrorism banner. 
311 Yamada notes, however, that an attack similar to that on the USS Cole or Limburg involving a speed 
boat laden with explosives is likely to succeed in spite of the ISPS Code which buttresses the security of 
certified vessels (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). 
34' As section 5.5 of the previous chapter indicated, GAM separatists have allegedly been involved in 
numerous attacks against ships in the Malacca Straits, including the hijacking of three crew members of 
the Idaten, a Japanese tugboat. 
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Yet, the appellation the 'war on terror' fails to take this distinction between barbarians 
and infidels into account. The advantage of this for the Great Powers in the interstate 
society is that they can define their enemy at will. Examples include those noted in the 
examination of the PSI above or in the designation by the US of Hamas as a terrorist 
group even after the organization became the dominant political party in the Palestinian 
parliament by means of a democratic election. However, categorizing all maritime 
violence under the label of terrorism encourages different politically violent groups to 
identify their causes as being similar and network their resources and capabilities. 
Isolating the organizations and movements which can be negotiated with (barbarians), 
from those which refuse to bargain (infidels), weakens the infidel threat. To do so 
requires that states in the international system simultaneously mobilise both hard 
(military) and soft (cultural) power to eradicate the infidels on the one hand whilst 
neutralising the support for infidel organizations on the other (Burke, 2004: 26). 
As Young and Valencia suggest, state strategies in the aftermath of 9/11 that have 
merely targeted terrorist finances and leadership may only be effective as a short-term 
measure. Unless complex questions concerning religion, ideology, sovereignty and 
foreign policy arc addressed, the maritime terrorist threat in Southeast Asia will 
continue to grow. Long-term solutions therefore require the establishment of indigenous 
maritime enforcement and surveillance capabilities, as well as the creation of a political 
environment in which religious and ideological positions and concerns can be voiced 
(Young and Valencia, 2003: 281). Maritime expert Brian Jenkins has noted, "There are 
an inexhaustible number of young people willing to kill and willing to die, and there 
have to be answers beyond killing them" (Jenkins, Fairplay, 19 August 2004: 3 1). Such 
an approach to treating maritime terrorism could be theoretically understood in terms of 
the Copenhagen School's conception of 'human security'. From the standpoint of the 
English School, this focus on 'human security' and terrorism in the maritime domain 
entails examining the position of transnational and human actors in the transnational 
and interhuman societies that Buzan identifies. By doing so, the concerns of these actors 
can be addressed by balancing order in the interstate society with justice. In the case of 
maritime terrorism, greater justice can be delivered through Buzan's primary 
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institutions in the interstate society, principally equality of people, nationalism, market 
and environmental stewardship institutions. 
A 'human security' response to maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia necessarily centres 
around the political and economic situation in Indonesia and the Philippines. Instability 
in both these states has provided numerous terrorist groups with a base from which to 
recruit and conduct sea-bome operations and is the primary cause of many of the 
terrorist instances that have occurred in Southeast Asian waters. Managing the health of 
Indonesian and Filipino democracies is therefore the key to confronting the problem of 
maritime crime and terrorism in Southeast Asia (Huxley, 2002: 89-91; Rivera, 2005: 
127-133). 
It is anticipated that by 2020 the volume of maritime trade will be double the amount of 
maritime trade in 2004.341 As the global economy becomes increasingly reliant upon 
goods shipped by sea, so it will be easier for terrorists to inflict ever greater damage 
upon the international economy by targeting maritime transport routes and major ports 
(Weeks, 2003: 17). Maritime targets will therefore become progressively attractive to 
terrorists who intend to harm or threaten the global economy in order to achieve their 
political goals (Szyliowicz, 2004: 353). In this environment, Japan can safeguard its 
maritime trade and the lives of its seafarers in the face of international terrorism by 
balancing order with justice in the interstate society. Japan can achieve this by 
elaborating strategies to end cthno-nationalist conflict, such as that in the Aceh region, 
as well as maintaining a continued emphasis on maritime patrols. 
341 In 2004, there were approximately 4,000 ports and 46,000 vessels engaged in the global maritime 
transport system (Weeks, 2003: 17). 
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7. Conclusion 
7.1 Japan's Approach to Maritime Security Issues - Hypotheses 
and Theoretical Framework 
Whv is maritime security important for Japan? 
As an island nation, Japan must guard its maritime territory against a myriad of threats 
which include intrusions by foreign vessels, illegal imports and migrants, the 
transportation of WMD, as well as violations of Japanese law. Equally, Japan must look 
beyond its EEZ to protect the passage of trade to and from the island nation from pirates 
and separatists who seek economic enrichment at Japan's expense and terrorists who 
aim to disrupt global trade in the name ofjihad. The Malacca Straits, through which one 
third of global trade and 80 percent of Japan's oil shipments are transported annually, 
lies at the heart of Japan"s maritime security (Asahi Shimbun, 15 March 2005: 39; 
Graham, 2006: 25-27). An accident resulting from a piratical attack or the intentional 
destruction of a vessel by a terrorist group to block the Malacca Straits or wreck a major 
international port would have serious repercussions upon the global economy 
(Richardson, 2004: 2-4,38-39). Furthermore, the Japanese shipping industry has 
experienced economic loss and Japanese crews have endured undue suffering at the 
hands of pirates in Southeast Asia. The Japanese government has been driven as much 
by Japan's economic and energy interests, as it has by a desire to safeguard the lives and 
property of its seafaring community. 
This study has examined Southeast Asian piracy and maritime terrorism; two of the 
major maritime security threats to Japan, as well as Japan's response to the North 
Korean spy ship incursions in March 1999 and December 2001. The scope, impact and 
the reasons behind the Japanese response to these three maritime security issues has 
bccn dctailcd. In doing so, this thesis has demonstrated that Japan's response to the 
maritime security issues examined has not only been conditioned by the constraints of 
the interstate society, as dcrined in Chapter 2, but also that Japan has purposefully 
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sought to enrich the interstate society by addressing these maritime security issues. That 
said, in response to North Korean spy ships and in its involvement in the PSI, Japanese 
actions have conflicted with international law. The repercussions of disregarding 
international law in these instances will be identified in this chapter. This concluding 
chapter will outline the overall argument of the thesis, as well as highlight the 
importance of Japan's efforts in confronting maritime security issues and the 
ramifications these efforts will have for Japan as a major world power. Finally, future 
avenues of research will be put forward. 
7.2 The English School and International Relations Theorv 
No single international relations theory can fully capture the scope of Japan's response 
to maritime security issues. Realism explains the difficulties associated with 
international naval cooperation in Southeast Asia which is mired in territorial disputes 
and Japan's desire to balance the growing Chinese power in Southeast Asia. Yet, 
realism has difficulty describing why the advanced Japanese MSDF and Coast Guard 
have not been dispatched to protect Japanese shipping in international waterways. 
Liberalism is better placed than realism to address the growing cooperation between 
regional maritime authorities or the institutionalization of the Information Sharing 
Centre on piracy in Singapore. Finally, Constructivism. can elucidate the importance of 
the Japan Coast Guard as an ideational model for the development of Southeast Asian 
maritime authorities and the adherence of Southeast Asian states to the rules and norms 
of the International Society. 
The English School's conception of an interstate society based on primary interstate 
institutions provides an overarching framework that can be used to comprehend the 
interplay between the three primary International Relations theories. In terms of Japan's 
response to maritime security, Japan has been motivated to protect SLOCs on which 
Japan's economic interests, or 'market' interests as the English School would term them, 
depend. The strcss placed upon diplomacy in the interstate society is mirrored in 
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Japan's efforts to build human networks of maritime experts throughout the Asian 
region as a basis for cooperation on maritime security issues. The laws and norms of the 
interstate society provide ideational standards which are instilled in Southeast Asian 
maritime officials who attend the Japan Coast Guard University in Hiroshima. 
Containing and engaging North Korea provides evidence of Great Power management 
at work, whilst periodic confrontations between Japanese maritime forces and North 
Korean spy ships demonstrates Japan's readiness to protect its sovereign territory. What 
is less evident, however, is how Japan's response to maritime security issues and 
Japan's obligations as a Great Power in the interstate society interact with and affect the 
state, transnational and human groups which perpetrate maritime violence and crime. 
These outlaw groups have been categorized into three types in this thesis: barbarians, 
infidels and pirates. The inspiration for these divisions has come from Bull's interest in 
actors who operate outside what he termed the international society. However, whilst 
Bull referenced these actors as historical bands that threatened the international society, 
this thesis has adopted Buzan's conception of interstate, transnational and interhuman 
societies in order to comprehend the interplay between states and the barbarians, 
infidcls and pirates that challenge the contemporary interstate society. The advantage of 
these categories is that states can better distinguish between adversaries in the interstate 
society in order to both avoid conflating threats and to encourage appropriate policy 
measures. In order to be politically expedient, the barbarian, infidel and pirate 
categories have been dcfincd so as to circumvent the same deficiencies as the 'rogue 
state' label that Litwak attacks in his book Rogue States and US Foreign Policy. States, 
Litwak argues, are inconsistently and selectively labeled as rogue states by Great 
Powers who perceive their interests threatened by these states. Once a Great Power has 
labeled a rogue state as such, the Great Power can only pursue a policy of isolation and 
containment towards that rogue state (Litwak, 2000: 8-9). 
Unlike 'rogue states', barbarians, infidels and pirates are defined in terms of the actor's 
relationship with and behavior within the interstate society. Pirates, which are 
designated as enemies of mankind, hostis humani generis, in international law, differ 
from the other two categories owing to their exclusively economic motivations. 
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Resolving piracy is therefore a question not only of enhanced patrols, but also of 
tackling the economic causes of piracy, such as unemployment and poverty in Southeast 
Asian coastal regions. Though both barbarians and infidels are described as actors 
driven by political goals, they are separate in the interstate society owing to the infidel's 
desire to replace the interstate society with an alternative system, as opposed to 
barbarians, who, whilst disobeying the rules of the interstate society, do not seek to 
overthrow the interstate society and, therefore, can be negotiated with. 
Litwak posits that socializing outlaws back into the international community through 
policies of engagement and containment 342 should figure as a principal policy aim of 
any Great Power (Litwak, 2000: 10-11). This thesis argues, however, that there are 
certain actors, infidels, who by their very definition, are beyond the pale of the interstate 
society, because they aspire to destroy the interstate society. Infidels can only be 
contained or eradicated, until such a time when they renounce their revolutionary 
intentions. Pirates too must abandon maritime crime and choose to return to society by 
sclecting a legitimate livelihood. This choice is of course made easier by the existence 
of legitimate alternative occupations. Finally, barbarians can decide to and be 
encouraged to Cntcr the fold of the interstate society by rejecting illicit practices and 
embracing the dictates of the interstate society. 
The determinations of barbarians, infidcls and pirates to join the interstate society, as 
well as the policy choices available to states aiming to socialize outlaws all hinge on 
Wendt's mode/depth socialization concept, which is comprised of coercion, calculation 
and belid. Buzan has taken up Wendt's notion of mode/depth socialization to enable 
the English School to interpret how actors in global politics act in and accept the 
interstate society. States may therefore coerce barbarians, infidels and pirates into 
joining the interstate society through force and containment, or calculate that 
negotiation is possible and devise policies that engage with the outlaw in question. 
Likewise, outlaws may calculate that more can be gained through cooperation with the 
3'2 Litwak adopts Alexander George's term 'conditional reciprocity' whereby states demand "meaningful 
changes in policy and behavior in return for each concession or benef if' (George quoted in Litwak, 2000: 
11). 
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interstate society, Libya being an obvious example, or outlaws may come to believe in 
the principles of the interstate society (Brinkley, 16 May 2006, The New York Times 
Online, littp: //%v%v-%v. n3jimes. com/2006/05/16/Nvorld/africa/16diplo. html, accessed 17 
May 2006). Because of the asymmetry in terms of material power between Great 
Powers in the interstate society and outlaws, it is unlikely that outlaws will be in a 
position to coerce the interstate society to do their bidding or that the interstate society 
would come to believe that outlaws could be socialized into the interstate society 
without altering their behavior. Significantly, however, the acquisition of a substantial 
coercive instrument, such as WMD, by outlaws could affect the asymmetry of material 
power between Great Powers and outlaws to the extent that states redefine their belief in 
the scope and purpose of the interstate society. 
The behavior of outlaws in the interstate society creates tensions between the primary 
institutions of the interstate society. Piratical acts threaten the security of commerce and 
the market, but these acts can not be tackled without first resolving issues of sovereignty 
to enable hot-pursuit. Incursions by North Korean spy ships into Japanese waters 
compel Japanese maritime organizations to protect their territorial boundaries. In so 
doing, engagement of North Korea by the Japanese government that occurs under the 
rubric of Great Powcr management may be threatened and even international law 
challenged. Finally, the creation of international coalitions by the Great Powers to 
combat the proliferation of WMD may exist in tension with international law. 
Nonetheless, by responding to outlaws, Great Powers may resolve these tensions 
between the primary institutions enabling the interstate society to evolve. The following 
section of this conclusion %vill address how Japan's response to maritime violence in 
each of the three case studies corresponds with the primary institutions of the interstate 
society and Wcndt's conception of modc/dcpth socialization. 
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7.3. Japan's Response to North Korean Spy Ships 
The Changing Response Between 1999-2001 
A comparison between the March 1999 and December 2001 North Korean spy ship 
intrusions centres upon the disparate responses of the Japanese government and 
maritime authorities in the two cases. In the March 1999 spy ship case, the Japanese 
government was evidently reluctant to have the Maritime Self-Defence Forces target or 
attempt to board the North Korean ships. The Japanese government's vacillation over 
how to respond to the spy ship intrusion restricted the actions of the MSDF to the rigid 
bounds of domestic and international law. The response of the Japanese government in 
March 1999 was juxtaposed with the December 2001 spy ship case, in which the Japan 
Coast Guard chased the spy ship into China's EEZ and attempted to board the spy ship. 
The North Korean vessel resisted and the JCG retaliated causing the North Korean crew 
members to scuttle their ship. The action of firing upon the North Korean vessel in 
China's EEZ contravened international laws regarding safe passage tluough 
international waters and could not be justified by referring to Japanese national laws, 
which only lcgitimiscd JCG action up to the boundary line of Japan's EEZ. In this 
instance, a failure upon the part of the Japanese government to clearly assess the level of 
crisis, coupled with the freer rein given to the Japan Coast Guard to capture the suspect 
vessel led to the JCG firing on the spy ship within China's EEZ where the vessel sank. 
Yet, several factors influenced these two divergent responses to the spy ship intrusions 
343 in March 1999 and December 2001 . 
The failure of crisis management was evident in both spy ship cases. A lack of 
communication between the MSDF, which located the North Korean spy ships, and the 
XG, which had jurisdictional authority in both incidents, prevented a more satisfactory 
outcome for the Japanese government, navy and maritime authorities. In March 1999, 
MSDF vessels chased the North Korean spy ships, despite the fact that the MSDF 
343 North Korean spy ship intrusions prior to 1999 had not provoked the same robust response to which 
the Japanese govcmmcnt sought recourse in March 1999, particularly with the invoking of the maritime 
security action. or the Japan Coast Guard directly targeting the North Korean vessel in December 2001. 
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lacked the authority to apprehend the North Korean boats. Whilst the Japancsc 
government demonstrated its determination to stand up to infringements of Japancse 
territory, the Obuchi Cabinet, which was not united in its North Korea policy, hesitated 
to order the MSDF to take maritime security action that could have prevented the two 
spy ships escaping. Yet, the Japanese government was seen to have shown restraint in 
the 1999 case and subsequently received praise from neighbouring countries 
Despite this international praise, the views of Japanese citizens were hardening towards 
North Korea. Worsening relations with the North following the launch of the 
Taepodong missile on 31 August 1998 provided the pretext for Japan to flex its muscles. 
The determined action taken by the Japanese government to order the MSDF to pursue 
the North Korean spy ships in 1999 was primarily due a change in Japanese public 
opinion, as the surveys in Chapter 4 show. In the wake of the Taepodong missile crisis 
and the March 1999 spy ship incursion, the Japanese people had become increasingly 
hostile towards North Korea and more willing to see Japan take a firm stance in defence 
of its territory. Whilst the mood of the people took government policy makers 
somewhat by surprise, the JCG promptly commenced live-fire exercises in anticipation 
of further North Korean spy ship transgressions of Japanese waters (Yamada interview, 
10 November 2004). 
As a result of the March 1999 spy ship incursion, cooperation guidelines between the 
JCG and MSDF were drawn up making it clear that the MSDF'would have to infonn 
the JCG in a timely fashion of incursions into Japanese waters and that the JCG 'ývould 
take charge of any pursuit of North Korean spy ships. Faster patrol boats were ordered 
so that the JCG would be able to keep up with vessels that attempted to flee Japanese 
waters. Hence, the response to the December 2001 incident was bound to be more 
robust than that of the March 1999 spy ship incursion because of amendments to the 
role and equipment of the Japan Coast Guard in light of the earlier spy ship event. 
In December 2001, the MSDF's delays in informing the JCG of the existence of the spy 
ship stalled the JCG's pursuit of the North Korean vessel. Because of this delay, the 
JCG patrol ships were not able to attempt to board the North Korean spy ship until it 
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had entered China's EEZ. The exchange of fire which resulted from the JCG's attempt 
to board the North Korean vessel ended with the spy ship scuttling itself with the loss of 
all hands. Whilst members of the Koizumi Cabinet, most notably Prime Minister 
Koizumi himself and Abe Shinz6 (the LDP Secretary General), were pushing for a more 
robust response to the threat posed by North Korea and taking a stronger diplomatic line, 
one of the main reasons for the sinking of the North Korean spy ship in China's EEZ 
lies with the failure of the Japanese government to fully understand the crisis. Believing 
that the foreign vessel was manned by Chinese Triads, the Koizumi government left the 
response to the spy ship in the hands of the JCG, reconvening only after the spy ship 
had scuttled itself (Yomiuri Shimbun, 25 December 2001: 1; Yamada interview, 10 
November 2004). Both the South Korean and Chinese governments viewed the 
Japanese measures as excessive. The objections of both South Korea and China 
concerning Japan's actions in the December 2001 spy ship case meant that only by 
salvaging the wreck of the spy ship could Japan prove to the interstate society the ship's 
identity and demonstrate that the purpose of the spy ship had been illegal. 
A further reason that encouraged the Japanese government's tough stance in the 
December 2001 case was the significance of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the US 
mainland. In the post-9/11 'war on terrorism', membership of the interstate society has 
been influenced by whether a country was with or against the US. Those states that 
stood against the US, primarily North Korea, Iraq and Iran, were labelled 'rogue states, ' 
whose actions were equated with terrorism and were positioned outside or on the fringes 
of interstate society. In this environment, Japan was able to pass the Anti-Tefforism 
Special Measures Bill in record time, as well as to act more decisively against a North 
Korean spy ship which transgressed Japanese waters in December 2001. In the 
December 2001 case, the Japan Coast Guard felt able to fire directly at an unidentified 
vessel, that had resisted Japanese attempts to stop and inspect it, in China's EEZ. Had 
the unidentified vessel belonged to a state that was part of the international society, such 
as China or South Korea, the ramifications would have been quite different, as Valencia 
and Amae point out: 
If the vessel were suspected of being almost any other nationality other than North Korean, 
firing directly at a suspected illegal fishing vessel, endangering it and its crew, would most 
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likely be considered an overreaction and an excessive use of force by the international 
community (Valencia and Amae, 2003: 200). 
Despite the fact that the response of the JCG to the December 2001 spy ship incursion 
lay outside the bounds of international law and therefore interstate society, both Japan 
and North Korea returned quickly to the negotiating table after the incident, with Prime 
Minister Koizumi visiting North Korea in September 2002. At this meeting Kim Jong 11 
determined to cease spy ship operations against Japan, as well as to release abducted 
Japanese citizens from North Korea in return for increased aid from the Koizumi 
government (Uriu, 2003: 86-88). Hence, in terms of Wendt's concept of mode/depth 
socialization, Japan employed coercive measures to halt North Korean spy ship 
intrusions, before engaging in diplomatic means, calculation, to resolve tensions with 
North Korea. 344 
Japan's firm stance vis-A-vis vessels transgressing its sovereign territory was 
demonstrated again in November 2004, when a Chinese submarine crossed through 
Japan's EEZ. This incident also showcased the extent to which cooperation between the 
MSDF and JCG had improved since the March 1999 spy ship case (Yamada interview, 
10 November 2004; Japan Pines, II November 2004: 1; Asahi Shimbun, II November, 
2004: 1). This level of coordination between the MSDF and JCG is instructive for the 
navies and maritime authorities of Southeast Asian states in combating both piracy and 
terrorism. By specifying that Coast Guards protect national territory against illegal 
activities and naval forces guard a state against foreign invasions, so cooperation can be 
fostered amongst maritime authorities in the field of maritime violence and crime, even 
whilst Southeast Asian navies remain hostile to each other because of the territorial 
disputes in the region. Nonetheless, the significant difference between the incursion of 
the Chinese submarine and that of the North Korean spy ship in December 2001 is that 
the MSDF took no offensive action towards the submarine, whereas when confronting 
maritime barbarians, in the form of a North Korean spy ship, international law could be 
disregarded. 
"' in spite of the spy ship incident, it is be] ieved that North Korea continues to ship illicit drugs into 
Japan via the Russian maf ia (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). 
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7.4 Japan's Response to Piracy 
The Sip_niricance of the AlondraRaitibow- Launching Japan's Approach to Piracy 
In 1999, the case of the pirated Alondra Rainbow launched Japan's response to piracy. 
This is in spite of the fact that, the previous year, the crew of the pirated Tenyu was 
never found. Nonetheless, there are several reasons why the case of the Alondra 
Rainbow was more significant for Japan's response to piracy. First, whereas none of the 
Tenyu's crew was Japanese, two members of the Alondra Rainbow, the captain and 
chief engineer, were. This fact alone drew the media's attention which was sustained by 
the length of time the crew were missing at sea and speculation about their wellbeing. 
Second, because of the similarities between the Alondra Rainbow and the Tenyu, which 
both carried the same cargo of aluminium. ingots from the same Indonesian port, the 
Japanese shipping industry rccognised that piracy in Southeast Asia was a continuing 
threat to its industry rather than just an isolated incident. This encouraged the Japanese 
shipping industry to lobby the Japanese government (Takase and Tanaka, 
http: //www. okazaki-inst. jp/piracy200l/Pira2OOl. etakatanaka. html, accessed 28 
February 2006) as well as to take out insurance against piratical attacks. Third, 
indications that international criminal syndicates had been involved in both the Tetuu 
and the Alondra Rainbow cases raised the issue of responding to the problem of piracy 
on an international level and therefore required that the Japanese government take the 
initiative. 
It was the Alondra Rainbow incident that encouraged Prime Minister Obuchi to 
announce an international cooperation meeting to tackle the issue of piracy in Southeast 
Asia at the ASEAN+3 summit held in the Philippines in November 1999. The 'Regional 
Conference on Combating Piracy', which was held in Tokyo on the 27-28 April 2000, 
did not result in firm commitments by the 16 states attending to collectively eliminate 
the problem of piracy. However, the conference set in motion regional dialogue on the 
issue of piracy between maritime experts in and outside govenunents, which was built 
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upon in the subsequent 'Asia Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed 
Robbery', held on 4-5 October 2001 in Tokyo. 
It was from this second anti-piracy conference and the Maritime Policy Bureau's Expert 
Meetings to Tackle Piracy which followed, that the creation of an Information Sharing 
Centre on piracy and armed robbery against ships was put forward. The establishment 
of the Information Sharing Centre in Singapore in 2004 represented the first step in 
operationalising a region-wide response to the problem of piracy. Until this point, 
Japan's operational efforts to tackle piracy had largely depended upon bilateral 
exercises as well as financial and technical assistance. In terms of the interstate society, 
the institutionalization of the Information Sharing Centre is key, as it demonstrates 
Japan's ability as a Great Power to generate consensus amongst states in the Southeast 
Asian region through diplomacy to transform the anti-piracy approach of Southeast 
Asian states which had hitherto been hindered by sovereignty issues. 
The Ramifications of Japan's Response 
Bilateral exercises, technical and financial assistance have been extremely influential in 
pushing Japan's anti-piracy agenda forward. Japanese financial assistance has covered 
the international conferences, as well as the training of maritime officials and joint 
exercises. By footing the bill, Japan has been able to set the agenda in combating piracy 
in Southeast Asia (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). The fact that the number of 
piratical attacks against ships stabilized after a peak number of incidents in 2000 owes 
much to the efforts of countries like Malaysia and Singapore spurred on by Japanese 
technical and financial assistance. 345 Bilateral means have included receiving foreign 
students at the Japan Coast Guard University in Hiroshima, scholarships from the 
345 The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency commenced operations in November 2005 with 20 of 
the 72 vessels that will ultimately comprise the MMEA's fleet. The Malaysian government approved 
4,035 posts for the agency which would have nine bases spread through 17 regions 
(www. bemai, na. com/bemama/v3/Xrintable. plil2? id= 139208, accessed 13 June 2005, 
http: //www. nimea. p, ov. my/mmeaBI/paae. plii2? filename=oLitput. php&option=view&iiewsid=22, accessed 
10 August 2006). Singapore has evolved a navy comprised primarily of corvettes and patrol ships 
designed to combat piracy and terrorism in its waters (Kikuchi, 2005: 165). 
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Nippon Foundation to attend the World Maritime University in Sweden, as well as joint 
patrols and exercises. Such measures have helped demonstrate the Japanese interest in 
eradicating piracy in the Southeast Asian region, whilst improving relations between 
346 Japan and Southeast Asian states (Kaiun, 2005: 48). 
Interaction between maritime authorities in Southeast Asia and the Japan Coast Guard 
has encouraged the creation of Southeast Asian Coast Guards based on the Japanese 
model. As a result, Southeast Asian maritime authorities are coming to rely more 
heavily upon the Japan Coast Guard for advice. The Japan Coast Guard is the most 
advanced in the region and ideally suited to instruct other maritime authorities in 
Southeast Asia on how to improve their capabilities (Yamada interview, 10 November 
2004; Kaiun, 2005: 49; Kikuchi, 2005: 167-168). The Japanese government was able to 
develop an Asian regional network of maritime officials through its bilateral exercises, 
technical and financial assistance, and sponsorship of conferences. By focusing on 
cooperation between non-military maritime organizations in Southeast Asia, 
emphasising the role of international law and developing the capabilities, awareness and 
knowledge of maritime officials, the Japanese government plays a pivotal role in 
discussions on maritime security in the Southeast Asian region. 347 Hence, from a 
Wendtian perspective, Japan's efforts are based not only on calculation, in that it is in 
the interests of littoml states in Southeast Asia to combat piracy, but also on fostering 
the belief amongst non-military maritime organizations that enforcing international and 
domestic laws holds the key to tackling piracy. 
However, Japan has developed bilateral relations with India's navy and maritime 
authorities in order to tackle the problem of piracy in the Malacca Straits. As well as the 
role of the Indian navy in the capture of the pirated 41ondra Rainbow in 1999, India 
shares Japan's concerns about the safe passage of its trade through the Malacca Straits. 
That said, there is clearly a strategic element to the cooperation between Japan and India. 
... That said, many of the exercises undertaken with the JCG have been of the Alondra Rainbow ship- 
hijacking type, which may no longer be as appropriate considering the fall of such instances of piracy 
since 2000. 347 Japan's anti-piracy efforts have avoided dealing with some Southeast Asian navies, such as the 
Philippines and Indonesian navies, which are viewed as corrupt and would find cooperation with other 
Southeast Asian states difficult considering the territorial conflicts in the region. 
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On the one hand, India is interested in acquiring advanced weapon systems that are 
interoperable with Japanese ships. The acquisition of such technology would serve to 
greatly enhance the capabilities of the Indian navy. On the other hand, both Japan and 
India are concerned by the rise of China and the emergence of a Chinese blue water 
navy. This demonstrates that Japan's involvement in fighting piracy is also premised on 
balancing China, or, in English School terminology, the Wendtian notion of calculation. 
Chinese expenditure on military assets has increased from Y 121 billion in 2001 to 
Y220 billion in 2004 and is set to increase to Y247 billion in 2005, though Pentagon 
officials estimate the actual figures to be between twice and three times as high. China 
has made efforts to improve its C412 capabilities, 348 developed a professional military, 
acquired advanced military equipment and technology from Russia and studied US 
strategies during the conflicts of the 1990s and early twenty-first century. The Chinese 
navy in particular has been increasing its strength through the purchase of 23 new 
amphibious assault vehicles, as well as conventional, electric-diesel and nuclear 
submarines (Ilu, 2005: 23-27). Whilst the Chinese authorities have administered 
tougher punishments to pirates and thereby decreased instances of piracy in their waters, 
concerns have been raised that China will look to protect its maritime interests in 
Southeast Asia by deploying its naval forces. On 27 April 2005, China signed a 
memorandum of understanding with the Philippines to develop maritime cooperation 
(see Appendix VII). Through such agreements, China could undermine Japan's efforts 
to cooperate with Southeast Asian states in the field of maritime security and create 
tensions between the Great Powers of the region. 
Japan's anti-piracy cfforts have also had implications for the shipping industry. Because 
of the international attention being focussed on the problem of piracy due to a series of 
international conferences sponsored by the Japanese government and Japanese 
organizations, shipping companies adopted a number of technical means of protecting 
their ships, most notably the tracking device ShipLoc. The adoption of ShipLoc, which 
was employed successfully in the retrieval of the pirated ship the Selayang, was mostly 
3,11 C412 refers to the command, control, communication, computers, intelligence and information systems 
of the military. 
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responsible for the decline in ship hijackings similar to that of the Alondra Rainbolv- 
Nevertheless, such measures have encouraged alternative forms of piracy, such as 
hostage taking and the targeting of tugs and barges, which increased after 2000, rather 
than the hijacking of merchant container or cargo vessels (Yamada, 2005: 46). The 
Japanese shipping industry has been training its crews to better protect their vessels 
from pirates. Security training for crews has been given added impetus with the 
implementation of the ISPS Code which necessitates that one crew member is 
responsible for security on board the ship and that detailed security plans are drawn up. 
Whilst such training and plans are beneficial, they do little to protect ships from armed 
pirates intent on kidnapping crews for ransom, as the case of the pirated Idaten revealed. 
Instead, coordinated patrols by the maritime authorities of littoral states hold the key to 
suppressing cases of kidnapping and ransom. 349 
The establishment of regular patrols since 2004 between Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Singapore has raised hopes amongst the shipping community that piracy will once again 
be contained, especially as the patrols are more expansive than earlier effortS. 350 
However, a lack of resources may limit the effectiveness of these patrols (Percival, 
2005: 28-30,35). Furthermore, it remains unclear as to whether or not the Information 
Sharing Centre established in Singapore will be a success or if the centre will be able to 
effectively complement the work of the IMB's Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala 
Lumpur. Considering existing animosities between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia, 
as well as the international nature of global shipping, the shipping community will 
probably continue to rely on the independently financed IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, 
rather than the government funded Information Sharing Centre (Yamada interview, 10 
Novcmbcr 2004; Kalun, 2005: 47). 
349 Yamada Yoshihiko has argued that Japanese ships should fly a Japanese flag or be able to fly a second 
flag that would enable the ship to receive the protection of that second state in the event of a piratical 
incident (Yamada, 2005: 48). Whilst this would allow the Japan Coast Guard to participate more actively 
in searching for crews and vessels that go missing, it remains to be seen whether the Japanese Shipping 
Association would be willing to pay higher fees for a Japanese flag, especially as once a vessel has been 
attacked or a crew kidnapped, search and rescue operations are difficult to mount. 350 During the early 1990s coordinated patrols between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were effective 
in suppressing piracy. 
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Whilst states have been content to receive financial and technical aid to help fight piracy, 
there has been little progress made in the area of hot pursuit. Furthermore, Noel Chong 
of the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala Lumpur has noted the absence of piracy 
arrests for years in the northern Malacca Straits where the Idaten was pirated, and a 
fon-ner maritime official in Southeast Asia has stated that littoral states merely pretend 
to police their waters, as they are fearful that the pirates are more heavily armed than 
they are. The maritime authorities of Southeast Asian states believe that even if crews 
are kidnapped, shipping companies can secure their release, especially if their insurance 
policy covers piracy (Yomiuri Shimbun, 23 March 2005: 17). In particular, the lack of 
improvement vis-A-vis eradicating piracy in Indonesian waters, where the majority of, 
as well as the most violent, piracy attacks occur in Southeast Asia, is notable. 
Indonesia's failure to impose tougher sentences upon pirates coupled with an absence of 
investigating pirates on land clearly undermines the international efforts designed to 
eradicate piracy in Southeast Asia. 
Since Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono became Indonesia's President in 2004, hopes have 
been raised that the piracy problem will be addressed, as he has stated that this is one of 
the aims of his presidency. However, secessionist conflict in Aceh, the devastation of 
the December 2004 tsunami and the power of the TNI all serve to undermine 
Yudhoyono's efforts. 351 Yudhoyono's intention to create an Indonesian Coast Guard 
that would take the best officers and equipment from the TNI and attract the brightest 
recruits, could substantially weaken the TNI (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). 
An Indonesian Coast Guard, with an ethos that centres upon international law, would 
also be able to patrol for TNI vessels perpetrating piracy. 352 By promoting Yudhoyono's 
efforts, supporting the reconstruction efforts in Northern Sumatra in the aftermath of the 
tsunami and encouraging peace talks in Finland between the Aceh Separatists and 
351 Piracy figures declined in the aftermath of the tsunami. This was mainly due to the presence of 
international navies which were supporting the relief effort, coupled with the devastation the tsunami 
caused to pirates and their vessels (Yamada, 2005: 46). 352 The incident involving the pirating of the Yayasan Tujuh by the Indonesian naval patrol boat, the KAL 
YOUTEFA, was presented in Chapter 3 (ICC-IMB Piracy Report third quarter 2004: 29). 
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Jakarta, the Japanese government has played a significant role. 353 As Chapter 3 noted, 
the conflict in Aceh has been resolved as a result of these peace talks. 
Overall, diplomatic moves and conferences initiated by Japan coupled with financial 
and technical assistance to Southeast Asian states have enhanced both the perception of 
the threat posed by piracy and the response of littoral states to that threat. Nonetheless, 
questions of sovereignty remain embedded in the Southeast Asian interstate society 
(Stubbs in Beeson, 2005: 223) preventing the Great Powers from playing a more robust 
role in defending the Malacca Straits. Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular, have 
remonstrated against external interference in their internal affairs since their 
independence (Sukma in Tan and Acharya (eds. ), 2004: 71-87; Mak in Tan and Acharya 
(eds. ), 2004: 127-137). The Indonesian and Malaysian prompt rejection of US offers to 
help patrol the Malacca Straits in 2004, as well as the failure to allow hot pursuit of 
maritime criminals and terrorists across maritime boundaries is indicative of how 
sovereignty issues affect maritime security in Southeast Asia (Valencia, 2005: 12- 
14). 354 As hypothesized in the introduction, Japan has had to conduct its response to 
maritime crime and terror according to the dictates of the interstate societies in which it 
operates, as determined by English School theory. In Southeast Asia, the interstate 
institution of sovereignty remains paramount. 
353 Japan's sponsorship of "The Preparatory Conference on Peace and Reconstruction in Aceh" held in 
Tokyo on 3 December 2002 was central in Japan's diplomatic efforts to resolve the separatist conflict in 
Northern Sumatra. For more, see http: www. mofa. go. jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/aceh/pre02l2-3. litml, 
and http: www. mofa. go. jp/region/asia-paci/indonesia/aceh/prc02l24. html, both accessed on 27 February 
2006. 
354 Both Malaysia and Indonesia claimed the Malacca Straits as their own sovereign territory in 197 1. 
However, major maritime powers, led by both the US and the former Soviet Union, ensured that all states 
had transit passage through the Malacca Straits, so that neither their commercial nor their military 
maritime interests would be impeded. The alternative was to define navigation rights through the Straits 
in terms of innocent passage. This would have delineated the Malacca Straits to be Indonesian and 
Malaysian sovereign territory over which they would have had complete authority (Valencia, 2005: 12- 
13). 
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7.5 JaDan's ResDonse to Maritime Terrorism 
Maritime terrorism can be separated into two groups: International Islamist Terrorist 
organizations and Ethrionationalist Terrorist movements. The principal aims of 
International Islamist Terrorist organizations, primarily led by Al Qaeda, which has 
strong connections with Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Southeast 
Asian region, is to mount a global struggle against the leaders of Middle Eastern states 
and their Western allies headed by the US. The International Islamic Terrorist 
organizations hope their jihad will result in the liberation of the Middle East from 
foreign influence so that an Islamic caliphate based on strict interpretations of the Koran 
may be established. In terms of maritime security, International Islamic Terror 
organizations focus on symbolic targets and intend to inflict the maximum number of 
casualties possible both to affect political change amongst foreign powers and to 
weaken the capacity and will of their enemies to fight back. Examples of International 
Islamic maritime terrorism include the attacks on the USS Cole, the Limburg and the 
Basra Oil Terminal. These instances point to the strong links between different 
International Islamic Terrorist groups. The implications for Southeast Asian maritime 
security are that International Islamic Terrorist organizations continue to benefit from 
conducting illegal trade through existing networks between terrorist movements. 
Furthermore, economic hardship, political repression and the rise of strict Islamic 
schools, madrasah, have served to bolster membership in such International Islamic 
Terrorist movements. JI plots uncovered in Singapore coupled with the Delvi Afadrim 
incident, in which a gas tanker was captured by an unknown group and sailed down the 
Malacca Straits, as well as the belief that a major maritime terrorist incident could be 
undertaken relatively easily, has convinced some analysts that a maritime terrorist attack 
is due (Richardson, 2004: 32-33). It is because of the revolutionary motivations of 
International Islamic Terrorist movements in challenging the status quo in the interstate 
society that such groups are termed infidels in the interstate society. 
Ethnonationalist Terrorist Movements, such as GAM in Indonesia and MILF in the 
Philippines, aim to wrest a distinct territory from the authority of a central government 
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in order to establish an independent state. The intention to build a state coupled with tile 
capacity for states to negotiate with Ethnonationalist Terrorist Movements makes the 
term barbarian an appropriate designation for these groups in the interstate society. Acts 
of maritime terrorism are undertaken by GAM and MILF to either finance their cause, 
through the kidnapping and ransom of merchant seafarers, or through attacking targets 
associated with the government, such as GAM attacks on an oil facility in Lhokseumave 
which was leased to ExxonMobil by the Jakarta government (Huxley, 2002: 81-82; 
Kaiun, 2005: 46). By distinguishing between these two different kinds of terrorism, 
governments can develop appropriate responses to each kind of terrorism. Hence, 
negotiating with Ethnonationalist Terrorist groups whilst increasing police patrols in 
piracy or maritime terror-prone areas can effectively curb Ethnonationalist maritime 
violence. Increasing multilateral cooperation between police and maritime authorities, 
greater attention to ship and port security and monitoring of vessels suspected of 
transporting WMD can diminish the threat posed by International Islamist Terror 
organizations. 
Yet, while it is important to separate these two types of terrorism, there has been a 
tendency amongst governments and analysts alike when discussing the 'war on terror' 
to conflate the two terror-types with a whole myriad of piratical attacks. By doing so, 
states fail to perceive what the real threats to maritime traffic are. Not only does such an 
approach lead to stringent measures that curtail the rights of citizens both on land and 
sea (for example, cases whereby mariners of certain nationalities are singled out as 
potential terror threats), they can also affect the free passage of trade (for example, 
increasing checks on cargoes delays shipments). Furthermore, opportunities to isolate 
pirate gangs and terror groups are missed by conflating piracy and terrorism. In other 
words, Ethnonationalist groups in Southeast Asia, like GAM, are less likely to associate 
with, rely on and aid other terror organizations if they are encouraged to make and abide 
by a political settlement. 
Whilst a maritime terrorist attack by an International Islamic Terror organization might 
be more destructive, acts of Ethnonationalist maritime terrorist violence are far more 
frequent. In particular, the targeting of tugs and barges in the Malacca Straits inhibits 
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trade and leaves shipping firms with little choice but to pay extortionate ransoms or 
condemn their crew members to be killed. Following the devastation caused by the 
December 2004 tsunami in Indonesia's Aceh region, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the 
Indonesian President, inaugurated peace talks with GAM that have led to the 
withdrawal of the TNI from Aceh and an end to the conflict there. The success of 
similar peace talks held between the Filipino government and the MILF are also likely 
to reduce the threat of Ethnonationalist maritime terrorist violence, as Chapter 3 detailed. 
The Impact of 9/11 upon Japan's Maritime Securitv 
Realist analyses of the US-led response to the 9/11 attacks on New York and 
Washington have centred on the actions of US-led military coalitions in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. Nevertheless, in terms of improving maritime transport systems globally, the 
US has initiated a great deal of change to international laws and within international 
frameworks. These changes have included the implementation of the ISPS Code, and 
revisions to the SUA Treaty. The US has also advanced measures supported by 
"coalitions of the willing', such as PSI, CSI and C-TPAT (Beckman, 2005: 215) that arc 
designed to provide enhanced protection against maritime security threats. Hence, the 
US has worked both wholly within the framework of international law, fostering belief 
in international law from a Wendtian perspective, as well as through the primary 
institution of Great Power management, adopting calculation and even coercive means 
to achieve its objectives. 
Japan's Evolving Response - Pushing the Boundaries of the Constitution 
Japan has been heavily involved in the 'war against terrorism. The swift passage of the 
Anti-Tefforism Special Measures Bill through the Japanese Diet, combined with the 
dispatch of the MSDF to support coalition forces fighting in Afghanistan and the GSDF 
to aid in the reconstruction of Iraq. In terms of maritime security, the Japanese 
government and the Japanese business community have played an active role by 
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participating in the PSI, CSI and C-TPAT, as well as the Japanese government's, 
adoption of the ISPS Code and the revisions to the SUA Treaty. 
The combination of the revised SUA Treaty and the PSI agreement has enabled Japan to 
play an integral role in the interdiction of WMD. By signing up to the CSI and C-TPAT, 
the Japanese government and Japanese businesses are protecting international shipments 
from being used as a means to transport or deliver terrorist weapons and equipment. 
Finally, in agreeing to the conditions set out in the ISPS Code, Japanese ports and 
shipping have enhanced their security measures against a possible terrorist attack. 
Nevertheless, the extent to which such measures will resolve the problem of maritime 
terrorism is debatable. The ISPS Code alone cannot prevent attacks such as those 
perpetrated against the USS Cole and the Limburg. Instead it remains vital to improve 
the capabilities of states throughout the world so that they can deal with the threat of 
maritime terrorism by themselves (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). 'I'lie PSI, 
meanwhile, requires that ships violate international law before they can be boarded, is 
not institutionalized, lacks the support of China and is focussed on shipments from 
North Korea and Iran. Furthermore, because of the secrecy surrounding PSI 
interdictions, the capture of legally traded dual use materials and the double standards in 
defining PSI target states, there is concern that the PSI will undermine UNCLOS if the 
initiative is not reformed (Valencia, 2005: 39-44,73-74). Because of this there is 
friction between US efforts to strengthen international law through the establishment of 
the ISPS Code on the one hand and unilateral measures, such as the PSI, which undercut 
international law on the other. Resolving this friction entails determining whether the 
international society is united in its response to maritime outlaws through instituting 
stringent international laws and norms, or whether it will fall wholly to Great Power 
coalitions to resolve the maritime outlaw threat. 
Japan's response to maritime terrorism perpetrated by infidels and barbarians in the 
interstate society has primarily followed the US lead. The Japanese government has 
supported US efforts to revise international law, as well as to work within Great Power 
led coalitions to prevent acts of catastrophic terrorism. However, whilst such measures 
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tackle the symptoms of maritime terrorism, they fail to treat the causes of terrorism in 
the interhuman and transnational societies. 
7.6 Towards a Human Securitv Framework for Treatinu 
Maritime Security Issues 
Going beyond the Confines of the International Society - Human Securitv and the 
International Community 
The limits of Japan's response to piracy and maritime terrorism are apparent in the 
difficulty of Southeast Asian states to adopt mechanisms enabling the hot pursuit of 
criminals and terrorists across maritime boundaries. The inviolability of sovereign 
territory in Southeast Asia, rooted in the decolonization and state-building process in 
this region over the course of the Cold War, gives both pirates and terrorists 
opportunities to attack ships and transport illicit goods. There is therefore a need for 
transnational responses to deal with maritime security issues in Southeast Asia (Hughes, 
2001: 420). Japan's efforts to evolve human networks of maritime officials across the 
Southeast Asian region have resulted in the development of a transnational response to 
maritime security. Whilst patrols of the Malacca Straits by Singapore, Indonesia and 
Malaysia are encouraging, littoral states require more equipment and expertise to 
combat terrorists and pirates at sea. The JCG could fill this operational gap were it not 
for Japan's inability to transgress the limits of sovereignty in the International Society. 
This indicates that a reliance upon intergovernmental approaches to maritime security 
issues in Southeast Asia alone will not solve the problem. 
If Japan is to develop a more potent response to maritime violence and crime in 
Southeast Asia, then it must not only address the symptoms but also deal directly with 
the causes. In order to do so, Japan has to go beyond treating Southeast Asian states as 
the key security referent and address the security needs of human beings in the coastal 
regions of Southeast Asia. Such an approach would adopt the concept of human security 
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resulting in policies that target development issues in Southeast Asia, ranging from 
economic deprivation in littoral areas to pollution at sea, land-based crime, rising 
immigration from hinterlands, education and health deficiencies. Doing so may 
necessitate that the Japanese government do more to work with NGOs which are able to 
operate more effectively than governments at the grassroots level (Gilson and Purvis, 
2003: 203-205; Kuroda, 2003: 237-240). Understanding where these development 
issues coincide with maritime security problems can start with a more detailed analysis 
of the IMB's piracy data. 
7.7 Policy Implications 
Developing a ResPonse to Piracy Based on Available Statistical Data 
One way of evolving Japan's response to piracy would be to sort the available IMB 
statistics on piracy according to the type of piracy perpetrated. In Chapter 3, maritime 
violence was divided into five different categories. These were Robin Hood Style Piracy, 
Transnational. Criminal Organizations, Piracy Perpetrated by State Authorities, 
Separatist Groups and Global Terrorist Groups. As has been noted, each of these types 
of outlaws exhibit different levels of violence in an attack depending upon the group's 
aims. Hence, Robin Hood Style Pirates perpetrate low-level acts of theft, usually 
eschewing violence and in which little of value is stolen. Transnational Criminal 
Organizations, State Authorities and Separatist Groups, while having various aims, tend 
to display more violence and steal more of value. Because of their different aims these 
three groups should not be clumped together, however, existing data are not sufficient to 
distinguish accurately between these three groups. Therefore, Chalk's division of piracy 
into low-level armed robbery, medium-level armed assault and robbery and major 
criminal hijack has been employed. Acts of Robin Hood Piracy as well as Kidnap and 
Ransom cases have been added to Chalk's definitions to give a clearer account of 
contemporary maritime violence in Southeast Asia. Global Terrorist Groups, whilst 
engaging in acts of piracy for economic gain, are connected with major acts of maritime 
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violence designed to harm the economic interests and military capabilities of states they 
have defined as their enemies, as well as to have a major political impact. 
The existing data can therefore be grouped into categories and mapped (see Appendix 
VIII) according to the criteria as follows: 
Robin Hood Piracy (RHP) - an attack involving little or no violence, in which 
under US$5,000 in cash and valuables is stolen. 
Low-level Armed Robbery (LLAR) - an attack by an armed piratical gang, 
which is prepared to employ moderate to high levels of violence and remove 
between US$5,000 and US$15,000 from the victims. 
* Medium-level Armed Assault and Robbery (MLAAR) - an attack by a well 
organized and equipped piratical group willing to injure and kill. The amount of 
goods and valuables stolen by such pirates would tend to exceed US$15,000 in a 
single raid. 
* Major Criminal Hijack (MCH) - an attack aimed at capturing a vessel in order 
to use it for illicit purposes. Such an attack is most often perpetrated by 
Transnational Criminal Organizations and often involves high levels of violence. 
e Kidnap and Ransom (K&R) - an attack in which crew members are targeted 
with the purpose of holding them for ransom. The execution of the crew usually 
follows an unpaid ransom. 
9 Global Terrorist Act (GTA) - an act of major maritime violence designed to 
damage the economic or military assets of an enemy state and have a significant 
political impact. High casualties are often desired in order to have the greatest 
political impact. 
The piracy map for the first quarter of 2006 (Appendix VIII) reveals a number of 
important points. First, acts of Robin Hood Piracy and Low-level Armed Robbery are 
concentrated around major Indonesian ports, such as Tanjong Priok (Jakarta), 
Balikpapan and Samarinda. These piratical acts occur when a vessel is anchored in port, 
suggesting that enhanced port security could deter these acts. Second, acts categorized 
as Medium-level Armed Robbery or Major Criminal Hijack are much rarer and 
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therefore harder to defend against. Nonetheless, a series of piracy maps detailing the 
different types of piratical attack over a number of years may reveal trends or piracy hot 
spots. This data can be used to warn merchant vessels of specific threats. A similar 
approach could be adopted towards protecting seafarers from acts of Kidnap and 
Ransom, though the piracy map shows that no Kidnap and Ransom case occurred in the 
first three months of 2006. Finally, the piracy map indicates that few acts of piracy 
occurred in the Malacca Straits during the first quarter of 2006. This confirms that 
trilateral, coordinated piracy patrols undertaken by Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia 
in the Malacca Straits appear to be having an impact upon piracy. 355 
The ramifications of developing anti-piracy policies based on detailed piracy maps 
would be as follows. 356 First, if coordinated through the Information Sharing Centre in 
Singapore, regional maritime authorities would be better informed of the state of piracy 
in their waters. Second, examining the available statistics in this way indicates the scale 
of each particular piracy problem in any part of Southeast Asia. Third, patterns in the 
existing data could be identified and maritime authorities throughout Southeast Asia 
could employ the maps generated from this study in order to design their patrols. Fourth, 
a closer analysis of the piracy data might point to certain types of piracy being 
perpetrated in particular regions and inhabited coastal cities and towns. By comparing 
the data concerning where different piratical acts occur, prediction becomes more 
possible and causes may be identified. Thus, strengthening port security in areas which 
experience a high level of Robin Hood Style Piracy would plausibly lead to a reduction 
in that type of piratical incident, as the review of the piracy map for the first quarter of 
2006 suggests. Furthermore, since Robin Hood Style Piracy is associated with 
economically deprived zones, targeting the area with ODA and granting loans to build 
the infrastructure of that location might be one way that Japan could develop its 
response to piracy. 
355 Nonetheless, piracy figures for the second quarter of 2006, combined with attacks ftom June to August 
2006, indicate that piracy in the Malacca Straits has only slightly declined from the previous year 
(http: //www. icc-ccs. oremain/news. plil2? newsid=69, accessed 18 August 2006). More time will be needed 
to assess the extent to which trilateral piracy patrols in the Malacca Straits are working. 
356 Piracy maps provided by the IMB only present the number of piracy attacks in each Southeast Asian 
country, though the IMB does release more detailed maps of piracy prone areas, such as the Malacca 
Straits (see bt! p: //www. icc-ccs. orgZprc/piracy maps 2006. php, accessed 18 August 2006). 
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7.8 Avenues for Future Research 
This thesis has examined Japan's response to maritime security threats poscd by 
barbarians, infidels and pirates in the Northeast and Southeast Asian interstate societies. 
By grouping outlaws that remain on the boundaries of the interstate society, but affect 
the ftinctioning of the interstate society, the interactions between the interstate society 
and the interhuman and transnational societies in English School theory can be 
comprehensively understood. Nonetheless, there arc four broad areas for future study 
that will enable the concepts of barbarians, infidels and pirates to be refined. 
First, the response of other Great Powers to threats posed by barbarians, infidels and 
pirates in other regions could be examined. The rise of piracy off the coast of Somalia, 
for example, provides a significant case study, not least because the distinction between 
pirates and barbarians can be explored in the context of Somalia, a failed state. Such a 
case study raises important questions concerning membership of the interstate society. 
At what point does a state disintegrate to the degree that it becomes no more than 
competing groups of criminal fiefdoms, where only pirates, not barbarians, thrive? How 
do Wendt's conceptions of coercion, calculation and belief serve to motivate warlords 
to reestablish a state entity? Furthermore, intervention by the guided missile destroyer, 
the USS Winston S. Churchill, on 21 January 2006, denotes Great Power interest in 
safeguarding international waters, as well as showing the potential of sophisticated 
naval forces in deterring pirates http: //www. icc-ccs. org/main/news. plip? newsid=62, 
accessed 7 February 2006). A study of piracy in Somalia could be contrasted with Iraq, 
which since the end of the US led invasion, has emerged as a piracy hotspot 
(httr): //NvN"v. icc-ccs. org/main/news. plip? newsid=63, accessed 7 February 2006). 
Second, the concept of barbarians, infidels and pirates could also be employed to 
discuss primarily land-based actors in the interstate society, though the term pirate 
would be substituted with criminal. Again, interesting definitional issues would arise, 
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such as whether to designate the Palestinian group Hamas as infidels, desiring the 
destruction of Israel, a member of the interstate society, or barbarians that have 
legitimately risen to political power in a national election despite their involvement in 
acts of political violence. What dilemmas will Hamas face should it choose to transform 
itself into a political party that eschews violence and accepts the existence of Israel? Or, 
as a special report in The Economist inquired, how would doctrinal issues such as 
control of Jerusalem be resolved and how would Sharia, or Islamic, law be incorporated 
into a democracy (The Economist, 4 February 2006: 22-24,40)? Such a study might 
suggest comparisons with terrorist organizations, like the Irish Republican Army, that 
have accepted a political process and publicly renounced violence. Would such a 
comparative study reveal that groups of former terrorists, or barbarians, who forswear 
violence for a political cause, keep their guns and engage in criminal enterprises, as 
elements of the IRA have done (The Economist, 4 February 2006: 51-52)? 
A study that mirrors the work of this thesis by examining the causes of, rather than the 
responses to, maritime violence and crime in the interstate society could also be 
undertaken. This would allow for the interaction between the interstate, interhuman and 
transnational societies to be understood from the 'bottom up'. From a theoretical 
perspective, such a study could help develop the links between Human Security and the 
English School, particularly by examining environmental issues, separatist conflicts and 
human rights violations through primary institutions of the interstate society, such as 
environmental stewardship, nationalism and the equality of people (Buzan, 2004a: 187). 
These research areas could collectively enable more sophisticated policy approaches to 
be adopted by Great Powers in their relations in the interstate, interhuman and 
transnational societies. 
Additional research can be conducted to examine the roles of the JCG and MSDF in 
combating maritime barbarians, infidels and pirates. As this thesis has shown, there 
have been tensions between the JCG and MSDF in combating North Korean spy ships. 
How will such tensions play out as the PSI, in which both the JCG and MSDF are 
involved, develops? Will Japan's maritime policy come to rely increasingly on the JCG, 
which can be dispatched around the globe as a maritime policing organization without 
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raising constitutional issues related to Article 9 unlike the MSDF? Since the end of the 
Cold War, as international relations have shifted from a bipolar to a multipolar world 
dominated by the US, a Superpower, the JCG has expanded its role, equipment and 
training. To what extent has this expansion come at the expense of the MSDF? Finally, 
this thesis has raised questions concerning the Japanese government's ability to respond 
to crises, thereby providing the basis for a more thorough assessment of the Japanese 
government's crisis management. 
7.9 The Future of Japan's Response to Maritime Security 
I 
Japan's approach to each of the maritime security issues examined in this dissertation 
demonstrates a tendency amongst Japanese policy makers to seize opportunities to 
reform the duties of Japanese maritime authorities based upon dramatic events. The 
response of the Japanese government to the incursions of North Korean spy ships, at a 
time when tensions between Japan and North Korea were high following the launch of 
the Tacpodong missile over the Japanese mainland, led to expansive new rules of 
engagement and improved weaponry for the Japan Coast Guard, as well as better 
coordination between the Japan Coast Guard and the Self-Defence Forces. The 
hijacking of the Alondra Rainbow in 1999 persuaded, the Japanese government to 
initiate a series of region-wide forums to develop a response to piracy. Following the 
ransom case of three crew members of the Idaten in March 2005, Japan's commitment 
to evolving this response to piracy throughout the Southeast Asian region has 
strengthened. Finally, the 9/11 attacks prompted a re-evaluation of the maritime security 
practices of the International Society. These maritime security practices have been 
transformed by a number of international agreements, all of which Japan has signed, 
designed to strengthen ships, ports and maritime trade from terrorist attacks. 
Furthermore, the Koizumi government has seized the chance to reform the conditions 
under which the Self-Defence Forces are deployed, enabling them to play a rear-support 
role to US and coalition forces in the 'war against terrorism'. 
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The Japanese response to maritime security threats, with the exception of Japan's 
response to North Korean spy ships, has been conditioned by Japanese policy-makers' 
understanding of the interstate society and what is possible within it. That is to say, laws 
governing international conduct between states have been strictly adhered to, diplomatic 
channels and international forum have provided the focus for the evolution of the 
Japanese response, and exercises undertaken abroad have been approved bilaterally or 
multilaterally. Only in the case of the North Korean spy ships could Japan's actions be 
described as abrogating international norms. Still, by limiting itself to an approach set 
within the confines of the interstate society, Japan's approach to maritime security 
issues deals only with the symptoms and not the causes of the security issues 
themselves. 
In order to tackle the underlying causes of piracy and maritime terrorism, a human 
security approach needs to be developed in tandem with the current response designed 
along the lines established by the International Society. To do so, the Information 
Sharing Centre established in Singapore could be'used to produce more thorough 
analyses of piratical and maritime terrorist incidents based upon the data provided by 
the IMB. Such analyses should first focus upon the level of the piracy or terrorist attack 
as specified by Chalk and Yamada, so that the different types of piratical attack can be 
separated from each other. Then, the areas where different levels of piratical attack 
occur can be determined. By doing so, the areas which are most prone to piratical attack 
can be ascertained and more heavily policed. Finally, the infort-nation on piratical 
attacks can be compared with economic, environmental, social and criminal data from 
littoral states to try and establish connections between the piratical incidents and the 
situations or conditions in Southeast Asian states that lead certain individuals to 
perpetrate acts of piracy or maritime terrorism. In so doing, international ODA donors 
and NGOs can look for opportunities to improve the conditions within the coastal 
regions that produce pirates. 
There are three reasons to believe that this is in fact occurring. First, the motivation for 
Japan's involvement in combating piracy was based not only on the opportunity to 
develop the duties and reach of the Japan Coast Guard, but also with the aim of 
314 
protecting Japanese lives at sea and to secure Japanese trade, which entails protecting 
both the economy and the standard of living of the Japanese people. Hence, human 
security concerns existed from the start of Japan's response to piracy following the 
attack on the 41ondra Rainbow. Second, the establishment of Coast Guards throughout 
the Asian region based upon the Japanese model as well as the continuing dialogues, 
initiated by Japan, between maritime authorities from across the region have created a 
human network of non-military personnel. It is of some significance that Coast Guards, 
whose primary duty is the protection of human life and the marine environment, are 
replacing navies and being put in charge of tackling maritime violence and crime. Third, 
increases in ODA directed at improving regional coast guard capabilities following the 
hijacking of three members of the Idaten crew, two of whom were Japanese, indicates 
that the Japanese government is willing to adapt its aid policies to confront maritime 
piracy and terror. 
The tasks of the Japan Coast Guard are more numerous and increasingly vital to Japan's 
safety. Though the equipment and personnel of the JCG are gradually increasing, they 
are still insufficient to tackle the myriad of duties the JCG must fulfill (Miyahira 
interview, 24 February 2004). The March 1999 and December 2001 incursions by North 
Korean spy ships, the transgression of Japan's EEZ by a Chinese submarine on 10 
November 2004, the global 'war on terror' and the dispatch of the SDF to Afghanistan 
and Iraq, as well as the case of the pirated Idaten in March 2005 have helped raise 
awareness amongst Japanese citizens and policy makers alike of the maritime security 
issues that Japan faces. 357 Such incidents have encouraged the Japanese government to 
finance improvements in the capabilities of the JCG, such as the development of 2,000- 
ton ships able to travel at 40 knots and armed with 40mrn cannons that can target 
vessels from Skin away. In addition, the Nippon Foundation has established ulninlori, a 
citizens' group designed to raise awareness about maritime affairs and take action to 
protect Japanese waters (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). The creation of such a 
citizens' organization coupled with the capabilities, knowledge and experience of the 
JCG provides a powerful combination to ensure the safety of Japan's seas. Japan has 
357 1,620,000 people came to see the North Korean spy ship which had been salvaged and was exhibited 
in Tokyo and Osaka (Yamada interview, 10 November 2004). 
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been promoting the replication of these institutions in Southeast Asian states which, 
because of the importance of the Malacca Straits as a shipping lane and the significant 
international ports of the Asian region, have become central in the fight against 
terrorism and maritime crime. Japan's success in forming regional networks of maritime 
officials is only the first step in this process. 
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